The Communist Party of the Russian Federation declared Khrushchev’s report on the cult of personality around Stalin to be erroneous. The BRICS resolution defended Russia and Iran, and condemned Ukraine, the USA, and Israel.

News Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is July 7th. It is now 07:41 in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

BRICS Summit Link to heading

Today is the final, concluding day of the BRICS summit. Well, the final declaration of the summit was actually published yesterday on the website of Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document is quite remarkable. It contains 126 points, most of which are criticisms of the West. Among other things, it proposes reforms to the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. Now, two points are of particular interest to us. First and foremost, two of them are dedicated to the war in Ukraine. Here we have point 22, which is rather generic. It mentions peacekeeping, support for the African peace initiative, and so on. What’s notable here? It’s notable that the BRICS member countries voted differently on the resolutions concerning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Russia, naturally, voted against these resolutions. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa abstained. Meanwhile, countries like Indonesia, which is now also part of BRICS, and several others queued to join, supported the resolution. So, there’s quite a bit of divergence. BRICS is not actually a political bloc, yet it’s an important conglomerate of countries. Just to clarify why I’m giving this organization so much attention: BRICS currently includes 10 countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China—these were the original core members. Then in 2010, South Africa joined. Last year, BRICS expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. Then came Indonesia. As of today, BRICS represents about half of the world’s population. The total economic output of BRICS accounts for approximately 40% of the global economy. So it’s not something to be brushed aside. Although it’s not a bloc, nor an economic union, much less a military alliance, it is a platform for forming a unified stance. And what is that unified stance? The most striking is paragraph 35 of the final document. It’s quite astounding, because it states that BRICS countries strongly condemn attacks on bridges and railway infrastructure that were allegedly deliberately aimed at civilians in the Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh regions. As a result, according to the resolution’s authors, civilians including children were harmed. What’s most important here is that not a word in this resolution—this declaration—mentions the daily attacks by Russia on residential buildings, civilian infrastructure, and the rising number of civilian casualties, including children. People die every day, dozens are wounded every day. Not a single word about this in the resolution. Here, the hand of Lavrov is clearly visible. The key point is that the remaining nine countries, as I listed, agreed to this. This is the kind of organization we’re dealing with—an organization that, in this sense, is being dictated to. Russia, while not the leading BRICS member, clearly exerts influence in political matters. Additionally, another point condemns attacks on Iran’s civilian infrastructure and peaceful nuclear facilities, which, as it turns out, were operating under full IAEA guarantees. The main thing is to keep the IAEA from finding out about this—an agency that has repeatedly stated that Iran has long since moved out from under any kind of oversight. In fact, Iran has already declared it will no longer allow IAEA inspectors. Here, the influence of Iran’s representative is quite obvious. So what can be said about all this? I want to emphasize that BRICS is a serious structure, despite its amorphous nature and the fact that it’s not a bloc or economic union. Nonetheless, it’s clearly a structure that supports Russia and Iran. Another important point is that BRICS is expanding rapidly. In fact, about 30 countries are now in line to join. If the BRICS organizers decide to open the gates, the organization could soon include nearly all of Africa, a significant portion of Southeast Asia, and parts of Latin America. Essentially, if BRICS chooses to expand, it could encompass nearly the entire globe—practically the whole Global South and Global East. So for now, this is a platform that opposes the European world, the Western world, the United States of America, and so on. That’s what happened in Rio de Janeiro.

CPRF Congress Link to heading

Now let’s move to the north of Eurasia. One of the noteworthy events there was the Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), which took place on July 5, this Saturday, in the Moscow region. I believe some important decisions were made there. First and foremost, the main decision was the adoption of a resolution declaring Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev’s report on the cult of personality at the 20th Congress in 1956 to be erroneous. The CPRF stated verbatim that it considers Khrushchev’s report on the cult of personality to be erroneous and politically biased. The report allegedly contained falsified facts, false accusations against Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, and distorted the truth about his state and party activities. The party also announced plans to petition Putin to restore the heroic names of Volgograd and the Volgograd Region back to Stalingrad and the Stalingrad Region.

Additionally, Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee Dmitry Novikov stated that the party had prepared a resolution to restore full historical justice regarding the outstanding figure of Russian and world history, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. Apart from that, the congress—predictably—re-elected the 81-year-old Gennady Zyuganov as Chairman of the CPRF Central Committee. He has held this position since 1993, so there is certainly continuity here.

Why do I consider this important to discuss? Because, in my view, it is a very strong bid by the CPRF to become the second-largest party, pushing aside LDPR and the rest, and possibly to become the main opposition party. That might sound strange given the context of Russia’s fascist dictatorship, but to some extent, it’s possible—I’ll try to explain why I think so.

Over the past 35 years, attitudes toward Stalin have radically shifted—from negative to positive. If you look at the polling data from the Levada Center, you’ll see that Russians now consider Stalin the greatest figure of all time. The numbers are striking: in 1989, only 12% considered Stalin great; by 2025, that number had risen to 42%. That’s a 3.5-fold increase. Why are we seeing a kind of return of the Stalin cult in Russia? It’s happening, to some extent, at the state level. This year, for example, a bas-relief sculpture of Stalin was unveiled in the Moscow Metro, and Volgograd Airport was renamed Stalingrad.

The reason is fairly clear. First, the cult of victory that Putin has been building for at least the last 20 years has definitely helped transform Stalin into a national hero. And the idea of Putinism itself, in many ways, drags Stalinism along with it. In fact, Stalinism now seems to be running ahead of Putinism, like a runaway cart pulling the horse downhill—you can no longer tell who’s leading whom, and stopping it is impossible. So yes, Putin significantly revived Stalinism, but now Stalinism has overtaken and is outpacing its creator.

This is why I consider the CPRF’s move a powerful signal that it wants to become the second-largest party after United Russia. Think about it: 42% of people consider Stalin a great man—that’s roughly 40 million out of 100 million adult Russians. And what’s important is that this was an open-ended survey: respondents weren’t given a fixed list of names like Lenin, Stalin, Putin, etc.—they had to write in the name themselves. That shows genuine conviction. People wrote “Stalin” with their own hand—an unmistakable political-technology move by the CPRF, staking a claim as the second opposition party.

It’s also worth noting that LDPR has declined sharply since Zhirinovsky’s death. Slutsky is no political leader; he’s more of a comedic figure. Meanwhile, the CPRF’s open embrace of Stalinism as a banner is significant. First, the level of support—the near-deification of Stalin—is huge. Second, Stalinism is today the only ideological platform from which one can criticize Putin in Russia. Dissatisfaction with Putin exists in latent form—no one openly speaks about it—but Stalinism is, perhaps, the only position from which such criticism is possible.

What does that mean? You can’t criticize Putin for being a fascist, for starting the war, for crushing free speech—that’ll land you in jail. But criticism from a Stalinist perspective is openly present even on Russia’s major TV channels. They don’t attack Putin directly, but dissatisfaction with the authorities is expressed—and that kind of criticism is only going to grow. From a Stalinist position, it’s very easy to criticize Putin—for not being Stalin enough, for not dropping nuclear bombs on Ukraine, Europe, or the U.S., for not launching mass mobilization, for not declaring “Arise, vast country!” and making grand Stalin-style statements. That line of attack is in high demand.

The problem? All this massive electoral potential is in the hands of a pathological coward and impotent figure—Zyuganov. He is clearly terrified of power. Remember how he effectively won in 1996 but hid from the responsibility of victory when facing a gravely ill Yeltsin. Zyuganov did everything he could to avoid taking power.

So yes, this is big news. Overall, the CPRF congress resolution shows that power as a whole is shifting strongly toward a red-brown alignment. Stalinism, the CPRF, and Putin’s outright fascism are blending into a unified political identity. The idea of a red-brown regime is becoming increasingly relevant.

That, in my view, is what’s most important to highlight today. We’ve discussed everything else in our Sunday weekly recap, on “Mediafrenia,” and in conversations with guests like Aizenberg, Mark Feygin, and others.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

So, that’s the news for today. Before moving on to the recap and answering your questions, I want to mention that today is Monday, which means that at 8:00 PM we’ll have Sergei Maratovich Grabsky joining us. And by the way, we’ll be discussing the potential consequences of halting weapons supplies to Ukraine. Here, both political and military analysis are important. Now, let’s move on to answering your questions.

Trump and the War in Ukraine. Kursk Region Link to heading

There are several questions regarding Trump and the war in Ukraine. First, a question from Boris: “These 30 days of truce—do you think it’s possible that during negotiations, Putin quietly promised Trump something like, ‘We’ll talk about 30 days, but let Ukraine first pull out of the Kursk region’? Like, ‘We can’t move forward while part of our territory is occupied.’ So Trump believed it and promised Zelensky 30 days. Ukraine pulled out of the Kursk region, one way or another, and rather quickly. But actually, not completely. So I’m not sure what to make of that.”

Dear Boris, you’re citing your sources, but it does seem that the pullout wasn’t complete. And then, I continue quoting Boris: “Then Putin brought in Lavrov with all the causes of the conflict, and Trump ended up looking like a complicit deceiver. And now it’s even worse—they’re pressing toward Sumy. The second time they tried the same trick, but it didn’t work. Maybe that’s why Zelensky insists so strongly on those 30 days—as if it’s an unresolved agreement. After every conversation with Putin, there’s a massive shelling of Kyiv. In my opinion, Putin is making Trump more and more his accomplice.”

Dear Boris, I wasn’t under the table or behind the curtain when Putin and Trump talked on the phone. So I can’t analyze all the ins and outs. I do believe that the idea of the 30 days originally came from Trump. By the way, this idea was also supported by the Europeans and Zelensky. So the position is quite reasonable. As for any promises allegedly made to Trump or Putin—I’m not in a position to comment on that, I don’t know. But in any case, Trump really does now look like Putin’s accomplice—and frankly, a deceiver. Not for the first time.

Where Is the Promised Trump Support for Rare Earth Metals? Link to heading

A question from Vera. There are many kind and warm words here, which Vera insists I read, but I’ll just note that such words are present. Now to the actual question: “Trump’s suspension of military aid will lead to heavy losses for Ukraine. Ukraine is now guarding Europe, and even though things on the front aren’t all bad for Ukraine right now, Azerbaijan is opposing Russia—which is also good. Things wouldn’t be so bad for Ukraine if Trump hadn’t suspended aid. But what about the agreements on rare earth metals? Trump promised support for Ukraine in exchange for those agreements. Or is that not true?”

Of course, of course that’s true. Of course it is, dear Vera. What can I say here? Well, Trump once again turned out to be an empty vessel—making noises that carry no weight. But that’s nothing new—we’re used to it by now. Though admittedly, getting used to it is still hard.

Who Should Respond to Trump and How Link to heading

Alex Ivanov: “On the one hand, you’re absolutely right—we have to listen to the president, an idiot, of the world’s most powerful country. There’s no choice. But on the other hand, he is an idiot. Exclamation mark—literally or just nonsense. One thing today, another tomorrow, and the exact opposite the day after—listening to him yesterday and today is genuinely disgusting. A dumb, reckless amateur. Not even a cunning one—just a constant loop. And let’s see what happens. Everything is going great—no substance. Obviously, he’s just a clown with no attention to detail. Is he joking? No—he’s just an idiot. How do you reconcile the need to listen with the knowledge that this is the talk of an idiot, worth absolutely nothing?”

Dear colleague, here’s what I think. You see, it all depends on who you are. If you’re an observer, journalist, or expert—like yours truly, and likely you as well—then you don’t need anything from Trump. You and I personally don’t need anything from him. So there’s no need for us to play dumb or praise Trump while listening to his idiotic speeches. We can say what we think.

But if you’re a politician, dear Alex, you can’t say what you just wrote—because you almost certainly need something from Trump. So you have to smile and flatter. That’s the job—politics. It’s a profession that sometimes requires, well, not necessarily lying, but not always telling the whole truth. Sometimes you have to do what European politicians—and Ukrainian ones too—are doing right now: basically, placating the idiot. What else can you do? He controls the weapons. He controls the aid. That’s important. So that’s political work.

By the way, this is the main reason I left politics and have no intention of going back—because it’s hard for me. There are people who are capable of that, and I am not one of them. That’s just how this job works.

On the Bombing of Kyiv Link to heading

Larisa: “It’s the fourth year under constant and intensifying bombardment in Kyiv. What is the enemy’s strategy? That’s my question. Yes, they’ve wiped a number of towns and cities off the map, like Bakhmut and Avdiivka—not small places. People evacuated from there. In our building alone, we have people from Bakhmut and Volnovakha. But Kyiv—how can you evacuate several million people? So are they trying to wipe it off the face of the earth along with its residents? What do they want?”

Dear Larisa, I believe that more and more people are coming to understand what was obvious from the start: they—meaning Putin and his accomplices—want to destroy Ukraine. All of it. Or rather, to erase it as an independent country and kill everyone who considers themselves Ukrainian. This is precisely what Putin means when he talks about “denazification” and “demilitarization”—eliminating the army and eliminating the nation. The people. That they haven’t yet succeeded is thanks to the Armed Forces of Ukraine—and not only them. But the attempt is clear. This is what he’s doing every single day.

About the 650,000 Jobs Link to heading

A question from Igor. One of the tools for continuing the war by Russia is said to be the fact that returning soldiers will once again start receiving meager salaries and will turn to crime. But if the state was able to find money for the war, then it should be able to pay a decent salary afterward, at least to the participants of the so-called “Special Military Operation.” After all, they won’t just stop consuming — they will be producing added capital. Moreover, some sanctions will be lifted, which will make it easier for businesses to operate.

Dear namesake! Please, tell me — how do you envision this? That is, 650,000 jobs for occupiers not only suffering from post-war syndrome, but also needing to be paid ten times more than the people working alongside them. What even is that? Especially considering — what are these 650,000 jobs? Presumably, they’ll be not only in the public sector but also in private companies. So how do you force a private business owner to pay an occupier a salary ten times higher than what others in the office earn, right? It’s simply impossible. Especially given the current trend where, if possible, these occupiers returning from the war are deliberately not hired, because these are unstable people, people with post-war syndrome, which is well known to everyone. And no one wants such a “gift” at their workplace. So unless there’s coercion or pressure from the state, people like this aren’t getting hired. And you’re talking about paying them the same salary they earned on the front? That’s out of the question. It’s impossible. But that’s not even the main point. The bigger issue is that these 650,000 people are used to killing, enjoy it, and are completely unfit for civilian life. We saw the Afghan syndrome, the Chechen syndrome. Well, this is the same — but raised to the third power. And then there are another 20 million who will see any end to the war — short of full occupation of Ukraine — as betrayal. We just spoke about the rise of Stalinism — well, this is exactly that. So. As for the arguments for continuing the war, there are many. And the method you’re talking about, forgive me, but I think it’s utopian. Pure utopia. It’s not going to happen. That’s precisely why Putin, understanding all this, doesn’t stop the war. And besides everything else, he doesn’t want to. He wants to achieve the result that lives in his delusional mind.

The Reason for the Decline of Democracy in Russia Link to heading

So, a question from Roman Sidorenko. The question is: what is the reason for the decline of democracy in Russia? And here’s how Roman Sidorenko formulates the question. I remember that in the 1990s, Russia was clearly ahead of Ukraine in implementing both political and economic reforms. I used to watch Russian news and political programs because they were more interesting than Ukrainian ones. Ukraine also copied Russian economic reforms. But by the early 2000s, everything changed. Some analysts believe this happened because Russia became a petrostate due to high oil prices. Others blame imperialism and the war in Chechnya. In your opinion, what was the main reason for the decline of democracy in Russia?

You know, dear Roman, I would start not with the most important point, but with a secondary one. Your question caught my attention, especially your remark that Russian programs were more interesting than Ukrainian ones. And this has to do not just with the reality they portrayed, but with the nature of television production itself — and not just television, but cinema as well. Yes, it’s true that TV and cinema in Russia in the 1990s were more professional than in Ukraine. And we know that a number of leading Ukrainian directors and TV professionals went to work in Russia. The reason is extremely simple. And here I can speak with certainty, because I know this process from the inside. The reason is money. In the 1990s — and even today — Russia’s advertising market was simply an order of magnitude larger than Ukraine’s. It was more developed, better equipped in terms of infrastructure. That was obvious. So, there was no question where a talented TV professional or official would choose to work. Of course — in Russia. That largely explains why Russian television in the 1990s — well, at least up until, say, 1996 or even 1998 — was much more advanced than Ukraine’s. In Russia during the 1990s, there were two conditions for producing television content: money and freedom. There was plenty of money and quite a bit of freedom. Yes, there were some restrictions, but both elements were present. In Ukraine, there was only freedom. And it’s clear that you can’t fly with just one wing.

And now to the main point — that was the secondary one, but something I know well and couldn’t resist talking about. Now the main thing. In the second half of the 1990s, there was a final disillusionment with reforms — plus the war in Chechnya. And right at that moment came the timely “successor” special operation. Putin appeared, and he skillfully pressed on the sore imperial points — all that “we’ll wipe them out in the outhouse” talk, the apartment bombings, and so on. In reality, that was the launch of the imperial syndrome mechanism. And it worked — and obviously, that’s incompatible with democracy. By the late 1990s — or even before that — democracy had begun to be turned into a scarecrow, a slur. Democrat, liberal. I went through an election campaign in 1993, and I can say it was a very difficult campaign. I traveled across many regions, met with a lot of people, and even after being elected to the State Duma, I continued traveling. And even back then, the words “democrat” and “liberal” were already used as insults. Later, they basically became profanities. If you spoke before a mass audience — not a refined, intellectual one — identifying yourself as a democrat, a liberal, a Westerner — it was a tough ordeal. I remember that well. And reforms were conducted in such a way that the very word became a curse. The behavior of those calling themselves democrats led to serious public rejection. So — the reason? The reason lies in all of that.

On Imperialism in Russia Link to heading

A question from Anatoly I support your statement that Russia must inevitably break apart — split along some conditional line of the “Russians,” into a Ural, Siberian, Far Eastern, and so on republic — to prevent a recurrence of empire or imperialism. My question is, why do ethnic Russians view this as some kind of catastrophe for themselves, for the Russian people? After all, there are several English-speaking countries, and no one — including Britain — is trying to force them all into one unified state. There are also many Arab countries, and Arabs don’t suffer from this fact. Yet for some reason, the idea of a single Russian state for Russians is seen as essential. Otherwise, we’re all doomed. What is this and where does it come from? Maybe in ancient times the idea of a single state for Russians was valid. But today, when we have examples that prove this thesis doesn’t hold up, Russians still cling to it. I believe they themselves are the first to suffer because of it.

And so on. First of all, a small, not the most important, but still a small note on your reasoning. The thing is, dear Anatoly, you contrast imperial-minded Russians with what you see as a complete lack of imperialism among the British and the Arabs. But that’s not entirely accurate. You’re looking at the situation post-factum — after Britain fell apart, after the empire ceased to exist. This was the greatest empire on which the sun never set. Let’s remember that the British Empire died quite slowly. There were many efforts to preserve it — let’s not even talk about India, where there was very strong resistance. And only after the Second World War did many decades of struggle and resistance pass. India fought for independence against those who carried the imperial syndrome — Churchill, for example. We remember what happened. Churchill was a prime carrier of this imperial mindset, resisting the dissolution of the British Empire. So to say that Russians are unique in not wanting their empire to collapse — that’s a mistake. In Arab countries, too, there’s the idea of a unified Islamic caliphate. So the idea of a single country uniting everyone — that’s actually imperialism as well. It’s not exclusive to Russians. And what you’re describing — Russians aren’t unique in this. But that’s a minor point, a small remark.

Now, the main point. What is imperialism? Among other things, it is reverence for size — the main value is territory. It doesn’t matter how people live, what the culture is, what science exists — what matters is the land. That’s the essence. That’s the atavism of imperialism. So when you ask: why is the breakup of a unified state so terrifying for Russians? It’s because they are an imperial people, formed through an imperial ethnogenesis. The Russian nation was shaped precisely as an imperial people. But again — this isn’t unique. We can find similar patterns among other peoples. It’s just that the Russian Empire is the last remaining classical empire. All the others have already collapsed. That’s why in other places the imperial syndrome is a disease that has been treated, that has healed. But in Russia, it still thrives.

About Phone Scammers Link to heading

A question from Ilya Have you or your close acquaintances ever encountered phone scammers? I’m always amazed when people fall for it. What is it — extraordinary hypnosis, psychological skill, a coincidence of circumstances? All of the above? If the security services are involved, does the fact that the country relatively recently believed in Chumak, Kashpirovsky, and shows like Battle of the Psychics have any influence? Is there some universal way to avoid falling for scammers’ cunning traps?

Dear Ilya! Well, first of all, I must say — again — I don’t think this is an exclusively Russian problem. Phone scams thrive in the U.S., Germany, and everywhere else. As for the reasons — well, again, professionals are at work. This is a business — a serious business. We know that phone scam call centers are even well-developed inside prisons. There are entire call centers set up with the participation of the FSIN. I don’t know about the FSB, although I suspect they may be involved too. But when it comes to FSIN — the Federal Penitentiary Service — meaning the prison authorities, they are definitely involved. This business setup is well known. There are lots of people in prison with nothing to do. So they strike deals with prison guards, who bring them phones and SIM cards, and the inmates make money. So, yes — state involvement is obvious. Not in terms of official government policy, but rather through corruption schemes in which FSIN participates.

Now, as for a universal method — well, I can say this: I’ve personally encountered phone scammers who call and start saying suspicious things are happening with your bank account. They introduce themselves as bank representatives. And then, regarding your account, they mention suspicious transactions. You must immediately end the call. There’s a golden rule: the classic phone scammer is someone who claims to be a bank representative and says something’s going on with your account, and then the conversation begins — they ask you to go to a website, verify something, or give some confirmation. The call must be ended immediately. How you end it depends on your temperament. You can just hang up and say “don’t call again,” or just hang up. Or you can say something sweet — that’s up to you.

Never, under any circumstances, will a real bank representative call you. Never, ever. The bank’s security service — any bank communication — happens only through the app. A phone call claiming to be from the bank is simply nonsense. Moreover — even setting that aside — phone scammers always try to keep you on the line. That’s a dead giveaway. Sometimes, just out of curiosity, you might try to respond. Then, when you start to say goodbye, they grab onto you like a claw: “No, don’t hang up! Do you understand…” and so on. That’s a phone scammer. Any kind of call like this is 100% a phone scam. So you should immediately hang up — no conversation, and definitely don’t comply with any requests, don’t go to websites, don’t provide personal data. And certainly — in the end, it always comes to this — “we’re offering you the chance to transfer your money to a secure account,” etc. Naturally, don’t do that. First and foremost — again — hang up as soon as someone says they’re from the bank or some other institution. It’s 100% a scam.

On the Murdered Azerbaijanis and Russians Link to heading

So? A question from Aid I once asked whose children were taken prisoner. That was my first thought. Now I can formulate and explain my view on the beating in Baku. I blame the Russian security forces for the killing of the Safarov brothers and the maiming of Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. So I got curious about the response. In Baku, two FSB officers were detained. At the Sputnik agency, they detained IT specialists and people with posters. I looked up the names and photos of the detainees on the Novaya Gazeta Europe website and noticed that Sergei Safronov, 23 years old, left Russia in 2022 and is probably of opposition views. Dmitry Fedorov, 22, says he’s from Magadan. Alexander, 35. An exotic surname for Russians — Alexey Vasilchenko, 25 — the surname suggests Ukrainian roots. And so on. There’s quite a long list, and questions arise. Faith writes: Questions for the Azerbaijani security services — who exactly did you beat up? Who did you take out your anger on — people without posters but with Ukrainian roots? So Russians get scared. I understand that there’s little information so far, and the situation could turn around — maybe the FSB officers were killed in Baku in retaliation, maybe Azerbaijanis will be urged to leave Russia, something else. But it seems like there was no other option for a response. That’s why Zakharova asked: Why do you care about Russian citizens? And then it seemed to me that those arrested weren’t Tatars, Bashkirs, or Chechens. Maybe it’s a hint at a possible ethnic conflict? Or if Aliyev is offended? And on top of that, not long ago some mufti said that if called upon, they would wipe out all of Moscow in a day.

Well, what can I say? Aliyev’s regime is a dictatorship. It’s not as dangerous to its neighbors as Putin’s. It’s just that Putin’s dictatorship is a fascist one. And Aliyev’s regime — it’s just a dictatorship. He’s simply a dictator who, to a significant extent, is also indifferent to human rights. So now you’re outraged that Aliyev’s regime responded? Putin’s regime committed monstrous human rights violations against Azerbaijanis. But the Putin regime — the Stalinist regime — also violated human rights with regard to Russian citizens. So, excuse me, in this case Putin didn’t pick a fight with Switzerland, or Sweden, or Finland. He picked a fight with a dictator — with Aliyev. And dictator Aliyev responds the way a dictator should. He doesn’t care about human rights. That’s the whole answer. Everything else, I think, is secondary — which surnames are Ukrainian, who happened to get caught, which Russian citizen got grabbed — whoever they caught, that’s who got terrorized. That’s all.

About Skobov Link to heading

Denis Lyubarev Can you ask your followers who are knowledgeable in modern technologies to translate Skobov’s speech? It would be great if you could collect all available information about him in one place, along with his works. What resources are needed to make a film about him? What kind of budget are we talking about?

Dear Denis! Let me respond in bullet points — but I’ll try to be thorough. So, point one: a film about Skobov is very, very much needed. Point two: I’m not ready to make this film right now — not because I don’t have the money. You’re asking me to name a budget — but the thing is, I’m not going to name any figure. First of all, to name one, I’d need to write a script, understand what resources are required to make this film at all. But more importantly, what’s needed is the will to create. You have to make the decision to start working, and then understand what’s needed — whether I even need support at all. So — I’m not ready to make this film now, even though I believe it’s very necessary. Not because of a lack of money — it’s quite possible I could make the film without money, with the means I already have. I just don’t know — it depends on the script. But I can’t make this film now because I simply don’t have… I don’t have time, I don’t have energy. That’s why I don’t have the resources — not financial, but human. That’s very unfortunate, very sad. It upsets me. But that’s the situation. If someone else takes it on, I’d be very glad. And maybe — I hope — I’ll be able to revive our project, find additional resources, and then I’ll make this film. And if money is needed, I’ll ask for it. But right now, unfortunately, it’s not relevant.

On Forecasting and Probability Link to heading

Lilia Dorman If we live in a probabilistic world, then what’s the value of analytics and forecasting? What can actually be predicted? Probabilistic realities? Or is probability theory just a cop-out for uncomfortable questions — like, “well, yeah, the prediction didn’t come true, it’s a 50/50 world after all”? At best, it’s very convenient. You can avoid being held accountable for your words.

Dear Lilia, I must say that living in a probabilistic world is a bit more complex than living in a Laplacian world, where everything is exact, and if you know the initial parameters, you can precisely predict what will happen in a thousand years. But we don’t live in Laplace’s world — we live in a probabilistic one. And life in this world requires a certain kind of preparation not just from experts, but from viewers and listeners as well. You see, if you’re expecting 100% accurate forecasts, then it means — quite simply — you’re not ready to live in a probabilistic world.

It’s like a weather forecast — it’s also probabilistic. Or like attempts at economic analysis — there, too, a certain probability is given. You’re not going to execute meteorologists for getting a forecast wrong, are you? That would be a Stalinist method, frankly. Once again, I want to emphasize: living in a probabilistic world demands a different mindset — not just from experts, but from consumers of expertise as well. You have to understand that a forecast typically comes with a range, and your job isn’t just to follow the numbers or predictions, but also the reasoning behind them.

In this more complex world, being a consumer of such information requires participation — you have to dig in. If you want to be a serious consumer of such analysis. If you just want to sit back with your arms folded and legs crossed saying, “Well, take responsibility for your predictions,” — of course we do, including with our reputations. And when we’re wrong, our reputations suffer. That’s fair. But at the same time, pay attention to the reasoning behind why a certain expert made a certain forecast. That matters too — sometimes more than the forecast itself. Sometimes, a mistake is more valuable than a correct prediction. A correct prediction might be luck or coincidence. But the reasoning behind a forecast can be far more meaningful than the forecast itself.

So — yes, weather forecasts sometimes come true, sometimes don’t. But again — shooting meteorologists isn’t the best solution.

Won’t Russia start reuniting again after the collapse? Link to heading

Strike. Like that. Thank you for analyzing the consequences of Russia’s collapse. You rightly said that a breakup into nation-states is not enough. The larger part of Russia, with its overwhelmingly Russian population, will once again pursue the greatness of the Russian nation. Imperial chauvinism will not disappear — that’s very accurate. I thought that the collapse of the Russian skeleton of the state itself might be even more important than just the breakup. More important than just the dissolution into national states of non-Russian indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. That is, the so-called international community will primarily be concerned with what to do with nuclear weapons and other offensive types of weapons, as was the case under Bush Sr., for example. It seems to me that this is a secondary issue. None of the fragments of the collapsed state will need these nuclear weapons and bombers. A group of world powers — China, Europe, India, for instance — can come to an agreement among themselves, say, buy them out and then destroy or equitably divide them, and transfer the nuclear weapons, say, to the IAEA, so they could sell the uranium to power plants of interested countries and replenish the budgets of the UN and other international organizations. But the main problem upon collapse will be the notorious universal equivalent — money. How will these new and small states survive without money? Even if they introduce their own currencies, it will take at least several years. And what should they do with this fundamental problem for the population? They might begin to reunite again into the notorious Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, and so on — which could once again end in yet another great empire. Or the international community will come up with something that suits all these new entities. Please analyze the possible options.

Dear colleague, I think that the threat following the collapse of the Russian Federation — the threat, if this collapse occurs not only through the secession of national republics, but also affects the so-called Russian regions — the threat of the revival of the Russian Empire seems to me rather illusory. Why? You know, the integration processes in the post-Soviet, or rather — and this slip is important — in the post-Russian space will by no means necessarily go through the reunification of Russia’s fragments. That’s it. If we draw an analogy with the collapse of the USSR, we see that the countries of the post-Soviet space — despite Russia’s huge efforts to create things like the CIS and other structures that attempt to unite the post-Soviet space — the countries that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, like the EU states, are not uniting among themselves. They are uniting elsewhere. For example, the Baltics, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia — they are striving for Europe, for the European Union. Azerbaijan, the Central Asian countries — they seek integration with Turkey, and to some extent with China, but not with Russia. So I believe the same will happen with the remnants of the Russian Federation. It’s by no means guaranteed that, say, countries formed from the fragments of the North Caucasus will seek to unite with, for instance, India or the Urals Republic. No, I think this process of integration will follow completely different lines. Some parts will gravitate toward Europe, some perhaps toward China, maybe Japan. Some will also integrate with Turkey, and so on. So the reunification of the fragments of the Russian Federation into some new Russian empire seems to me extremely unlikely, extremely unlikely. Therefore, I think this threat does not exist.

On the Cult of Stalin’s Personality Link to heading

Is that so? Vera. Communists believe that the denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality was a mistake. In many places, monuments to him are being erected. There is already a revision underway of the rehabilitation of those who were repressed. Do you think this is a sign that, at the official level, they are acknowledging that there was no cult? Does it mean that, in their view, there were no repressions, only people who were “supposedly” repressed? My great-grandfather, a priest, was executed in 1937 as an enemy of the people.

Dear Vera! I actually dedicated a significant part of our morning stream to this topic. I believe the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is a kind of red-brown formation. This has been known for quite some time. I myself participated, if I’m not mistaken, back in 1992 in a discussion between, let’s say, these red-browns — Prokhanov was there, Seleznev too, and so on. And the CPRF has been drifting toward Stalinism and fascism. Zyuganov is not, so to speak, a communist-internationalist in the spirit of Marx or Lenin, but first and foremost a Stalinist and nationalist. I’m not sure that for Putin the CPRF is a guiding light. I think this initiative — to cancel the denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality and revive this cult at the state level — will most likely, in the foreseeable future, remain at the party level. But it does matter, because thanks to this, I think Zyuganov may be able to make a certain leap and truly become the second political party in Russia.

About Shvydkoy Link to heading

Galina Deeva Please, I ask you not to ignore Shvydkoy’s piece “The Revival of Censorship.” Censorship, dear Galina, did not ignore the piece. Naturally, such a phenomenon had to be documented. And in the latest episode of Mediafrenia 144 — it’s on our channel, aired on Saturday, that is, the day before yesterday — we actually spoke quite a lot about this phenomenon, about how Mikhail Shvydkoy hit the ground and turned into, well, I would say, a Stalinist. Because this is an attempt to revive censorship, and specifically preemptive censorship — the old Soviet-style censorship, which Shvydkoy essentially praised in an ode.

This is certainly a remarkable phenomenon. I was reminded of Kafka’s brilliant story “The Metamorphosis,” where a man suddenly wakes up in his bed and finds himself in the body of a monstrous insect. It seems to me that something similar is happening with some representatives of the once liberal democratic forces in Russia — people like Shvydkoy. It’s a vivid, vivid example. So all of this was documented in the latest episode of Mediafrenia.

About Ausländer and Israel Link to heading

Nikolai. In connection with the fact that I just listened with great attention to Sergey Shur’s stream, where the guest was an amazing person who believes that the song by Makarevich — the one for those who do something wrong — was written about him. We’re talking about Yuri Goldman, who proposed a very interesting idea of building a navigable canal through Israeli territory from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea. It turns out that the Jewish question — I ask forgiveness from Jews for this absurdity — can be solved by the Jews themselves, and for a long time. Possibly once and for all. It very much looks like this project is not only entirely feasible but also quite worthy of implementation. I think it would be good to invite Yuri Dedov, Goldman, to our channel to discuss the political aspects of this idea. Would that be possible?

Dear Nikolai, I believe that technically this is entirely possible. I just want to point out that this idea did not emerge yesterday — it has been discussed for some time. And I think that this idea, and the presence of this remarkable person, are worthwhile, but I would prefer that he not be alone. I believe we need some kind of opponent — or not necessarily an opponent, but simply an expert who can evaluate this idea. I don’t know — I’ve read that the cost estimates for this project vary, but exceed $100 billion. Still, it’s interesting and worth discussing. So yes, I think it’s possible. But we need someone other than myself as a conversation partner, because I understand absolutely nothing about this. I could only sit with my mouth open and listen. We need someone who understands, who is in the know. And this project is being discussed in Israel. I’d like it to be tied to at least some sort of planning or expert evaluation.

Dolin and Sorokin Link to heading

Is that so? Valeria Plugotarenko. Please comment on what I consider a very significant and fascinating conversation between film critic Anton Dolin and writer Vladimir Sorokin — from the perspective of a journalist and sociologist. What question would you have asked Vladimir Sorokin? Perhaps one that Anton Dolin did not ask.

You know, this truly is a significant event, but I wasn’t thrilled by the conversation. And do you know why? Because it was a very, well, you see — it was a conversation with a truly outstanding writer. You might describe him in the spirit of that story “The Hat” — I can’t recall the exact title, but the film was called The Hat, where writers were categorized as great, outstanding, well-known, and just some guys. I think Vladimir Sorokin is at least outstanding — and most likely a great writer.

But the thing is, this conversation took place during a war, during a monstrous war. And to me, it felt like this slow-paced, very flattering conversation with Sorokin, full of literary musings — it just didn’t sit right. You see, it was a conversation about Russian culture, Russian literature, during wartime. And not a single word was said about the contribution Russian culture and literature may have made to the formation of imperialism and the Russian fascism we see today. I’m not a supporter of drawing a straight line from Pushkin to Putin — no, I’m not in favor of that kind of simplification, of such direct literary determinism — that Dostoevsky’s imperialism is the same as Putin’s imperialism. No.

But still, if we believe that Russian culture means something, that it matters, then it is currently being tested. That is — there must have been something in Russian culture, in Russian literature, that allowed fascism to take root in Russia. How can that be? After all, it didn’t happen somewhere else — it happened here. So there must be something that failed to prevent it. That kind of conversation — I’m not saying exactly what it should have been — but if, by some miracle, I had the chance to interview or talk with Vladimir Sorokin, I would certainly prepare thoroughly. I would structure the questions in a way that wouldn’t be primitive, that wouldn’t give Sorokin the temptation to laugh them off as foolish. That’s exactly how he might treat questions that draw a straight line from Pushkin to Putin. No — one could prepare and pose the questions properly.

I still believe that during wartime, we need to bring issues to the forefront — and these slow-paced conversations about the greatness of Russian culture… Well, they made me a bit uncomfortable.

About Kompromat on Trump Link to heading

So, a question from Vitaly. It seems to me that you’re deeply mistaken in thinking that Trump doesn’t understand Putin and expects to strike a lucrative deal with him that will bring in a lot of money. The reason lies elsewhere. This topic has been raised repeatedly by many people but got lost due to lack of evidence, in my opinion, writes Vitaly. Everything is obvious. This is classic KGB work. During Trump’s visit to Moscow, a girl was set up for him — most likely more than one. Then it suddenly turned out that she, or one of them, was underage. The incident was documented and classified. Now Trump is firmly on the hook. He will follow any orders from Putin. He has no way out until the information is leaked. Putin’s recent offer to exchange films about family values is further confirmation of this — and an open threat to Trump. Therefore, the main reason for halting weapons supplies to Ukraine is Trump’s cowardice in the face of this kompromat being made public.

Dear Vitaly! This version has been around and continues to circulate, but lately it hasn’t been strongly advocated, and it doesn’t seem convincing to me. It just doesn’t. You see, I actually considered this possibility myself for a while — when Trump first came to power. But you know what? What more kompromat do you even need on Trump? He’s the subject of multiple criminal cases, including the main charge of attempting a coup. Imagine — the President of the United States tried to organize and did organize a coup. He called on people to storm the Capitol — a coup. And nothing sticks.

Trump’s name appears in files related to Jeffrey Epstein, who was convicted of abuse of minors. Elon Musk published a video of Trump partying at Epstein’s event, where minors were allegedly abused and involved in prostitution and sex trafficking. And still — nothing. It all bounces off. Trump is essentially immune to such things. I mean, imagine — there’s a video of him with a girl, making rhythmic movements. So what? You think that kind of video would change anything in America? Trump’s supporters would just say: “He’s a real man — for his age, look how well he moves, in rhythm, doing everything right.” You see? It doesn’t work that way.

So some additional kompromat — what kind? An underage girl? Honestly, your hypothesis seems highly unconvincing to me. There’s already so much kompromat on Trump. He’s even accused of using campaign funds to pay a porn star. And yet — you see — for the American psyche, money is sacred. Even the misuse of campaign funds to pay for the services of an escort was taken in stride. No one fainted — except maybe some Democrats. Republicans were fine with it. “He’s a normal guy, doing everything right.”

So I think you’re mistaken. But do I believe there’s a ton of kompromat on him? Absolutely, not a second of doubt. But it doesn’t work.

Comment on Trump Link to heading

So, a question from an anonymous subscriber. The behavior of the Russian dictator indicates that Trump will not harm him. Putin’s confidence in his own untouchability — at least from Trump — gives him additional motivation for aggressive war in Ukraine. Trump’s behavior itself is explained by the total incompetence of his followers in making “great deals” with counterparts, and by his cabinet’s utter lack of professionalism. Nevertheless, the problems of Ukraine and Europe as a whole are not Trump’s — or America’s — problems. They’re businessmen — looking to cash in. And if this narcissist even gets a prize for it, well then — pow! Based on this hypothesis, the dictator will try to resolve the Ukraine issue before Trump leaves the office of U.S. president. Also, let’s not forget that Comrade Xi gave his blessing to his Russian governor until 2030.

Well, overall, I don’t really see what there is to comment on. This point of view has the right to exist.

Rational Reasons Behind Trump’s Behavior Link to heading

Comment by Max I disagree with the claim that Trump is trying to force Ukraine into capitulation. Why would he do that? The goal can’t be to portray an aggressive invasion as a peaceful settlement. One million refugees, repression, awards—nobody gets peace prizes for that. And he’d get backlash from his own media. Trump simply doesn’t know what to do. He doesn’t want to participate in the war. Ukraine’s fate doesn’t concern him much, so he’s trying to shift the burden onto Europe. Secondly, we’re used to thinking the U.S. has 100,000 aircraft carriers and 100,000 Tomahawks on each. I don’t think that’s the case. America doesn’t fight prolonged wars of attrition. Ukraine is in its fourth year of war. Ammunition consumption exceeds any U.S. standards. To sustain such a war, it’s not enough to have stockpiles. You need to ramp up the military-industrial complex, like in World War II. I’m not sure that’s happening. We should ask an expert, but I suspect there are problems there too. And finally, this is very expensive weaponry—no one fights with it for long. When Israel uses Patriot missiles, it strikes Iranian launchers and thereby reduces its own missile use. But Ukraine is an endless consumption. Even if you’re firing the cheapest missile three million times—once a day—that’s a billion dollars gone in under a year. And if those are expensive missiles, say $8 million each to hit a single target, two fired per target, and dozens of targets… That’s just Patriots. How much more is there? To sustain such a war technically and materially, you have to commit fully. Trump clearly doesn’t want to do that. He wanted to end free shipments. He ended them. It’s now Europe’s move, but I see no reason why he wouldn’t sell weapons for money, if they’re in stock. Predicting Trump’s actions is a thankless task. But Ukraine’s capitulation is definitely not what he wants. That would immediately endanger Eastern Europe. It would give China free rein, and most importantly, it would stain his own reputation. Besides, though it’s expensive, both the U.S. and Europe can afford it.

Dear Max, I completely agree with your analysis. There is only one weak point in it, I believe—you’re rationalizing Trump. Just like there’s a problem with rationalizing Putin—attributing rational motives to him. If he were a rational thinker, he wouldn’t have invaded Ukraine. Nothing threatened him. The same goes for Trump. You’re reasoning from a rational perspective, but that doesn’t apply to Trump. That, I think, is the only weak spot in your reasoning—this rationalization of Trump.

Azerbaijanis and Turks Are Different Peoples Link to heading

Natalya, regarding your discussion. Oleg, You’re not entirely right when you call Azerbaijanis and Turks one people. Azerbaijanis, unlike Turks, are Shia. That’s a very important distinguishing, and in this case, dividing characteristic. It’s like calling Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks one people just because they speak the same language.

Dear Natalya, I’m not the one calling them one people. That’s Erdogan’s position, which the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan agrees with. One people, two countries. That’s the position—it’s Erdogan’s political stance. Not mine, you understand? So in this case, it’s actually very simple. And by the way, yes, Ilya in the next comment is repeating exactly what I said. I believe Igor Yakovenko is simply quoting Erdogan when he says “one people, two countries.” Well, exactly. So, Natalya, there’s no need to convince me. I definitely know that Azerbaijanis and Turks are not one people, but in this case my opinion doesn’t matter. What matters is Erdogan’s position, and that’s what he believes.

Is Every Russian an Imperialist? Link to heading

Lyudmila Lefort Igor Aleksandrovich, if you disagree with the thesis that any Russian is an imperialist, just scratch the surface and you’ll find one. You named two people. That’s how many there are out of 140 million. So the thesis, sorry, is valid. I didn’t agree at first either, but the war sharpened all feelings. And then I realized—it’s true. The thesis holds. As for Svitan, you’re forcibly seeing antisemitism in every word he says, even where no one else would notice it.

You know, dear Lyudmila, let me restore the context, so to speak. When we talked about the idea that if you scratch any Russian, you’ll find imperialism, I did indeed name two people—Skobov and Sakharov. I mentioned them not because they are the only non-imperial Russians, but simply because they’re well-known—that’s who came to mind. But I clearly remember the first time I encountered the idea that any Russian must be an imperialist. It was at the Free Russia Forum Congress, where I was leading a separate session, with around 100 participants. Sitting in the room were about 100 Russian liberals. And then Muzhdabaev said there isn’t a single Russian liberal who believes Crimea is Ukrainian or who condemns the occupation of Crimea. The room went silent. I said, “Excuse me, but there are 100 people in this room—Russian liberals—and I’m sure every one of them opposes the occupation of Crimea.” It was truly shocking. People were initially stunned, then voices of indignation arose.

You see, the problem is that in Russia there are about 20 million people who do not consider themselves imperialists, who oppose imperialist positions. To varying degrees, yes. But still. You just don’t know them, and I don’t know many of them either—their names mean nothing to you. I mentioned two well-known names, but that doesn’t mean the list ends there. Again, that doesn’t mean that most Russians don’t support the war—they do. Most passively. Most are people who may not be imperialists in the spirit of, say, Prokhanov or Solovyov, but they support it with their indifference. That’s the problem. But to claim that scratching any Russian reveals an imperialist—well, there are people who love that idea. A whole script-based sect, I’d say, who love to scratch. Maybe they should scratch somewhere else. This pathological desire to “scratch someone”—that’s an illness, a sect, as Babchenko put it.

Once again: a huge number of people are not imperialists. A huge number. And a huge number don’t break on issues like Ukraine or Crimea. But we just don’t know them, and you don’t know them. I don’t know many either—but they’re not limited to two names. Right?

And about Svitan. There was a time when one could overlook antisemitism. Roman Grigorievich—but at some point, it became impossible to ignore.

Andrey. Same thing. When talking about Russians who aren’t imperialists, you mention no more than half a dozen names. Maybe exceptions prove the rule, and so on. Well, I’ve already responded to that point.

Visa-Free Travel for Ukrainians Link to heading

Lyudmila Syomina In Ukraine now, citizens can freely travel around Europe without visas, they can study and work. The main thing is language and professionalism—they can’t just receive aid. Although they do receive it now, it’s only going toward the war effort. So Igor Aleksandrovich should know this.

You know, dear Lyudmila, I’m aware—but you’re mistaken. Ukrainian citizens can enter the Schengen Area without a visa, but only for a short stay—up to 90 days within any 180-day period, provided they have a biometric passport. And the purpose of the visit must be tourism, business meetings, or visiting relatives. Staying in the Schengen Zone for more than 90 days, as well as working or studying, is not allowed without a visa for Ukrainians. That’s just the fact. It’s a little different from what you’re saying, dear Lyudmila. It’s 90 days, and only for tourism, business meetings, or visiting relatives. No work, no study.

Israel and Ukraine Cannot Be Compared Link to heading

Really? Eleonora Comparing Israel and Ukraine? Lobbying in the U.S.? What are you talking about? Israel is the fifth-largest country in the world in terms of arms production and sales. And Ukraine—where is it? They looted their military-industrial complex, sold it off, sold it off, sold off their homeland. Who do they have to blame now?

Well, I don’t know what to comment on here.

Where Tomahawks Are Launched From Link to heading

So, Cynical Skeptic—a sponsor of our channel, for which we’re very grateful—has made the following remark: With all due respect, Tomahawks are launched from ships.

But that’s inaccurate—that’s a mistake. Tomahawks are launched both from the sea and from land-based installations. So, not only from ships. It just requires different types of launch platforms.

Are There Circumstances That Prevent People From Leaving? Link to heading

Is that so? A question—or rather, a comment—from Igor: I disagree with you. You can sell your apartment and move somewhere else. Otherwise… Otherwise we’ll start justifying the cries of people in Eastern Ukraine—“Putin, come, restore order!”

Dear namesake, I don’t quite understand the connection. Let me trace the origins of that remark. The point is, one of the commentators said that—yes, originally, it was a response to a comment, I believe, from one of our regulars, someone who said that everyone living near military sites in Russia should flee. Well, again, this advice, in my view, is rather… you know, it’s easy to solve someone else’s trouble with your hands. When you say that someone who owns an apartment near a military facility should leave—what is he supposed to do? Sell the apartment? You know very well how the real estate market works in Russia. How is that even possible if the person doesn’t have money to make up the difference, again? Solving someone else’s trouble with your own hands is easy. People have different circumstances. Someone might work in a single-industry town, live near a military site. What should they do? I’m not trying to defend or excuse anyone. It’s just that there are real-life situations. And these casual bits of advice—well, as I said, they’re like Babchenko’s “Run, fools, run.” Sure. And if you can’t run, crawl and shoot. But to equate that with people in Eastern Ukraine calling out “Putin, come restore order!”—there’s still a difference between those who support Putin and those whose life circumstances simply don’t allow them to move away from a military site. This overly simplified view of other people’s problems, I think, is not quite right.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

So, dear friends, it looks like I’ve finished all the questions I found. I’ve answered them. So let me remind you that today at 8:00 PM we’ll have a conversation with Sergey Ivanovich Hrabskiy. And for now—glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives! See you at 8:00 PM.

Source: https://youtu.be/eRSm_7Ntx2E