California against Trump. Canada – is it Europe? Orban’s revelations. The political striptease of self-proclaimed leaders of the Russian opposition.
Main Theme Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 10th. In Kyiv, it’s now 07:41, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Massive Attack on Civilians in Ukraine Link to heading
But of course, we’ll start with what happened last night in Ukraine. This night saw one of the most massive attacks on Ukraine—it involved strike drones, missiles, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. There were about 500 drones in total, but according to the reports of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it was 479 drones, four X-type missiles, 47 Kinzhal missiles, and 10 cruise missiles. In short, one of the most massive attacks. Most of the missiles and drones were shot down. Nevertheless, there was significant destruction in Kyiv, Odesa, and Rivne. In short, there were casualties—fatalities, deadly incidents. In short, it was truly one of the most tragic nights in Ukraine. Is this that very retaliatory strike? But, apparently, this revenge by Putin is drawn out. It is drawn out. It is unlikely to be just a single strike—Putin will continue killing Ukrainians, which he has been doing for the fourth year now.
Trump Sent Troops to California Link to heading
Now let’s move to the United States of America. Here we’re seeing a very important event that, in my opinion, represents the democratic country’s response to the attempts of a fascist-type leader to establish a dictatorship. Recent events show that Trump, in addition to sending 2,000 guardsmen to California, also sent 700 marines. In other words, it’s essentially an army. The military presence in California is intensifying. This is an attempt—an attempt to break California over his knee. It will undoubtedly be unsuccessful. In particular, Trump’s statement that he would support the arrest of California’s governor—he made this statement yesterday, and in response, the governor said, “Please, be my guest, let’s see you arrest me,” and he has already filed a lawsuit against the federal authorities for deploying the National Guard without his consent. In fact, this is the first such blatant violation of state sovereignty in at least the last 60 years. According to the law, the National Guard can only be deployed at the initiative of the state’s governor or the state authorities if they assess the situation as beyond their capabilities to handle. There are also grounds for deploying troops in the event of a foreign invasion or an insurrection to overthrow the government. Naturally, there is nothing like that happening here. So what Trump is doing is undoubtedly lawlessness.
In fact, we are seeing a confrontation between the largest, most influential, wealthiest, and, I would say, most technologically advanced state of the United States and a fascist-type leader. The further development and escalation of this confrontation is unlikely to earn Trump political points and will most likely end in his defeat. The real reason for this conflict is, of course, the attempt to solve the migrant problem by administrative methods. Administrative methods are certainly necessary, but the actions of the federal authorities here undoubtedly involve human rights violations. Trump is living in an alternative reality. His statement about arresting the governor of California, his claim that Los Angeles would have been destroyed without the National Guard—this is that very alternative reality that he demonstrates everywhere: in his position on Ukraine, where he claims that without him, Putin would have already taken Kyiv long ago; and in his position on Gaza, where he says that the residents of the Gaza Strip should be resettled somewhere on another planet. In short, Trump is demonstrating his complete inadequacy here. In my opinion, this confrontation between California and Trump will end in his defeat. It won’t end in impeachment, of course, but at the very least it will be another defeat for Trump.
Proposal for Canada to Join the EU Link to heading
The reaction to the actions of the 47th President of the United States around the world is beginning to take the form of mass resistance. In particular, there was one statement by a German politician that struck me as very significant. Joachim Reit, a member of the European Parliament, gave a major interview to The Guardian in which he said that the European Union needs to be strengthened, including by integrating geographically non-European countries, specifically Canada. So, in response to Trump’s threats to make Canada the 51st state of the USA, there is a possibility of a transatlantic alliance that could ultimately lead to Canada joining the European Union. Because, in fact, what has happened due to Trump’s actions is essentially the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic nature of Western civilization, and this has become a reality. In fact, Trump has effectively separated the United States of America from Europe, setting it in opposition to Europe. But America is not just the United States—it’s also, for instance, Canada. And here, I think, this movement toward Canada joining the EU is quite realistic. Of course, it’s not a matter for today or tomorrow, but I believe this idea could become a reality. And I’m not even talking about how this would increase the weight of the European Union since Canada is already a member of NATO. Canada is a highly educated country—the Canadian people are highly educated, with 58% of Canadians holding higher education degrees. Canada is a wealthy country with enormous energy resources, and it could significantly reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas.
There was a quite representative poll in which 44% of Canadians surveyed believe that Canada should consider joining the European Union. This idea doesn’t seem fantastical because, although the EU treaty stipulates that only European countries can apply for membership, there are exceptions. Many of them are overseas territories of France that lie outside Europe but belong to the EU. Cyprus, for example, is geographically in Western Asia but is an EU member. So I think this formality can be easily overcome. This is yet another reaction from the world to the destructive actions of Trump. I think this prospect is very interesting—it’s not for today or tomorrow, but I believe there is a real possibility of movement in this direction. This is, I would say, a general movement to strengthen Europe’s agency and increase its role. In my view, this is one of the most important responses to the historical challenge posed to humanity by Trumpism: the destruction of Western democracy, which is clearly one of the goals of Trumpism, the enemy of liberal democracy. One of the answers to this could be the strengthening of Europe—militarily, which we are constantly talking about, and also politically, including by bringing in a country like Canada. So, in other words, there is a kind of mutual movement here.
Undermining Europe from Within Link to heading
In addition to this resistance, Trumpism is also working to undermine Europe from within. Here, I’d like to focus on what I consider a very important revelation from one of the main Trojan horses within Europe—arguably the main European Trumpist, Viktor Orban. His recent interview with French journalists, given the day before yesterday, as I see it, very fully outlined his position regarding the war in Ukraine and Russia. This seems to me to be the most complete articulation of his stance to date. So, I think it’s right to highlight and, at the very least, try to analyze this position now. Previously, we mostly just heard some scattered remarks from him: protests against Ukraine joining not only NATO but also the EU, protests against helping Ukraine, and so on—scattered statements. But here, it seems to me, he perhaps for the first time laid out his position in a comprehensive way.
So, the position goes like this—I’m not quoting verbatim, just summarizing: first, Orban claims that the threat from Russia to Europe is illusory because the Russians are too weak. Many Ukrainian journalists I spoke with yesterday took this as some sort of anti-Putin position, but that’s a mistake. In reality, this is Orban’s way of downplaying the threat from Russia to avoid confrontation and to prevent Europe and the United States from supporting Ukraine by saying there is no threat—Russians are too weak for that. They can’t even defeat Ukraine—this, by the way, is a direct quote—and therefore they won’t be able to attack NATO in Ukraine. First, there should be a ceasefire, and then peace.
Orban categorically opposes the growth of Europe’s agency, believing the most important thing is an agreement between Russia and the United States. He says neither the Europeans nor the Ukrainians can reach an agreement with Russia. He is categorically against confrontation with Russia and believes it’s necessary to reach a strategic agreement with Russia that takes Russian interests into account. He is firmly against sanctions. And finally, he declared he would be happy to welcome Putin with full honors if he comes, despite the international arrest warrant.
This position of Orban’s, as I see it, is not the mainstream in Europe, of course, but it is gaining a certain popularity. We see similar sentiments from Fico, from Alternative for Germany in the FRG, and from a fairly large number of supporters of this sort of position. Although it may seem pragmatic, in fact, it’s undoubtedly suicidal for Europe. I thought it was important to mention this.
Self-Proclaimed Leaders of the Russian Opposition Link to heading
Another event that took place last week, which I somehow missed—well, rather, I, I’m speaking about myself now—somehow overlooked because there were so many other, as I saw it, more important events. But still, it’s an event worth mentioning. Last week, what I would call a political striptease of the Russian emigration took place. Not everyone, of course—just the self-proclaimed leaders of the Russian opposition. We’re talking about the fact that on Thursday, June 5th, Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, and Yulia Navalnaya spoke at the European Parliament.
So what happened there? Formally, it was a joint appearance at a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Rights. What actually happened? First of all, one of the most striking things: none of these self-proclaimed leaders—first of all, these people declared themselves the leaders of the opposition, particularly Yulia Navalnaya. In response to a critical remark from one of the parliamentarians who said that at present there isn’t the necessary unity among Russian opposition figures, Navalnaya, without batting an eye, stated that she, Yashin, and Kara-Murza were the united opposition and that they, in fact, represent it. Who told her this? By what means was this decided? How these three came to represent the Russian opposition is entirely unclear. But there they were, the three of them together, saying: we are the leaders of the Russian opposition.
Of the important things that happened there: first, not one of these three people who declared themselves the united Russian opposition’s leaders could answer the question: “Whose is Crimea?” This question was asked, but no clear answer was given. When Yashin was asked if he wanted Russia to lose, he said he wanted Russia to withdraw its troops from Ukraine, and that would be a defeat for Putin but not for Russia. In other words, a complete failure to understand that in this war, you have to choose sides. Are you for Russia or for Ukraine? A total failure to grasp that it’s not just Putin waging this war—Putin isn’t the one personally pulling the triggers, launching the missiles, killing Ukrainians. Russians are doing that. It’s Russia at war with Ukraine, and the inability to see that the only possible position is, well yes, you might say you’re for Russia—but then you’re against Ukraine. This inability to make that choice is what sets these three self-proclaimed leaders apart.
Also of note is Yulia Navalnaya’s indignation. Of course, these three are very different. Yashin and Vladimir Kara-Murza have serious political experience—there’s no question there. They were politicians when they were in Russia. These are people who were also imprisoned for their beliefs—these two facts alone set them far apart from Yulia Navalnaya. So while they might be wrong in their positions, at least they’re coherent. As for Yulia Navalnaya, that’s a separate story. Her indignation was over the European Union allocating €5 million to an American media corporation that reports on Russia—specifically, she didn’t name it, following Putin’s example of not naming Navalny himself. But she meant Radio Liberty. This is, you know, a kind of stylistic striptease.
Navalnaya’s conviction is that instead of supporting Radio Liberty, support should go to Russian media outlets. But what is Radio Liberty? I think everyone understands—it’s a media organization that reports not just on Russia but also on 22 other countries in 27 languages. It played a huge role in the ideological and mental resistance not just in Russia but in many other countries as well. So Navalnaya’s position here shows her incredible political ignorance and, frankly, an overt egoism. A certain—how shall I put it—perhaps the kindest word is a certain naïveté. A person who works solely for themselves, exploiting the memory of their murdered husband to extract every possible dividend and not hiding it at all.
Her separate story includes the channel she’s created and is presenting: the Russian-language channel “Russia of the Future.” Even the name “Russia of the Future” now sounds extremely cynical. The stated idea is that the channel will be about fighting corruption in Russia today, not just about the future of Russia. In essence, the idea behind this channel and the Anti-Corruption Foundation is that Russian officials should stop stealing money so that more of it can be spent on killing Ukrainians. In essence, that’s Yulia Navalnaya’s main idea, if you strip away all the rhetorical flourishes.
As for Yulia Navalnaya, it’s been clear for a long time, just as Yashin’s and Kara-Murza’s positions are also clear. But what’s not surprising, though it does provoke mild annoyance, is the stance of European politicians and public figures—and not just Europeans, but Americans too—who still don’t understand what Russia is, who’s who in Russian emigration, and what it all means. They still treat Yulia Navalnaya as some kind of leader of the Russian opposition. This is probably because they remember that her murdered husband, Alexei Navalny, really was, in a sense, the most prominent political figure in Russia apart from Putin, and could claim leadership of the Russian opposition when it still existed. But why and how that leadership status and political potential should be transferred to his widow is a mystery to political science. Political leadership is not transferred by marriage contract or by biological means. I think this simple truth is unknown to European officials and politicians. Unfortunately, they view the world this way.
I think what’s happened is closely linked to the degradation of the expert community in Europe—and not just in Europe, but in the United States too. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many serious research centers in the US and Europe disappeared or stopped being funded because the Soviet Union had posed a real threat. Russia no longer did. This vacuum was quickly filled by agents of the Putin regime. Besides the serious problem of direct Russian infiltration, the valorization of the expert community—in other words, the influence of structures like the Valdai Club, the penetration of essentially Putin’s agents into the expert community—led to this degradation. As a result, Western politicians following the advice of these so-called experts have lost any understanding of what’s actually going on in Russia, of what to expect from it, and of who’s who. So their personal assessments are completely mistaken.
This is indeed a problem—though not the biggest one, certainly, compared to Trumpism or the tragedy Ukraine is living through now. But still, it’s a petty nastiness that, in my view, complicates the proper development of relations both with Russia and with Ukraine.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
So, before I move on to answering your questions, I want to mention that today at 21:00 we will have a conversation with Vitaly Portnikov. I think there are a lot of questions that make sense to discuss with him. I think it will be interesting at 20:00. Vitaly Portnikov. Now, I’ll move on to answering your questions.
About Korzhavin’s Quatrain Link to heading
The first question is anonymous because the question’s author is in Russia and asked not to mention their name. It’s a rather intriguing question about the perception of a poem by Naum Korzhavin, which includes the following quatrain:
In our difficult times a man needs a wife, a steadfast one, a cozy home to shelter him from the filth of the outside world.
The author of the question is a woman, saying that she and her husband had a disagreement about this. She writes that she, thanks to her acquired specialty, clearly distinguishes between the lyric “I” and the author, and understands the conventions of the lyric world. But her husband, a mathematician and logician, immediately felt a strong dislike for the opening lines of the poem, saying that the words “a man needs a wife” imply that the man is a human and the wife isn’t—that this is what these words mean to him. She objects, saying that in this context, “man” is synonymous with “husband,” and that while it begins with the man’s personal needs, the poem’s perspective broadens to include any concerned person. She doesn’t see a contrast between “a man” and “a wife,” but her husband categorically sees a contrast and refuses to accept the poem because of it. She asked me to look at this text from my perspective.
Dear colleague, I must say that in this case—though not out of male solidarity—I’m on your husband’s side. Here’s why: both you and your husband, as is clear from your words and text, are obviously very intelligent people. I’ve learned over time, in the course of this virtual dialogue with people, to see the human behind the words. And both of you have a heightened sensitivity to the gender-based, let’s say, undertones in the text. I say this with great sympathy for Korzhavin—I remember his work in Novaya Gazeta, where he had a special column. He’s a bright and interesting poet and publicist. But in this case, there is indeed a certain hint of male chauvinism: “a man needs a wife.” I understand your interpretation, that you see the lyric speaker as separate from the author, but still, this does sting a bit. So, while I fully understand your perspective, I’m more on your husband’s side here. I think that, in the end, this may well be a dealbreaker for some readers. So, with all due respect to you and to Korzhavin, I find myself siding more with your husband on this one.
About the State and Russian Propaganda Link to heading
So, a question from the chat from Andreas during the Thursday morning stream last week: In response to a question about the views of the Polish politician Kulpa on history, you expressed the opinion (not verbatim) that one needs to know the Polish side of history as well, because living solely within the Ukrainian historical bubble is quite dangerous. It’s well known that interpretation or distortion of history is a weapon of propaganda in the hands of politicians. The so-called Belarusian side of the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, not to mention the one-sided historical perspectives, for example. Where is the line between interpretation, distortion, propaganda, and simply a different opinion on history?
Dear Andreas, it seems to me that the line is clearly defined by whether propaganda and distortion involve denying or falsifying historical facts. A vivid example is the denial of the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which Soviet history denied for many years. Or, for instance, the assertion that Katyn was the work of the Gestapo, not the NKVD—this is simply the substitution of facts, the denial of facts, the falsification of facts, the invention of facts, and so on. That’s the line beyond which raw propaganda begins—direct lies.
I can’t think offhand of vivid examples of cases that would be more of “another interpretation,” another opinion. Well, for example, today in the Russian version of history, it’s common to portray Alexander Nevsky’s actions as a kind of diplomatic mastery—when he set the Tatar cavalry against Novgorod and his political opponents, he’s presented as a master of diplomacy. It’s no coincidence that he was made a saint and declared the patron of diplomacy by the totalitarian satanic sect of the Russian Orthodox Church. Every time I entered the building of MGIMO over more than two decades, I would cringe at seeing the bust of this vampire, Alexander Nevsky, on the second floor of that building.
So that’s really a question of interpretation: who was Suvorov, for example—a hero or a butcher? That’s interpretation. As long as one doesn’t deny facts but interprets them—there, you get what’s called “another opinion.” But if you deny, for example, Suvorov’s role in suppressing some liberation movements, well, then that’s direct propaganda. That’s how I see that line. Ultimately, of course, this is the realm of historians, not politicians.
Can the War Be Ended by Eliminating the Propagandists Link to heading
Another question from Andreas in the stream: You expressed the idea that it’s impossible to threaten other countries with nuclear weapons if you don’t have delivery systems. The question is: so could the roadmap to ending the war and freeing Russia from the Putin regime lie in blocking the main purveyors of patriotism—the propagandists—by cutting them off from the airwaves, from money, or simply by harshly discrediting them?
You know, I think that’s a very important task—one that, in my very limited capacity, I’m trying to contribute to as well. In fact, I promise that we will more regularly continue with the “Mediafrenia” and “Trumpofrenia” programs and a whole range of other initiatives focused on combating propaganda. But to say that this is the roadmap to ending the war—that this is the main direction of that roadmap—no, I don’t think so.
The main thing is the defeat of the Russian occupying army. Despite the enormous role of propaganda, it’s still secondary. Propaganda undoubtedly plays a part in brainwashing and in why so many Russians support the war, but the core of the roadmap is the destruction of Russia’s military potential. Of course, part of that potential does include these Russian information troops.
About Russian Propaganda Claiming That Ukraine Refuses the Bodies of the Dead Link to heading
A question from Yulia: How to explain why Russia accuses Ukraine of refusing to accept the bodies of the dead? I just don’t believe it.
Well, how? How to explain it? Russian propaganda lies. It lies constantly, because that’s what Russian propaganda does.
Ingredients of a Modern State Link to heading
A question from Ivan: Which, in your view, is more important for the existence and health of a desirable state: democratic elections and representatives of the people, starting from the lowest, municipal level, or the rule of law over the will of individuals or organizations? After all, we probably want different things from the state. Many people crave some form of freedom.
By the way, I’d like to offer a small comment right away: the state does not give freedom. The state can stop limiting it, but it can’t give freedom. That’s not the state’s job. Freedom can only be granted by the individual themselves. Just a small note.
Besides democracy, government, and law, what other ingredients do we need, and how important are they, generally speaking? What should we want—or can we want—from a modern state?
Dear Ivan, I think, to some extent, the question of choosing between democracy—elected government—and the triumph of the law is somewhat rhetorical. It’s like asking: what’s more important, the brain or the heart? Whom do you love more, mom or dad? I believe that, first of all, the presence of elections is impossible without the triumph of the law. Democracy includes elections, and democracy includes the rule of law. These are absolutely inseparable things. In fact, there’s nothing else we should demand from the state—because the state shouldn’t give freedom, and it shouldn’t limit it either. How we use this opportunity—this condition of the state not limiting freedom—is already our question. That’s a question of civil society, of culture, of public consciousness.
About Trump and the “Founding Fathers” Link to heading
So, Alex Ivanov asks: Don’t you think that the system established by the Founding Fathers of the United States has literally become outdated? The system of checks and balances might not work if Trump and those like him simply ignore court decisions, taking into account the fact that the Justice Department is subordinate to Trump. He controls the security apparatus—the National Guard and the police. The Supreme Court and both chambers of Congress are ignored—he does what he wants. Where could this lead? Right now, it looks exactly like that. There are no means to force Trump to comply with the Constitution and court decisions. The Founding Fathers could not have foreseen the election of such a degenerate.
Well, dear Alex, right now there’s an ongoing test. It’s happening at this very moment—it’s happening in California, it’s happening in a whole series of court cases that are going all the way up to the Supreme Court. Right now, we’re witnessing a test of this system’s stability. This system is currently being tested by Trump. We’re watching this colossal historical experiment unfold in real time.
About Dictators Link to heading
A question from a subscriber calling themselves capo BBC. Let me just say once again, dear friends, if you want me to address you by a certain name, feel free to use any name. It’s not at all that I require you to give up anonymity. Otherwise, I just read what YouTube calls you. In the stream you said that the death of a dictator can change everything. What do you think is the real source of a dictator’s power—one that makes people carry out their will? Dictators can’t shoot lasers from their eyes or anything. Why do people obey them? Is it sheer, wet-your-pants fear? What kind of power is this? I think it’s an interesting topic for research at the intersection of sociology and psychology. For example, everyone knows that during the repressions of the 1930s, the NKVD officers would jump out of windows when it became clear they’d soon be arrested, but there’s not a single known case of one of them resisting. If you’re going to die anyway, why not die fighting back? So where does this paralysis of will come from in dictatorial systems? It’s really interesting—these were heroes of war, the Civil War, the First World War, men who didn’t fear death in battle, yet they feared the dictator.
It’s an intriguing story. You see, during wartime, people felt they had the support of their comrades. Here, though, they found themselves alone against the system. It was their own coming for them. What happens in a dictatorship? The dictator builds a system—this system of suppression. It really works. A person feels alone against this system.
This feeling that everyone else is afraid—that’s key. When Putin was berating his Security Council lackeys, it was a collective fear. If even one of them had stood up, I think the situation could have changed. But this system of suppression—when a person feels utterly alone—really works.
There’s another aspect. Speaking specifically of Putinism, this has been 25 years of purges. Rising to the top has depended on negative selection. In Putin’s system, those who ended up at the top were the ones incapable of resisting. All those who were not afraid, who could stand up without wetting themselves at the dictator’s gaze, never made it to the top. Some were killed, some were filtered out, some emigrated. Just look at who’s at the top now—these are the very ones who trembled before Putin. Twenty-five years of Putin’s selection process—and that’s the result. So the system works as both a selection mechanism and a tool of suppression.
About the Kovalchuk Brothers Link to heading
A question from Egor: Who are the Kovalchuk brothers? Where are their relatives and children? Please tell us.
Dear Egor, I’ll briefly answer your question, though I don’t want to substitute for Wikipedia or encyclopedias. In short, here are the well-known facts: there’s Yury Valentinovich Kovalchuk, who is the former chairman of the board of Rossiya Bank—a purely Putin-style bank. There’s his older brother, Mikhail Kovalchuk, president of the Kurchatov Institute and a person who, to a large extent, has ruined the Russian Academy of Sciences. Yury Kovalchuk’s son has been chairman of the Audit Chamber since last year.
Indeed, according to a number of investigations, Yury Kovalchuk played a significant role in misleading Putin. Not because I think that the tsar is good and the boyars are bad—of course, Putin himself made the decisions and was only too happy to be misled—but there’s evidence suggesting that Yury Kovalchuk had a crucial role in pushing Putin to decide to attack Ukraine. He helped create an information bubble for Putin in which Ukraine seemed very weak, and the situation in Europe seemed favorable, and so on. That’s basically it in a nutshell about these people.
About the FBK and the Hatred Towards It Link to heading
Gennady Konovalov asks a very distinctive question: If you believe, unlike the FBK, that corruption in Putin’s Russia is good, then following your logic, one could also say that fascism, general savagery, the absence of morality, legal arbitrariness, repression, and the unchanging dictatorship are also good. But in their boundless hatred of the FBK, many people confuse causes and effects. They cross the boundaries of decency. Don’t you think so?
Dear Gennady, no, I don’t think so. I’m not sure whom you’re talking about—this “boundless hatred of the FBK.” What I see is something else. I think that the main thing happening today in Eurasia, in Europe, is the war—the war of the Putin Reich against Ukraine. And all events, including those in Russia itself, must be interpreted in the context of this war. So, I don’t believe corruption is good, but I do believe that an objective fight against corruption benefits the Russian economy. That’s obvious, isn’t it?
Just follow the logic instead of using labels. There’s a simple question: does corruption benefit or harm Russia’s economy? I believe it harms it. Right? Gennady, just answer that question: does corruption harm Russia’s economy? Yes or no? It does, right? Therefore, fighting corruption benefits Russia’s economy. Yes or no? Yes, it does. So, fighting corruption strengthens Russia’s economy, meaning it allows Russia to spend more on the war, to kill more Ukrainians, to more effectively seize Ukrainian territory. That’s obvious, isn’t it? So, there’s no need to put forward nonsense like claiming that fascism is good, legal arbitrariness is good, repression is good. That’s a strange position.
I think either you, dear Gennady, are simply trolling me—which is your right—or you’re just unable to connect the dots. Trying to fix certain shortcomings of the Hitler Reich in the midst of a war to make it more effective might seem like a good idea from your perspective.
There’s no boundless hatred of the FBK here. There’s simply the understanding that this organization, especially after the tragic death of Navalny, has degenerated and lost any real meaning, as I’ve said several times. This is especially tied to the fact that its claims to leadership in the broader opposition have been taken up by Yulia Navalnaya.
On refusing to criticize Ukraine and analysis Link to heading
Alright. Here, Andreas is once again bringing up the question of why I refuse to criticize Ukraine. You’re saying that you don’t criticize Ukraine for moral reasons, because as a citizen of an aggressor country, you don’t consider yourself entitled to do so. However, you remain in the public role of an independent analyst, from whom the audience expects a comprehensive view of events. Doesn’t that mean that your personal moral principle takes priority over the professional standard of analytical objectivity? If so, shouldn’t you then clearly identify your role not as an analyst, but as a moral commentator with a partial perspective on events? Because otherwise, the audience might perceive your silence not as a choice, but as a lack of a problem, which in itself is a form of influence.
So, dear Andrey, you’re still trying to get me to either start investigating and criticizing the actions of the Ukrainian government, or to admit and hang a sign on myself that says I’m not doing analysis, but just moral commentary. You know, I don’t hang signs on myself. I’m not claiming to be some completely impartial analyst. No, I’m a journalist, a sociologist who analyzes events and comments on them critically. That’s it. How I’m perceived — well, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, as they say. So how the audience perceives me is their business. But I’m not going to hang any signs on myself except the one that’s already in my, so to speak, stream. I’m a journalist. I’m a sociologist. Period. After that, it’s up to you to decide whether to consider me an objective analyst or a moral commentator. That’s up to you. As for objectivity — that’s not true. What does it mean that my silence means there’s no problem? No, I’ve never hidden and never claimed that there are no problems in Ukraine related to, well, political and military leadership. There are problems. You see? But it’s not my task, you understand? It’s not my job. There are countless problems in the world that I don’t analyze — for example, I don’t analyze internal issues in Australia, but they exist. There are people who do that. Moreover, my self-imposed taboo on analyzing internal Ukrainian problems is not eternal. I don’t rule out that at some point I might lift this self-imposed ban. Possibly. I just think that right now it’s not advisable because I don’t see problems or mistakes in the Ukrainian government or its military and political leadership that would require my analysis. Because otherwise, the analysis wouldn’t be complete. I think the main problems right now are Russia’s position — and I analyze that — and the position of the United States of America — I analyze that — and Europe’s position — I analyze that too. As for some internal issues in Ukraine, yes, they exist, I don’t deny that. But I don’t think that right now switching to analyzing them is necessary. And you see, the whole question is about proportions. There’s a whole group of people who focus solely on that. For example, Babchenko — he can’t pass by the Ukrainian leadership without criticizing them. Everything’s wrong for him. Or, for example, Koch, who in every text says something about the incredible stupidity of the Ukrainian leadership — in literally every text. Or, for example, Shariy — the same thing, you see? There are people who do that. Please, go to them, and you’ll get a full picture, a complete register. Or, for example, Arestovych. Or Latynina — please. If you want criticism of the Russian leadership, go to them. You see? So I’m not suggesting you only listen to me. That’s it. I don’t have a monopoly. So my choice is exactly that. I think it’s quite appropriate for the current situation.
About Bandera Link to heading
Ah? So, Timofey Tatarenko has a few questions. About Bandera, historical memory. Can we invite to the discussion the figure of Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian historian and blogger? Well, actually, that’s who you’re talking about — Vitaly Alexandrovich. GREBNEV
Yes. Well, in principle, yes. I’m just not sure. Right now, I’m not sure that discussing the figure of Stepan Bandera is extremely relevant, like dropping everything and starting to discuss this figure. Maybe, I don’t know. Somehow, I’m just not very interested in it. I might disappoint you, but right now, discussing Bandera out of the blue — I don’t know, I’m not sure.
About Marcus Aurelius Link to heading
The next question is about Marcus Aurelius. How do you assess the philosophy of Stoicism as a whole, and Marcus Aurelius’s views in particular, especially his practice of journaling as a philosophical, personal tool of reflection?
Yes, absolutely. Well, it’s probably one of those unique cases where an emperor was engaged in such deep self-reflection. It’s a unique experience, specifically from the standpoint of reflection itself. He did this for himself — these writings weren’t meant for publication. It’s essentially the internal laboratory of Marcus Aurelius. In terms of content, I’m not that interested. I think I read 12 of these texts at one point, and they didn’t leave a deep impression on me. But I was intrigued by the practice of this kind of reflection — in terms of content, I didn’t see much added value compared to Epictetus, because essentially it’s a restatement of what Epictetus wrote. It’s the idea that you shouldn’t try to remake the world to your liking, that you should accept fate, as we’d now say, stoically — calmly, without complaint. Overall, it’s an interesting and worthy position.
Next, there’s a question about duality. So, Timofey raises a question about the duality of Marcus Aurelius. Why, despite his historical philosophy preaching tolerance and inner calm, is Marcus Aurelius criticized by historians for persecuting Christians? To what extent is this contradiction rooted in his personal views, and to what extent in the political context?
Well, dear Timofey, you know, generally speaking, a philosopher — Marcus Aurelius was, after all, an acting philosopher, a philosopher in power — is always a contradictory figure. And here there’s an obvious contradiction, you’re right. He saw Christians as a threat to the empire. This is one of those cases where — and please take my words here with a bit of self-irony — I’m not trying to compare myself to Marcus Aurelius, of course, but one of the reasons I left politics was because I realized it’s impossible to combine journalism or sociology with political work. The contradiction of Marcus Aurelius is a vivid example of that: that it’s impossible to reconcile, and it manifested clearly. Of course, according to the logic of Stoicism, the persecution of Christians was not justified. But Marcus Aurelius, in this case, acted as an emperor, who understood the growing spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire as a threat to the empire. He was outraged by this Christian embrace of death and so on — belief in the afterlife, all of that. He saw it as a threat to the empire. So, in this case, he was acting not as a philosopher, but as an emperor.
About Churchill’s Fulton Speech Link to heading
Nail Vakhitov. How would you comment on Churchill’s speech? Fulton. I first read it, I think, in 2008. I agree with every word there. Churchill probably wasn’t right about everything. Maybe he missed something.
I think this is the easiest question for you. Well, yes. In the form in which you’re asking it, the question is indeed an easy one. This is a historic speech, this was in 1946. It was essentially the West’s positioning after the war — the Iron Curtain, the announcement or rather the acknowledgment of the Cold War, the declaration that the Soviet Union, a former ally in the war, was now an adversary. So it really was a historic speech. And I don’t see any mistake in it. I think, especially given that the speech was delivered in the United States, it was one of the most vivid political acts of Churchill.
About Zhvanetsky’s remarks and attitudes towards the military Link to heading
So, Sokol Pushkin Mikhail Mikhailovich Zhvanetsky once shared some information about the customs prevailing in the ranks of the “Israeli military” in quotation marks. It turns out that soldiers who are captured are instructed to tell everything they know without waiting for torture. And during this time, apparently, the military units are supposed to change their deployment locations. That’s how the satirist jokes. Also, the crews are driven to the front lines only by the driver, while the rest of the crew gets there on their own, so as not to wear themselves out in this “oven” even before the battle begins. And the question from Sokol Koshkin: Why do some countries have such an attitude towards their servicemen? Perhaps others don’t. Israel is just an example I brought up. I’m not asking which approach is more humane — that’s obvious. I want to ask which approach, from your point of view, is more effective in terms of completing the combat mission.
Well, you know, I think the experience of the Israeli army proves that their approach is more effective. The value of human life and the respect for the army in Israel is just so strong. And this approach that Zhvanetsky described, and which is well known — that every… Excuse me, please. I just noticed this because I recently lived in Israel for about six months, and I have a lot of acquaintances in Israel. Young men and women go into military service willingly and with the clear understanding that it’s not just a duty, but they do it without fear, knowing that the country has their back. What you just quoted from Zhvanetsky is just one part of what creates this environment. It’s definitely very effective — specifically from a military point of view, in terms of completing combat missions. Because every Israeli soldier knows that if something happens to them, the whole country will stand behind them and spare no effort to rescue them if they’re captured, for example. So it’s not just a humane approach — it’s also a very pragmatic one. I think that in this case, Israel is a model for building relationships between soldiers, the state, and society.
About Chekhov and the film “The Darling” Link to heading
So, a question from Serafim Lozhkin. An unexpected question for you, not your usual topic. I’m watching an old film, “The Darling,” based on Chekhov’s story. I remembered a literature lesson in a Soviet school in the 1960s. The teacher said that the heroine is a negative character. I still don’t understand why, why she’s considered negative. Besides you, I have no one to ask. Apparently, I’m missing something.
Well? Dear colleague, you’re really pushing me into the field of literary criticism, which I absolutely don’t want to enter. But let’s lay out a few theses. First of all, this whole thing — your teacher sticking labels on characters — that’s part of the Soviet tradition of holding trials over characters like Eugene Onegin, this attempt to divide characters into negative and positive. Chekhov, like Gogol, didn’t do that. He didn’t create negative or positive characters — he just took pieces of life and described them. So, what is “The Darling”? I’ll say right away that for many men, a woman who completely dissolves herself in her husband is an ideal. So many would like their wives to be like that. But for the emancipation of women, for feminists especially, this is a negative. So it all depends on what perspective you’re looking from. I think Chekhov absolutely brilliantly depicted a particular type of woman — neither negative nor positive, just as she is. So you see, I’m not going to do literary criticism in the spirit of those old Soviet “pioneer trials” over NATO, over “The Darling,” over Anna Karenina, over whom? Over Eugene Onegin. Definitely not. This is just a very vivid character. Thank you, thank you to Chekhov for being able to pull from life and depict, to pass through his genius and show this type of woman. Again, for many men, it’s an ideal — for the emancipation of women, for feminists especially, it’s certainly a very negative image. It all depends on whose eyes you’re looking through.
About the stupidity and intelligence of bloggers Link to heading
Vladimir Krikunov. I get the impression that most bloggers and commentators on the war and everything related to it are talking absolute nonsense. I mean the opinions that are on our side, so to speak. And it’s nonsense not out of malice, stupidity, or ignorance — it’s about filling airtime. I’ll clarify that I haven’t noticed this with you, which is why I’m asking whether you’ve noticed confirmation of my observations?
Dear Vladimir, maybe we’re watching different streams of different bloggers, but overall I don’t think so. Yes, of course, there are… I just don’t know what general pool of bloggers you used or what selective sample of bloggers you used to come to such a conclusion. I don’t know, I’m just not ready to say. I haven’t gotten that impression. Yes, naturally, since I do media criticism, I see mistakes in our colleagues, in our like-minded people as well. But I wouldn’t criticize so harshly. Again, it’s a matter of choice, a matter of the sample.
About collective responsibility Link to heading
A question from a subscriber under the name “Starter.” Sasha, you’ve often said that all Russians bear collective responsibility for the war. How do you understand the collective responsibility of Jews in 1930s Germany by analogy with Russians, who never were subjects of their country? Do you believe that Jews also bore collective responsibility for the actions of their government? If not, then for what? Or is this an exception?
Dear colleague, this isn’t an exception. It’s just, as they say, the nail is being hammered into the wrong wall. The Russian government acts on behalf of Russians. Hitler did not act on behalf of the Jews — in a series of laws, he excluded Jews from the number of German citizens. That’s the 1935 Nuremberg laws and other laws — he struck them out. He didn’t act on behalf of Jews, he declared Jews to be his enemies. So, of course, there’s no collective responsibility there. And that’s a radical difference between Russians in the Putin era and Jews in the Hitler era — there’s no common ground here. There’s absolute antagonism, absolute difference. There isn’t a single similarity here.
About fundraising and commissioned film Link to heading
Denis Shvets, two questions How much does it cost to make a commissioned video? For example, a film on the topic of the history of Putin with coverage of his reactions to events — a short one-hour piece, and then to launch a fundraiser for a series with commentary from psychologists, historians, human rights defenders, and relatives. Obviously, for witnesses of those events now and for history teachers of future generations, it would be useful to learn the history of the criminal of our time from a journalist like you, me.
Dear Denis, I can say right away that I will not be announcing a fundraiser. If I have the strength, health, and ability, I’ll make this film. It’s an interesting idea — thank you for it. But I definitely won’t announce a fundraiser, because as I’ve said several times before, when I collect money for drones for the Freedom of Russia Legion, I don’t accumulate this money in some account of my own. I just provide the accounts of those organizations fighting against Putin’s fascism. In the same way, I suggest that those who want to support the channel become subscribers or patriots, or find some other way to help. But I don’t announce fundraising for specific things because that would mean creating some sort of accounting — I’d have to report on it and so on. That’s something I don’t want to do. As for the film — it’s an interesting idea. I don’t think it would cost some crazy amount of money. The question isn’t so much about money as about my physical resources, and those are quite limited. So if I can, I’ll do it without money. I simply don’t have the physical resources for large projects, so I won’t be collecting money for them either. But of course, funds are needed to maintain the team I already have.
About humanity’s third transition Link to heading
Now another question from Denis. Humanity, as a species, has evolved twice. The agricultural transition — planting seeds, and the invention of the printing press. The first allowed humans to move from living with animals and forests to living in families rather than tribes. The second divided philosophy into physics, chemistry, nuclear energy, mechanics, automotive engineering, economics, cybernetics, and so on. What do you think the third transition might be for us as a species? Even the first successful colony on another planet wouldn’t give a big result by itself. Artificial intelligence, it seems, can only degrade. The ability of people to learn and, therefore, to research and create new things — maybe the next transition will be the development of post-post-apocalyptic societies.
Dear Denis! You’re talking about evolution. First of all, I’m not really sure that what you’re talking about is the evolution of humans as a species. That is, humans as a species, as Homo sapiens, remain in the same state they were in before the Neolithic Revolution and before the printing press. What you’re really talking about is revolutions or evolution within civilization. Here, I want to share my opinion. In my view, you’re mixing two different foundations. First, if you’re talking about a political revolution, as you mention, then the logical continuation of that would not be the Gutenberg Revolution, but rather, after the Neolithic Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and then the post-industrial. So there are three of these big breaks or transitions: the Neolithic Revolution, then the Industrial Revolution, and then the post-industrial.
If you’re talking about media revolutions, then before Gutenberg’s era, there was the invention of writing — that was a real revolution that Socrates, among others, opposed. Then there was the printing press, then television, radio, the Internet, social networks. So there’s that logic, too. These are two different kinds of changes in human society that went in parallel, but to mix them and say, “the Neolithic Revolution and then the printing press” — that’s a bit illogical.
But now, the main point. You’re inviting me to do some futurology, to look into something like an anti-utopia. If I understand you correctly, your idea of developing post-apocalyptic societies is, I guess, an invitation to an anti-utopia? Well, I don’t know — that’s not really close to me. So what’s the next transition? For now, we just have to survive this one. Right now, the horizon of planning, of forecasting, is very limited because of the chaos that’s being created. Right now there’s chaos, fog — the future is very hard to see through it. Let’s say there are probabilities of different developments. We can talk about various probabilities of how these transitions might unfold. So I don’t think there’s one single policy or path that leads from the past to the future. A lot depends on human actions, on freedom of will. And I think that’s the problem — for futurologists.
About Todorovsky’s film “My Friend Frankenstein” Link to heading
Alright. Tesla or Bertha? What is your opinion on Valery Petrovich Todorovsky’s film “My Friend Frankenstein”? Is it banned today?
No, I haven’t heard anything about it being banned. The film is an anti-war film that describes what’s called the Chechen syndrome. It’s a good, solid film. The Chechen syndrome is shown, depicted. But again, I don’t want to be a film critic. Beyond that, it becomes subjective — evaluations of the actors’ performances and so on — and that’s not my area. I either get or don’t get aesthetic pleasure from watching certain films, but I don’t consider my taste to be a standard. I’ve said that several times. So I’m not going to go onto the field of film criticism — I won’t do that. But the fact is, yes, it’s an anti-war film that analyzes the Chechen syndrome and does so quite well. It’s not banned. I haven’t heard anything about that, at least.
About Brilev and propagandists Link to heading
Alright. Sergey asks: Tell me, please, what do you know about Sergey Brilev? Why isn’t anyone dealing with him? Richard Putin’s talk propagandists on Channel One Russia — deceitful reports from Europe, the Saturday wrap-up program, lots of other stuff. Yes, right after the start of the not-war, he immediately fled to London. But, excuse me, before that he had been shamelessly lying and fooling Russians for 22 years. Will he really get away with all that? Why isn’t anyone in the exiled journalistic community raising this issue? He has a passport in Britain, property that could be seized if not jailed. Or am I missing something?
Dear Sergey! As far as I know, Brilev — let’s put the dots over the i’s. Brilev is under sanctions from the UK, Ukraine, Australia, and Canada. That’s what I know specifically — whether they’ve taken anything from him or not, I don’t know. But he is under sanctions. As for evaluating Brilev — I completely agree with you. He was once seen as a “light” propagandist — meaning he wasn’t spouting smoke from his ears, he didn’t have foam at the mouth when he ranted like Solovyov. But he was a propagandist and a liar, that’s obvious. He’s under sanctions. I don’t know what else there is to say. Whether they took away his property, I just don’t know. Honestly, I’m not very interested in him. Just because right now he’s not in the spotlight. So, well, he was — and he’s under sanctions. That’s enough justice for me — that he’s under sanctions from the UK, Ukraine, Australia, and Canada, as far as I know.
About Communist Party deputy Bondarenko Link to heading
Alright? A question from George: Would you be interested in talking to the Communist Party deputy Nikolai Bondarenko? He manages to criticize the government every day on his channel. Still free?
I don’t know. I’m not sure, first of all, if he would want to talk to me. Secondly, I’m not sure, not sure — after all, being a deputy from the Communist Party is, well, it’s a sentence in itself. But yes, he does indeed criticize the government — he’s very bright, very noisy, yes? Well, I don’t know. Dear colleague, this is a very unexpected idea for me. I’m not sure. I’d have to look for him. Of course, I know him — he’s very popular, very well known. But I’m not sure I want to. I’d need to study it, to understand why. You see, he’s there, he speaks a lot, he’s quoted by many. I don’t really understand why — what would be the point of arranging a debate with him on some political topics? I don’t know, maybe to try to reveal him as a politician? I don’t know. I need to think about it. It’s an unexpected question. I’m not ready.
About the invitation from Vox Veritatis Link to heading
Anna Winter. Regarding historical discussions, I can recommend to you the historian and blogger Vox Veritatis.
Well, yes, I know who you’re talking about, and overall, it’s interesting. I’m just not 100% sure that I want to organize any serious historical discussions right now. In a conversation with Piotr Kulpa, I happened to mention the idea of organizing a political discussion with him. But since he personally took quite a firm position — one that many in Poland share — a critical assessment of the Ukrainian view of history, I spontaneously proposed in a live stream to arrange a discussion with a Polish historian and a Ukrainian historian. Just like that. But he declined at the time, saying that history is a matter for historians.
So, as for deliberately organizing discussions right now, I’m not sure it’s necessary. It’s just something that really needs to be thought through.
About Kellogg’s speech Link to heading
Alright. Continuing our discussion with a subscriber named Max about Kellogg’s speech, Max writes: I don’t equate condemnation of escalation with the statement of fact that risks are increasing — for me, these are different statements, leading to different consequences. When the U.S. wants to condemn, they say it directly. For example, in 2004, after Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, the U.S. expressed official disapproval. And so on. Today we’re dealing with Trump. It’s clear what that means, but I didn’t hear any official condemnation. Just some vague phrases that don’t limit Ukraine’s further actions. He just stated that these strikes increased the level of risk. You can interpret his words in different ways, and so on.
So, this is a question, again, you know, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. You think that saying these strikes increased the level of risk isn’t condemnation. I think that any, any such statement that something increases the level of risk carries a negative connotation. You think it doesn’t? Well. So, on to the next point.
Again, subscriber Max writes that the discussion between Ukraine and Poland about national heroes, even if historians rather than publicists conduct it, is absolutely untimely.
Well, let’s put it this way. I’m generally ready to agree with you. I’m ready to agree. At least, I probably won’t be doing that on our channel. Although that’s a debatable point, you know? Because the question is: what result do we expect? If it leads to discord, then that’s not great. But if it’s possible to find some consensus, then maybe it’s worth it — but that has to be predicted. But probably, I’m ready to agree with you.
About liberal values and democracy during wartime Link to heading
A question from Van. Regarding liberalism, I agree, but still, in some cases, such as providing urgent military aid, lengthy approvals can have irreversible consequences.
Dear colleague, I can only say that in wartime, democracy does indeed shrink. But the whole question is whether democracy should be limited only in the countries directly involved in the war, or whether everyone else should also be forced to follow suit. I think not. I think preserving democratic governance itself is valuable. So, about the long approvals — it seems to me that’s not inherently a property of liberalism. It depends on people. If people aren’t hurrying, if they don’t understand that their decisions affect the fate of others, that’s not a matter of liberalism — it’s a matter of the specific people in charge.
About Robert Sapolsky Link to heading
Next. Alexander Zhirnov, on the topic of the emergence of religiosity among contemporaries. One of the best is Professor, neuroendocrinologist Robert Sapolsky. There are many videos of his on this topic. Please present them to our audience.
Dear Alexander! I’m fulfilling your request. Here it is: Professor Robert Sapolsky. The only thing I want to say is that he’s truly a very interesting author. He’s a blogger, he’s the author of many popular videos, and overall he’s interesting. But you know, he’s still somewhat closer to militant atheism — well, maybe “militant” is not quite the right word, but his materials under the title “The Biology of Religiousness,” when he derives not even the psychological but the biological roots of religiosity — to me, that seems somewhat one-sided. I myself take a generally skeptical, very skeptical view of religion. But I’m not a supporter of this kind of biological approach to religion. I think religion is still a social process, a social phenomenon, not a biological one.
About timestamps Link to heading
A proposal from a Moscow migrant Let me help your editors with timestamps.
Thank you very much. I think we’ll do it this way. We do indeed have some problems in the work of our team, related to the health of one of the participants, and for a while, I would be truly grateful if you could take on that function.
About street polls Link to heading
Alright? Regarding polls. Here’s Dr. Wallace: Conducting a poll is a good idea. I think that statistics in the UK, at least in the region called West London, would be very dismal.
Well, this isn’t about statistics. Street talks aren’t representative surveys — they’re illustrations. Right? And then Leonid writes: If there’s no one in Yerevan for the street talks, I’d be happy to do it, but I only have a phone.
A phone is enough. So. That’s one opinion about street polls. In my opinion, you’re self-sufficient in your program. Pandering to your dear viewers and their many requests in the name of entertainment won’t benefit an author’s channel with your academic style of narration. The results of the polls… and then there’s some more criticism.
You know, I think — well, we’ll try, we’ll try. There’s nothing catastrophic about it. And then Tatiana’s opinion: Who needs these street polls? Why waste time on that?
Dear Tatiana! Let’s give it a try. If it works, great. If it doesn’t fit organically, if it’s clunky and gets in the way, we’ll stop. That’s it. And here’s Max’s opinion again: I’ll share my view on street polls — I’m not interested, because they’re not representative. It’s someone’s opinion. If we’re talking about an instrumental toolkit, then it’s not an instrument. But what would be interesting and useful would be to introduce a section called “News in Sociology.” Many listeners don’t have the time — and more importantly, the habit — to follow social polls. It would be useful to know the results — that’s already an instrument.
Dear Max! Well, since you’re a regular conversation partner and I really respect your opinion, let me just offer a counterpoint. Here’s how I see it: tell me, for example, do illustrations — like the pictures you see on a magazine cover — have a kind of… you see? Street polls, street talks are illustrations. Yes, they’re not representative, they’re not science, they’re not sociology, but they’re illustrations. They’re illustrations. That’s why I believe they have a right to exist. I always stress that even our polls on our channel aren’t representative — not even in relation to anything, not even the channel’s audience, because it’s the most active segment that answers. And how that correlates with broader views — it’s also unclear. But it’s an illustration, it’s a snapshot, it’s like a photo that accompanies an article. How much the photo captures some general trend — that’s always a question. So I think, let’s keep them. Let’s give it a try.
Concluding word Link to heading
That’s it for today. See? This time we’re under two hours — already progress. Dear friends, we’re wrapping up our morning talk for today. I’ll remind you once again that at 9 PM we’ll have a meeting with Vitaliy Portnikov. I think it will be an interesting “synchronization of watches.” Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves, freedom for Alexander Skobov, for all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian prisoners of war. See you at 8 PM. Goodbye!
Source: https://youtu.be/HlgMne5Iz5o