Ukraine and the United States signed an agreement on natural resources. It does not contain any Ukrainian debts. Tucker Carlson directly accused Zelensky’s government of attempting to assassinate Trump.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 1st, in Kyiv. It is now 7:41 AM, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Natural Resources Deal Link to heading
Well, I’ll get straight to the main point. Despite many twists and turns surrounding this natural resources deal—which was initially called the Rare Earth Metals Deal, then the Rare Earth Elements Deal, and finally the Resources Deal—it was, in short, signed. It was signed by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Oon and Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Yulia Svyrydenko. The scale of this event, I think, is something we’ll discuss today. I’ll be having an important conversation with Igor Vladimirovich Lipsits, where we’ll discuss the specifics and details of this deal in more depth. But already, it’s safe to say that both the results and the process are quite significant. What is known at this point, and is not really in doubt, is that this is about the creation of an investment fund for the restoration of Ukraine. Ukraine retains full control over its subsoil, infrastructure, and natural resources. The fund is being created on a 50/50 basis. The most important achievement of this negotiation process is that the agreement does not involve any debt obligations for Ukraine and does not pose any barrier to Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. In essence, the deal grants the United States privileged access to new investment projects, namely, to all projects related to the development of Ukraine’s natural resources.
Let me describe how both sides present this deal. First, as I’ve said, full ownership and control remain with Ukraine. Second, it’s a partnership of equals—50/50 management of this fund. Ukraine’s national assets are protected, and the deal does not create any debt obligations for Ukraine. It is fully consistent with Ukraine’s Euro-integration path, and the fund will be financed exclusively through new licenses. There are, of course, tax guarantees. Just a few hours ago, as I was preparing this commentary, the press was dominated by reports that the deal was falling apart. This was still the case as of last night. Different sources described the reasons for the breakdown in different ways. Some blamed Ukraine, saying that just hours before signing—on the night of April 30—the Ukrainian side started making changes to the agreement. The U.S. reportedly issued an ultimatum: either sign the agreement or go home. This clearly echoed the tones of the infamous Oval Office scandal when the Trump administration simply kicked the Ukrainian delegation out of the White House—and basically out of the United States altogether.
But other sources referenced Yulia Svyrydenko’s position: she was willing to sign a framework agreement but refused to sign a detailed version, insisting that such a detailed agreement required approval from the Verkhovna Rada. In any case, all of that is in the past now. The deal has been signed, and I believe this is an enormous success, clearly for both sides, but especially for Ukrainian diplomacy. I don’t know all the individuals involved, but we do know that one person who fought for terms acceptable to Ukraine was Yulia Svyrydenko. It’s also evident that there was a team of lawyers behind her—I don’t know who they were, but their role was critical. This is undeniably a major achievement because the Ukrainian side managed to counter Trump’s position—Trump, who had just recently been demanding Ukraine repay non-existent debts. It’s very telling how that position evolved. At first, Trump claimed Ukraine owed the U.S. $500 billion. Then the figure dropped to $350 billion, then $300 billion, and finally to $100 billion. And in the end, that number magically disappeared altogether. This is a major diplomatic win and a clear sign that Ukrainian diplomacy has grown significantly stronger in recent years.
In general, I want to stress again that we will discuss the scope and importance of this agreement with Igor Vladimirovich Lipsits, but it’s already clear that this is a breakthrough. One of the biggest questions is whether this agreement in some way preserves a U.S. role in the peace process. Because if the U.S. now has major economic interests in Ukraine, it sends a message to Russia, to Putin, that the U.S. now has serious, high-priority interests in Ukraine. Therefore, continuing the war against Ukraine now significantly risks violating U.S. economic interests. If the United States is investing and developing industrial facilities—mining and processing plants, for example—how else can they develop mineral resources? Structures must be built. And in that case, war becomes direct interference in U.S. interests. How this changes the whole situation is something I definitely want to talk about today. I have two meetings—one with Igor Eidman and one with Igor Vladimirovich Lipsits. I’ll be discussing this topic with both of them. I think this is a situation that could significantly change not only the dynamic but also affect the U.S. position on this war. It would be very strange, for example, if the U.S., having signed this deal and established a vested interest in its success—in the revenue it could generate—were to stop funding or supporting Ukraine militarily. That would leave Ukraine defenseless against Russian aggression. So then how would the U.S. protect its economic interests, how would it protect these very mining and processing plants that are supposed to be built? These are real questions that need to be addressed. But overall, I believe this is a very positive development.
Tucker Carlson Link to heading
And of course, when talking about life today, how can one avoid negativity? One such negative development is yesterday’s statement by Tucker Carlson alleging that the Zelensky government was involved in an assassination attempt on Trump. Let me quote what was said yesterday: “This is a fact,” claimed Tucker Carlson, referring to “elements of the Ukrainian leadership.” What exactly these “elements” are, I don’t know. But here’s the phrase: “Elements of the Ukrainian leadership have attempted to assassinate certain individuals, starting with the current president.” Essentially, I don’t know how soon Tucker Carlson will be invited to host his own show on Russian television, but I think this process should happen at lightning speed because he’s ready. Naturally, the question arises: where? Most likely in Margarita Simonyan’s department. He’s ready—practically already there.
And I must say, in terms of dishonesty and rabid service to Putin’s fascist regime, Tucker Carlson might actually outdo Solovyov. He is, without question, more talented. Without question, as a professional content creator, he is stronger than all of them. Therefore, I think the role of a kind of Goebbels or Julius Streicher has been reserved for him—he is undoubtedly number one right now. What’s particularly interesting is that all this time we believed that Tucker was—well, I personally thought Tucker Carlson was primarily serving Trump. But now I’m not so sure. Perhaps for a time, he was definitely doing Trump’s bidding. Then he seemed to serve two masters. And now, perhaps, he’s more in service to Putin’s interests, judging by his recent statements. Quite a transformation.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, I want to remind you once again that we have two very interesting guests today. At 20:00 and 13:00, we have Igor Eidman, and at 18:00, Igor Lipsits. I think both conversations are worth watching and listening to, because these are people who have a non-trivial understanding of reality, who can clarify and refine perspectives—experts whose opinions are important on many current issues, especially in connection with last night’s signing of this deal. Now, moving on to your questions.
What Does the Religion Animal Project Look Like? Link to heading
So, a question from Yulia.
How do you envision activity within the Religion Animal project? If there were no war right now, and if you had free time, what would this project mean to you? Expansion of Dutch practices, creating a coalition of countries united by a common law on animals? Perhaps the revival of the cult of God the Father, the protector of animals, or something else? And the second question: what if the war lasts another 15 years, and we never start the Religion Animal project?
The second question is relatively easy to answer because I just don’t know. First, I don’t know how long this war will last. Second, I simply don’t know how much time or how many resources can be freed up, you know? But at this moment, all of my personal, intellectual, temporal, and most importantly, energetic resources are devoted to the projects I’m currently involved in. I have absolutely no reserves to start any new projects. And the Religion Animal project is a very, very serious and large undertaking that probably requires full-time commitment—yes, that serious.
Now, what is this project? I’ll answer briefly. It has several dimensions. First and foremost, it’s a research project. Some of the provocative questions are fully valid. Everyone has the right to criticize, mock, and laugh—that’s a full right. I’m not offended at all and fully acknowledge the right to mock or ridicule any of my positions. That’s fine. Still, there are many questions like “how can this be without meat?”, or “cats kill mice—what, should we ban that too?” and so on. Or “there are dog breeds specifically bred for hunting—should they all be killed now?”, etc. In short, there’s a lot of mockery and questions that do have the right to be asked.
To immediately address questions like “are you going to protect the rights of worms, or bacteria too?”—yes, those are questions that deserve to be answered. So, in the broadest sense, this is a research project aimed at answering the question: what should the relationship be between the one and only species called Homo sapiens and the 2 million other animal species that are our neighbors on this planet? Those are the known ones—another 7 million, as far as I understand, are still waiting to be discovered. So this huge number of neighbors on our planet—they are all different, and we need to answer how our many and diverse relationships with them should be structured. This is a research project. You can’t answer this purely speculatively—it needs research. And I’m interested in this research and ready to work on it, if the conditions arise. And the conditions, of course, are twofold. First, some attempt to increase my personal resources—primarily health-related. And second, a change in the situation. Because as long as this war continues, it’s clear that it’s the most important issue. And it’s clear that I likely won’t be able to seriously engage in anything else.
So, the first part is the research project. The second part of this project is animal rights activism. So, it’s not just about research—it’s also about direct aid, support, and organization. For example, coordinating transfers to shelters. There’s a big project—I don’t know how alive it is right now—that involves transferring animals (say, dogs and cats) from countries where animal rights are heavily violated (like Russia, where they suffer) to countries that are ready to take them in. This project continues despite the war. But in any case, when we talk about the Religion Animal project, it also includes these directions: legislative development—another part of the project. So it’s a research project, a human rights protection project, and a legislative initiative. As you can see, it’s a complex task that requires completely different resources. For now, it remains a dream.
Will Reading 1984 Affect China, Russia, or the USA? Link to heading
Denis Lyubarev—apologies if I’m placing the stress incorrectly; that’s unfortunately one of the drawbacks of this kind of remote communication. So, a question from Denis:
Don’t you think it would be useful right now for as many people as possible to read 1984? I assume you’re referring to Orwell’s novel. North Korea has demonstrated the outcome of adopting Orwell’s teachings. China and Russia have followed the same path. The USA is trying to join in.
You know, Denis, I’m not 100% sure—of course, books do change people’s consciousness. There are great books that mean a lot, and Orwell’s novel is certainly one of those. But the book by itself—reading 1984, for instance—didn’t prevent, say, the rise of Putinism. There’s just no way around that. Those are the facts. Of course, the Orwell novel is more relevant now than ever. But I’m not sure that releasing tens of millions of copies, say in the United States, would stop what’s happening there right now.
I have a hard time imagining someone like Reznik, a Trump supporter, reading 1984, slapping his forehead, and saying, “Good God, how could I not have realized what’s happening? This is about us!” No, I don’t think it works that way. Similarly, I can’t picture a typical Putin supporter, or a member of the information service class—the TV propagandists—rereading the novel and exclaiming, “My God, this is about us!” Unfortunately, that’s just not how it works.
The Cotton Case Link to heading
A question from Sasha:
What do you think about Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov? What was that story about? Briefly, please.
Well, briefly. First of all, I should say that although I did personally encounter Telman Gdlyan when he was a member of the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform, I never conducted an in-depth study of this story—specifically, the Cotton Case, which was the main focus of Gdlyan and Ivanov’s activity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, their work wasn’t particularly prominent. I know more about Gdlyan than Ivanov. I saw Ivanov at some Democratic Platform and Democratic Russia council meetings—he was still somewhat active.
But the main focus of their activity, of course, was the Cotton Case. And here I still have many questions. I haven’t researched it thoroughly—that kind of work would require digging through witness testimonies and verifying them. On one hand, they were prominent anti-corruption figures in the late Soviet era. The Cotton Case involved bribery, fraud, and corruption, primarily in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the USSR’s Prosecutor General’s Office accused them of extracting confessions under duress and falsifying evidence. As a result, a criminal case was opened against them.
To form a personal, informed opinion on this case, one would need to thoroughly examine testimonies and investigate the details. I haven’t done that, so I don’t have a definitive personal impression. The only thing I can say is that, based on observing Telman Gdlyan at Democratic Platform meetings and reading his columns in Novy Vzglyad, he was clearly a populist. Definitely a populist—just like anyone who builds a political career around fighting corruption. That includes Lukashenko and, frankly, Navalny as well, despite my personal respect for him. It’s undeniably populism. Gdlyan’s style was perhaps closer to Lukashenko’s—quite a hardline form of populism. But overall, as I’ve said, I haven’t formed a final opinion about these two undoubtedly interesting figures.
Sense of Humor as an Indicator of Intelligence Link to heading
Larisa Smirnova.
Do you think a foolish person can have a non-foolish sense of humor? And is a refined sense of humor always a sign of intelligence?
Dear Larisa! These are two very different questions. The answer to the first is definitely no. Despite the subjectivity in how we judge who’s foolish and who’s intelligent, I think there’s some consensus—some conventional understanding of these everyday terms. I believe it’s impossible to imagine a foolish person who possesses, as you put it, a “non-foolish” sense of humor. It’s almost a tautology—the answer is contained in the question itself: of course not.
Now, the second question is actually quite interesting. It concerns how we evaluate people. Since we build relationships, we inevitably assess others—not in the biblical “judge not, lest ye be judged” sense, but more as forming opinions about others. That’s an important distinction. So, is a refined sense of humor always a sign of intelligence?
For a long time, it was widely believed that a good sense of humor clearly indicated intelligence. But if we look at specific examples, we’ll see that’s far from always true. And I’m not talking about basic laughter or crude jokes—there are plenty of those in various TV shows, especially in recent years: all those KVN performers, “Laughter Panoramas,” and Petrosyan’s “old ladies,” not to mention some youth programs that also rely on silly jokes. That’s not what I mean.
Even among people with seemingly decent humor—take, for example, Mikhail Zadornov. Despite his populism and his fixation on “Americans are so dumb,” he undeniably had a sense of humor. Some of his performances show he knew how to joke—he had that skill. A certain performative flair helped as well. But can he be considered an intelligent person? I think not. Alongside his ability to joke, he was also famously obsessed with pseudo-linguistics—interpreting word meanings based on phonetic resemblance. One example I remember vividly: “Zapad (the West) comes from ‘zapadlo’ (disgrace).” He would draw conclusions that the West is bad based on such phonetic coincidences. This is just one of many of his linguistic stunts. When you hear things like that, you realize you’re listening to a fool. But when you hear some of his jokes—they’re pretty good.
So, to avoid drowning in endless examples, I’ll just give you my conclusion: there is certainly a correlation between a sense of humor and intelligence—but it’s not linear. A sense of humor is a significant factor that can indicate someone isn’t stupid, but it’s not a guarantee. The correlation exists, but it’s nonlinear.
Why Doesn’t Ukraine Respond to Genocide with Genocide Link to heading
Viktor Kuts.
Mr. Yakovenko, do you still believe that Ukraine should not respond to genocide with genocide? Let me break it down again: orcs, those untouched by war, rejoice in the killing of Ukrainians. Only when their lives are shattered and their cities leveled like Mariupol and Bakhmut will they begin to understand. Their “females” praise the bloodlust and thank thieves and murderers for sending their men to be minced. What else is there to discuss? You say such retaliation would provoke Mordor and the West. I’ve seen little concern from the West, and the Russian fascists are only pleased by Ukrainian deaths. They’ll send more to be slaughtered when they see fit. The death of Ukrainian journalists, with organ removal and signs of torture, is proof of what Mordor brings to the world.
You know, dear Viktor, let’s break this down calmly. First of all, as you know, I try not to criticize the position of Ukraine’s military and political leadership. That leadership’s stance is clear: Ukraine strikes military targets and does not target civilians. Yes, collateral damage happens—it always has and always will—but Ukraine does not deliberately respond to genocide with genocide.
So, if you are proposing a change in that policy, you’re not just arguing with me—you’re arguing with Ukraine’s official military-political position. That’s the first point I want to establish: this is the current reality. And you’re asking not something within my power, but essentially proposing that Ukraine shift its entire strategic doctrine.
I disagree with that proposal. I believe Ukraine’s leadership is correct in not answering genocide with genocide, and instead acting solely based on military necessity.
Now to address your claim that “only when their lives are broken and cities turned to dust will they start to get it.” I strongly believe that you are deeply mistaken. What actually happens when lives are broken, when loved ones are killed, and homes are destroyed, is that people feel a desire for revenge. That’s point one. If these “orcs,” as you call them, are now fighting for money—as mercenaries—then they will soon fight for vengeance. You will shift their motivation from greed to hatred.
Second, you are underestimating the power of Russian external propaganda. The moment Ukraine were to respond with genocide, Russian propaganda—which already has significant influence in Latin America, parts of Europe, and elsewhere—would flood the global media with images of this “Ukrainian atrocity.” And Ukraine, unlike Russia, has no functioning international broadcasting apparatus. So truth crawls like a tortoise, while lies fly on wings.
You are calling for a retaliatory genocide. And in doing so, you’d be handing Russian propaganda an enormous gift. All the documentation of Russian war crimes—critical as it is—would be drowned out by footage of Ukrainian retaliation against civilians. Western sympathies would shift. If you think the West is fragile now, wait until it sees that kind of shift in the narrative.
Ask yourself honestly: what do you want to achieve? Revenge? That’s an understandable emotion. But by doing so, you would significantly weaken Ukraine’s international standing. And I strongly suspect—though I can’t say for sure—that this could lead to a reduction in Western military aid. Meanwhile, Russia would gain an influx of angry, motivated fighters eager to “avenge” their own.
What you’re proposing is a strategic disaster and a propaganda jackpot for Putin. I’m not arguing from a position of moral idealism here—though those arguments exist too. I’m arguing from the standpoint of military effectiveness. To mirror the enemy’s crimes not only degrades Ukraine’s moral position—it reduces its capacity to win.
And finally, there’s the hard reality of logistics: the limited number of shells, of resources. These must be used for military targets, not spent on killing civilians—which is militarily useless and strategically counterproductive.
I understand your emotions, but I do not share your position.
Use of the Word “Russian” Everywhere Link to heading
A question from Anvar:
For many years—and constantly during Putin’s rule—I’ve wondered why Russians feel the need to stick the word “Russian” onto everything significant. Russian river Volga, Russian North, Russian birch tree, taiga, sugar, tea, and of course, the “Russian world.” Then there are all the odious fascist-socialist organizations like the Russian Community, Russian Unity, the phenomenon of the Russian March. Is this some centuries-old sense of inferiority, an attempt to turn other peoples into a uniform slave mass under the label “Russian”? In some places it seems to work—for example, songs like “I’m a Tatar with a Russian soul” on Tatar radio, which foster second-rate Russians. I think so. And they don’t seem to understand that all this pressure causes many non-Russian peoples to feel rejection, aversion, and often hatred toward anything Russian. So, what drives these people? Where does this hatred of others come from? After all, every action has an equal and opposite reaction. In that case—fine, go ahead, it’ll make the empire of nations collapse faster. I’d really like to know your opinion.
You know, dear Anvar, you’ve actually already answered your own question in how it’s framed. The reason is quite simple and consists of two parts. From a political point of view, it’s imperialism. From a social-psychological point of view, it’s chauvinism. Imperialist chauvinism requires, among other things, this kind of lexical framing: “Russian World,” “Russian Community,” “Russian March,” and so on.
If we try to analyze the verbal, lexical presentation of Nazism—specifically, the Nazi Reich—we see exactly the same thing: the dominance of the word “German.” I once supervised a very capable student at MGIMO who wrote a thesis on the linguistic framing of Nazi ideology in the Third Reich. She did a content analysis of German newspapers from that period, and also tried to examine German radio broadcasts, counting how often “German” appeared—German physics, German men, German women, etc. I can’t recall the numbers now—it was in the mid-2000s—but it was everywhere. Possibly even more intensely than what we see with “Russian” today. So yes, this is a universal phenomenon: imperialism on one hand, and chauvinism on the other.
On Freedom, Equality, and Brotherhood Link to heading
A question from Igor Stella. The question is:
I fully understand the structure of the modern Western world, its core values—human rights, animal rights, etc. But I keep asking myself whether the right to private property fundamentally contradicts the basic human sense of justice. Why should land, forests, rivers, seas, sand, clay, stone, oil, coal historically end up as private or state property in the hands of a limited number of people on the planet? Why can they sell it to each other, pass it on to their heirs, while many are born with nothing? At best, they’ll work their entire lives to pay off a small apartment through rent or mortgage. Not to mention the openly impoverished regions of the world. Arguments like “those who want to, will earn” sound like demagoguery. I don’t want to take that into account. Shouldn’t every human being have an inalienable right—alongside freedom of movement, the right to vote, and the right to decent treatment—to a piece of living space, a piece of Earth’s surface, a share of the planet’s resources? A roof over one’s head? I understand this is technically hard to implement—hello to the communists! But isn’t universal justice one of the goals of organizing into a society? Or is social Darwinism still in force? Why are projects like universal basic income still not properly implemented?
Dear namesake, you’re raising the eternal question of the nature of what we call social justice—and how two cornerstone principles of modern civilization, especially Western civilization, can be reconciled: freedom, on one hand (the principles of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, and ultimately liberty and justice), and the internal contradiction between them. It’s clear that when you give people freedom, the outcome—through their individual efforts—will be inequality. These results get passed on through inheritance, and injustice arises. Equality disappears. If you make equality your foundation, over time you’re forced to limit freedom.
This is the core dilemma of democracy—where competition between the so-called “right” and “left” creates a certain balance. These are the political swings on which modern Western civilization rests—competition between right-wing and left-wing parties.
In the post-Soviet, Russian-speaking, democratic, anti-Putin space, there’s a strong tilt toward anti-leftism. We were raised for decades on Marx’s Capital, the Communist Manifesto, and other radical leftist doctrines. So we have a deep-seated aversion to anything left-leaning. That’s why many Russian-speaking anti-Putin bloggers and authors support Trump—because he fights leftism.
But globally, the world is much bigger than this narrow viewpoint. And so we see those same swings. What you’re saying is perfectly reasonable and legitimate—but opposed to it is the view that someone who competes freely and achieves results has the right to secure those results as private property—land, homes, real estate, etc. Restricting this right leads to severe distortions. What’s the point of free competition then? What’s the incentive to develop your human potential if you can’t benefit from the results of your work?
In contrast to your argument—which, let’s be honest, is a valid and logical left-wing view—an equally convincing right-wing argument can be made: “Why shouldn’t I, having worked hard all my life, be able to own land or property?”
It’s all about balance. And that balance always has a specific historical character. For example, in the Nordic countries, there’s a standard practice where people receive certain guaranteed rights from birth. The idea of a universal basic income is, in fact, largely realized in several countries—Norway, for example. So it’s not accurate to say it hasn’t been implemented anywhere.
Ultimately, I believe it’s all about balance. What you’re advocating for is, to varying degrees, already being implemented in the platforms of social-democratic and socialist parties that compete successfully in the marketplace of political ideas with right-wing parties. So the question really is one of balance.
How Does Religion Animal Align with Animal Instincts? Link to heading
So, Ilona Vardul.
I listened to your broadcast in recording. The thing about meat is, of course, nicely put. I’ve worked with animals for over 10 years, and I understand—war is terrifying. But work remains work. Growing meat in a lab is great, but will there be enough to feed dogs and cats? What about snakes? What do we feed them if it’s dangerous to offer alternatives to mice? I respect you deeply, but when you talk about how awful hunting is—what do we do with breeds that were created over generations for working roles? I face a huge problem today when people buy a cute face for the sofa, but that face needs to work—and properly. I’ve run for years in suits behind dogs. I understand it was my choice. But a bear or a fox didn’t choose that. Still, dogs of certain breeds aren’t to blame for being wired for prey. Maybe I’m wrong, but shouldn’t we consider their needs—not just our lofty ideals? Or are we heading toward condemning a cat for killing a mouse? I dreamed of getting a parrot. Two weeks later the cats killed and ate it. And solitary caging of songbirds is cruelty, too. And there’s another popular form of cruelty today—hyper-care. You wouldn’t believe the consequences. Once again, I say this with deep respect.
Well, everything is clear. So, what can I say, dear colleague? I have to tell you that, in fact, you’ve raised a great number of questions that should be addressed by the research component of the Religion Animal program.
As for dogs bred for killing animals—well, let’s look at a national sport and long-standing British tradition: fox hunting. It was essentially the hounding of foxes. Today it’s banned in the UK. A certain number of dogs were bred specifically for this kind of hunt. They weren’t put down—people just stopped that practice, that’s all. What happened to those dogs? I don’t know, but I doubt their fate was especially tragic.
So, all of this requires study. It’s precisely part of the Religion Animal research project: how to address these questions. This is not about instant changes. When you say there’s not enough lab-grown meat for certain needs—well, that’s just the beginning of the project. But it’s progressing. Maybe more slowly than we’d like, since humanity has many pressing problems—but the process has started, and it’s irreversible.
The quantity of this product is increasing. The price is decreasing. Initially it was incredibly expensive, but now the price is coming down. A lab-grown hamburger still costs several times more than a conventional one—but it’s moving toward parity. This is how it always is with revolutionary new ideas—they need time to settle in.
I’m not claiming I can answer all your questions right now—for one very simple reason: I’m not a fan of speculative answers. I believe in research, through which answers to these kinds of questions become possible.
So that, I think, is how I would respond to your complex and thoughtful question.
Dmitry Oreshkin’s Optimistic View on Peace Talks Link to heading
Marat,
I always read and listen to Dmitry Oreshkin with interest. It turns out that many years ago, we both regularly visited the main building of Moscow State University—just on different floors. Lately, on various channels, he’s been repeating the same idea: the war is wearing out, resources are running low, and Putin understands this. Negotiations are slowly, awkwardly advancing toward peace. I’m not as optimistic. I’d like to ask you to comment on this thesis. As far as I understand, your view is more skeptical. It would be great to discuss this with Dmitry Borisovich again when he’s next on your show.
Dear Marat, the thing is, the last time Dmitry Borisovich joined us on our channel, we discussed this very topic. And I must tell you, our differing positions became quite clear. Dmitry Borisovich is optimistic about these negotiations. He believes they will succeed. I view this more skeptically. We made our positions public. Who is right—we’ll find out over time.
We had a kind of mini-discussion. I usually invite experts not to argue with them, but to hear their perspective. But sometimes what we do isn’t a classical interview—it’s more of a conversation. That’s the genre I call “thinking together.” And when we think together, that means I, too, contribute. I’m not a traditional interviewer—even though I know how to conduct interviews—because in this case, the format is different. It’s about thinking aloud, together.
I usually stay quiet, since I have enough of my own broadcasts, but with Dmitry Borisovich we had a bit of a debate. We’ll see who turns out to be right.
On the Term “Obrazovantsy” (The Educated Masses) Link to heading
Well, there are a few obvious points here. The term obrazovantsy was originally a disparaging label that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn hurled at the Soviet intelligentsia in 1974, in his famous essay of the same name. In that piece, Solzhenitsyn lamented the disappearance of the true intelligentsia in the USSR—and, in his view, of the people as well. What remained were obrazovantsy—educated people, but not intelligentsia.
Solzhenitsyn’s idea was that the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia—those who didn’t emigrate or weren’t repressed—gradually dissolved into the broader mass of people with higher education. Thus, according to him, obrazovantsy replaced the intelligentsia.
Let’s unpack this. Solzhenitsyn’s moral authority—earned through his imprisonment and writing—made him a kind of guru for quite a while. I’ll admit, when I first read his essay Obrazovantsy, I more or less agreed with it, influenced by the general respect he commanded. But over time, especially after his antisemitic book Two Hundred Years Together, and particularly after he returned to Russia and willingly accepted an award from Putin (despite having refused one from Yeltsin), I began to see things differently.
So, what’s the core issue with obrazovantsy? It’s quite simple. Yes, the Soviet and post-Soviet intelligentsia became a mass phenomenon. Solzhenitsyn wasn’t just talking about education, but about spiritual qualities—he believed the intelligentsia should be in opposition to power, should be morally upright, and should question authority. But with the mass expansion of higher education, a diploma no longer guaranteed those traits.
And here’s the key point: mass education led, inevitably, to a certain moral and political dilution. The defining trait of obrazovantsy is heightened adaptability—in other words, conformity. Educated people became valuable under any regime. A person with a degree is not necessarily someone with critical thinking or moral principles. Xenophon already said, “Much learning does not teach understanding.”
Just look at who staffs election commissions in Russia—teachers, largely. Who implements the monstrous school programs that deform children? Also teachers, also with higher education. Conformism has become a hallmark of the educated class—perhaps even more than among those with only a basic education, because the educated are more inclined to pursue careers and adapt.
So, this isn’t a moral deviation—it’s an objective outcome of the massification of higher education. That’s why there’s been a certain moral and political degradation.
In this light, the term obrazovantsy reflects the nature of our time. Educated people became a mass phenomenon—and with that came a decline in the kind of moral and intellectual rigor that once distinguished the intelligentsia. And ironically, Solzhenitsyn himself—by aligning with Putin—undermined his own distinction between the intelligentsia and obrazovantsy. In that situation, was he an intelligent or an obrazovanets? That, I think, is a rhetorical question.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So. Dear friends, we are concluding our morning stream here. I want to remind you that we have two very interesting guests today. At 13:00, sociologist Igor Eidman will join us—and I think there are quite a few questions about Germany that we’ll want to discuss with him. And, of course, the key conversation will be with Igor Vladimirovich Lipsits, specifically on the topic of today’s stream, including that recent deal—and more.
On that note, I’m wrapping up our morning stream. Thank you for being part of this conversation, for thinking together. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom for Alexander Skobov, Darya Kozyreva, all Russian political prisoners, and Ukrainian captives! See you at 13:00!
Source: https://youtu.be/wsOVaIsa25o