Lately, Russian generals, top managers, and oligarchs have been experiencing three types of misfortunes: arrests for corruption, sudden deaths/suicides, and eliminations by Ukrainian special services.
News Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is July 8. It’s 07:41 in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
The U.S. Sends Weapons to Ukraine Link to heading
Well, I’ll start with some good news. True, as always with anything coming from the administration of the 47th President of the United States, it’s a bit uncertain, but still, everything seems to be more or less okay. Yesterday, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, announced—without going into any details—that the U.S. will send new batches of weapons to Ukraine. And the Pentagon immediately declared that everything is already being shipped, already on the way, everything is moving, and soon things will be alright.
A sudden moment of clarity, a revelation, seems to have struck Donald Fred Fitch. What caused it? I have no idea. I don’t even want to speculate. Maybe Putin finally got on his nerves with his blatant rudeness. Maybe there was a good conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky. Maybe some other factors played a role. But it looks like the pause in weapons supplies has ended. It’s still unclear what kind of weapons and in what quantity, but apparently, the stockpiles in Poland are already being handed over to Ukraine. This is very good news, and I congratulate all of you, dear friends.
High Mortality Among the Russian Elite Link to heading
Now, to the main topic of the episode. What’s the title of this stream? “Elite Fall in Russia.” In fact, it’s about time someone made a feature or documentary film called something like “The Bosses in Russia Cry Too.” Or something along those lines. It would be a very long film—a sort of multi-episode soap opera, like “Santa Barbara.” Because the troubles that have befallen the so-called Russian elite, the Russian leadership, over the past few years, months, and even days, are incredibly varied and numerous.
As I already mentioned in the introduction to the stream, there are three types of trouble. First, mass arrests for corruption. If we include resignations and career downfalls, it’s in the thousands—just in the Ministry of Defense alone. The second category is sudden deaths, which are officially declared suicides but are actually unclear. And finally, the third is the elimination of war criminals by Ukrainian special services.
So let’s take it from the top. Recently, there has truly been a fall among Russia’s top officials. The latest case is the sudden death of Transport Minister Starovoitov, which is, first of all, unclear when it happened, second, unclear how it happened, and third, unclear who exactly died. Did the actual minister die, or was he already a private citizen fired by Putin at that point? The body of Starovoitov was found on July 7, though according to some sources, it was in a car; others say it was in an empty lot.
Several publications report that Starovoitov shot himself on the night from Saturday to Sunday, and the body was actually found on July 5. The head of the Duma’s Defense Committee, Andrey Kartapolov, claimed the minister died quite a while ago. However, on July 6, the Transport Ministry reported that Starovoit was conducting a meeting. So apparently, on July 6, the day after he allegedly died, he was still holding meetings. Not only that, he also congratulated people on Seafarer’s Day. So for a dead man, Starovoitov was remarkably active. Apparently, Putin fired a corpse, because the dismissal order was published on the morning of July 7, and the Investigative Committee also confirmed that he had already been dead on the 5th.
The Investigative Committee says he was found dead in his personal vehicle, but several media outlets, including Kommersant, show photos of his body being taken from an empty lot. All of these inconsistencies suggest that suicide might not be the actual cause of death. Especially since the case involves large-scale embezzlement—over 1 billion rubles—related to the construction of defensive barriers, like the so-called “dragon’s teeth” on the border of the Kursk region, which Ukrainian forces reportedly crossed with ease.
The main witness against Starovoitov was his successor, the current governor of the Kursk region. It’s quite possible that this wasn’t a suicide but a murder, given that such embezzlement likely involved others beyond just the transport minister—probably within the new leadership of the Defense Ministry. The chain might have simply been cut off. That’s one hypothesis.
The purge at the top levels of Russian power continues. On the same day, July 7, another young official suddenly died—42-year-old deputy head of the Property Management Department of the Russian Rail Transport Agency, Alexey Korneichuk—who collapsed during a meeting.
The mass deaths of Russian officials, top managers, and businessmen have been dubbed in the Western press as the “Sudden Russian Death Syndrome.” Dozens of individuals have suddenly died under mysterious circumstances. These are mainly top managers in the fuel and energy sector—Lukoil, for instance, where four top managers have died under strange conditions in two years. Likewise, Gazprom, where numerous suicides have been reported.
I won’t go into detailed names—it’s all well-known. We’re talking about dozens of deaths that formed the basis for identifying this syndrome. It strongly resembles what happened during the collapse of the Soviet Union, when large sums of party money—known as the “party gold”—were being smuggled out. There was a wave of “window accidents” involving the Administrative Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Enormous funds previously sent to support communist and terrorist regimes abroad were now up for grabs. The operators of these transactions were KGB officers, and there was a power struggle between the Central Committee staff and the KGB over who would claim the money. That’s when the window-falls began—mostly affecting the Central Committee staff, since their “special training” didn’t match that of the KGB.
Today, something similar is happening. The deaths of top oil and gas executives result from shrinking corruption opportunities and a redistribution of market control. Similar things are happening with the Ministry of Defense: we’re seeing a massive wave of arrests. The number of detained, accused, arrested, or dismissed top Defense Ministry officials is likely in the hundreds now, depending on what level you use as a cutoff. If you include Shoigu’s advisors and department heads, we’re definitely in the hundreds.
This is clearly a purge, but it didn’t stop with Shoigu’s circle. It’s now affecting Belousov’s team, which suggests that this is primarily about dividing up the corruption pie.
Finally, the third type of misfortune facing senior Putin regime figures is elimination by Ukrainian special services due to war crimes. One recent case is the killing of Major General Mikhail Gudkov, who had just been appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Putin had recently praised him in glowing terms, calling him a brilliant commander under whom the marines were “valiantly killing Ukrainians.” After his promotion, he was eliminated.
Before that, other figures were taken out: militant and propagandist Vladlen Tatarsky, former Ukrainian MP and traitor Ilya Kiva, the commander of the 41st Missile Ship Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet Valery Trankov, and General Igor Kirillov, chief of Russia’s radiological and chemical defense troops, who was directly involved in using chemical weapons against Ukrainians.
These are all war criminals. This list is far from complete—just some of the eliminations carried out by Ukraine’s Security Service.
So, what we’re seeing is a serious crisis at the top. The war, besides other changes in Russian society, has caused a spike in corruption. Corruption has always been the backbone of the Russian economy, but under wartime conditions—with closed military budgets and extreme secrecy—stealing has become easier. This secrecy has turbocharged corruption, and competition for the slices of the corruption pie has intensified, even as the pie itself is shrinking. Infighting among different clans and factions within the elite is growing and will continue to grow as the war drags on.
No, we shouldn’t expect them to destroy each other entirely—it won’t go that far. But the movement in that direction brings a certain satisfaction. Among those arrested, imprisoned, or eliminated, there are no innocents. That’s what I want to emphasize—no one in that group deserves sympathy or pity. Their arrests or deaths are all good news. Fewer war criminals, fewer accomplices of the Putin regime.
So, the main theme of today’s talk—along with the good news I started with—is actually another set of good news: a clear weakening of the Putin regime.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before I move on to answering your questions, I want to say that today at 8:00 PM we will try, so to speak, to present something. I will try, more precisely, to present to you the next episode of the program Trumpophrenia, because in fact a lot of material has piled up. I will try to release this episode. So. And now I’m moving on to answering your questions.
On Closing the Sky Over Ukraine Link to heading
Question from Vera Kovalchuk. Do you think NATO countries will ever decide to close the sky over Ukraine? Is there really no way to stop this terror from Russia? Every day there are deaths, injuries, and the destruction of Ukraine’s most beautiful cities. It’s painful to watch, simply unbearable.
Dear Vera! Well, today’s message about Trump, that weapons will continue to be supplied — I very much hope that among those weapons will be Patriot systems and ammunition for them. This means that there is movement in the right direction. That is, the sky over Ukraine will be increasingly closed. But the task of completely closing the sky over Ukraine — it seems to me that this is not a very feasible task. You see, we’ve seen how, with the help of the United States, Israel tried to close the sky over a small country — Israel is a small country. But even closing the sky over Israel with the help of the United States hasn’t fully worked. That is, it’s not entirely possible, because in such cases, the mass scale of the strikes usually means that something still gets through. And we’re not even talking about a country as large as Ukraine. Ukraine is the largest country in Europe by territory. And here, territory is what really matters. Completely closing the sky — well, such a scenario is hardly possible. But closing the sky over major cities, such as Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv — well, that’s probably possible. And probably, this is exactly what both the military and political leadership of Ukraine are working on right now.
Flight Cancellations at Russian Airports Link to heading
Sergey Afanasyev from Riga. From Riga. Right now, hundreds of flights in Russia are being canceled due to drone threats. How do you assess the tactic where Ukraine launches several drones every hour? Not for strikes, but to keep major airports under constant threat and cause a transportation collapse. How justified and effective is this in terms of psychological or economic warfare? Do you personally support this tactic?
Well, so to speak, any attempt to destabilize the situation in Russia is undoubtedly a legitimate tactic for Ukraine. So yes, of course, I support it. The only question is that there are quite a few such targets and tactics. There’s the tactic of destroying military facilities — airfields, command posts, oil depots, refineries. These are all, so to speak, legitimate targets. All of this is quite a reasonable tactic. Transportation targets — creating a transport collapse — that’s one of those tactics. So to say that one should focus only on that, on causing a transportation collapse, well, the Ukrainian military and political leadership clearly understands that this would be an artificial self-limitation. So yes, it’s one of the possible tactics.
How to Explain to an American Why Putin Attacked in 2022 Link to heading
Denis Lipsitz, How would you explain to an American the reasons for Putin’s attack on Ukraine in 2022? And a second question — can Russia, the Moscow Empire, be considered a country where everything beyond the MKAD is a colony?
Well, the first question — I don’t know exactly how to explain it specifically to an American, but a simple explanation, as it seems to me, would be understandable to any normal person. The reason for the invasion is the imperial syndrome of Putin personally and a significant part of the Russian population. That is, Putin’s imperial syndrome is a necessary condition for this war. And the imperial syndrome in the minds of a significant part of the population is a sufficient condition. If the imperial syndrome existed only in Putin’s head, the war would, of course, not have started. So this coincidence — or rather, convergence — is quite a logical phenomenon: this imperial syndrome exists both in Putin’s head and in the minds of a large portion of the population. You know, usually there are some objective reasons for war — dividing up territory or some kind of economic problems. None of that applies here. The causes of this war are entirely in people’s heads — in Putin’s head and in the heads of many Russians. In other words, the causes of the war are purely subjective. There are no objective reasons for this war.
As for the second question — can Russia be considered a Moscow Empire, and everything beyond the MKAD a colony? I don’t think so. Because if we look at the history of the Russian Empire, and the Russian Federation, and the Soviet Union — these are essentially one continuous imperial phenomenon. To call Moscow the metropolis would be inaccurate. Moscow itself is a colony, just as subjected to the Kremlin as other regions. In fact, if you’re looking for a true metropolis, then it’s the Kremlin — not the region called Moscow. And this also applies not just to Moscow but to St. Petersburg, which is also to some extent privileged, being a second capital. But they are all colonies. The “Leningrad affair” that Stalin launched and other such events show that even the Moscow leadership can be purged at any moment. So really — if Moscow is a colony, then who are the colonizers? Luzhkov? Well, we all saw what happened to Luzhkov once he became inconvenient to the central power. So no — Moscow is not a colony, and it’s not a metropolis either. The metropolis is the Kremlin. That’s the kind of unique empire we’re dealing with. Yes, of course it’s privileged. But it’s not the only region in Russia in a privileged position. Chechnya also enjoys special privileges. But would we call Chechnya the metropolis? Probably not — that would also be a mistake.
About English-Speaking Countries and Language Pressure Link to heading
So, a question from a Muscovite. Okay? Baskin writes the following: So maybe the issue is that English-speaking countries, when it comes to so-called Russophobia as the reason for the “special military operation,” don’t engage in persecution of the English language, English culture, and no one tries to pump people up with hatred toward the USA?
Well, that’s how it’s written. That’s the language — I can’t do anything about it.
To pump people up with hatred toward the USA, England, to arm these English-speaking countries. If in Ukraine — the person writes — if in Ukraine the position were more or less clear, if Russian were one of the state languages, just like English is always one of the official languages in English-speaking countries; if people weren’t forced to speak Ukrainian, like in English-speaking countries they’re not forced to speak native national languages; if the government didn’t support activists who terrorize Russian speakers; if they didn’t cancel Pushkin and Lenin; if Western partners didn’t support the militarization of Russophobia — then maybe there wouldn’t be a “special military operation,” and no one would be trying to protect Russians in Ukraine, and we’d be friends now, like the English-speaking countries are with each other.
Well, what can I say? We’ve just had a propaganda manual pop up on our channel. Since it’s here, let’s break it down.
First of all, the idea that people were forced to speak Ukrainian — I don’t know if this person has ever been to Ukraine, say, before the war. Because if they had, it’s unlikely they’d be telling fairy tales about being forced to speak Ukrainian. I personally visited Ukraine several times before the war — in 2008, and later. I can say that, at least before the full-scale war, Kyiv — I remember this clearly, and this might be professional bias from being a sociologist, but sometimes you end up doing impromptu fieldwork — I once walked along the Dnipro River embankment on a warm August evening, and I started casually tallying how many people I heard speaking Russian and how many were speaking Ukrainian. I noted them down on a piece of paper — one column for Russian, one for Ukrainian. The second column stayed empty. Not a single snippet of conversation in Ukrainian. Only fragments of conversations in Russian. That was Kyiv in 2008.
So you see, to say that someone was forbidden to speak Russian in Ukraine — only someone who’s never been there could say that. I traveled through a good portion of Ukrainian cities before the war — in 2008, 2010 — and yes, of course, in Lviv Ukrainian probably dominated. But if you spoke Russian, no one gave you trouble. Kyiv was entirely Russian-speaking. Sure, when you entered a store, they’d greet you in Ukrainian — but you’d switch to Russian, and they’d respond in Russian. No issues at all. Russian-language TV channels dominated in Ukraine — absolutely dominated.
So really, all this nonsense about bans on speaking Russian is just pure propaganda.
Now, about “Western partners supporting the militarization of Russophobia” — another piece of nonsense, another line from the propaganda manual. Western partners actually facilitated Ukraine’s disarmament. Bush Sr. personally came to Ukraine and pressured them into signing the Budapest Memorandum — effectively disarming them. Thanks to Western partners, Ukraine was demilitarized. What kind of “militarization” of Ukraine are we talking about before the war? This is just another talking point.
And as for Russophobia — don’t even get me started. Western partners followed a completely Russophile policy before the war. They disarmed Ukraine, hoping not even for the collapse of the Soviet Union.
So yes, utter nonsense. Everything we just heard — Baskin’s message — is just a selection from a Russian propaganda manual, from some Russian propaganda trash heap. But let’s see — maybe the person is genuinely mistaken. I’m a believer in the presumption of innocence. Maybe he’s just wrong. Though probably not.
About Phone Scammers from Ukraine Link to heading
Here’s another question with a similar undertone from a subscriber named Alexey. Here’s what he adds to his question about phone scammers: Igor Alexandrovich, do you know that a huge number of such calls come from the territory of Ukraine? YouTube is full of videos like that. And they don’t just call Russia—which might be understandable—but also Kazakhstan, Belarus, the Baltic states, they come up with anything. They change medical policies, intercom systems, extend service contracts for phones, social services, and clinics—all to gain access to personal data. And so on. These call centers are run by young people, mostly aged 17 to 25, and others. And here comes the question—a very telling one: Can you explain this from the standpoint of the Ukrainian mentality? Why are they like this?
Alexey asks. You know, this attempt to explain phone fraud through the lens of the Ukrainian mentality leads one to suspect that either the author of the question suffers from chronic Ukrainophobia, or this is also some kind of script. Because phone fraud is a worldwide, global phenomenon. As I said in the previous stream, I explained in detail how this criminal business is organized in Russia. And, you know, for some reason you didn’t ask about the Russian mentality behind this kind of business.
There are obvious reasons why Ukrainian phone scammers mainly target Russia. The first is language. In Ukraine, people speak Russian very well—almost everyone is bilingual. For example, there are known cases when they tried to target Kazakhstan, but people there immediately switch to Kazakh. The scammers don’t speak Kazakh, and that’s where it ends. That’s the first reason.
The second reason is even more important. Why is it so convenient to target Russia? It’s not due to some special characteristic. The reason is very simple: the Ukrainian security services and police are actively fighting phone scams. For your information, Alexey, I’d like to inform you that Ukraine is fighting these call centers very intensively. The peculiarity of this fight is that it’s very effective in countries where Ukrainian police can collaborate with local authorities—like Kazakhstan, the Baltic states, and the Czech Republic. As a result of joint operations between the police of Ukraine and these countries, call centers are exposed and shut down.
But with Russian law enforcement, the Ukrainian police cannot work—for obvious reasons, because Russia is an aggressor. That’s why Russians remain defenseless. That’s the simple reason.
As for “why they are like this?"—well, maybe try looking in the mirror.
About Ukrainians Earning Money in Moscow Link to heading
So, Alexander is asking. He has two questions. From Alexander: Have you heard Mykola Veresnya’s speech in Vilnius in recent days?
Well, I can say right away—no, I haven’t heard it. If you think it’s really worth listening to, I’ll find the recording and listen. And the second question:
From your response today to one of the listeners—it turns out that many people from Ukraine moved to Moscow not only for money but also included producers and TV people like Rodnyansky, as well as a bunch of singers, performers, actors, and actresses. Which, by the way, served not only the imperial idea well but also the perception of Ukraine as something familiar and close. How are the Kyiv or Dnipro natives who came to conquer Moscow or St. Petersburg different from natives of the Russian hinterland who did the same? At the same time, Georgia gave us only, forgive me, Tina Kandelaki. Diana Gurtskaya. And from all the Baltic countries—no one, zero. Why do you think that is? The accent, or something else? I’m not talking about those who were famous before the USSR collapsed or invited directors, but those who moved to Russia after the USSR fell.
You know, dear Alexander, as I mentioned in response to a previous question, Ukraine—before the war, before 2014—was completely integrated into the Russian media and cultural space. I might even dare to use the term “absorbed” by the Russian cultural and media space.
Once again, based on my repeated visits to Ukraine before the war, before 2014—well, you know, you pick up a TV remote, and the first 10 buttons are Russian channels. Maybe I’m exaggerating slightly, but only slightly. I remember very well how a regular hotel TV remote worked—you just click through the buttons as usual, and it’s all Russian channels: Channel One, Rossiya, Rossiya-1, Rossiya-24, Kultura, NTV, STS, TNT, and so on. Only after that do Ukrainian channels appear.
So, in reality, there was none of that talk about rampant nationalism in Ukraine, and the stuff about banning the Russian language—that’s just nonsense. There was no resistance. I insist on this because, as someone who traveled there on various assignments—not on vacation or visiting, but business trips—as Secretary General of the Russian Union of Journalists, as Director of the National Literary Service, as part of the Public Expertise Project—I went there with various objectives. And every time I observed: there was no resistance to Russia’s cultural and media dominance. So, this isn’t just an impression—it’s the result of, well, a kind of investigation, you could say.
The Colors of Fascism and Communism Link to heading
So, a question from Louis: For some reason, I started wondering—where do their choices of color to represent themselves and their ideas come from? Why did the communists choose red? Why did the fascists choose brown? After all, these are perfectly normal, beautiful colors. Why did the fascists and communists choose them specifically? What symbolism did they assign to them?
You know, this is actually a fairly simple question, because the communists chose red as a symbol of revolutionary struggle, of the workers’ movement. It’s the symbol of blood shed in the fight for freedom.
Brown is the color of the shirts worn by the SA stormtroopers—brown shirts. In Italy they had black shirts; in Germany, brown ones. So that’s fairly straightforward.
Communist red became a symbol first during the Paris Commune, then during the October Revolution. In 1792, the red flag was raised in Paris during the uprising of that year. But it became the definitive symbol of the modern workers’ movement after the Paris uprising of 1832.
So red means blood spilled for one’s own. In this mythology, it’s the communist blood spilled for freedom and justice. That’s why it’s a traditional color for communism.
And brown—that’s just the uniform of the stormtroopers. It’s very straightforward, since that organization played a crucial role in establishing the Nazi regime in Germany. So it’s all quite simple, really.
From Pushkin to Putin Link to heading
Is that so? Tatyana, such an indignant question. Dear Igor Aleksandrovich, I apologize in advance for the emotional comment on the topic “from Pushkin to Putin.” What influence, and more importantly, on whom? Imperialism in Russian culture is generally spoken of, with rare exceptions, by a handful of intellectuals—the people of Pushkin and Dostoevsky. Total lack of culture, from top to bottom. Ask anyone—who has actually read anything by Pushkin or Dostoevsky, whether on the street or in the State Duma? And I’m not even mentioning the youth. It’s laughable to even discuss. At best, you’ll hear that Dostoevsky was a lunatic with epilepsy and depressive texts. As for Pushkin—if anyone remembers Onegin from school, that’s the best-case scenario. This current regime didn’t come to power with Pushkin. Pushkin is a symbol for them, not a leader, a banner, not a guide. This is a rebuke directed at me—as if you must be completely disconnected from Russian realities to seriously discuss the influence of 19th-century culture on Matviyenko and the “depth of culture” with all its merits and flaws. Culture is not transmitted sexually, through the air, or in any automatic way. Becoming a cultured person is hard work. It’s work, reading, thinking, analysis—and that work is priceless. What are we even talking about?
Dear Tatyana! Thank you for your emotion. Thank you for defending culture. But I just want to say—please understand—it works differently. I’ll try to explain now, calmly, without emotion, without, so to speak, this kind of… without any heated tone. There’s this so-called two-step flow of communication theory, or in other words, a two-stage model of communication. One of its authors is the American sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld. By the way, his books have been translated into Russian and are generally available, as far as I know—they were being sold at least for a time. For me, Lazarsfeld is one of those go-to authors, the kind of thinker with whom it would be very useful to synchronise your thinking, even remotely. What’s the essence of this two-stage communication model? The core idea is that information and influence from the media first pass through opinion leaders and only then reach the general public. In other words, influence on the public does happen—but not directly. And it’s the same with culture. The influence of high culture, Russian literature, etc., doesn’t happen directly—it happens through people who are authoritative sources of information for their social circles. So, roughly speaking—how does the Russian people know, feel, and say that “Pushkin is our everything,” even though they haven’t read Pushkin? Where do they get it from? They get it from authoritative people, people considered trusted voices. That’s the main idea behind this two-step model of communication. There are opinion leaders—people with authority in a particular field—and there are people within a group who trust their opinions. Lazarsfeld introduced the term “two-step.” I’m unfortunately away from my library right now, so I can’t list the books, but he has articles that have been translated into Russian. I highly recommend finding them. I think it won’t be difficult—you can find his works online. Paul Lazarsfeld. The idea is that this two-step flow of information, media influence, and cultural influence is mediated by micro-groups—in particular, by these opinion leaders. And then mass communication can either reinforce the audience’s existing social preferences or bring latent ones to the surface. So imperialism—overt or latent—imperialism in Russian culture is spread through public opinion leaders and finds fertile ground in the latent preferences of the deep public. Once again, this is the two-step model of communication. That’s how it works, and that’s the only way it works. Lazarsfeld also studied electoral behavior. He tested this model in the electoral sphere as well. So this is really important, in my opinion—this two-step propaganda theory or two-stage model of communication is now more or less accepted. I haven’t heard any strong objections. Of course, there’s always criticism—there always is. But this is a working model. So that’s how it works—it’s not just that someone grabs Turgenev and Pushkin at the market. No. That doesn’t happen and won’t happen. It’s the opinion leaders—the elite—who carry Turgenev and Pushkin from the marketplace, and they’re the ones who start influencing the mass audience. They are the ones who say that Pushkin is our everything.
On Tyranny and PMCs Link to heading
So, Petya Katz read in Timothy Snyder the idea that one of the signs of tyranny is the delegation of power—the monopoly on violence—to third parties: stormtroopers, various PMCs. What’s the point of such delegation? After all, it seems much more logical to assume that the more totalitarian a regime is, the more dangerous it is for it to transfer extraordinary powers to anyone else. Dictators are typically distrustful even of such a natural institution as the army—and afraid of it. And lastly, as I understand it, the second question is: what do you think of Timothy Snyder’s book On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century? It’s a kind of minimal instruction manual on civic hygiene under hostile conditions. Would you add anything to the measures Snyder suggests?
Well, I can say right away: Timothy Snyder is—well, I wouldn’t say he’s my favorite historian—but he’s certainly a respected one. And his book—God, the first one I read was Bloodlands… What was it? Slipped my mind now. But I’ve read On Tyranny, of course. And, well, what can I add? You see, those 20 lessons from the 20th century are quite comprehensive. I probably wouldn’t add anything. I’d maybe condense or streamline it a bit. There may be some repetition. Now, regarding your main question about the delegation of power—the monopoly on violence—to third parties, that’s actually very natural, because it works. It’s the divide and conquer principle. In democracies, the principle of delegating violence is realized only through state institutions. That’s precisely why totalitarian regimes, which try to protect themselves from potential coups or the end of their rule by the army or security services, try to create checks and balances. That is, they try to establish organs of violence outside of formal state power. The army is often politically neutered because it’s the main instrument of violence. The NKVD, for example, was placed under the control of the party. As for PMCs, I think Putin made a mistake—he delegated that violence to the Wagner Group—and he almost paid for it. So yes, the divide and conquer principle is clearly present here. To balance the army, institutions like the extraordinary NKVD or the Cheka are created. And to balance and control the Cheka, the party is placed above it—and periodically, especially under Stalin, the NKVD or MGB leadership was purged. So the checks and balances are the reason. I think it’s all fairly straightforward.
On Nation States Link to heading
Tofik Mamedov from Baku, Question A nation state on the political stage is gradually losing its significance along with the UN. The current structure of states is not trustworthy, lacks a systemic nature, and undermines national development in favor of the political ambitions of politicians. What will replace nationalization—or, as I understand it, the nation states?
Is that so? Dear Tofik, frankly speaking, I understand what you’re writing about. I understand that indeed there is now criticism of nation states, and globalization as a process that to some extent limits national sovereignty. In general. The very system of nation states arose with the Peace of Westphalia. The Westphalian agreements. The system of nation states—1648—when, after the Thirty Years’ War, there emerged, essentially, the first system of national security in human history. That is, it was at that point that the idea of nation states was taken as a foundation, and now this system is being criticized in several respects. First, from the perspective of human rights, the right of nations to self-determination is being opposed to the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is one line of criticism of nation states. And second, nation states are accused of being unable to provide effective governance in conditions of globalization. This criticism of nation states exists, it is indeed relevant, but it doesn’t abolish nation states. I don’t see any real prospect right now that nation states will exit the historical stage. Despite—for example—take the most extreme manifestation of globalization: the European Union. A supranational super-state has essentially emerged, which to some extent has taken on the functions of state governance. But nevertheless, nation states have not disappeared. Italy hasn’t gone anywhere, Poland hasn’t gone anywhere, Finland hasn’t gone anywhere. They remain as nation states. And even a structure like the EU hasn’t led to their disappearance. So I think it’s too early to bury nation states. But contradictions—they do exist, and to some extent, they are a driver of progress.
On Piontkovsky’s Remarks About Iran Link to heading
A question from the author known as Flame of Victory. Andrei Piontkovsky claimed that the regime in Iran is weaker than ever, and that now is the time to overthrow it. And so, everyone who could, called on the Iranian people to overthrow it—but they didn’t even lift a finger. The reason is clear. But the expert spoke so confidently—maybe even Western politicians listened to him. What was the basis for such confidence? It seems that to overthrow a regime, internal forces or some kind of network with strong external support are needed? It seems that has never happened before.
Dear colleague, I’ve said several times in response to criticism of Andrei Andreyevich that Andrei Andreyevich isn’t some kind of analyst sitting on Alpha Centauri, coldly and impartially trying to figure out what kind of worms are doing what here. Andrei Andreyevich has chosen the role of a combat political scientist. That is, his texts and speeches aren’t just cold analysis—they’re attempts at reconnaissance by fire. I’m choosing my words carefully now. There are fairly significant traditions of this. In particular, one of my idols in sociology, Pierre Bourdieu—he also spoke out with, yes, academic texts that are quite detached, so to speak. But he also had passionate works written from a clear position. Andrei Andreyevich is also such a combat political scientist. That is, he carries out reconnaissance by fire. His publications are often concentrated advice to certain political forces on what needs to be done to change the situation. So, in a way, yes—it’s an attempt to offer advice, an attempt to influence the situation, not just to talk from a distance, weighing arguments for and against certain developments. No, it’s an attempt to make an impact. That’s who Andrei Andreyevich is. He’s been that way for a long time, ever since I met him. And so all the reproaches that he’s not making predictions—no, he’s doing analysis and saying what this or that political actor should do in order to change the situation for the better. That’s what Andrei Piontkovsky is. Not some detached warm commentator reasoning from planet Alpha Centauri.
On Updating Knowledge and Sources Link to heading
Alright. Someone writes I’ve had this question for a while, and it seems today is a perfect occasion to ask it. I graduated from the history department at Herzen University a long time ago. My knowledge clearly needs updating. Given your extensive teaching experience, could you recommend sources and resources? At some point, I stopped trusting European university professors because of their leftist ideologies. Unfortunately, good Russian sources have become unavailable. I’m probably mistaken in some way, so I hope for your expert opinion.
Dear colleague, you know, I’m always a bit stumped when asked to recommend a source for studying history, sociology, philosophy, and so on. In this case—well, you graduated from the history department at Herzen, yes? So you have a professional historical education. That’s where you differ from me, because I don’t have formal historical training. I have two degrees—one in philosophy and one in psychology. But no degree in history.
As for the problem you’re facing, I see two ways to approach the acquisition of historical knowledge. The first is classical academic historical education, which one can still obtain. If you’re dissatisfied with the current options—well, perhaps you could look into the French Annales School. It still exists, and you might look into which universities it operates in. That’s a strong historical tradition. There are also some serious British historical schools where you’re less likely to encounter political biases. So that’s one path—classical historical education, which I think is the most preferable.
The second option is the one chosen by alternative historians like Mark Solonin, for example, and others who take on a specific topic. He’s not a historian in the classical sense. I don’t know how well Mark Solonin knows, say… Well, he doesn’t have a traditional academic background in history, with training in ancient history, etc. But he takes a topic—such as World War II—and dives into it with full intensity. And the question, dear colleague, is: what is your goal? Because different goals require different methods. If it’s just a feeling—you graduated from the history department and feel that your knowledge needs refreshing—then a classical education is the way to go.
But if you want to solve a specific problem, you don’t need to spend several years studying at a university or in graduate school. You can just start searching for sources, analyzing and comparing them on your own. Do it independently—just as Solonin does. I’m not a fan of Solonin, either in his historical views or—especially—his political ones. But I admire the passion with which he works. He uncovered a huge layer of previously unknown information thanks to his diligence, meticulousness, and determination. So that’s another option—pick a topic and dig into it. But again, it all depends on your goal. Different goals require different approaches.
On YouTube Headlines Link to heading
Tatyana, a question for you as a media expert. I recently came across a headline on a major YouTube channel that read: “Right now Ukraine’s Sapsan strikes Moscow. Explosions in the Kremlin. Explosions. Putin flees.” And there are plenty of similar examples. It’s more or less clear why content creators resort to such tactics—it guarantees views. But what I don’t quite understand is why viewers respond to these headlines. In my opinion, this shows extreme disrespect for the audience. Frankly, it makes fools of people. Could you explain who, how, and why this works? It only takes a few clicks on such videos to realize that 99% of the time the actual content has nothing to do with these headlines. It’s like the Pavlov’s dog experiment—but in reverse. There’s a bell—the headline—but no food. And yet, it works.
Dear Tatyana! You know, this is the kind of question like—why do people fall for populism? But it’s obvious—when someone promises, like Mr. Zhirinovsky used to, a man for every woman, a bottle of vodka for every man, we’ll hang everyone and wash our boots in the Indian Ocean. Clearly, it’s nonsense. And yet people fell for Trump’s populism, you see?
Or take another example—why do people get hooked on drugs? Because it’s quick, instant pleasure. So in this case, those clickbait headlines—they’re like motion detectors, you see? They grab attention. That’s what it’s about—grabbing attention. And it works. Because it’s easy, it doesn’t make you think, it doesn’t demand effort. It’s a bright, moving spot that grabs the eye. Like a motion detector in a frog’s brain.
On Moderators Link to heading
Svetitsya writes Igor. Right now the channel has an excellent moderator without a gatekeeper complex, which is rare.
Yes, I can say that on the Telegram channel there are two moderators, and we’re all very lucky to have them.
And why not enable? Writes about the SMO—these comments also chatted at the start of the stream, not serious discussion. More comments will impact the channel’s rating. Glory to Ukraine’s defenders!
I completely agree. Indeed—Glory to the heroes! But dear Svet, I didn’t fully understand your point. I reread your message twice. I don’t understand what you mean by “enable comments.” They are enabled. What does it mean to enable comments? They’ve been on from the start, and the moderator is working with them. What? What am I supposed to do? Please clarify, because as I understand it, you’re offering an important suggestion—but I don’t quite grasp it.
On Immortality in Glukhovsky’s Novel and on Faith Link to heading
A question from Bastard Jones. A question for you as the only philosopher I know, probably—Glukhovsky. In his novel The Future, humanity has achieved immortality, and religion became unnecessary since there was no longer any need for an afterlife. So here’s the question: what would have to happen to humanity for even the most stubborn liars to conclude that God doesn’t exist? Because with every revolutionary technological breakthrough of our species, they reinterpret and adapt their sacred texts to fit the new reality. It’s a question to reflect on. And please thank the subscribers who supported me in the comments and helped me reframe my questions from another angle. You usually give me very brief answers. Sorry for being a bother.
I’m answering as best I can. Now, regarding your question. You know, I don’t believe religion will disappear due to any single event. This is a historical process. If we look at long enough timeframes, it’s a historical trend. If we don’t focus on what’s happening this month, or over a year or two, but zoom out—there is a decline in the role of religion. More and more states are moving toward separating church and state. Schools from church, in some form or another.
Again, over long periods, the share of believers is decreasing. There’s also a reduction of obscurantism within religions themselves. Some churches are more open to modernization—the Protestant church is very much so, and even the Catholic Church is undergoing reforms. As for Orthodoxy… let’s not dwell on the sad stuff.
But overall, again—I don’t think religion will vanish as a result of some event or series of events. The role of religion is gradually diminishing, the number of believers is decreasing. Again, if we look at long, long stretches of time. But as for it ending in the complete disappearance of religion—I don’t see that trend yet.
On Introverts and Extroverts Link to heading
A question from Vladimir. Please tell us what you know about experiments—and are introverts a personality trait or something else? How is it formed? Why do strong and weak sides exist in nature, if they can be distinguished?
Well, I don’t think I… You write here that I supposedly know more than our subscribers. I don’t think so. This is one of those questions from the field of psychology where—well, naturally—I probably know about as much as you do. So, these are two opposing personality types. The main criterion for distinguishing them is the direction of a person’s energy. If it’s directed outward, then it’s an extrovert. If it’s inward, then it’s an introvert. Extroverts are communicators. They’re sociable people. They can be good organizers. Introverts are people of reflection. They are capable of thoughtful, independent work. That is—like the saying goes—different moms are needed, different moms are important. Both types have advantages that the other lacks.
Now, this division into introverts and extroverts is a kind of classification. It’s an external framework, developed as a result of psychologists trying to understand people, so they analyze and define different types. It’s similar to the four classic temperaments—choleric, melancholic, phlegmatic, and sanguine. In their pure form, they don’t really exist. But this approach helps to classify people in some way, yes? Just like when composing a portrait—like forensic specialists creating a verbal sketch—they define types of eyebrows, chin shape, hairline, and so on. This allows for systematization and orientation in the diversity of human types. So the division into introvert and extrovert is one of those tools people have invented to try to understand themselves and human society.
Fascism and Liberalism Link to heading
So, as she would like you to analyze the current state of the so-called democratic system in democratic countries. The main pillars of democracy more or less continue to function in countries where people follow so-called Protestantism, as well as in Japan and South Korea—the so-called strongholds of world democracy. The USA has degenerated before our very eyes. The American people suddenly got offended and elected Trump. And then comes a characterization of him. Isn’t this happening because the fundamental principles of democracy are so outdated that they no longer fit the modern IT and AI-driven world—so much so that only demagogues, unprincipled careerists, populists, and other human filth manage to come to power through democratic means? After all, even Hitler came to power entirely through democratic procedures.
Well, that, by the way, is not accurate. You can’t say that Hitler came to power solely through democratic means. That’s a separate discussion. But it’s important—Hitler’s path to power is well-known, and it wasn’t purely democratic. Then it continues:
Churchill was right about democracy. What can you do? In the Anglo-Saxon world, with their common law and wild conservatism, things aren’t smooth either. They inherently exclude the possibility of modernizing that law. In short, these democracies are writing their own death sentence and paving the way for autocracy or even dictatorship. Political careerists skillfully exploit the flaws of democracy. And so on. Orbán, AfD, Salvini, Valdés, and others come to mind. Authoritarianism and mafiosi. In short—farewell to world peace, long live total separation.
Well, you know, burying democracy, burying the West in general, civilization itself—that’s kind of our thing. Starting with 1917, when the book The Decline of the West came out. Even before that, really, Europe, European civilization, and democracy have been declared dead many, many times over many years. And here we go again. So, you’re not the first.
I think the resources are still there. Every time there’s a crisis of democracy—and yet democracy proves to be a fairly resilient system of organizing society. I don’t see it as such a disaster. Yes, it’s bad, but it’s not the end of the world.
And, unfortunately, to avoid responding to your long question with an equally long answer, I’ll just state my conviction. If needed, I might lay out the reasoning another time. But I don’t believe this is the end of democracy. I don’t think we’re seeing total upheaval. Over long historical stretches, we don’t see total regression—on the contrary, we see growth, we see progress, we see the advance of humanism.
But to see that, you need to zoom out from the current week. Sometimes bad news dominates one week, sometimes good news does. But look at the bigger picture: there used to be cannibalism—now it’s gone. There was slavery—now it’s gone. There was a time when no system or norms restrained aggressive wars. But a different system emerged. Look—even now, yes, there is a war—but from 1945 until 2014, there was no major war in Europe. If we’re talking about large-scale wars, the gap was 70 years. Now this has happened, yes. But even so, saying everything is going downhill—that’s simply not accurate.
The Source of Hatred Toward Liberals Link to heading
So, a question from Yulia. What is the reason for the hatred of liberals and democracy? Forty-two percent support Stalin, they admire Ivan the Terrible, Maluta Skuratov. At the same time, there’s fierce hatred toward liberals and democrats. What’s the cause of this hatred? At first glance, it’s simple—liberals are weak, kind, and we are strength. Maybe I’m wrong, but it seems to me that aggression, fascism, hates the intelligentsia—and liberalism too—because deep down it knows the others are better. That’s what enrages them. Beyond the fact that it’s easier in an aggressive crowd, there’s something about kindness and humanity that won’t leave them alone—because evil senses that it is weaker than good.
Well, I can say right away, dear Yulia—you’re a romantic, and I think you’re mistaken in this. I believe liberalism is perceived—take the most striking example—Hitler. He hated liberal democracy with a burning hatred. He called them bourgeois liberal democracies—first and foremost Britain, France, and the USA—seeing them as the main threat to himself.
Liberalism is the only true threat. Nazism and communism—those are the only other systems. There’s nothing else. That’s why the hatred toward liberalism is natural—for being the main opponent, one of the key factors fascism defines itself against. This hatred of liberalism stems from the fact that it contradicts fascism, it is its opposite, its antithesis—and likewise for communism. Hence the hatred—hatred toward the main enemy.
They sense it—the main threat to them is precisely liberalism. So in my view, it’s all very clear. It’s not about some sense of “higher or better,” no—it’s about a threat. They sense their own death in liberalism. That’s where the hatred comes from. It’s simple.
About the historian Martirosyan Link to heading
The REGNUM mask writes. Has anyone heard about the history? MARTIROSYAN Can he be trusted?
You know, well, it’s a matter of taste, of course. But I really don’t like Stalinists. And historian Martirosyan? He’s a fierce Stalinist, a former intelligence officer who devotes all his work to exposing things. Now the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, so to speak, has made a statement about Khrushchev’s mistakes concerning the denunciation of the cult of personality. But Martirosyan is precisely the kind of person who writes books about this, makes videos, videos about it. So he’s a fierce Stalinist who is trying, so to speak, to cleanse the bright memory of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin from all sorts of tarnish. Well, how much he can be trusted is a matter of taste.
Why the Suicide Theories of Russian Officials Don’t Hold Up Link to heading
Mr. Stepan, what is the likelihood that Putin’s officials and oligarchs, who attain their positions with honor, in pursuit of power and profit, suddenly turn out to be people of honor and commit suicide, shoot themselves, or jump out of windows?
Dear Mr. Stepan! I think the likelihood of that is very close to zero. You know, we do know of actual suicide cases, including suicides of, shall we say, not the most sympathetic people, which can be considered suicides of honor. For example, there’s Pugo, by the way, who committed suicide after the well-known events, and Marshal Aliyev. Now those, yes, really were people who believed in the idea, so to speak, of communism, and when the Soviet Union collapsed before their eyes, they took their own lives. That, you understand? But neither Pugo nor Marshal Aliyev were corrupt officials. You see, corruption—it just doesn’t quite fit for me. That is, a person rises to power for the sake of profit and corruption, and then commits an act of honor? That just doesn’t really add up. So I don’t think so.
On the Irrationality of Putin and Trump Link to heading
Comment from Max not for, not for argument’s sake. I was just voicing a thought in what I wrote. The vulnerability lies in all my quasi-military reasoning. I don’t have access to classified data. I don’t know what’s going on with the U.S. military-industrial complex, or with stockpiles of weapons. These are my abstract reflections. But what I’m absolutely sure of is that both Trump and Putin are rational people. I fully understand why Putin started the war, why he misjudged the possible resistance. Everyone miscalculated back then. But he adapted, reshaped the economy, the military, and society. All of that is perfectly rational. Yes, he often talks nonsense, but he does that with a very specific goal. Same with Trump—he may be an incompetent official, misjudge his capabilities, make rational but mistaken decisions based on false inputs. But that’s different. Apparently, Trump is capable of adjusting those inputs and, therefore, changing his decisions. We’ve seen this. So I disagree. I actually believe that both of these figures are highly rational. It’s just that their personal traits and the way they interact with others increase the risk of mistakes.
Well, I won’t comment here, because I simply have a different view. You see, here we fall into one of those ultimately pointless debates—a debate over words, over what “rationality” means. You understand? So I just read out that comment. I can say that I have a different understanding of rationality. I think Putin started this war for completely irrational reasons. Because his interests, as a man who wants to preserve absolute power over the country, clearly contradicted this action. Right. And the same goes for Trump. I don’t see anything rational in his actions. But again, apparently, the author and I are using different definitions of the word “rationality.”
Trump and the Javelins Link to heading
Viktor Khripun Many, many commentators claim that it was Trump who provided Javelins to Ukraine, which is true. But almost no one mentions that there were problems with them too. Trump initially approved the deliveries, and then blocked them. And then the U.S. Congress put pressure on Trump. He had to approve them again. Has everyone really forgotten about this?
Well, not everyone. I, for one, remember.
About the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) Link to heading
So? Right. Another comment from Max. It seems to me that this whole story with the CPRF isn’t about opposition. In Russia, those who open their mouths without approval from the top quickly shut them again. I think this isn’t an internal matter, but an external one. What started the conflict between the Soviet Union and China? Khrushchev’s report. In China’s eyes, the Russian Federation is a renegade, a capitalist country with monstrous corruption and no ideology. It can be used, but a real alliance with the Russian Federation is impossible. And I think this is the Kremlin’s attempt to imitate a leftward shift. It’s no coincidence that at this puppet show, Karabas-Barabas KIRIENKO was present.
Well, again, I’ve read out your comment, dear Max. I hold a completely different point of view. I don’t think this whole story was initiated by the Kremlin in an attempt to please China. You know, that would be too subtle a joke for our circus. And besides, if your version were correct, then this move toward a so-called return to Stalinist roots would have come from the ruling party. Who exactly is China supposed to ally with? The CPRF? But the CPRF isn’t the ruling party. Then it should have been United Russia. So if your logic holds, why would the CPRF be raising the banner of friendship with China? No, this is entirely the CPRF’s initiative. It is certainly not against Putin. It’s their attempt to solve internal problems by warming a little pot of soup over the bonfire of a big war. As for Kiriyenko’s presence, well, in his role as the overseer of domestic policy, he attends all significant events involving parliamentary parties.
About BRICS Link to heading
Right? A question from Elena Malenkiy Comment from an international economist. From an economic standpoint, BRICS is a complete zero. The countries in it are nothing more than markets for Western goods—which the West doesn’t sell much of to begin with—and they’re not really destinations for Western capital either. So this is a gathering of losers who can’t do anything without the West. A brief analysis of the economic situation between 2023 and 2023 shows that the only country among them that grew until 2007–2008 was China, but afterward it began to stagnate. And now its economic situation is quite poor. The rest aren’t capable of developing at all. India, which stalled at the Green Revolution back in the ’70s and ’80s and hasn’t moved forward since; Brazil, with its socially and economically disastrous policies; and even more so all the others. Egypt, for example, endlessly repeating itself. They’re rushing to join BRICS because they believe that by uniting, they’ll be able to throw their weight around with the West. Unlikely. All their bravado rests on China, and China’s collapse into a deep economic hole has been well underway for a long time. They want reform—fine, let them go ahead and create their own organization and fund it themselves. And it’s long past time for the West to shut down the UN as we know it. Serious experts were writing about this back in the 2000s.
You know, dear colleague, this kind of hat-tossing attitude, you see? BRICS is half the world’s population, 40% of the global economy. You just brush it off like that. This Eurocentric or Western-centric view of the world, in my opinion, doesn’t match reality. I mean, what’s this about China? You paint a picture as if China is doomed, and India has been stuck in the 1970s. And yet, what’s happening with India’s economy right now? It’s becoming a fast-growing economy that’s actually taking an increasingly serious role in the global distribution of goods and money. So, you end up with a rather strange worldview. For decades, the United States has been shrinking its share of global GDP. China’s has been growing. And yet you say China is constantly collapsing—as if it’s going to fall all the way down to the point of becoming the world hegemon. So I think you’re, shall we say, painting a very comfortable picture of the world—for the West. Right? Yes. So now BRICS is just an influential organization of backward Third World economies? Didn’t expect that from you. I’m not saying it’s a dominant organization, but BRICS—again, you see—you call them backward Third World economies. Who exactly? China? Brazil? India? Sure. Let’s just keep brushing off the fact that these countries are playing an increasingly important role in today’s world. Right. But Trump and the United States don’t see it that way. They view China as the planet’s second-largest economy.
About Putinists and the Entire Population of Russia Link to heading
And so. Still backward, right? Okay, Bastard Jones. Igor Alexandrovich, excuse me, but it seems to me that on Mediafrenia’s morning broadcasts and guest streams, you commented on a street interview with Putin grant recipients. More often than not, you describe the state of the entire country through the lens of their schizophrenia. It sounds jarring and inappropriate in relation to all your compatriots on your—on our—channel. I could chalk it up to sarcasm, but in guest appearances it comes across as disrespectful—like a conspiracy, as if Putin just got lucky with the people, and so on. It’s easy to lump the whole population together and insult them, mocking those brainwashed poems as if it’s as easy as taking candy from a child, excluding only people like Skobov and Sakharov and labeling everyone else with a faceless term: “many.” But you know perfectly well that you can’t find alternative correspondents now. And so on. You just can’t paint everyone with the same brush.
I don’t even intend to. But you see, there are two accusations. On the one hand, some people accuse me of saying that the entire Russian people are cattle. And when I bring up Sakharov and Skobov as examples, they claim I’m setting two people against 140 million—that they’re just exceptions that prove the rule. Now Bastard Jones accuses me of the exact opposite. Dear friends, don’t look for a black cat in a dark room—especially when it’s not there. There is nothing like that in what I say or do. There’s no smear campaign, no painting everyone black. That’s nonsense. I don’t know where you saw that. But what is truly on the surface—what’s visible—are Putin’s squads, Solovyov, Kiselyov, and Margarita Simonyan. What’s on the surface are those who support Putin and the war. Yes, it’s clearly connected to fear. Absolutely. But you know, it’s not much comfort to Ukrainians that they’re being killed not in the name of 140 million, but maybe in the name of half, or 60%, or even 20%. You see, on the surface everything is defined by those who support Putin. That’s the problem. That’s what matters. And how many are there? Well, as a sociologist, I can offer an expert estimate based on intuition and indirect indicators: about 20 million today are internally opposed to Putin—resisting at home, in their kitchens, in internal exile, in private. But that doesn’t change the fact that Russia as a state and as a population remains a threat. You see? I repeat: it doesn’t matter to Ukrainians what portion of the Russian population is killing them. That’s it. That’s the most important thing.
About Scam Calls and Fraudsters Link to heading
So then, Vladislav from Latvia. Regarding fraudsters and calls from the bank—this is slightly related to my professional field. I’m involved in one of the areas of client data protection, evaluating the legal necessity of requesting and storing certain customer data. A bank might call, but it would definitely be an unusual situation. Most likely, they’d invite the person to visit a branch and resolve the issue there. That’s how it works in Latvia. In the Baltic countries, phone scammers almost always share one trait—they speak Russian. In Latvia, I get about eight or nine scam calls a year, and they’re always in Russian. I answer in Latvian, and they hang up pretty quickly.
Well, I’ve already mentioned that in Kazakhstan, if you answer in Kazakh, scammers catch on quickly there too. The most important thing to remember—as a rule—is not to act on impulse. There’s a universal approach, regardless of country: hang up and call the bank directly using the official number. That’s it. So, I’ll probably leave it at that. A comment from Latvia.
Alright. Timur Klimenko
You misled your listeners in the part where you discussed phone scammers. In principle, you’re right. If someone is unsure or lacks confidence, the best thing to do is end the call, call the bank or support service, or check directly in the bank’s app. You’re also right that no security service or bank branch employee ever calls clients. But there is one department that can call. That’s the monitoring department—called differently in various banks, but the purpose is the same: preventing card fraud. The point of the call is to verify the legitimacy of a card transaction. And here, there are nuances. The employee always asks if they’re speaking to the cardholder—meaning they already know the person’s full name. They themselves state the suspicious transaction, the time, amount, and merchant, and only ask whether the operation is legitimate. They never ask for the card number, since they already have it—let alone any card codes or SMS codes.
Well, actually, you know, I don’t see how I misled anyone. That’s exactly what I was talking about.
Trump’s Behavior, “Agent Krasnov” Link to heading
So? Well, Vitaly still insists on his version—that Trump behaves the way he does because he’s on Putin’s leash, essentially. Well, again, these are incomparable crimes. I won’t read it aloud, because it’s just a repetition of the same thing. That is, I’m convinced this is a mistake. Sure, kompromat was being collected on Trump. Yes, they worked with him when he was in Russia. But I’m absolutely convinced that the kind of kompromat already out there on Trump can’t be added to in any meaningful way. No perversions, no photos—none of it matters. You see, he has a Teflon rating. A Teflon image—everything slides off him like water off a duck’s back. For the United States, the crimes he’s already been charged with would be more than enough for him to be done with politics. But he’s not leaving. So, it’s not working. You see? It’s not working.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So, dear friends, this is where we’ll end our conversation today. I believe I’ve answered all the questions I saw, read all the comments when I felt it necessary, and added my own 0.03 ₽. With that, we wrap up our morning stream for today. Thank you for your patience. Glory to Ukraine, please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives. I’ll share updates on our future broadcasts separately. See you next time! Goodbye.
Source: https://youtu.be/vd0jN4dqgBg