Dictator Duterte, a Putin sympathizer, will stand trial at the ICC. Putin is pausing in response to truce proposals, but the very idea raises at least five questions.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is March 13, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Duterte Will Stand Trial Link to heading
From my point of view, this is good news. I understand that opinions may differ, but nevertheless, former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte—a close friend of Putin’s sympathizers, at the very least, and a member of this so-called World Club of Dictators—will stand trial at the International Criminal Court. This is likely to happen in the coming days, as the plane carrying Duterte already departed for Rotterdam yesterday.
Duterte is one of the most brutal dictators of recent times, a man with blood on his hands—over 6,000 people, according to Filipino human rights activists. These were victims of extrajudicial killings in a campaign that Duterte himself initiated and even personally participated in. He claimed that he personally killed three drug dealers. This is a man who consistently voiced support for Putin, and Putin, in turn, spoke warmly of him.
I’m not sure how closely Putin is following what’s happening to his sympathizers, but I believe he is. Just as he once closely followed the fate of Gaddafi and other dictators. So, as the saying goes, the rope may be long, but it will still come to an end. We’ll see. Of course, the fate of each dictator is different, but in the end, it all leads to a very specific outcome, albeit in different variations.
Russia’s Reaction to the Talks in Saudi Arabia Link to heading
Now, regarding the main topic of today’s discussion—undoubtedly, the consequences of what took place in Saudi Arabia and the aftermath of the negotiations between the Americans and Ukrainians, which have now concluded. In my view, they were as successful as they possibly could have been. In fact, the success of these talks has probably exceeded even the most optimistic expectations. The most important question now is: what will Putin do in response?
So far, it seems that Putin is keeping silent and has not made any statements on the matter. Meanwhile, Peskov has declared—quoting him directly—that “Russia is working on well-thought-out options for conducting the process of peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian conflict.” This vague and convoluted phrase essentially means that they are still holding off on any concrete response.
If we look at the official Russian stance, we can observe an interesting pattern: the lower the level of officialdom, the more definitive the reaction becomes. At the very top, we have Putin, who remains completely silent. The next level down is Peskov, who gives an ambiguous statement open to interpretation. As we descend further down the hierarchy, we get to deputies and senators, whose responses become increasingly categorical—outright rejection, in most cases. For instance, the well-known reactionary Klimov has already stated that under no circumstances should there be any negotiations, only victory.
Essentially, the lower the political weight of a Russian government representative, the more decisive and negative their response becomes. Those who appear on Russian television—figures with virtually no political significance—are the loudest in their outrage, calling any negotiations a betrayal and insisting that the war must continue.
As for the likelihood of Putin actually agreeing to a ceasefire, there is little reason to speculate, but it is obvious that no one expects him to suddenly say, “Oh, I hadn’t thought of that! Good thing the Americans and Ukrainians suggested ending the war. Of course, I support a 30-day truce.” No rational person anticipates such a reaction from him.
There is little doubt that Putin will try to stall for time, dragging out the process in anticipation of a potential meeting with Trump. Right now, it is not in his interest to commit to anything. Instead, he will attempt to use this period to secure maximum territorial gains for Russian forces, kill as many Ukrainians as possible, and further destroy Ukrainian cities. This is his obvious strategy.
When he does eventually respond, his demands will be predictable. First, he will insist on full control over all occupied territories within their administrative borders—meaning he will demand the transfer of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, which would immediately make any agreement impossible. He will also demand amendments to Ukraine’s constitution, requiring it to renounce NATO membership. Additionally, he will call for the lifting of sanctions. In short, he will put forward a set of conditions that are entirely unacceptable for Ukraine, just as he has done before. The result will be a prolonged negotiation process.
I do not believe that talks will collapse immediately, nor do I think Trump would halt the process after Putin’s initial response. However, it is unclear what kind of sanctions the West would impose if negotiations fail. Up until now, sanctions have not been enough to force Putin to end the war, so this remains a big question mark.
Lastly, I want to emphasize once again that I do not see how this war could end—even temporarily—by 2025. But if a miracle happens, anything is possible. In the end, they might somehow reach an agreement. I don’t understand how that could happen, but just because I can’t see a way doesn’t mean it’s impossible.
Five Questions About the Truce Link to heading
But let’s conduct a thought experiment—what if this actually happened? A ceasefire agreement was reached. And immediately, several questions arise in my mind. In fact, quite a lot of them, but I will try to formulate and present at least five key questions for discussion, dear friends, which, in my opinion, emerge right away if such a situation were to occur. Here are these five questions.
First. Yes. Before I ask these questions, I want to share some numbers that I tried to clarify while preparing for today’s discussion. What exactly does a ceasefire mean? Along what line? According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Serdyukov, the length of the front line is 3,700 kilometers. Moreover, in many cases, this front line runs through populated areas, not just through open fields. Some villages are partially controlled by the occupiers, while the other part is held by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Once again, the figure—3,700 kilometers—is the entire front line where the ceasefire would need to be enforced.
Now, the second number. I was unable to determine the exact section of the front where active combat is currently taking place. However, as of last autumn, according to Serdyukov, active fighting was occurring along a 977-kilometer stretch—almost 1,000 kilometers. So, let’s remember these two figures: 3,700 kilometers for the entire front line and approximately 1,000 kilometers of active combat zones. This is an enormous distance. For comparison, there are no European state borders of this scale.
Another important figure: during previous ceasefires, when agreements were reached to halt hostilities, violations of the ceasefire occurred tens of thousands of times. Let me emphasize—tens of thousands of violations. That is, despite agreements to cease fire, violations still happened on a massive scale.
Now, the questions.
First question: Who and how will control the ceasefire regime? I won’t even consider the unrealistic scenario in which foreign troops are deployed because Russia would never agree to that. Any foreign military personnel would be targeted for elimination, or at the very least, there would be an attempt to eliminate them by Russian occupying forces. That’s obvious. Just yesterday, Putin supposedly visited the Kursk region and explicitly stated that any foreign soldier would be treated as a mercenary and subject to destruction because international law supposedly does not apply to them. So, the question remains: who and how will control the ceasefire along this 3,700-kilometer (or even 1,000-kilometer) front? How many people would be required? How would this be enforced?
Second question: What will happen to the military personnel on both sides—the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian occupying troops? Will they just sit in their trenches for the entire ceasefire period? What if it lasts 30 days or more? Will they simply remain in their positions, or will they be withdrawn, given leave, or even sent home? Any of these options lead to further questions. If they remain in the trenches doing nothing, that’s one issue. If they are withdrawn, that would leave the front exposed, creating the temptation to cross it and seize new territories. There are many complexities here.
Third question: Even if both sides—Ukraine and Russia—genuinely want to cease fire, how can they control the actions of individual soldiers? The Russian invasion force consists of 600,000 troops. How can it be guaranteed that not a single one of these occupiers will provoke or attack? On the other hand, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, though smaller, still consist of hundreds of thousands of people. Among them, there are certainly those who oppose a ceasefire—those who have lost loved ones and comrades and do not agree with stopping the fight. We understand perfectly well that the number of such people in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not zero. There are undoubtedly those who will see a ceasefire agreement signed by Zelensky and Serdyukov as a betrayal and will refuse to comply. “So what if they arranged a ceasefire? I did not,” some might say.
This means that a ceasefire does not automatically extend to every soldier fighting on the front. Many have personal vendettas, both among the occupiers—who, although they are the aggressors, have also lost comrades—and among the Ukrainian forces, who are defending their country. Revenge, emotions, and years of combat experience will not simply disappear. Those who have fought on the front lines for three or four years understand this best. As a result, ceasefire violations will not be isolated incidents; they will happen by the hundreds or thousands.
Fourth question: What will the U.S., and particularly Trump, do if the ceasefire is repeatedly violated? Violations will undoubtedly occur on both sides. In this situation, will the United States be forced to respond, or will it choose to do nothing? That is a crucial question.
Fifth and final question: Will military aid to Ukraine continue throughout the ceasefire period? If it does, then Putin will categorically oppose such an agreement. If it does not, then Ukraine will be significantly weakened, given that Russia’s military-industrial complex has a much greater potential than Ukraine’s. In this case, the truce would clearly benefit Russia. If aid continues, then Putin will reject these conditions outright.
These are just a few of the many questions that arise regarding a potential ceasefire.
Ceasefire – A Benefit Despite All the Questions Link to heading
So, once again, I want to emphasize that if, by some miracle, Putin actually agrees to a ceasefire, then despite all these questions and all the problems associated with it, I believe it would be a very positive development. Because every day of ceasefire, every day of this regime—despite all the inevitable violations, which I can guarantee with 100% certainty simply because that’s how it has always been and avoiding it is impossible—still represents a huge benefit. Every day without shelling of Ukrainian cities means lives saved, dozens of Ukrainian lives preserved each day. A ceasefire would at the very least sharply reduce the number of casualties among Ukrainian soldiers.
So, if a ceasefire can be achieved, then despite all these concerns, which I cannot help but raise and want to bring up for discussion, despite my doubts—which, in my opinion, are quite reasonable—it would still be a great and undeniable benefit. After all, it means saving lives. And beyond that, we will see what happens next.
Once again, I believe that Donald Trump’s approach of pressuring Ukraine to agree, and then pressuring Russia to agree, is fundamentally detached from reality. I consider this position mistaken because it will not lead to peace. In the end, war can only be stopped on the battlefield. The idea that this problem has no military solution—a claim repeated like some kind of mantra—is simply wrong. It does have a military solution, very much so. The only question is what kind of “cards” are dealt, to use Trump’s language. And by “cards,” I primarily mean weapons: long-range missiles, aircraft, and air defense systems. These three components can ensure a military resolution of this conflict in Ukraine’s favor. Everything else, in my opinion, is deceptive rhetoric. And the biggest deceiver, sitting in the Kremlin, is more than happy about it.
These are just some initial reflections for now.
Survey Results – Will Russia Agree to a Truce? Link to heading
And now, you know what I’d like to do? Last time, I put a question to a vote: Do you think there is a chance that Russia will accept the proposal for a 30-day truce?
Now, first of all, we weren’t able to display the question and results as an image. But a full day has passed, and the question remains relevant. So, let’s take a look at the results.
A total of 20,000 people voted—which, as you can imagine, is quite a large number. Here are the results:
- 24% believe there is a chance that Russia will accept the proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Quite a lot of optimists, it seems. I must say, our audience tends to be rather optimistic.
- 62% think there is no chance. I didn’t participate in the vote myself, but I also share this view.
- 12% were undecided.
So, overall, the results have changed very little compared to when I first reviewed them yesterday. However, as you can see, skepticism clearly dominates, with most people believing there is no chance of a truce.
I also took a look at the comments—there were a lot of them—and I’d like to read a few that I think are worth noting.
- A user named Sam Poster writes: “Putin will agree just to avoid irritating Trump, and then he’ll stage a provocation and blame Ukraine.”
- Another user, March to the Mince (a play on words in their username), comments: “He’ll agree, then break the truce and claim Ukraine provoked him. In general, Ukraine will be blamed for everything as usual.”
- And a third comment from User Igor: “He’ll accept the truce, then break it himself and blame Ukraine. This has happened many times since 2014.”
In general, most of the comments follow the same line of thinking. So, these are the results of our survey.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
But before I move on to answering your questions, I want to say that we have quite a busy day today. At 16:00, we will have Garry Kimovich Kasparov. And at 20:00, David Sharp. Once again, at 16:00, Kasparov. At 20:00, David Sharp. Now, I will proceed with answering your questions.
Roman Bessmertny Link to heading
Alright. The author of the question names themselves. Well, nothing I can do about that. And the question is:
What? What can you say about Roman Bessmertny? Would you like to talk to him?
Dear colleague, as you well know, I do not comment on Ukraine’s internal politics and do not provide assessments of Ukrainian politicians, one of whom, undoubtedly, is Roman Bessmertny. But as for a conversation—I think that would be interesting. I think that would be interesting. I do not rule out such a possibility. If he agrees, we’ll consider it. Thank you for the reminder about him. About this politician.
Can Novikov Criticize Zelensky? Link to heading
Irina,
I was shocked to hear Ilya Novikov’s harsh criticism of Zelensky. Igor, in your opinion, is this justified? Is it appropriate to criticize the president of a country that is a victim of brutal aggression, especially at such a crucial moment when the fate of the world is truly being decided, when there is a battle between good and evil? Especially if this criticism comes from someone who stands on the right side.
You know, Ilya Sergeyevich Novikov—well, let’s clarify a few points. First of all, he commands respect because—well, in this case, I’m not, forgive the tautology, not a lawyer defending a lawyer. I’m not Novikov’s advocate, and I don’t agree with him on everything. But still, he has a moral right, because from the very first days, he joined the defense forces. And in this sense, let’s say, he does have some moral right to criticize the leadership of the country he is defending. That’s the first thing.
Second, I think that lawyer Novikov’s position is largely shaped by the fact that he is Petro Poroshenko’s lawyer. His political sympathies here are obvious. And given that Petro Poroshenko is Zelensky’s opponent, I think that explains a lot.
I also want to say that, for example, I personally have decided that criticizing Zelensky is off-limits for me—not because I particularly like him, but simply because, as a citizen of the aggressor country, I find it inappropriate for me to do so. However, I absolutely do not believe that the president of a country at war is beyond criticism. No, there is no basis for that. Supporting Ukraine does not necessarily mean supporting Zelensky.
So I don’t see anything terrible in Novikov criticizing Zelensky. I have personally chosen not to do so, but that doesn’t mean I consider my position to be universal. Novikov criticizes—let him criticize. And he is not the only one doing it. That’s normal. Right?
Could the Negative Reaction to the Ceasefire from Russia Be Staged? Link to heading
Captain Obvious asks:
Don’t you think that Ukraine’s current concession—agreeing to a ceasefire without security guarantees—is a prearranged stance between Trump and Putin? Trump wouldn’t propose something to Ukraine that Putin would outright reject or be highly unlikely to accept, because he wants to avoid confrontation with Putin at all costs. And right now, a pause in the war benefits Putin more than Ukraine, given economic problems, manpower shortages, etc. By the summer of this year, Putin could have found himself in a very difficult situation. Meanwhile, the overtly negative reaction from pro-Kremlin media channels seems like an act—something along the lines of: “Well, we didn’t want this, but since you’ve begged so much, we’ll grudgingly, painfully agree.”
You know, I must say that in this case, I disagree with most of your points, dear colleague.
First of all, I don’t think that Putin currently needs a pause in the war more than Ukraine does. I’m not convinced of that. I don’t agree that his situation—with the economy and everything else—is as catastrophic as you suggest. Russian occupiers continue advancing. Right now, at this very moment, they are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region. Yes, of course, initially, this operation in the Kursk region was not intended as a territorial seizure—it was a raid, and it was clear from the start that they would withdraw. But still, they are managing to carry it out. Slowly but surely, they continue advancing in Donbas.
So saying that Putin needs a ceasefire more than Ukraine does is a big question. A big question. At the very least, it’s not an axiom but a theorem that needs to be proven.
As for the reaction from media channels, I believe it is genuine. It’s not an act. It’s a sincere reaction. They genuinely want the war to continue—partly because their very existence depends on it. They live off the war. These channels, these people—they thrive on war. And if the war stops, they will find themselves in a kind of limbo, unsure of what to do next. So I think they genuinely want the war to continue, rather than just putting on an act.
Regarding the main part of your question—whether Trump and Putin coordinated this proposal—I highly doubt it. Highly doubt it. At the very least, because it’s clear that Putin, in its current form, is almost certainly not going to accept a simple 30-day ceasefire proposal. Almost certainly not. He will most likely put forward conditions, drag things out, and so on. So, in this regard, I also think you are not entirely correct. Right?
And a postscript—by the time of tomorrow’s broadcast, when you read this question, Putin may have already given his consent, which, in reality, was already there. In that case, the question will be irrelevant.
It is relevant. See, here you were mistaken. Putin has not given his consent. And I believe that, in the form this proposal was made, he will not agree to it.
Can the U.S. Be Called a Democracy If It Has Invaded and Bombed 48 Countries? Link to heading
Waldemar Klyuev. Right? Oh, sorry. He writes that his name is Vladimir.
Thank you for your work. Well, thank you, you’re welcome. So, the question: You repeatedly call the U.S. a democratic country, although it is currently led by an undemocratic leader. Perhaps. The question is, can the U.S. be called a democratic country if its armed forces have invaded or bombed other nations 48 times since the end of World War II, in some cases multiple times? What kind of threat did these countries pose to the U.S.? Here is the list.
Now, first of all, let’s break this down step by step.
When I say that the U.S. is a democratic country, I am primarily referring to its internal system of governance, which has all the hallmarks of a democracy. Power genuinely comes from the people—there are elections, voting, and public will is largely unrestricted. The internal structure of the United States is highly democratic. It is a federal system in which each state enjoys significant autonomy. There is a Congress that serves as a check on presidential power—although, in this case, both chambers happen to be controlled by the same party, but that is not always the case. There is an independent judiciary, a free press, and many other democratic features. So, in terms of its internal system, the U.S. is undeniably democratic. I don’t believe there is much room for reasonable debate on that point.
Now, regarding foreign policy: I am not here to defend U.S. foreign policy, but I must point out that many of the conflicts you mention were largely tied to the Cold War and the global confrontation with the Soviet Union. Many of these interventions were, in some way, attempts to defend democracy or prevent genocide.
For example, you mention U.S. military interventions, such as in Korea. But let’s be clear about what happened there—North Korea, backed by the Soviet Union and China, attacked South Korea. The U.S. intervened in response. What was wrong with that? The same applies to Vietnam—the communist regime in North Vietnam sought to destroy democratic South Vietnam, and the U.S. attempted to prevent that. Afghanistan was a source of terrorism, and the U.S. intervention was linked to that threat. The same goes for military actions against Cuba—Cuba was a Soviet outpost in the Western Hemisphere throughout the Cold War.
So, looking at these events, I emphasize again—while I do not necessarily endorse all U.S. foreign interventions, many of them were either aimed at countering terrorism or were part of the broader Cold War struggle, where the Soviet Union was actively supporting dictatorial and terrorist regimes.
And once again, my main argument about the democratic nature of the U.S. refers to its internal political structure, which is unquestionably democratic.
Why Will Latynina and Svetov Be Imprisoned in Russia? Link to heading
So, Pan Stepan, a question about Duterte. Well, dear colleague, I already answered that in the main part of the stream. Now, Andrey is very active on our page. Here’s his question, followed by a flood of comments from him.
Why isn’t Venediktov imprisoned in Russia, but Latynina or Svetov will be? Are they more dangerous to the regime? Or are they just on assignments in other countries, and we should all quietly respect their right to serve Putin’s regime?
Well, regarding Svetov—there is already a criminal case against him, so there’s little doubt that he would be imprisoned. As for Latynina, I don’t know whether she will be or not. I assume this question is a reaction to my response about whether I support the deportation of Latynina and Svetov to Russia. I said that I do not support it.
Let me clarify: deportation depends on the decision of the host country, which acts based on its own security concerns. It is not about restoring some form of justice as we might perceive it. A country does not deport someone to make things “fair”; it does so when it sees a threat to itself.
Now, Andrey has made many comments about this, even accusing me of being a “liberal liberal” and of opposing military aid to Ukraine—which is outright false. Mr. Andrey, you are lying when you claim that I am some kind of pacifist who opposes military aid to Ukraine. Either you are new to this channel, or you are deliberately distorting the truth. I have consistently advocated for a significant increase in military aid to Ukraine, for the destruction of Russian occupiers, and for dismantling the Russian war machine. So, accusing me of pacifism is simply dishonest.
Now, returning to Latynina—this reaction is typical of people who see the world in extremes: either you demand the death penalty for everyone with a different opinion, or you’re a traitor. Some people can only see things in terms of boiling or freezing points, with no in-between.
As for the core issue—why aren’t Latynina or Svetov being deported? Deportation is primarily a question of whether the host country sees them as a security threat. As far as I know, Svetov is in Argentina, and it seems that the Argentine authorities do not see his statements as dangerous. Svetov has recently started, in a roundabout way, to express support for Putin—not in the sense of openly backing the war or Ukraine’s destruction, but in a way that justifies Putin’s actions. Argentina apparently doesn’t see this as a threat.
Latynina, if I’m not mistaken, is in Germany. It seems that the German authorities don’t perceive her sudden sympathy for Putin—or her near-justification of him—as a threat. The same goes for Arestovych, who, as far as I know, is in the U.S. and is now openly speaking against Ukraine while, in many ways, supporting Putin. Yet the U.S. government does not consider him a danger.
Here’s a risky hypothesis: if Latynina or Arestovych were in one of the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania—I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of their deportation. The Baltic states perceive the presence of such “fifth column” figures as a real security threat. Again, this is not about justice—it’s about national security. Germany does not see a risk, and Argentina certainly does not, so deportation is not even a consideration.
One more point: if someone is deported and they are not considered a criminal in the host country, they won’t be forcibly sent to Russia. They will simply be told that their stay is over and given the choice of where to go—whether Russia, Turkey, Vietnam, or anywhere else. This is a standard procedure.
So, to be clear: I do not believe that Latynina and Svetov must be deported, despite my strong disapproval of their positions. I do not think it is necessary to ensure that they are imprisoned or otherwise punished.
As for Andrey’s original claim that “Venediktov isn’t jailed in Russia, but Latynina and Svetov will be”—Svetov will definitely be imprisoned because there is already a criminal case against him. Latynina? I don’t know. But again, I am not convinced that people I dislike should be handed over to Putin’s regime just for the sake of punishment.
And finally, about the false dilemma that Andrey presents—claiming that “if you feel sorry for Svetov, you don’t care about the suffering of thousands of Ukrainians.” That is nonsense. My sympathies are unequivocally with Ukraine. That should be obvious from my actions—not just during the war, but long before it.
Do I have sympathy for Svetov or Latynina? No. But that doesn’t mean I think they should be handed over to the regime to be destroyed. That’s my stance.
Was Yavlinsky Always an Amoeba? Link to heading
Just a second. Helga,
today you mentioned Yavlinsky. I’ve already asked about this person twice, but unfortunately, no answer yet. I recently came across an interview with Yavlinsky by some Russian journalist. I don’t know much about him except that he is the leader of the Yabloko party. But after listening to the interview, I was completely baffled—I didn’t want to use the word “shocked,” but Yavlinsky seems like an amoeba. Forgive me if I’m wrong, but these are my impressions—emotions, a feeling of something completely unprecedented yet utterly vague. How can such a person be considered a leader? In my opinion, he’s just a remora fish clinging to financial currents and political trends. No wonder Putin’s dictatorship took hold in Russia. It seems to me that you sympathize with Yavlinsky—or am I mistaken? What do you see as his strengths and weaknesses?
Dear Olga!
First of all, I certainly do not sympathize with Yavlinsky, and I have spoken about him multiple times. In fact, I debated Yavlinsky in 2018, on the eve of the presidential elections. Any sympathy I had for him ended sometime in the late 1990s. I continued to interact with him afterward, but his vote in favor of Putin during the State Duma’s decision on the prime minister’s candidacy was, for me, an act that was difficult to explain. He later justified his decision, but that is a matter for his own biography. So, saying that I sympathize with him would be incorrect—that is not the case.
Yavlinsky has changed significantly over time. The person he was in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a completely different figure. Back then, he was a politician with a clear position, one that I generally supported. However, later on, we had a serious political divergence—not a complete break, but at least a very strong disagreement. By early 1995, this led to a situation where, although I remained in the faction led by Yavlinsky and even served as his deputy within it, I had already made the personal decision to leave politics.
Over time, Yavlinsky gradually shifted toward compromise, something I could not agree with and have criticized him for repeatedly. I have often spoken about what I see as his main issue: he prioritized the survival of his party in a totalitarian state above all else. His attempt to preserve a so-called left-liberal party—though the ideological classification of Yabloko is debatable, its foundation is undeniably liberalism—led him to his current state.
Essentially, Yavlinsky tried to maintain a liberal party within a fascist dictatorship, within something akin to the Third Reich. His determination to keep Yabloko alive at any cost resulted in a paradox—he preserved the party’s registration certificate but lost both his electorate and his credibility. He kept the party’s formal existence, but at the cost of his political identity and public support.
That is a brief summary, though I have spoken about him at length before.
On Provocation During the Ceasefire Link to heading
I see.
I realize I’m getting ahead of myself, but let’s suppose Putin accepts the ceasefire proposal—solely to provoke Ukraine into breaking it, as he is a master of provocation. Then, as per a prior agreement, Trump covers for him. And suddenly, Ukraine is to blame, with all the consequences that follow. Again. How likely do you think this scenario is?
I have just outlined in my previous five questions that this scenario is practically inevitable. The only part I can’t fully agree with is the suggestion that Trump, by prior agreement with Putin, will cover for him. I don’t have any data to confirm that such an arrangement exists or will exist. However, this kind of reaction is quite natural. If Ukraine ends up breaking the ceasefire—which is inevitable—violations will occur from both sides. And in such a situation, selective monitoring is entirely possible.
So, I completely agree with you, except for the idea that this necessarily requires a Putin-Trump conspiracy. There is no need for a formal agreement in order to stage a provocation and get the expected reaction.
Why Are American Democrats Silent? Link to heading
Tatyana. Tatyana from Baku.
Why do you think we don’t hear from the Clintons, Obama, or Nobel laureate Biden? What about Harris? These people must understand that their actions—and inactions—have led to Trump’s return to power. Why are they always silent about events in America and Ukraine? Or are we simply unaware of their statements and speeches?
Well, first of all, I really don’t know—I haven’t specifically searched for their statements. But usually, remarks from figures like Biden, Harris, Obama, and Clinton naturally surface in the news cycle. So if we aren’t seeing them—and I monitor dozens of international media outlets almost daily—then most likely, such statements simply haven’t been made.
Now, why is that? You know, during Trump’s first term as the 45th president, Barack Obama did occasionally speak out and criticize him. But I think right now it’s too early. I believe they are waiting. These are former presidents and vice presidents—people of significant political weight. Perhaps they don’t see the point in rushing to speak out immediately; they may consider it premature. Maybe they are simply waiting for Trump to provide enough material for criticism.
That’s my hypothesis, though I can’t insist on it.
On Animal Protection Link to heading
Hassun. Right, this is another question that sparked heated debate about animals. Hassun writes:
A society’s humanity is measured by how it treats its most defenseless. In a scenario where an elderly woman and a pack of stray dogs clash, and the dogs attack her, who is the defenseless one? Whom should I sympathize with? In a city of 200,000 people with 1,000 stray dogs forming packs and multiplying rapidly due to an available food supply, aggressively defending their territory as territorial predators—should my sympathy go to the dogs or the people who live there? The situation is clearly the result of human negligence, leading to a conflict between human lives and the lives of animals. Whom should I sympathize with? But please, Igor Alexandrovich—writes Hodgson—let’s not talk about the TNR program. It’s obvious that in Russia, where a million stray dogs roam the streets and funds for sterilization are simply embezzled, TNR does not work. TNR is effective only for maintaining a population that has already been brought under control, and achieving that control has never been as humane as we’d like. So, in the end, is it really humane?
For those unfamiliar with the term, TNR stands for trap-neuter-return, a program aimed at managing stray animal populations.
I don’t understand why you assume I support TNR. I haven’t spoken about animal protection in a long time, but I’ve always been against TNR. It might be somewhat reasonable for cats since they don’t pose a threat in the way that dogs do. But even with cats, it’s still cruel—releasing them into an urban environment without care means condemning them to a slow, painful death.
As for dogs, I am categorically against TNR. Given the situation in Russia, if the choice is between TNR and humane euthanasia, euthanasia is actually the more humane option. Subjecting animals to a life of constant suffering isn’t a better alternative.
That said, we are discussing a situation that has already reached a crisis point—a crime, essentially. The real crime is that people abandon puppies, kittens, and adult animals on the streets in the first place. That’s where the problem starts. And now we’re left debating whether to protect the elderly woman or the dogs—this is a false dilemma.
If the goal is to make the country more humane, then the real solution is strict laws against abandoning animals. If you take in a pet, you must either care for it or surrender it to a shelter. Shelters should exist and be properly funded. Owning an animal should come with responsibility—not as a vague moral principle but as a matter of state policy. Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s famous idea that “we are responsible for those we tame” should be institutionalized into law. If someone decides to get a pet, they should be legally accountable for it. Dumping an animal on the street should carry severe penalties—ideally criminal charges, or at the very least, substantial fines. That’s how this problem should be addressed.
When things have been allowed to spiral out of control to the point where stray dog packs roam the streets, extreme measures inevitably become necessary. Unfortunately, TNR is not one of them.
And then there’s the absurd argument that people who advocate for humane treatment of animals should also defend viruses—because, after all, viruses are alive too. Anyone making that kind of argument has no place in a serious discussion. They fundamentally misunderstand the issue.
Religious perspectives on this topic are a separate matter. In the context of discussions about Ukraine, the United States, and other global events, bringing up religion feels out of place. If needed, that discussion should happen separately, in its own proper context.
But in general, I still stand by my belief that advocating for animal rights is a modern form of humanism. If we abandon that, then what exactly are we fighting for?
Some argue that during wartime, we must set humanism aside. But if you discard humanism, then what makes you any better than those who commit terror?
It’s a dangerous game—fighting the dragon, only to become the dragon yourself. That’s not a strategy I support.
Closing Words Link to heading
That’s it for today’s morning stream, dear friends. A reminder that at 16:00, we have Garry Kimovich Kasparov, and at 20:00, David Sharp. I believe both conversations will be very interesting and insightful.
Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom for Alexander Skobov, Russian political prisoners, and Ukrainian captives!
All the best! See you at 16:00.
Source: https://youtu.be/pJvxsCnxrh4