Justice Minister Chuichenko called the Decembrists foreign agents, his deputy Sviridenko explained that a foreign agent could be an alien, and the head of the Investigative Committee Bastrykin laughed at the slogan “Russia will be free.”

Main Topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 22. It’s 07:41 in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflection on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

Statements from Trump’s Team Link to heading

First, a few words about the noises being made by the team of the 47th President of the United States. Trump once again repeated that he believes Russia’s exclusion from the G8 was a mistake. Well, I don’t know about Russia. But what about China? Why? If Russia needed to be included and should be included again in the G8, then fundamentally—what is the G8? Well, now it’s the G7. It’s essentially a club of major democracies. That’s the idea. If Russia should be included, then why not China? Why is India left out? These are countries that are economically much more powerful. The same goes for Brazil. All in all, it’s strange. It’s like there’s just some fixation on Putin.

There was a very interesting debate about this yesterday during hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, where Marco Rubio spoke. His main thesis was that we cannot end the war without talking to Putin. Therefore, we must keep talking to Putin. How conversations with Putin bring the war closer to an end, Rubio did not clarify.

But the highlight was, of course, a whole series—an entire saga—of his responses to Congressman Keating’s questions. Keating asked Rubio if he considers Vladimir Putin, the person with whom the United States is negotiating, a war criminal. To which Rubio said no. Some of the events in Ukraine could be described as war crimes, but our goal is to end the war.

Then Keating asks again—it’s a fairly simple question. Is he a war criminal, the person we’re negotiating with—Vladimir Putin? He’s trying to get through to Rubio. He’s a war criminal. That was the second question. Rubio responds, “But I’m trying to answer your question. I’m saying that we are trying to end the war.” So the person is asking whether Putin is a war criminal. Rubio says, “We’re trying to end the war.” War crimes have been committed. Who will answer for them? There will be a time and place for that. But for now, the task is to end the war.

Ultimately, Keating asked Rubio six times whether he considers Putin a war criminal, but received no answer.

What’s really funny is that before this war began—the big war—back in 2017, during the hearings when Rex Tillerson was being confirmed as Secretary of State, Rubio, who was a senator at the time, asked Tillerson if he considered Putin a war criminal. Tillerson replied that he wouldn’t use that term. To which Marco Rubio sharply replied—let me quote from my notes. Here it is: “There should be no difficulty in saying that Vladimir Putin is a war criminal, and I’m disappointed in your inability to say what I believe is commonly accepted.” That was Marco Rubio in 2017. Like some kind of Kasparov, I don’t know, honestly. So what happens to a person when he sells his soul to the devil? It’s hard. Or no, probably—it’s probably easy. Curious. A curious legal observation, don’t you think, comrades?

So, dear friends, the central topic of our discussion today is, of course, the St. Petersburg Legal Forum. An event that might seem routine—an economic, legal forum. But I’d like to say a few words about it. There was a lot of interesting stuff at this forum. In fact, you could create an entire satirical show—or an analytical one, if you prefer—based solely on the materials from this forum. There was plenty going on. Constant calls to toughen legislation on foreign agents. Discussions about the Dulles Plan. Proposals to amend the Russian Constitution. Medvedev gave several passionate speeches. I can’t fit all of it into one program. First, he furiously lashed out at the minor Bonapartes disembarked from Europe—Ukraine. Then he went on at length about how we defeated Napoleon, forgetting that it was a victory of a large coalition that included Prussia and England. So, actually… well, Medvedev is a special case, of course. And I resisted the temptation to show a long video about Medvedev. It’s quite something.

There was a striking speech by Nikolai Kropachev, rector of St. Petersburg State University, who spoke strongly against a secular state and called the invasion of Ukraine a war for religion, for true religious values—in essence, a crusade. Well, okay then. Now a lot becomes clear.

Arguably one of the most important statements came from Deputy Justice Minister Oleg Sviridenko, who said that even aliens could be recognized as foreign agents in Russia. He said, for example, that the legislation had worked fine, but the realities of the time had changed, and the influence of the collective West on Russia had intensified. “We couldn’t stand still. And today, even if a cosmonaut lands from any planet and starts performing miracles against our country, he will be a foreign agent,” Sviridenko promised. This illustrates why, even if some extraterrestrial intelligence exists, it’s not in a hurry to make contact with Earth—because of people like this. Who would want to come, start a conversation, and immediately be labeled a foreign agent with all the consequences?

By the way, this is why I say it’s dangerous for aliens to communicate with Earthlings. The same Sviridenko also lamented that criminal liability for foreign agents only applies after repeated violations. He converted this sorrow into a proposal. “I believe,” said Sviridenko, “that the Ministry of Justice will propose initiatives, because criminal liability must be introduced. This is the new concept. Enough coddling these entities who bring nothing good to our country.”

But all this fades in comparison to the main stars of the legal forum: Minister Sviridenko, Justice Minister Chuichenko, head of the Investigative Committee of Russia Bastrykin, and Abdul Hakim Haqqani—the author of the Taliban’s legal and judicial system in Afghanistan. This trio is arguably the forum’s brightest highlight.

Chuichenko attacked the Decembrists, declaring them not merely agents, but apparently extremists. Let’s actually watch the video—retelling it doesn’t do it justice. This came up during a lecture by Vladimir Medinsky on the Decembrists. The question arose: were they under foreign influence? And then more questions followed—were the results of their activities mostly positive or negative? The conclusion was that the Decembrists weren’t objects of foreign influence, but rather subjects—they sought out that influence themselves, studied Western ideas. Incidentally, Pestel and Muravyov admired the American model the most. Despite the differences in their foundational acts, they both saw the U.S. Constitution as a model in many respects.

So personally, I don’t see foreign backstage influence in their decision to go to the square. They drew from Western culture and ideology to form their views. This is, I think, a very interesting exercise in retrospective justice. If you review all of Russian history through Chuichenko’s lens—well, it gets interesting. Who is Peter the Great, then? A foreign agent? An undesirable organization in the form of a monarch? Just a direct conduit of Western culture. And Prince Vladimir, who adopted Western values—Christianity from Byzantium? It’s frightening to imagine what would happen if Chuichenko’s perspective were realized. There’s a vast field of work here. Identifying foreign agents in Russian history—now that’s a promising occupation! Think of all the money that could be allocated for this. How many institutes could be created? It’s actually a great idea.

Aside from that, Chuichenko proposed making the protection of moral values a basis for terminating a criminal case. He said that defending moral values could be a third ground for exemption from criminal liability and case closure. He said, and I quote, “I have a proposal to consider whether we might introduce a third ground for exemption from criminal liability, in order to ensure fairness in sentencing.” Currently, people are exempted if they acted out of extreme necessity or in self-defense. And now—if they were defending moral values? I’d just like to say that’s also a vast field of work. For example—Chikatilo? Listen, Andrei Romanovich needs to be posthumously rehabilitated and perhaps even decorated—because he defended moral values. And all those Jack the Ripper types who disemboweled prostitutes—national heroes, defenders of moral values. So serious work ahead, and here Chuichenko has plenty of room to operate.

By the way, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma Tolstoy gave a fiery speech calling for large-scale rewriting of the Constitution. He didn’t get into much detail, but there was far more clarity in the speech by Abdul Hakim Haqqani, who authored the legal system of the Taliban in Afghanistan. I’ll get to his speech in a bit, but first—the incredibly vivid performance by Investigative Committee head Bastrykin. He heard some noise—and I suggest we watch the video, because I lack the artistic skill to do it justice. Let’s watch.

“Hare Krishnas are not migrants; Hare Krishna is a protest action. Russia will be free.” That quieted down quickly, didn’t it? You know, dear friends, as for Bastrykin—it’s all clear. This is a ghoul who evokes historical echoes—whether Beria or Malyuta Skuratov or someone else. What struck me most was the reaction of the audience. Look—young, fresh faces—these seemed to be young lawyers, perhaps students, maybe grad students, maybe practicing lawyers. And these people—at Bastrykin’s mockery of the slogan “Russia will be free”—they laughed. Well, it is funny. Funny, of course. “Russia will be free.” What a joke—in the context of Putinism, of this so-called “rule of lawyers.” I remember when Putin came to power with his team, many said, “Well, it’s good, finally lawyers are in charge—they’ll bring order, a dictatorship of law.” Yeah. Well, look at how that turned out.

That reaction—to the slogan “Russia will be free”—is, I think, the most accurate verdict on Russia today. It vividly illustrates the future of the country that lies in the north of Eurasia.

By the way—those Hare Krishnas, migrants? Turns out they were delegates from the United Arab Emirates performing their traditional dances. So Bastrykin, as usual, missed the mark.

And finally, let me say something about the overall direction suggested by this St. Petersburg Legal Forum. It is clearly a Taliban path. Because the author of the Taliban’s legal system, Abdul Hakim Haqqani, spoke there as a teacher—not just a guest, but a mentor. He shared his experience, and everyone listened closely. He said that in Afghanistan, human rights are fully protected, and a purely Islamic system based on Sharia has been created. Recently, the Taliban’s Ministry of Energy’s Book Commission published a list of 433 banned works. Russia is clearly following the Taliban’s course.

The notorious case against publishers now unfolding—especially the publishing house Eksmo. Raids on bookstores are already underway; books are being confiscated and marked for destruction. Not just books with LGBTQ references, but all so-called young adult literature—books written for and about teenagers. And of course, books by authors declared foreign agents in Russia. What happens to them? They’re burned.

Exactly like the Taliban. What is a purely Islamic system? If anyone doesn’t know—in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, television, music, musical instruments, visual arts, computers, chess, white shoes, and any talk of personal life are banned. There is extreme discrimination against women, who are completely banned from education, from being treated by male doctors, and from appearing in public without a husband or male relative. And last year, the Taliban leader officially declared that, under Sharia, women would be publicly stoned to death for adultery—adultery in a bathhouse, no less. Sorry, but under this “pure legal system,” that means any pre-marital or extra-marital relationship. In short—anything involving male-female relations outside of marriage—stoned to death.

What about Vladimir Vladimirovich and Kabaeva? I don’t think the Taliban would let that slide.

But regardless—this is the path Russia is on. And I believe that, for now, these are just words—but the distance from words to implementation is very, very short in Russia. So the country is becoming increasingly unlivable.

And this Taliban trajectory is being normalized—tourism to Afghanistan, tourism to North Korea—just to get people used to it.

So, dear Russians, congratulations.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

I’m moving on to answering your questions.

On Indirect Methods of Sociological Polling Link to heading

First, a question from the chat by Andrey. I agree that polling sociology is impossible in totalitarian countries. What do you think about the following indirect method of assessing public sentiment? Reading a relatively non-political Russian Telegram channel, which is generally about everyday life and is read by people with different views—because everyone’s interested, for example, in when the hot water will be turned off—like “Moscow 360.” In it, for example, there’s a message about flight cancellations at Moscow airports due to Ukrainian drone attacks. Based on the number of likes and dislikes, we estimate the share of supporters and opponents of the genocide of Ukrainians. As a layperson, it seems to me that if there are enough reactions—a few thousand—the method could at least roughly estimate sentiment in the population. Because Telegram kind of acts like a comrade major’s database.

No, dear colleague. First of all, whether it’s a few thousand or a few hundred thousand makes no difference, because if the sample is correct—if it is representative of the general population—then just a few hundred responses are enough to understand what’s going on in society. The method, as an indirect method, as one of many—it has the right to exist. But let’s say this is very flawed sociology. It’s important to always specify that this, of course, is not an indicator of public sentiment, because any media-based poll—one based on media content—is always a poll of participants in a specific forum or Telegram channel. And second, it absolutely does not mean that if someone… I mean, again, you see, I sometimes ask questions on our Telegram channel. And I never say this represents the opinion of all Russians. No, it’s just a rough idea of what you, dear friends—our channel’s audience—are thinking. So, of course, this cannot be extrapolated to represent all Russians’ opinions. The same goes for “Moscow 360”—it’s not all Russians’ opinion either.

Secondly, if the reaction to airport closures is negative, that doesn’t at all mean that people support the genocide of Ukrainians. Of course not. People just don’t like the fact that airports are closing. That absolutely does not mean they support genocide. So that’s completely, as they say, unfounded reasoning.

There were also a lot of comments about the use of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. The general opinion is that the statement by the person who said that Ukrainians in Europe—or specifically in Sweden—speak only Russian is not representative. Since I wasn’t able to answer that question myself—because I simply don’t know—many say they’ve seen a different reality and have different views.

On Negotiations and Inviting Mykhailo Podolyak Link to heading

Now, the next questions. Leo Leo. Please, it’s time for an intellectual feast with Distant. Especially since the situation has drastically changed. Judging by Ukrainian television, there’s no particular decline in morale.

Well, Mykhailo Mykhailovych Podolyak is always among our regular speakers. Let’s arrange it and definitely have a conversation.

On Zelensky’s Negotiation Logic Link to heading

A question from someone who calls themselves Animate. At the beginning of the war, Zelensky stated that no negotiations with Putin personally were possible, and at the time this was commented on as a logical and correct decision. Now Zelensky refused to negotiate with Russian representatives because Putin wasn’t there. And again, this is seen as a logical and correct decision. Why does the logic shift so drastically? Please help me understand.

To me, it’s fairly obvious that the mere agreement to negotiate in Istanbul was given under pressure from Trump. That’s pretty clear. Initially—since Trump had changed his position—well, the level of Ukraine’s dependence on the United States is evident. And it’s clear that if, for example, Ukraine, particularly Zelensky, had refused to follow his demand—a literal demand that Ukraine must immediately accept Russia’s invitation to negotiate in Istanbul (even though not long ago he held the opposite position, saying a 30-day ceasefire must come first)—then it’s obvious this move was made under pressure.

And here I want to read a response to this comment by Savva Ivanov, which I think is quite reasonable: A reasonable person in politics acts according to the situation. The American president is mocking Ukrainians and eagerly engaging in political traps for Zelensky. The Turkish one was just another. The Ukrainian side didn’t behave diplomatically enough—back when Biden, who was loyal to Ukraine, was in power, no one pushed for talks with Putin, but today Washington shamelessly tries to force Zelensky to talk to him. Refusing, citing previous positions, would give a chance to Putin’s propaganda and Trump’s crowd to accuse Zelensky of being unwilling to negotiate. But events ultimately showed the serious world that it’s actually Putin who doesn’t want peace. They proposed Turkey themselves, then got scared to go and again sent their overseas fake doctor of historical sciences who resolves absolutely nothing. Once more, he is the utter disgrace of Ukrainian diplomacy. In Turkey, they had to walk a narrow path over a deep political pit—and managed not to fall in.

Overall, I agree with the author of this comment.

Questions About Trump, Biden, and the USA Link to heading

Now, a few questions about Trump, Biden, and America. The first question: Yevgeny Rubio: How would you assess the appearance of an American Brezhnev in the U.S.? The Democratic Party leadership’s attempt to nominate a mortally ill, incoherent person—Joe Biden—for president. An aggressive form of prostate cancer with bone metastases, loss of orientation in time and space. Where does such hypocrisy and utter contempt for voters come from?

Dear Yevgeny! I think the crisis of the political and electoral system in the United States is widely acknowledged. Only the lazy haven’t criticized what happened in the last election. That’s all clear. Now, regarding incoherence—Biden’s illness has only recently come to light. Yes, it is, of course, a problem that the Democrats haven’t found anyone besides a very old and very unhealthy man. But let’s not forget that Roosevelt was a disabled man confined to a wheelchair. I understand that comparing Biden to Roosevelt may be a stretch, but still—a serious illness, being confined to a wheelchair, doesn’t in itself make someone incapable.

As for incoherence—yes, of course, there were moments: when the man walks up the stairs and falls, stumbles—that was eagerly copied, spread, mocked, etc. But you know, everything is relative. And what about our next, 47th president? It seems to me that compared to Trump’s total incoherence, Biden looks like the gold standard of sanity. At the very least, he hasn’t uttered any mind-boggling nonsense. His speech has been fairly coherent. Again—everything is known in comparison.

And the fact that this is a manifestation of a deep political crisis—a profound crisis of the U.S. political system—is something we’ve been discussing throughout the entire time we’ve been communicating.

On the Vote Counts for Trump and Harris Link to heading

Yury Chelnokov: I looked up the American data—over 71 million voted for Trump, around 66 for Harris. Where did you get the 77 million figure?

I’m honestly amazed. People quote numbers… Dear Yury, over 77,303,000 people voted for Trump—those are the official numbers. I don’t know where you’re getting your figures. I just remember it well—sorry, some things stick in memory. And no, Harris didn’t get 65 or 66 million votes—over 75 million people voted for her and Biden combined. Again, your numbers—I don’t know where they come from. Just check your source. Look at the official data, check Wikipedia if you want. The English version has a detailed article on the last U.S. presidential election. Everything’s listed there. Just go read it. You’re mistaken.

On the Closure of “Voice of America” and Journalistic Responsibility Link to heading

A question from a subscriber who calls themselves Concrete, Steel, Wood: Igor, do you think there is partial blame on editorial staff in the closure of Voice of America? I followed not just the Ukrainian edition, which often aired reports about the difficult lives of Ukrainian refugees from Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia. You know, dear colleague, I generally dislike the idea of blaming the staff themselves or finding editorial flaws and saying that’s why it was shut down.

No, of course not. It wasn’t shut down for that. I’m not familiar with the Ukrainian edition of Voice of America. I watched the Russian one—well, at least I used to. And I can’t say there were any major biases there. So I completely disagree with the idea that the journalists or editorial staff at Voice of America bear any responsibility. No, I think this is a deliberate move by Trump. First, he wanted to cut back, to kill off this soft power—Trump had no use for it. And second, despite being funded from the U.S. budget, it was still a fairly independent media outlet. Naturally, Voice of America didn’t spread openly anti-American content, but overall the atmosphere was quite free. I never worked for Voice of America, but I did collaborate with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and I can say—yes, there were restrictions. But more like those of public broadcasters than state-run ones. There was strict tolerance, political correctness—that sort of thing. But there weren’t any major political limitations or biases. So no, there’s no blame here.

On the Use of Various Philosophers in Reasoning Link to heading

A subscriber named Children’s Choir: Igor Aleksandrovich, do you use the works of different philosophers in your work? Isn’t there a danger of being led to political conclusions in error?

Ah? Sorry, I see the signature says Igor—my apologies, namesake, I mistook you for someone else. So, dear namesake, you see—when you use different tools in everyday practical work, like screwdrivers, drills, hammers, pliers, and so on, that’s not called eclecticism, it’s called problem-solving.

I’ve said many times that besides the intellectual pleasure you naturally get when reading the texts of smart people, on a practical level—pragmatically—these thinkers are helpers to me, they are tools. For instance, I find reading Plato—where he presents the views of Socrates—very helpful and interesting as a tool. When I’m tackling an intellectual task, another tool might be more helpful—like something from Nicholas Luhmann or Pierre Bourdieu. Sometimes even Marx’s theory of alienation proves useful. This doesn’t mean I adopt everything wholesale—but I take what is useful, what is relevant.

So this toolbox I have—it’s partly in my head. At one point, I even tried to build a physical library. It’s not eclecticism—it’s the use of what I’d call a principle of intellectual complementarity. Because becoming a follower of just one doctrine, I think, is limiting.

And if someone wants to label that as eclecticism—fine, I agree. In fact, during some joint projects I’ve done with fairly well-known figures, when we were discussing methodology, one prominent researcher once labeled me an eclectic—saying I was a Buddhist one moment, a supporter of something else the next. But to me, limiting yourself to a single concept is a mistake. So yes—in this case, eclecticism, even if it’s present, doesn’t lead to delusion; it enriches the scope of research.

On Conversations with Yury Pivovarov Link to heading

Irina: Where can I listen to your lectures, your historical discussions with Yury Pivovarov? I really enjoy detailed lectures. Please send a link.

You know, those conversations—they’re all available on our YouTube channel, on our page. You couldn’t find them? Well, okay—I’ll try to locate and send the link. But yes, they are on our YouTube. Since there are over 4,000 videos there, of course, it’s difficult to search. I don’t know—maybe we need to create a separate guide. That’s something our team is actually considering: how to make the search easier. It seems we’ve structured things somehow, but when it comes to digging through an archive, we need to think about how to improve that.

On Irina Khakamada Link to heading

Olga Kapustina: Please tell us—sorry—about Irina Khakamada and her work. I liked her public statements about Ukraine and Russian politics in general, from what I’ve heard. I suspect she wasn’t an independent political figure. Or am I wrong? If in some parallel reality she had become president, how would events have changed? In recent years Irina has gone into coaching and complete silence. Understandably, she avoids politics for her own safety.

Well, dear Olga! First, I’d like to highlight one of Irina Mutsuovna’s positive traits—personal courage. She showed this during the episode in October 2002 when she participated in negotiations with armed terrorists during the Dubrovka theater hostage crisis and helped escort four hostages—including three children—out of the building.

As for being “not independent”—Khakamada was, in many ways, both independent and not. When I met her, she was part of Boris Borovoy’s team—she was close to him, and I remember those early ’90s meetings and discussions well. She was in partnership with Borovoy and certainly under his influence at the time.

In terms of her views, she was a typical right-wing liberal. Though she was quite skilled at shifting her positions depending on the circumstances. Later, she became part of the Union of Right Forces team—Nemtsov, Koch, Chubais, and others. One thing that stands out about her is a certain performative cynicism. For instance, there’s her infamous 1998 statement on the TV show Vzglyad, where she said that most coal mines should be closed and miners should find other sources of income—like picking mushrooms and berries in the woods. That quote later came to be attributed to nearly all democrats. Economically, one might debate it, but statements like that strike me as deeply cynical. Telling people “go pick mushrooms” is a stark political attitude—and it was very characteristic of Irina. I encountered that cynicism in our interactions more than once.

Her position on Ukraine also shifted. Her statements often changed depending on the audience. For example, in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, when she appeared on Russia-24, she said that Crimeans had always wanted to be part of Russia and called the so-called referendum a “special operation without a single shot.” But on Echo of Moscow, she called Crimea’s annexation exactly that—an annexation. Later she added that the president’s approval rating rose after the referendum, and even proposed that Ukraine be paid reparations in exchange for reviewing the borders. All of that seems to me like political cynicism, which in many ways was Khakamada’s credo.

Still, she always maintained a pragmatic position—essentially: “there is power, it must be yielded to.” But again, I emphasize—personal courage and the ability to act do matter. I wouldn’t say she was completely non-independent—no. But she did work as part of a team, which is entirely normal in politics.

On the Language Spoken by Ukrainians Abroad and the Division Into “Us” and “Them” Link to heading

A question from Igor: In the last broadcast, you responded to a question about which language Ukrainians speak in emigration and gave your opinion. The viewer’s example truly wasn’t representative. Many Ukrainians speak and write Ukrainian in Europe—I’ve seen and heard it in many countries. Yes, some speak Russian. From my experience, yes, refugees from Ukraine’s eastern regions, used to speaking Russian at home, continue to speak it abroad. Naturally, emigrants from the western regions prefer Ukrainian. Here’s my question: don’t you think lately there’s been far too much focus on dividing people into “us” and “them”? Not just Russians and Ukrainians. Wouldn’t it be better if politicians, on the contrary, tried to put out this fire and left language solely to its communicative function, fostering tolerance for all languages? I mean those politicians who want peace—not just with neighbors but within their own country.

Well, the language issue can’t be reduced to communication alone. Let’s put it this way—sorry—the language issue is, in any case, not just a matter of communication, but a political one too. And it’s simply unrealistic to completely remove it from politics. Because if you, as a politician, decide not to politicize the language issue—well, others will. That’s the problem. Especially if there’s a… You see, I would fully agree with you and support the idea that depoliticizing the language issue would be the right move—if not for one thing. If, specifically in Ukraine (and not just Ukraine, but across the entire post-Soviet space), the politicization of the language issue weren’t directly tied to Russia’s aggressive nature.

Let’s be clear—why is the language issue politicized? Because Russia is prepared to attack neighboring countries in the name of “protecting” the Russian language. If Russia didn’t defend the Russian language with such methods, the politicization of the language issue would be a matter for the fringe. It would be a marginal issue that we could safely ignore. But when Russia is prepared to kill in order to “protect” the Russian language—naturally, the language question becomes extremely serious and political.

Let me draw an analogy with religion. Religion should absolutely be a private matter—believe or don’t believe, believe in one thing or another. But when religious wars begin, religion becomes a critically important political issue. So yes—I’m in favor of depoliticizing the language issue entirely. Speak whatever language you want—that’s your business. But under the current circumstances and this kind of neighborhood, the language issue is unavoidably political. It simply cannot be removed.

Still, the idea of depoliticizing the language issue is one I really like. But, sorry—as long as there’s an aggressive Russian empire, on the post-Soviet space, it’s just not possible. It’s simply not possible to take it out of politics.

Scandal in Norway Over New Push to End Support for Ukraine Link to heading

Pan Stepan: Here in Norway, a scandal is brewing around the microscopic party FOK, which suddenly launched an ad campaign costing over $100,000 to stop Norway from sending money to Ukraine. At first, they refused to disclose the source of funding, but when directly accused of ties to Russia, they said the money came from Norwegian millionaire Odd Berge. However, he mostly lives in Murmansk, where he has a concrete production business. He says he’s acting out of personal conviction and claims the war in Ukraine was started by the U.S.—Russia is only defending itself. What do you think, is there a chance he’s not lying about his convictions? Or is this undoubtedly a Russian intelligence operation?

Well, it’s worth noting that he likely doesn’t actually live there—there are already comments under your question pointing out that he can’t reside in Murmansk, since he was expelled in 2016 for ten years. So?

I don’t know. I wouldn’t say this is necessarily a textbook case of an FSB operation—it looks like a classic PR campaign. I don’t know the true sources of the funding. I don’t know whether this is an FSB op, or what he truly believes. That, honestly, is not exactly a question for me—you’d need telepathy, or a harsh interrogation.

So yes, it’s undoubtedly a PR stunt. I think it’s entirely possible that it’s Russian-funded—but I can’t prove that. Maybe, just maybe, the man is acting out of heartfelt conviction.

Olga Trifonova: I asked about the Glazunov Gallery—I also see him as a court painter, which is why I only visited it now, having had no interest earlier. I have a philology degree from Moscow State University and have worked my whole life as a teacher and editor. I understand well—and affirm—that the role of art and literature is enormous. They are highly active forces that subtly shape people’s consciousness. Since the war began, I’ve been trying to understand why so many people support what’s happening. The Glazunov Gallery is located right across from the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts. It was founded in 2007—an important point—and at that time, art still wasn’t fully subordinated to power. The gallery and theater still enjoyed creative freedom. The Pushkin Museum was still a center for expanding art, for opening boundaries. The Glazunov Gallery, even then, was a center of nationalism and aggression—long before today’s obscurantism. That’s what shocked me—perhaps naively. We’re not talking about Lenin statues. The gallery’s very existence was already preparing the worldview that Putinism offers today: national superiority, territorial expansion at any cost. The militant Christ—that’s the title of one painting. Hatred toward democracy and Europe. All this long before totalitarianism and the cult of Medinsky. I’m not interested in Glazunov as a person. My question is—what was already happening then? In whose interest?

Well yes, thank you for the question. I think the answer is fairly obvious. Imperial chauvinism existed long before Putin—but it wasn’t then state policy. Let’s say it was one of the currents within state policy, but it wasn’t the dominant one. And now? Yes, now it is.

Glazunov is one of the manifestations of something that’s always been there. I’ve said before that in the Soviet Union there was a fairly influential “Russian party,” and what you describe was reflected in it. True, it was crushed under Andropov—because the Russian party called for steps to increase the weight and role of the RSFSR, and the Soviet political leadership understood perfectly that this was a sure path to the collapse of the USSR. That’s precisely why there was no separate Communist Party of the RSFSR. The emergence of such a party would have meant dual power—which is essentially what happened after the presidency of Russia was established under Yeltsin and the USSR found itself with two competing power centers: one in Russia, one in the Union as a whole.

So the Russian party was suppressed and dismantled. But the ideas remained. The sentiments remained. So even in the Soviet Union, this kind of obscurantism existed—I saw it, I encountered it. It was in journals like Sovremennik, Molodaya Gvardiya, and so on. It was all there, yes. The groundwork for Putinism had been well laid.

Why Will Ukraine Win? Link to heading

Vlad Birn: Why will Ukraine win, according to Zelensky’s Institute? As I understand it, Ukraine receives at least $130,000,000,000 a year in foreign aid. Meanwhile, since exhausting its strategic reserves around 2005, Russia is losing about the same amount annually and growing poorer.

Well, that’s an arithmetic explanation. But still—wars aren’t fought with dollars, they’re fought with weapons. As Napoleon is often (correctly) quoted: war is money, money, and more money. That’s true. But war is also weapons. War is also people. And right now, Russia has the advantage in both weapons and manpower.

So your argument is valid—I agree with it. The trend is indeed moving in Ukraine’s favor, and that financial factor is part of it. Not the only one, but it’s certainly part of it.

On Left and Right—Where Are You? Link to heading

Antonina: Yesterday you said you don’t identify with the left on the economic axis of the political compass—left-right. I’m positioned near the center on the economic axis and almost at the very bottom of the social axis (liberalism–authoritarianism). So, using Avakov’s terminology, I’m a liberal. Where are you?

Dear Antonina, I can only speak in terms of self-assessment. In my view—and again, this isn’t an attempt to apply some external label or diagnosis—I see myself as a centrist-leaning liberal. Of course, some call me leftist, others, I don’t know, even an FSB agent—but those are external opinions. I see myself as a liberal of centrist persuasion. So I’m neither right nor left, or at least that’s how it seems to me.

Questions About the Bible and Israel Link to heading

Irina Ivanova: As I understand it, you believe that the historical events in the Bible were recorded only after they occurred. But how then do you explain that in ancient times, one of the writers predicted Germany’s defeat in World War I and that the League of Nations would be replaced by the UN after World War II? Could this not be divine revelation?

Dear Irina, I would like you to name this writer and show their texts. Because—honestly—I’ve seen so many of these so-called prophecies, like those of Nostradamus, which are expressed in such vague terms and in such quantity that, you know, like a broken clock, they’re bound to be right twice a day. And then everyone starts marveling. “Iron-beaked birds”—those must be airplanes. You see what I mean—there’s just nothing there. These so-called predictions from the Bible simply don’t exist.

The Bible is a collection of ancient Hebrew myths—very well written ones—that became the foundation for two great religions: Judaism and Christianity. Ultimately, Islam also arose in large part in opposition to or based on these two religions. But in any case, at its core, it’s ancient Hebrew mythology. That said, the impact of this mythology is enormous—it has deeply shaped humanity.

And here’s a question from Lenin—a traditional one: Israel was divided into Samaria and Judea only after Solomon’s reign. Before that, the twelve tribes returned from Egyptian captivity and settled the Canaanite land. That’s nothing less than Israel. There was no international law at the time. The sources of this information are Exodus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Kings, and Josephus’s Jewish Antiquities. So when you say there was no Israel—what source are you relying on?

Let me answer directly: you either didn’t listen carefully or misunderstood what I said. I stated that Israel did not exist for centuries. When it reemerged in 1948, it was a new state. Before that, for several centuries, there had been no Israel at all. I was responding to your statement that Israel had continuously existed. Maybe I misunderstood your phrasing—but historically, there was no Israel for several hundred years.

When Israel was established following a UN resolution and Britain’s withdrawal from its mandate, it was a newly formed state that claims historical continuity with the ancient Israel of millennia past. That’s a clear fact.

Then Lenin writes: I’d also be grateful if you could point out insertions and falsifications in the Old Testament texts related to prophecies, the destruction of the First Temple, exile, and return. Am I correct in understanding that, in your view, Christ’s prophecy of the destruction of the Second Temple—as mentioned in Matthew, Mark, and Luke—are later insertions written after the fact?

Yes, you understand correctly.

Let me say this plainly: the Bible was written over several centuries. It was begun only after the destruction of the First Temple—that is, in the 6th century BCE. This period—again, the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II—is well documented by non-biblical sources. We know what happened to the Jewish people at that time not just through myth but through historical records.

Before that, the Bible may have existed in some oral form, but mostly as oral tradition. So yes, the Bible is unquestionably a collection of later Jewish myths. That’s why it contains no actual predictions of future events. Anything written about events that occurred later was written after the fact—yes, they are insertions.

So when you cite the Bible as proof of Christian historiography, you’re engaging in circular reasoning. You’re trying to prove the truth of Christianity based on the assumed truth of the Bible—which is the very thing in question. That’s circular logic, you see?

On Reparations to Ukraine Link to heading

A question from a subscriber called Dudy Sudy about reparations to Ukraine: The 2023 OSCE resolution recognizing Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism places responsibility for the aggression on the ethnic Russian majority.

Dear colleague, you are stating a blatant falsehood. There is nothing of the sort in that resolution. You are simply lying. Why? I don’t understand.

The resolution identifies the victims as Ukrainians, Belarusians, and national minorities within Russia. It says nothing about reparations being paid by states with a Russian ethnic majority in the event of a Russian collapse. That’s utter nonsense. The resolution contains nothing about the possible breakup of Russia, nor about assigning collective guilt to ethnic Russians.

Responsibility for aggression lies with the state, not with any ethnic majority. If Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Tuvans, Udmurts, or others commit crimes in Ukraine, the ones held accountable are not the “ethnic Russian majority”—that is a complete lie—but the state and the specific individuals who committed the crimes.

I truly don’t understand where this disgusting form of nationalism is coming from—especially on what is supposed to be a respectable channel. And most of all—why lie?

On the Cult of the USSR in the Baltics and Ukraine’s Immunity to “Sovok” Link to heading

A question from Misanthrope—if I understand correctly, the colleague’s name is Alexander. He writes that this isn’t really a question—but all right, I’ll read it anyway. Thank you for your comment. Yes, this relates to why the cult of the Soviet Union isn’t more strongly suppressed in the Baltic states—that’s how the question was phrased, I believe. I studied in Tallinn, writes Alexander, and could give a lecture myself on how the Soviet Baltic republics differed from the rest of the USSR. In short, we Ukrainians and the rest, with rare exceptions, were Soviet people. But Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians mostly were not. It surprised me that in places like Vilnius and Tallinn, Soviet symbols aren’t being aggressively removed. In Tallinn, for instance, the Kino Druzhba or a building on Tartu Highway still have stars, sickles, hammers, and wheat sheaves—apparently assuming the local immunity is so strong, the infection won’t stick. A recent example: Estonia’s Eurovision entrant caused irritation in Ukraine for being allegedly pro-Russian. But in Estonia, no one really cared. So, I’d like to know—how strong has this immunity become in Ukraine? And why haven’t you invited Serhiy Hrabovsky, as I asked before? Or maybe Fesenko, Holovakha, or Libanova?

Well, about Hrabovsky—dear Alexander, I get the feeling that you see me as a kind of waiter—you place an order, and I must immediately deliver the dish. I am always grateful, dear friends, for your suggestions about this or that expert. Always grateful—thank you for every recommendation. But who and when to invite is, first, my decision. And second—it’s not always up to me. A person might be busy. Or might simply not want to come on. That happens. That’s normal. So please, don’t be too upset or feel ignored. I appreciate every suggestion.

As for your point—I’ve lived in Lithuania for three years now, and I honestly don’t see any particular nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Yes, there are a few things—like shops with Russian-language books. But those are treated calmly. Most of that literature isn’t propaganda. So no, I don’t see widespread nostalgia here—for the USSR or for Russia.

I do trust your perspective, Alexander, at least to some degree—but personally, I just haven’t seen that sort of Soviet nostalgia. So maybe I’ll try to raise this topic again next time we have Holovakha or Libanova. Though I’m not sure they’re particularly well-versed in the current situation in Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia. Not necessarily.

On Voting for Fascists and for Trump Link to heading

Alright. The discussion here is still a continuation of the conversation about voting. This is Alter Dron writing about voting: You don’t have to vote for fascists—you can spoil your ballot. I’m not sure who they’re even suggesting to vote for right now. Katz? Yeah, it doesn’t matter. People need to be politically active even for fake reasons, to maintain their sense of agency. And regarding the journalistic questions to Trump—the last question in my examples was ironic. Of course, questions should be respectful. We’re all used to Trump being teflon-coated. But he lost the debate to Harris. If he’s regularly asked tough questions, he’ll dodge them. That’s how you can get to his Tesla.

Dear colleagues! I’ve already tried to explain that Trump and his team have essentially purged the White House press pool. So I think there’s no one left to ask these questions. But in general, I agree—yes, tough questions should be asked. By the way, journalists do ask them. It’s just that not all of us—I don’t, for example—monitor Trump’s press conferences. I listen to what he says, but pay less attention to the questions.

As for Katz, well, you see, there’s no one to vote for. Again, involving people in fake events—I think it’s wrong to create false illusions. I believe it’s wrong to show up and vote when you’re given a choice between fascists of various shades, and only those kinds are currently included on the ballot.

If you like, I don’t see the point in continuing this discussion—it just goes in circles. I believe that calling on people to vote in the Moscow City Duma elections this past September was a mistake, it was wrong. What’s the point in creating the illusion that something can be changed that way? Just like you said—“abolishing” means showing political activity. Well, those kinds of suggestions are like going out and shining a flashlight. That’s political activity too. To me, it’s an illusion, it’s a mistake, it’s wrong. You think it’s right? Alright then, everyone’s stated their positions? Okay.

Now, a whole series of questions and comments about the Russian language from Ukrainians.

A Series of Comments on Russian Speech Link to heading

Margarita writes: *So the fact that someone heard Russian being spoken on a Swedish train by Ukrainian refugees really doesn’t mean anything. I work at a school with Ukrainian refugee children as well. And many of them speak Russian because they are Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Some, however, may address me in Ukrainian, and you can also hear Ukrainian being spoken on the street. So it’s not true that only Russian is spoken.

And secondly, you claimed that in the Baltic countries, specifically in Lithuania, there is no nostalgia for the Soviet Union. I can’t speak for Lithuania, but I can say this about Estonia—there definitely is nostalgia.*

Well then, dear Margarita, I specifically mentioned Lithuania. As for Estonia and Latvia—I completely agree with you that in those countries there is indeed a much larger share of Russians. The Russian population in Lithuania is relatively small. That explains the differences. And regarding Estonia and Latvia, I didn’t say anything. Here, I completely agree with you.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

Alright, dear friends, this is where we’ll wrap up our morning stream. Thank you for your patience, thank you for your questions. As always, it’s very important. Thinking, I’ll emphasize again, is only possible together. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander Skobov! Freedom for all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives! See you next time! All the best!

Source: https://youtu.be/uR5nL7xx7co