Putin thanked Hamas for its humanitarianism. Trump found out that Zelensky, it turns out, didn’t start the war. Naryshkin’s agency identified Hitler in the face of Ursula von der Leyen.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 18th. It’s 7:42 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
We are living inside a stupid and unfunny caricature Link to heading
And I have some thoughts about a similar cliché — the one about how we’re living inside an Orwellian or Zamyatin-style dystopia, and so on. All those kinds of authors. But you know, as I was going through the news — in particular while preparing for today’s talk, I looked through quite a few reports from various sources — and I became convinced that this isn’t a dystopia. A dystopia is a system. We’re living inside a caricature — a flat, dumb, unbelievably talentless, unskilled, and completely unfunny caricature. Just listen and see for yourself.
First, news from our Russian terrarium in the Kremlin. The Kremlin’s website published the full transcript and video transcript of Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the family of Alexander Trufanov — nearly his entire family had been held hostage by Hamas. And here’s the key phrase from Putin’s remarks to the family. I’ll quote: “I think,” said Putin, “we should express our gratitude to the leadership, the political wing of Hamas, for meeting us halfway and carrying out this humanitarian act. You were freed.”
Attention! Hamas — a humanitarian act. So Putin thanked Hamas for showing humanism.
To grasp the full extent of the talentless caricature that Putin currently represents, you just have to understand who the Trufanov family is. Alexander Trufanov, his mother Elena, and his grandmother Irina were kidnapped by Hamas. Alexander Trufanov’s father, Vitaly, was killed by Hamas on October 7th. And now I can only imagine what it must have been like — what it must have felt like for this family, sitting at that meeting with Putin, to hear Hamas being thanked for its humanism. Absolutely astonishing.
I don’t know what they were thinking, of course, but we can only guess. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still in the hands of the humanitarian organization Hamas. Most likely, many of them are already dead. Humanitarian Hamas — Putin’s latest gem. An unfunny caricature.
Negotiation-mania Link to heading
Now, on to the news from the fields of victory. Or rather — excuse me, I keep mixing things up — negotiation-mania. First, Trump announced that the deal on resources with Ukraine might be signed on April 24. But yesterday, a memorandum was signed — not the actual deal, just a memorandum about the deal. This was reported yesterday by Ukraine’s Minister of Economy, Svyrydenko. She said that preparation for the actual deal is underway, including the creation of an investment fund for Ukraine’s reconstruction. And she did confirm that the agreement itself is planned to be signed on April 24.
It’s hard to form a clear opinion on this for now, since we don’t know the actual content of the deal — it keeps changing. As far as I understand, Ukrainian diplomacy and the Ukrainian government are currently working intensely to make sure that the deal, at the very least, resembles a proper agreement. The caricatured aspect of this situation is that Trump initially stated that Ukraine’s debt to the United States was half a trillion — $500,000,000,000. Then that number dropped to $350 billion, and later he started mentioning $300 billion. Most recently, it seems to have been reduced to $200 billion. I don’t know if Ukrainian diplomacy and the Ukrainian government can somehow pull off a reversal where the United States ends up owing money to Ukraine — but given how wildly the figures are shifting, one can only hope in the effectiveness of Ukrainian diplomacy. At the very least, that really could be considered a significant success. Still, the final content of this deal — the actual agreement — remains unknown.
What else is notable, also in the realm of caricature? Yesterday, Trump, while commenting publicly, said that he no longer considers Volodymyr Zelensky responsible for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I’ll quote what he said: “I don’t consider Zelensky responsible, but I’m not thrilled that this war started.” Interesting — everyone thought he was thrilled? Turns out, no, he’s not thrilled. “I don’t blame him — Zelensky,” said Trump. “But I wouldn’t say he’s done a great job. I’m not a big fan of his.”
Not long ago, Trump’s words still rang in our ears — blaming Biden and Zelensky for starting the war. But now, apparently, he’s learned something new. This was said during a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Perhaps the Italian PM told Trump something new about Zelensky, and that changed his point of view.
The fact that Trump isn’t a fan of Zelensky might be upsetting on the one hand. But on the other hand, considering Trump has repeatedly declared himself a big fan of people like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un, maybe it’s actually better not to be in that company.
One more bit of negotiation-related news I’d highlight is a statement from Russia’s main representative at the UN — I’m quoting: “A ceasefire in Ukraine at this stage is unrealistic.” Just a small touch to add to the overall picture of what’s going on in this whole negotiation-mania.
No visible results from the meeting in Paris Link to heading
If I’m not mistaken — and I had, of course, planned to make some comments today about what happened yesterday in Paris — well, you know, I really have nothing to say, because everything that happened there, all the comments, all the evaluations just sounded like: “the negotiations were excellent.” I’m referring to the talks involving Marco Rubio, Witkoff, representatives from France, and representatives from Ukraine. The delegation was headed by the head of the President’s Office, Yermak.
Everyone said the negotiations were successful, that everything was great, everything went well — but nothing specific was said. So unfortunately, about events of this kind, I really have nothing I can say.
The Level of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Link to heading
And finally, from my point of view, there’s an event that may not be very important or significant, but it serves as a window into the world of Russian power. The day before yesterday, on the website of the Foreign Intelligence Service — Naryshkin’s agency — an astonishing publication appeared. A publication in which the common enemy of Moscow and Washington was named as Euro-fascism. The title of the article on the Foreign Intelligence Service website reads: “Euro-fascism — as 80 years ago, a common enemy of Moscow and Washington.”
On the cover of today’s discussion, today’s stream, there’s a caricature — an illustration from this article — which is a reworking of a Soviet World War II-era poster. In the original Soviet poster, three bayonets — British, American, and Soviet — pierce Adolf Hitler, who is depicted as a swastika. The swastika has Hitler’s head grafted onto it. On the Foreign Intelligence Service website, the reworked version replaces Hitler’s head with the head of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. So — today’s Hitler is Ursula von der Leyen.
You know, commenting on a caricature is a losing game. If it’s funny — no need to comment. If it’s not funny — also no need to comment. So I won’t say anything about the claim that Ursula von der Leyen is today’s Hitler. Laugh if you find it funny, be outraged if it outrages you, or simply try to understand what is happening to the Russian government.
Further in the article, it says that Europe is historically predisposed to various forms of totalitarianism. This, from the official website of a service that supports — pardon the tautology — one of the most totalitarian regimes on the planet today. And then, citing some unnamed “experts,” the article claims that today’s rift between the U.S. and the EU is facilitating a rapprochement between Moscow and Washington. It then goes on to try and describe how France has repeatedly come under dictatorial regimes — mentioning Napoleon and others. Basically, a nightmare. Meanwhile, of course, Russia has supposedly always been a shining democracy.
What’s really important here, in my view, is this: this article and caricature weren’t published in Moskovsky Komsomolets, not in Pavel Gusev’s paper, not in Zavtra, not by Prokhanov, not even in Komsomolskaya Pravda, not even on the RIA Novosti website. No — this was published on the official website of the Foreign Intelligence Service.
It makes me recall what the Foreign Intelligence Service used to be. A vast distance from where we are now. The first director of the service was Yevgeny Primakov. Since I personally knew him, now deceased, I can say — yes, he was an imperialist, of course. We all remember his famous plane turn over the Atlantic, when he was headed to the U.S. and, in response to events in Yugoslavia, personally decided to turn the plane around. He was certainly a strong figure, quite a reactionary one. But that was a completely different scale. My attitude toward Yevgeny Maksimovich is certainly not admiring — there’s nothing positive in it — but he was a person of stature. An educated man, an academician, a former director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, then of the Institute of World Economy, and so on. A serious figure. A truly educated person, yes? A product of the Soviet intelligence services — but still.
It is absolutely unimaginable that under Primakov, a caricature and article like this would have appeared. The Foreign Intelligence Service is the direct descendant of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB of the USSR — the KGB division responsible for foreign intelligence. And who comes to mind from among its former leaders? General Leonid Parshin, for instance. It’s absolutely impossible to imagine something like this under him either. He was also a fairly well-known KGB officer. To think he would allow such a ridiculous article and caricature — no chance.
Another name that comes to mind from the First Chief Directorate is Kryuchkov — the man who inspired the GKChP coup. A vile figure, one of the most loathsome of the late KGB era. But still — these were not cartoonish figures.
Whereas Naryshkin — he himself is a caricature. What is happening now in Putin’s Russia is, on the one hand, a massive threat to the whole world — a bloody regime committing crimes daily. But on the other hand, one of the facets of Putin’s regime is that it’s a caricature of the Soviet Union. And we are now living inside this caricature — even though I’m not physically in Russia, we’re still inside it. Because this flat, talentless, completely unfunny caricature significantly influences and even creates caricatures in the external world around it.
And the fact that on the other side of the Atlantic another caricature — of the United States — has appeared, I mean Trump and his regime — I don’t know to what extent Russia’s caricature contributed to the emergence of the one across the ocean. But we are living inside this caricature now. And that really makes you think — how do we get out of this?
Because, as someone rightly said, today’s Putinism has killed satire. You can’t laugh at it, you can’t mock it — because joking about a caricature is pointless. The caricature itself is already an act of satire.
So those are my thoughts about today’s — or, if you prefer, yesterday’s — events.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to your questions, I want to mention that we have two interesting conversations today. First, at 8:00 PM, we’ll have a discussion with a representative of the Freedom of Russia Legion — someone who is on the front line. This representative of the Freedom of Russia Legion is named Erik. Usually, we refer to them by their call signs. If he wants to, he’ll share his real name. And at 7:00 PM, as usual on Fridays, we’ll have a conversation with Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky. Now, let’s move on to your questions.
On Repentance and Yeltsin-Era Propaganda Link to heading
So, a question from Yevgeny:
A question about Vladimir Yakovlev. I’ve been listening to you for more than three years. I haven’t heard your opinion on him yet. In an interview with Irina Scheitelman two years ago, Vladimir talked about the exceptional importance of repentance in the context of Germany’s history. However, he didn’t apply that understanding to himself personally. Irina did a great job then, bringing up his cooperation with the Russian authorities and reminding him about the publication of the newspaper “Ne Dai Bog.” He said it was very brief and very exciting. I think he was uncomfortable talking about it. That really affected me at the time. During the Yeltsin-era propaganda, I lacked the intelligence and knowledge to oppose it — something I now regret.
Well, Yevgeny, you’re not alone. There was indeed a very powerful wave at the time. And the newspaper Ne Dai Bog was a manifestation of that wave, when practically all major media outlets and the vast majority of journalists became involved in a frenzied propaganda campaign in support of Yeltsin.
Let me say a few words about Vladimir Yakovlev. He played a rather significant role in the development of independent Russian journalism — high-quality Russian journalism. He was the founder of Kommersant back in the late Soviet Union. At that time, the USSR had effectively collapsed, it just hadn’t realized it yet. There was already a Soviet law on the press that abolished censorship. So, yes, the USSR was essentially dead — no one had just told it yet. And Vladimir Yakovlev created what was essentially the first quality mass newspaper.
I won’t go into detail about the many other newspapers — for example, yours truly was also publishing a paper at that time, but obviously on a completely different scale. Yes, Yakovlev created a new language, a new style. The first Kommersant, that first era — it was truly a landmark event. I don’t think now is the time to analyze what exactly distinguished Kommersant, but it had a dispassionate, yet ironically detached tone in its reporting. It was high-quality press. For that time, it was astonishing.
You see, Vladimir Yakovlev belongs to that group often referred to as the “golden youth” who came of age in the final years of Soviet power. He’s the son of Yegor Yakovlev — part of the children of high-ranking Soviet figures, the generation of the Sixtiers. And yes, they received an excellent education — as excellent as it could be in the Soviet Union. By Soviet standards, very good. They also had a huge amount of initial social capital thanks to their parents’ positions. And when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, they truly began doing real work. Yakovlev was one of them.
His involvement in creating Ne Dai Bog — it’s no surprise that this stung him a bit, because that was a betrayal of the profession. A small, petty betrayal of the profession. But overall, I think — I don’t know what he’s doing now, honestly — but overall, his legacy is quite significant. He left a serious mark on Russian journalism. Of course, that journalism no longer exists. That whole post-Soviet journalism is like an Atlantis — it has disappeared. But his influence remains. Just like Egyptian civilization is gone, but the pyramids are still there.
So yes, overall, I regard him as someone who contributed a lot. And that doesn’t just vanish — even though today’s Kommersant is just a caricature of Yakovlev’s original. Even the Kommersant under Berezovsky was a caricature compared to the original. But the style, the journalistic format — he set certain standards. They live on in the people who can still write today, who now write abroad. So, as they say, nothing disappears without a trace.
As for betrayal — yes, it happened, and many were guilty of it. I’d just point out that I don’t know many prominent journalists who managed to resist that temptation. It was a kind of herd momentum, a peer pressure that swept up the entire scene, turning it into an extension of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin’s campaign headquarters.
On Ukrainophobia and Joseph Brodsky Link to heading
Natalya Art:
You once said that we, Russians, don’t have Ukrainophobia, but many of my friends and acquaintances clearly do. If it’s only a result of propaganda, then why did Brodsky — who certainly didn’t listen to Putin’s propaganda — write his poem about Ukraine’s independence? Why not about Georgia’s independence, for example? My acquaintances’ attitude toward Ukraine is very similar — with everything but outright hatred: there’s disgust, imperial and cultural arrogance. And the most common sayings are about Ukrainians and Jews. So it turns out there’s antisemitism, but no Ukrainophobia?
You know, dear Natalya, let’s clarify a few things. First, just a few strokes of the picture. A person with a Jewish surname always experienced problems in Russia and in the Soviet Union. Always. There was state antisemitism — when Jews were barred from certain universities. There was everyday antisemitism — when people treated Jews poorly, to put it mildly. There was professional antisemitism — when Jews were not hired for leadership positions in the Soviet Union. So antisemitism was obvious, tangible, and recognizable.
A person with a Ukrainian surname, on the other hand, never had any such problems — neither in Russia, nor in the Soviet Union, nor in post-Soviet Russia. I can speak from personal experience, and I can speak for many people who have done perfectly fine with Ukrainian surnames — not just back then, but even now, during the war with Ukraine. Just look at Matviyenko, Kiriyenko, and others — they feel perfectly comfortable in power.
I had a conversation about this with Portnikov, who said that those people “aren’t Ukrainians.” But I want to note that the same could be said about Jews who faced repression and discrimination — they didn’t speak Hebrew or Yiddish, they didn’t wear a kippah, they didn’t observe Shabbat. But still — based on surname alone, on ethnicity alone — they were persecuted to varying degrees. So yes, antisemitism existed and still exists.
Ukrainophobia — understood as persecution of people on the basis of nationality — does not exist in Russia. It simply doesn’t. Now, when it comes to various kinds of ethno-political arrogance toward Ukraine — yes, all of that exists. That’s a general feature of xenophobia, and Ukrainophobia can’t really be separated from attitudes toward, say, people from Central Asia.
We are currently in a time of war, which is a special situation. And on TV, yes, all this hatred is being stirred up. But in real, everyday life — yes, there is arrogance. You are absolutely right. And, by the way, you very accurately described the traits: there is certainly imperial arrogance. There is cultural arrogance — that’s definitely present. But there is no hatred or persecution. Just as a fact — it’s not there.
So, in that sense, we can’t speak of Ukrainophobia as a state policy — how can there be, when people like Kiriyenko and Matviyenko hold power? Nor is there grassroots Ukrainophobia — no “cave-dwelling” haters of Ukrainians among the masses. Unlike the situation with Jews.
That’s what I meant.
As for the current hatred of Ukraine — yes, it is hatred toward Ukraine as a country, not toward Ukrainians as an ethnic group. And yes, on TV right now there’s talk of “we’ll kill you all,” etc. But that’s directed at the residents of Ukraine — at the country Russia has decided to destroy. It does not apply to ethnic Ukrainians living in Russia. That’s just the reality.
None of this, of course, cancels out the fascism at play — the attempt to destroy Ukraine and everyone living there. In fact, when Solovyov screams “we’ll kill you all,” it’s not just about Ukrainians in Ukraine — it applies to Russians, Jews, everyone. It’s not Ukrainophobia in the sense of ethnic hatred. It’s about a pathological desire to eliminate a neighboring country along with all its residents, regardless of ethnicity.
That’s the key difference between the absence of Ukrainophobia and the presence of antisemitism.
On the Dumbing Down of Russians. The Role of “Dom-2” in This. On Kusanashvili. Link to heading
Unyly Oslik (Melancholy Donkey):
A follow-up question on the topic of the dumbing down during wartime. Do you believe that the methodical dumbing down of Russians began around the mid-2000s, with so-called optimization and Dom-2 — in short, the show Dom-2 — whose goal was the destruction of critical thinking, the lowering of empathy, the normalization of vulgarity, including moral vulgarity, and the awakening of other immoral human traits? With the war, supported by the people, as the culmination of it all. And a second question — your opinion on Otar Kushanashvili, if you follow him? He’s clearly an unusual character. Somehow, from within Russia, he speaks out against the war — bravely, I think — while also admitting friendships with well-known pro-Kremlin figures like Baskov.
As for Kushanashvili — well, you know, even if you don’t actively follow him, it’s impossible not to notice this character. He’s everywhere in the Russian media space. When he first emerged in Russian journalism, he was a kind of symbol of its immaturity — a scandalous figure who constantly got into altercations, fights (although “fights” is a stretch — he mostly got beaten up), someone a bit fictionalized. A perennial victim — always being attacked or humiliated in some way. In short, someone who constantly provoked something.
Now, the fact that he is fully, 100% on Ukraine’s side — and has taken a stance against Russian aggression from the very beginning — does him credit. He’s a deeply contradictory figure: on the one hand, someone who embraced full cynicism, scandal, and shock value; and on the other, clearly possessing a core of human values that now, to a large extent, outweigh everything else about him.
As for the dumbing down — I don’t think there was initially a deliberate goal. All that REN-TV, Dom-2, and similar content — it was mostly about serving public demand. Ratings. It was an attempt to drive ratings, mainly for money. Now, the fact that it was supported by the government — not everything aimed at profit is supported by the state. But in this case, the interests aligned. The desire of TV producers to make money, and the authorities’ understanding that this kind of dumbing down is useful to them — those things coincided. So yes, a convergence of interests.
On Sergey Glazyev Link to heading
Tamara Pumpyansky:
A. What do you think of Sergey Glazyev? Is he a political prostitute?
You know, I wouldn’t call him that exactly. If we’re going down that path of comparisons — he’s more like the organizer. The brothel manager, so to speak. Glazyev is a rabid, caricatured, fiery statist. I had the misfortune of not only being acquainted with him but also trying to get him on my side once — when I proposed my version of the advertising law. We were both deputies in the first State Duma.
When I was pushing for that very difficult law — which caused conflicts with many journalists who thought we didn’t need one at all — I remember a session in the Marble Hall of the Union of Journalists of Russia, where I gathered media leaders and tried to explain that regulation was inevitable. The chaos in advertising was unacceptable — media were promoting pyramid schemes like MMM, people were losing everything, trusting the media. That, in many ways, sparked the public’s hostility toward the press. Essentially, that was the first nail in the coffin of Russian journalism. Because millions who lost their money because of Mavrodi didn’t trust him — they trusted Russian newspapers. “If it’s in the paper, it must be true.” That was the mindset.
I vividly remember Pavel Gusev shouting at me during that meeting, accusing me of censorship and storming out. I tried to get a sensible advertising law passed. Glazyev initially supported it, but then — perhaps realizing something — publicly withdrew his support. In the end, an utterly backward, repressive version of the law passed, one that essentially allowed for the destruction of any media outlet. But anyway…
Back to Glazyev — sorry for the digression. Glazyev is one of the most repugnant figures in Russian politics. A foaming-at-the-mouth anti-Westerner, full-on conspiracy theorist, always battling imaginary “puppet masters.” You asked whether he’s a political prostitute — no, he actually believes in all the garbage he spews. He was one of the ideological architects of the so-called Russian Spring, a staunch supporter of the Crimea annexation and the Donbas war.
He’s also an unabashed antisemite. After Zelensky was elected, it was Glazyev who came up with the utterly insane and grotesque idea that Zelensky, being Jewish, would help relocate Israeli citizens to Russian-free areas of Donbas. That fascist, absurd idea — now thankfully forgotten — was his.
And on top of all that, he’s an academician. An academician who’s been repeatedly caught publishing pseudoscientific nonsense. Truly — no redeeming qualities. One of the most revolting characters out there.
Interestingly, Solovyov heavily promotes Glazyev as an economist — he is, after all, an “academician.” And to Putin’s credit — for all his lack of brilliance — he’s smart enough not to let people like Glazyev near the actual levers of economic power. Because frankly, it would be a blessing for all humanity if Glazyev were made Minister of the Economy or put in charge of the Central Bank — the war would end in a month, tops.
Does China Have Any Allies? Link to heading
A question from Ilya:
If we think about a possible — or rather forced — alliance with China, I’m curious about your view. A general characterization of the Eastern superpower as an ally. I’ve heard that one of China’s weaknesses is the fact that it has no and has never had allies, that it’s, forgive me, essentially by itself and in itself, aside from temporary military alliances like during World War II. In your opinion, what is this due to? Also, how is it that small but militaristic Japan, if we can put it that way, so easily launched aggression against what was already a not-so-small China? Can we say that despite its military potential, China is still not a military or warlike nation? And why?
Well, look, dear Ilya, first of all — China does have allies, even though you’re mostly right. But just to set the record straight — today, China does have an ally: North Korea. Of course, you could call North Korea a kind of Chinese proxy, and you wouldn’t be entirely wrong. But at the same time — not quite. Because North Korea is still an independent military unit. Yes, it is fully supported by China, and now also by Russia. But it’s more appropriate to consider it a vassal-type ally.
Now, why hasn’t China historically had allies? Yes, it’s true — historically, the “Celestial Empire,” or the “Middle Kingdom,” as the Chinese call themselves, has always seen itself as self-sufficient and strong, never in need of alliances. And that continues today — because, let’s face it, what kind of alliances do you need when you have 1.5 billion people? That’s more than the entire global West. So China doesn’t particularly need allies.
Of course, there have been short-term partnerships — like with the USSR when it suited China. But once China began to rise on its own, it no longer needed the USSR, and that was the end of that.
Culturally, China is guided by Confucianism — and not only that, but it emphasizes peace and long-term strategy. It’s a civilization focused on slow, steady achievements. China’s recent response to the U.S. tariff aggression made this clear: “Chinese civilization existed for 5,000 years before the U.S. and will exist for another 5,000 after the U.S. is gone.” That’s their mindset — a long game, not prone to military adventures.
Could China take Taiwan militarily? Yes, absolutely. But does it? No, it doesn’t. China is waiting for Taiwan to fall into its hands on its own. This is a deeply ingrained philosophy of inevitability that runs through much of China’s approach.
Anyone who’s had to deal with Chinese representatives — and I had to during my time working with the Union of Journalists of Russia — knows they are incredibly tough negotiators. They’re never in a hurry, and they categorically reject any form of pressure. So yes, China is a very difficult negotiating partner.
As for illusions about some kind of alliance between China and the EU — I wouldn’t count on it. What’s more likely is that China will try to build relationships with individual EU countries, not with the EU as a whole. No love will come from the EU as a bloc — but with certain countries, yes, possibly.
A Stream with Bykov? Link to heading
A question from Roman:
Do you plan to do a stream with Bykov? I think it would be interesting.
That won’t happen. For Dmitry Lvovich, I’m like a red rag to a bull. So even the idea itself would provoke an outburst — yet another explosion and fit about how this could even be possible, and so on. No, this just isn’t one of those cases.
On the Stream with Troitsky Link to heading
A user asks:
Unfortunately, I was disappointed by your stream with Troitsky. The declared topic — the state of the average Russian youth — was not explored at all. The issue isn’t who “Tekhnik” was, but rather how these young people, who reacted so strongly to him, live and what defines them — as shown at his funeral. This is an important topic, partially within your field as a sociologist. Maybe a younger expert is needed, someone closer to the subject? Perhaps Dima Zeltser? Do you plan to continue reflecting on this topic together?
Let’s break this down. As for Dima Zeltser — without a doubt, he’s someone with whom I’ll continue to “sync my watch,” so to speak. He’s an important expert, and we’ll definitely keep reflecting together. But yes, I agree — the topic of youth wasn’t really covered with Troitsky. What interested me in Troitsky was precisely his role as a music critic. And in my view, we did discuss contemporary music, including music connected with youth culture, quite well. I personally found much of what he said very valuable.
So I wouldn’t call it shallow, at least not in terms of modern music. In that regard, Artyomiy Kimovich is, for me, the number one expert — and I got what I wanted from that conversation. I think those who listened and didn’t try to hear what wasn’t there, but instead listened to what actually was, likely found it worthwhile.
Of course, Troitsky is not an expert on youth from a sociological standpoint — you’re absolutely right. And yes, perhaps the topic of “modern Russian youth” was poorly chosen as the headline for the stream. The discussion was about music — modern music, including folk groups, rap, rock, and so on. And I think, on that topic, everything that was said had depth and wasn’t superficial. That’s my take. If you don’t praise yourself, who will?
As for the broader topic of youth — I agree, we need to find the right conversation partners for that.
On Michael Naki Link to heading
A question from Yuri:
I have a question about principled people. How right or adequate is it to be that way? Take Michael Naki, for example. He’s undoubtedly a great friend of Ukraine and firmly on the right side of history in that regard. I listen to his daily briefings — everything is very sensible, objective, and well-balanced. But as soon as it touches on something he disagrees with — like the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) — he seems to change. He takes a rigidly principled stance that FBK is good and the ultimate truth. Anyone who not only disagrees but even dares to question their sainthood is treated as an enemy of all that is good. He ignores all reasonable arguments and evidence of their mistakes. Even with the situation involving Nevzlin, which is still under investigation as far as I understand, he was sure from day one that Nevzlin and Khodorkovsky were guilty of everything. He just “knows” it. So it turns out that such ‘principled’ people might actually be more harmful than helpful — because once they’ve decided something, they’ll never change their opinion. I feel like Trump supporters are made from the same mold — capable of rational thinking until the topic touches their idol. My opinion is I can only listen to his briefings. Everything else is not just uninteresting, but sometimes unpleasant to hear. What do you think about this, dear Yuri?
I would replace the word principled with biased. What’s happening in the Russian liberal crowd — of which Michael Naki is definitely a part — does resemble, to some extent, the behavior of Trump supporters. In some areas, they crystallize into something resembling a totalitarian sect, becoming incapable of critical reflection.
As for Michael personally — part of it also comes down to family ties. His wife, a very good journalist, Nina Rossiyashvili, works for Popular Politics. So naturally, any criticism or skeptical stance toward FBK would create a conflict of interest. That adds another layer of fixation and bias.
So yes, I agree with you overall — just let’s call it what it is. It’s not principledness. It’s bias.
On the Campaign in Israel Against Netanyahu Link to heading
Eduard Yanovich:
What is your view on the emerging campaign in Israel against the government? It’s led by retired military officer Grigory Tamar. A video of his recently appeared on YouTube titled “Cannibals in Power,” where he expresses the opinion that Netanyahu is supported in Israel by Putinists.
Dear colleague, I haven’t seen that video. I have a general idea of who Grigory Tamar is. But I think the role of this expert in Israeli political life is being greatly exaggerated. I don’t believe he is capable of leading a campaign against Netanyahu’s government. There are already quite serious forces engaged in that without him.
What’s my attitude toward it? In reality, the campaign against Netanyahu has been ongoing since the very first minute he became Prime Minister. It hasn’t stopped — there are multiple criminal cases against him. And in that context, Tamar, in my opinion, is far from central.
My attitude toward Netanyahu is very critical. What more is there to say? As for Tamar — again, I haven’t seen the video, maybe I’ll watch it if I have time. But I doubt it represents any kind of revolutionary breakthrough or can be considered a major blow to Netanyahu. He has far weightier political opponents.
On the End of the War Link to heading
Ivan Goncharuk:
I’m interested in your opinion. I think we’ll be at war for another five to seven years. Russia won’t back down. While we’re weakened by the lack of U.S. support, Europe will strengthen significantly. But it will still be weaker than Russia. Plus, with Trump — I used to think we’d manage in 2025, 2026, or 2027. But now I think we’ll be fighting throughout Trump’s term and then a couple more years, very actively, with U.S. help — if we’re lucky with the next president. That’s assuming no black swans.
You know, dear Ivan, your mention of black swans is very much to the point. But it’s not just about black swans — it’s about the complexity and multi-vector nature of the whole situation. Yes, there are problems, as you mentioned — problems with resources, which depend on many factors. There are issues…
Look, today the forecast horizon is very limited. You’re talking about five to seven years — but the real forecast horizon is much, much shorter.
For example — a deal is now being signed between Ukraine and the United States. Does that change the situation? Yes, it does. September will be a moment of truth for Trump. Will he continue helping? By then, the lights will be out — the stars will have dimmed, so to speak — the current aid from Biden will be exhausted. September will be a defining moment. Will Trump help in any way or not? That will change everything.
There are so many switches along this war train’s path — things that could shift the course one way or another. So — dear colleague — can you confidently say that Trump will stop aid in September? I can’t. I don’t know. And that matters a lot.
Can we confidently say that there won’t be any surprises inside Russia that could change things? I can’t say that with certainty either.
Can we say with confidence that European assistance and the ability to buy arms with European money in the U.S. won’t create conditions for a turning point in the war? I don’t know.
So yes, I also believe that 2025 will be a year of war. Most likely, 2026 too. But again — that’s if no major events occur that could be called black swans. The current planning horizon just doesn’t allow for confident talk about five to seven years.
On Trump and Biden Link to heading
Artem Shevchenko:
It’s more a request than a question — could you reflect on the differences in personality between Trump and Biden? Their politics are fairly clear. But what’s the essential difference between them as ordinary people?
Dear Artem,
You know, I think that what we see and know about Trump and Biden doesn’t really allow us to separate them too much from their politics. This is one of those cases where personality is almost dissolved in politics. You can’t really extract or isolate Biden’s personality from his political identity. Of course, his family members probably know who he is outside of politics — but we don’t.
To us, Biden appears as a politician — and the defining characteristic is that he’s a professional politician. His main trait is caution — that same caution which shaped his policies, his approach to aid, and everything else that led to criticism and, ultimately, cost him support. But still, he’s a responsible politician, measured — someone who takes his office seriously.
As for Trump, well — to say something obvious — he’s a narcissist. Absolutely. He represents a kind of modern fascist mindset — not ideologically like someone fully committed, but more of an emotional fascist. Unlike, say, Viktor Orbán, who is a true believer, Trump is driven more by instincts and emotions.
Again, it’s hard to separate either of them from their politics. They are, in the Aristotelian sense, fully political animals. Trying to dissect their personalities apart from their political roles — to imagine them as ordinary people — would require surgical tools I simply don’t have. That would take in-depth interviews with those close to them. As it stands, we see them only as politicians. There’s really nothing more to say.
On the Telegram Channel and Moderators Link to heading
Mask Cash:
A purely technical question. Why do you need assistants in your Telegram channel? There are fewer than 13,000 subscribers. Comments under posts rarely exceed 20. I’ve noticed that when someone publicly brings in such helpers, the moderation often ends up in the hands of fanatically devoted followers, which leads to inadequate moderation. I was permanently banned the day before yesterday for harmless sarcasm. I’ve only encountered this kind of thing before with Nevzorov — but his channels are a full-on sect and a cesspool, so it made sense. Also — could you bring back the 7:40 timecodes, if possible?
Let me start with the last part. Timecodes are usually present. But — as paradoxical as it sounds — the members of my team are also human. Things happen. Sometimes they don’t make it in time. But yes, we try to have timecodes — if they’re missing, we work to correct that. It’s just something that slipped through the cracks.
Now, to your main point — respectfully, you’ve made a few factual errors in your comment. First, regarding the number of comments: just the other night, I checked in at around 2:00 AM, and when I looked again a few hours later, there were over 400 new comments. There’s actually a very active discussion happening in the Telegram chat. Yes, the channel itself is small — under 13,000 subscribers. Of course, I’d like it to be more, but that would require constant development — a full-time job in itself. But even with a modest subscriber count, the chat is very lively — people exchange opinions, and unfortunately, there are tons of trolls and bots.
That’s why I eventually held a vote in the chat, asking whether we needed moderators. The overwhelming majority said yes. Because we all know what trolls and bots can do in a discussion — they disrupt it. I’ve seen people leave because of it. These trolls use AI to generate endless accounts. You ban one, and ten more show up under different names. It’s the same troll in a thousand faces.
I don’t have the time to monitor all this. So I asked the community if they wanted moderators — they said yes. I then chose two people — and keep in mind, just as you know me, I know many of you. You listen to me, I also read your comments. Over the course of three or four years, I’ve come to understand who’s who. These are not, as you put it, “fanatically in love” types. They’re two very reasonable people who kindly agreed to help — and I’m very pleased with their work. Thanks to them, the channel is troll-free.
As for your specific case — I don’t know what you said or how you presented yourself. But I know these two moderators are extremely restrained. If you were banned, something must have genuinely crossed the line — usually, that means insults, profanity, or aggressive behavior. I’m not in a position to evaluate your particular case now, but I do trust the moderators’ judgment.
So yes, moderators are necessary. Without them, it just wouldn’t work. I remember times when discussions completely fell apart because someone would show up, hijack the conversation, start trolling, swearing, attacking others — and all the normal participants would simply leave.
If during a lecture a drunk lout shows up, starts swearing and attacking people, the lecture stops. The conversation stops. I don’t want that. That’s all.
On Collective Responsibility Link to heading
Next question, from Anna Tarkhova:
Please clarify your position on collective responsibility. You’ve said that all Russians either already feel or will feel it, just like the Germans once did — simply because they are citizens of an aggressor state. I agree. So why, then, can’t all Muslims be subject to collective responsibility because of the actions of Islamic terrorists? It’s very upsetting that innocent people suffer. But as you say, “that’s how it works.”
Dear Anna,
Let’s first agree on the framework of our conversation — are we speaking in the paradigm of what ought to be (the normative), or of what is (the factual)? Collective responsibility operates in both, but it’s crucial to distinguish the two.
In the paradigm of what is — that is, reality — collective responsibility sets in regardless of whether I want it, approve of it, or consider it just. Incidentally, the inability to separate the normative from the factual is the source of many misunderstandings.
Let me make a quick analogy. I’m often accused of being a bloodthirsty monster who wants the war to continue. On what basis? On the basis that I say I believe the war cannot be stopped right now — because Putin doesn’t want it to end. And people respond, “But we want it to end! You’re saying it won’t end — so you must want that too.” No — I also want it to end. But I see that Putin doesn’t, and therefore it’s unrealistic to expect otherwise.
That’s the difference: I’m speaking from the paradigm of reality (what is), while they’re projecting onto me the paradigm of values or aspirations (what ought to be). That’s a mistake.
It’s the same here. Responsibility sets in simply as a fact. Whether or not I have a conscience, whether or not I want to accept collective responsibility as a citizen of Russia — it will find me anyway. That’s the paradigm of what is.
Now, in the normative paradigm — that’s a personal matter. If you have a conscience and recognize your belonging to a community that is, directly or indirectly, involved in the crimes of the Putin regime — then yes, you bear responsibility. If not — you can claim, “I have nothing to do with this.” Fine. That’s your choice.
Same with Muslims. Muslims, in fact, do face collective responsibility — in the factual sense. That’s the paradigm of what is. As for the normative — it depends on whether a person sees themselves as part of the Ummah, the global Muslim community. If yes, then there’s a sense of responsibility for the actions of those within it. If not — then, again, it’s a matter of personal conscience.
So yes — what you’ve said is absolutely correct.
On Djemal’s Views Link to heading
Eduard Yanovich:
Geydar Djemal believed that behind every major terrorist attack targeting ordinary people — not politicians — are intelligence agencies. And that intelligence agencies always protect power, not citizens. This applies to America and Israel alike. Al-Qaeda was a CIA creation. Hamas is largely controlled by Mossad. Hamas was created with Israel’s support. More detailed arguments can be found in Djemal’s work. Do you agree? You recently said you’re not sure the KGB is the only evil on earth. If Djemal is right, then all sources of evil on earth are easy to list and identify — which makes it clear what we’re fighting.
I can’t say I agree. In this case, you’re quoting Geydar Djemal, but let me respond not to the flavor of the quote, but to the substance of the argument. I can’t judge how accurately you’ve conveyed Djemal’s words — with all due respect — but I’ll address the points themselves.
First: the claim that Hamas is largely controlled by Mossad is false. There is nothing like that going on. Yes, it’s true that Hamas was created in 1987 during the First Intifada, rooted in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. And yes — Israel did, at the time, provide some financial support. That was a serious strategic mistake by the Israeli government. In an attempt to undermine the secular Fatah, they supported a more religious counterweight. But let’s be clear: Israel did not create Hamas. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch would have formed anyway. Israel’s support helped it grow — that’s all. So let’s be precise: Mossad is not controlling Hamas now, nor could it be. That’s nonsense.
As for Al-Qaeda — it was formed in 1988, born of a union between the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Osama bin Laden. Yes, during the Soviet-Afghan War, Islamic fighters in Afghanistan received financial and logistical support — including from the U.S. But to say the CIA created Al-Qaeda is incorrect. It emerged organically from the radicalization and mobilization of Islamist movements. Yes, there was funding — but it’s misleading to attribute authorship to Western intelligence services.
And who, for example, created the Taliban? What intelligence agency is behind them? This is a deeply archaic movement that emerged from Afghan society itself. No intelligence agency was its architect.
Same goes for Hezbollah, for the Houthis in Yemen — what intelligence services “created” them? Again — some financial and indirect support, yes. But mostly, these are expressions of internal ideological, religious, and social movements — especially those connected to the Muslim Brotherhood.
So yes, I think the view that intelligence services are behind every evil in the world is a serious overstatement. Certainly, KGB/FSB are a major evil. But they are far from the only one. Conspiracies aren’t the only mechanism of evil in the world — there’s also organized crime, terrorism, and other forces that arise independently.
The notion that intelligence agencies — especially Russian ones — are some all-powerful octopus pulling the strings of global terrorism is just wrong. It’s a huge exaggeration.
I mean, look — I just spent most of this stream talking about the absolutely cartoonish nature of the people currently heading Russian intelligence — especially Naryshkin. And do you seriously believe that these clownish figures are running the world? That they’re manipulating every terrorist organization from behind the scenes?
Come on — it’s laughable.
Assassination Attempt on Trump Link to heading
Vladislav Klochkoff:
Three questions. What do you think of the idea that Trump should have commissioned a portrait of himself — not from a court painter, but from the editorial staff at Charlie Hebdo? Funny, perhaps. Maybe the last bit of nonsense he’ll allow himself before his political demise. Let’s not talk about terms — let’s talk about siege. Isn’t he at risk not just of political death, but real death?
Well, dear Vladislav, the only question truly worth answering here is the third one. And I must say — that question is real, and it is serious. I do not rule out the possibility that such a risk exists. In fact, the two recent assassination attempts already speak to that.
I would not want — truly would not want — for Trump’s presidency to end that way. You know very well how I feel about him. But still, I believe it would be a great tragedy, because whoever comes after him would likely be even worse. That person would be driven not only by fascist views but also by a desire for revenge — for the martyrdom of Trump.
So God forbid. Yes — the risk is absolutely there. And on that point, I agree with you.
On Wagner Fighters in Syria Link to heading
A. asks:
Is it really accurate to compare hand-to-hand combat or even shootouts with small arms? What happened with Wagner in Syria wasn’t a direct clash — as in, a unit of Russian fighters versus a similarly armed NATO unit. From what I understand, Wagner was simply shelled from a distance with artillery, and later a B-52 came and quite literally wiped out what was still alive. If it had been a direct confrontation, unit versus unit, things could have turned out differently. I’m not defending Wagner — just pointing this out for the sake of accuracy.
Dear colleague, you see —
We’re talking here about the combat potential of NATO soldiers. You’re suggesting we imagine some kind of abstract conditions — stripping NATO soldiers of their aviation, artillery, small arms — and what, have them settle things with their fists?
I don’t know what the outcome would be of a face-to-face, wall-to-wall fight between NATO troops and, say, Russian paratroopers. I don’t know — and frankly, I’m not interested. Because such a scenario can only occur in our imaginations.
What matters in reality is the actual combat capability of NATO armies and soldiers — and of Russian troops. And real war includes air power, artillery, logistics, and everything else — which is precisely what led to the instant destruction of Wagner’s unit in Syria. That’s the point.
We’re not talking about physical strength or hypothetical bar fights between NATO troops and Russian paratroopers or convicts. I have no idea who would win — and again, I don’t care.
What we’re comparing is military potential. I was responding to a critical comment from someone who claimed that NATO soldiers are “a joke.” No — they’re not. And the events in Syria prove that clearly.
On Terrorist Attacks and Their Connection to the War Link to heading
Viktor Khripun again:
About half a year into the war, I heard a speaker suggest that during the entire time of the war, there hadn’t been a single major terrorist attack anywhere in the world — all because the world’s “main terrorist” was busy in Ukraine. I started thinking about it and couldn’t recall any either. And then for another six months to a year, there seemed to be nothing. What do you think about that?
Well, you know — I won’t even mention that the largest terrorist attack in recent years happened on October 7, 2023. That was right in the thick of the war.
And more broadly — I don’t want to list out the dozens of terrorist attacks that took place in 2022, 2023, and 2024. But there’s a simple tool for that — Wikipedia has a dedicated page. Just type in “terrorist attacks in 2022,” and a whole bloody world will open up, showing incidents all around the globe.
So, dear Viktor, I think your hypothesis is mistaken.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
That brings us to the end of our morning conversation today. I’d like to draw your attention to the fact that at 3:00 PM we’ll have a discussion with Erik, a representative of the Freedom of Russia Legion — it promises to be an interesting talk. And finally, at 8:00 PM, we’ll have our traditional Friday meeting with Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky. Thank you for your patience. Thank you. Take care of yourselves. All the best to you. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian POWs! Goodbye!
Source: https://youtu.be/-M5R4g3cckI