U.S. President’s special envoy Richard Grenell stated that the nuclear weapons Ukraine gave to Russia under the Budapest Memorandum were Russian. Trump continues “Signalgate,” blaming everything on the journalist.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is March 27. It’s 7:42 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what’s happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Historical Rhyme: The Crimean War Link to heading
Two historical rhymes seem relevant to me. On this day, March 27, 1854, the Crimean War began. This marked the official beginning of the Crimean War as a war of Russia not only against Turkey but also against Great Britain and France. It was on this very date, March 27, that Britain and France declared war on Russia. What interests me here, when referring to this date and the beginning of the Crimean War, is not so much the military aspects of this truly important and significant campaign, nor even its consequences—it’s clear that Russia, overall, lost the war. This defeat laid the foundation for fundamental social transformations that followed. What I am particularly interested in is the public sentiment on both sides of the front. That is, the media component, which, it seems to me, has not been well studied in the context of today’s situation.
Because what was happening in Europe, where such brilliant publicists—hawks, fanatical hawks—demanded the destruction of the Russian Empire, like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who intensely urged the British-French coalition to destroy the Russian Empire. This side of their activity, in my opinion, has not been fully reflected upon—namely, their role as propagandists, as hawkish propagandists. On the other side, there was the completely rabid hawk of the Russian Empire, Fyodor Ivanovich Tyutchev, who was so imperialist, so fervently supportive of the Russian world, that he even caused some irritation on the part of Nicholas I. And finally, the emergence of a bright new trend in this public atmosphere—pacifism—whose unquestionable leader was Leo Tolstoy.
I think that what was happening back then at the beginning of the war, and what the awakening of these media forces contributed to, remains highly relevant today. We’re seeing very similar phenomena in today’s world.
Historical Rhyme: The 1953 Amnesty Link to heading
Well, another historical rhyme that I think is worth noting today is that on this day, March 27, 1953, the largest amnesty in the history of the Russian state was declared. It was first called the Voroshilov Amnesty, then the Beria Amnesty—though the latter name was entirely undeserved. But that’s not the point. What matters is that around 1,300,000 criminals were released, which caused an absolutely horrific spike in crime. I won’t cite exact numbers, but at least for certain types of crimes, such as robbery, crime rates increased several times over in 1953 and 1954.
Why do I think this historical rhyme is relevant? Because what will happen in Russia after the end of this war, I think, will make the Voroshilov Amnesty seem like a walk in the park. Yes, the total number of criminals and war criminals who will be thrown back into Russia after the war may actually be smaller—1,300,000 then, and here maybe 600,000. And if you count various auxiliary troops, well, generally speaking, the number may be smaller. But I believe that the contingent of war criminals that will be pushed back into Russia poses a more serious threat than even the 1953 amnesty, which was depicted in the film Cold Summer of 1953.
What’s going to happen after the war ends, in my view, is even more serious. That, I believe, is one of the reasons why Putin has no interest in ending the war. Because he understands that the end of the war would bring far graver consequences for him than its continuation. And the return home of more than 600,000 criminals and war criminals is not the only consequence that Putin’s Russia should fear.
Yesterday Marked 25 Years of Putin in Power Link to heading
Well, another historical date worth mentioning. Yesterday marked 25 years of Putin being in power. For the first time, on March 26, 2000, he was elected President of Russia. And? Well, I think summing up Putin’s 25 years in power is a topic for a separate discussion. But overall, we can say that Putin truly created a situation—essentially, he created the conditions for the countdown to Russia’s collapse. One could cite figures: Russia’s population has decreased during this period. Putin took Russia as a member of the G8, a respected country that was supported and welcomed by both Western and Eastern nations. A huge number of world leaders used to come to Russia on May 9th—so there were plenty of indicators of international respect for Russia.
Some commenters were upset by what I said—that during the first period of Putin’s rule, from 2000 to roughly 2008, before the default, there was rapid economic growth and a rise in living standards. Some commentators were basically pushing at an open door, arguing that it wasn’t thanks to Putin. Some even denied this growth happened at all, which is pointless—there are statistics. Others argued that it wasn’t Putin’s doing, but rather the result of a booming oil market. Well, of course—it’s obvious. Putin benefited from what became known as “Putin’s luck,” a topic I once debated with Leonid Radzikhovsky in the pages of the virtual Daily Journal. It was indeed luck—a massive surge in oil prices, rivers of petrodollars flowing into the Russian economy. Yes, most of it was captured by Putin’s inner circle, but some of those petrodollars did reach the population. And ultimately, all of it went down the drain.
After the Munich speech in 2007, Putin set Russia against the entire civilized world. And this is what we ended up with. In general, the topic of Putin’s 25 years in power deserves a full conversation on its own. But even so, I think the situation is clearly revealed in what it has led to: a war in the center of Europe, which will likely be the final chapter in the history of Russia as a phenomenon in world history. The dismantling of all state institutions that Putin carried out will not go without consequences.
On Grenell’s Statement That the Nuclear Weapons Were Not Ukrainian Link to heading
Well, let’s move on to current events. Perhaps the most, well, not the most important, but certainly the most striking event, which actually gave rise to the rather, perhaps, blunt title of today’s stream—“Mitrofanushkas in the White House”—is yesterday’s statement by U.S. Special Presidential Envoy Richard Grenell, who declared that the nuclear weapons Ukraine gave to the Russian Federation under the Budapest Memorandum were Russian. So, once again: under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees. And what exactly did Grenell say? That they weren’t Ukrainian. “It was not Ukrainian,” Grenell wrote. “This is an uncomfortable fact.” Well, yes—it is an uncomfortable fact, to put it mildly. But of course, not for the reasons Grenell suggests.
The uncomfortable truth is that a person who served as the U.S. Ambassador—this isn’t just someone off the street, after all—a person with a biography, someone who was the U.S. Ambassador to Germany for nearly three years, from 2018 to 2020, and then served as Acting Director of National Intelligence, and who is also a Harvard graduate—this person now says that the nuclear weapons Ukraine relinquished under the Budapest Memorandum were not Ukrainian, but Russian.
So apparently, in Harvard, where he studied, during his diplomatic career, and while leading U.S. intelligence, this man somehow missed the fact that there once existed a country called the Soviet Union. The USSR had nuclear weapons, which were deployed across several republics. This country, the Soviet Union, consisted of 15 republics that were, according to the Soviet Constitution, equal in status—including the Russian RSFSR and Ukraine. And let’s not forget Kazakhstan and Belarus, on whose territories nuclear weapons were also deployed. These four republics were equal members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
So the weapons located in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukrainian SSR were absolutely not the property of the RSFSR—that is, of Russia. That fact is obvious to just about everyone. I won’t even mention those who lived in Russia or Ukraine at the time—but in principle, someone of Grenell’s rank should have at least some basic understanding of history and geography. But in this case, we’re dealing with a real-life Mitrofan, who, like the character, doesn’t need geography because there are cabbies, and knows plenty of amusing tales instead of actual history. Well, that’s the trouble.
And overall, when we see what’s happening today in the United States—the statements made by various officials and members of Trump’s team—we constantly see these “Mitrofanushkas” in the White House. Understand, I really don’t want to take the stance of the late Zadornov, with his catchphrase “Americans are so dumb,” but the problem isn’t with Americans as a whole—it’s with who ends up in the White House. It’s truly a cluster of ignoramuses—people who, I don’t know how, studied at America’s top universities but are still deeply ignorant. Maybe they’re knowledgeable in some other fields, but still, people who occupy top positions in the U.S. government and make important decisions—decisions we’ll discuss shortly—should not be operating under the belief that Ukraine never had nuclear weapons, and that those weapons were Russia’s.
By the way, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer thoroughly explained why Grenell is wrong: those nuclear warheads in Ukraine were former Soviet, not Russian, and while in storage, they were under Ukraine’s exclusive responsibility—not Russia’s. In the end, yes—someone who served as ambassador to Ukraine probably knows a thing or two about this, unlike someone currently holding a key position in the U.S. administration.
Signalgate Continues Link to heading
So, what else is going on? This situation—this presence of a Mitrofan in the White House—leads to developments like the one we discussed yesterday: Signalgate, the infamous story involving the inclusion of a journalist in a secret chat and, essentially, a fantastic scenario in which communication for a top-secret meeting planning a strike on the Yemeni Houthis was carried out via the Signal messenger. I gave a fairly detailed account of this story yesterday. But now there’s been a continuation, and notably, it was entirely initiated by the White House itself.
What happened? The Atlantic, the outlet whose editor-in-chief was behind the initial exposé, published another article with even more detailed screenshots from the Signal chat. In it, one can see a message from U.S. Secretary of Defense Peter Higgs, sent 30 minutes before American warplanes took off. The message includes detailed information about exactly when and what kinds of attacks—by F-18 fighters, drones, Tomahawk missiles—were planned on Houthi positions in Yemen.
Why did The Atlantic’s editor decide to continue publishing this? Because Defense Secretary Higgs, Director of National Intelligence Hubbard, CIA Director Ratcliffe, and Trump himself began claiming that The Atlantic and its editor were lying about what was said in the Signal chat. So now we’re in a truly scandalous, unpleasant situation. And honestly, if the White House weren’t filled with “Mitrofanushkas” but responsible individuals, the simplest and most appropriate reaction would’ve been to admit a serious leak, a real blunder. Even if they didn’t want to fire anyone, they could’ve just said, “Yes, this was an unfortunate incident,” and left it at that.
Instead, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the head of national intelligence, the CIA director, and the President of the United States all launched attacks against the editor, accusing him of lying. Moreover, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that there was no classified information in the chat. However, she also said she opposed publication because the chat contained sensitive information. What the difference is between “classified” and “sensitive” only she seems to know. But the key point is that the journalist was accused of lying. Naturally, the journalist asked: if there’s no classified information, would they object to publishing more of the content? The answer was basically, “It’s not classified, but it’s sensitive.”
So, having been accused of lying, the journalist decided to publish more detailed information—especially since the attack had already occurred and there was no longer any risk to pilots. In reality, the publication posed no tragic consequences. Then Leavitt claimed the whole affair—quote—“was another hoax invented by Trump haters known for sensationalism.” But where’s the hoax? A journalist published the contents of a chat he was added to. Where is the deception? Where’s the lie?
This, to me, is a textbook case of what happens when, instead of responding calmly and with dignity—acknowledging a mistake, admitting a serious issue, and leaving it at that—Donald Trump, for example, when asked about the new Atlantic article, again resorted to personal attacks. He called the publication a “witch hunt,” the magazine a “failing journal,” and Jeffrey Goldberg “a truly disgusting guy.”
This is a classic case of people who don’t understand what they’re doing. They’re just inflating the story, dumping a bucket of garbage on their own heads, and then kicking themselves while they’re down. It’s truly a fireworks display of incompetence—an explosion of total professional unfitness, practically from everyone in the White House. And okay, in the end, maybe this could be written off as just an American problem. Americans, for some reason, elected a Mitrofanushka to their White House. So be it.
Trump’s Global Policy Link to heading
But the problem is that based on this completely false understanding of reality, which exists in the minds of the White House occupants, global policy is being built. Right now, we’re immersed in these negotiations about a ceasefire, and we’re so focused on the trees that we don’t see the forest. And the forest is this: for Trump, this isn’t just about a few isolated moves—he has an overarching global geopolitical strategy, the essence of which is, to some extent, an attempt to replicate what is loosely called the Nixon-Kissinger model. That is, the model from 1972.
Back then, Kissinger tried to play the China card against the Soviet Union. Here, it’s the reverse—they’re trying to play the Russia card against China. The goal is to pull Russia away from China and either establish an alliance with Russia against China or, at the very least, secure Russia’s neutrality in this rivalry with China. This reveals a complete lack of understanding of how strong the ties between China and Russia are.
Later on, when we get into the details of how support is unfolding for participants in the war, I’ll try to show just how important China’s support for Russia is—it’s critical. China is a strategic partner for Russia, and prying them apart is impossible. Achieving the same effect Nixon and Kissinger once did—with Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy and Nixon’s strategic opening to China to counter the USSR—simply isn’t possible now, in reverse. That’s just the result of these people having absolutely no idea what modern Russia is, what today’s Russia-China relationship looks like, and so on.
Trump, in everything he does, is convinced that the Russia-Ukraine war must be ended as quickly as possible, under any conditions—because he doesn’t want to stretch his resources. He’s simply not interested. He doesn’t care about Europe, he doesn’t care about Ukraine—he cares about China. And in that sense, it’s absolutely clear that his policy is aimed at dividing the world with Putin. That is, trying to reach an agreement with Putin that Ukraine is part of Russia’s sphere of influence, while China is the U.S.’s main adversary to deal with.
There’s a complete lack of understanding of what Russia actually is in this situation. Just as his special envoy believes that Ukraine’s nuclear weapons really belonged to Russia, Trump likewise believes he has a chance to detach Russia from China and turn it into an ally. I don’t know if he’ll ever be disappointed by Putin’s real position, or if his illusions will remain intact.
Aid from Russia’s Allies Link to heading
A question—so, if we talk about what’s happening in terms of allied support, here’s what’s going on. Specifically, North Korea. The latest developments in this support effort are that, according to South Korean intelligence, North Korea has sent an additional 3,000 troops to Russia since the beginning of this year, as reinforcements to the 11,000 who are already fighting. Of those 11,000, again according to South Korean intelligence, 4,000 have been eliminated—now lying in Ukraine’s black soil and no longer posing any threat. So 3,000 more have been sent as replacements.
In addition, North Korea is sending Moscow missiles, artillery, ammunition, a significant number of short-range ballistic missiles, grenade launchers, and multiple rocket launch systems—in short, quite serious aid. I’d really like—actually, I’ll probably ask Sergey Maratovich Grafsky on Monday—for his expert opinion: who is providing more aid—North Korea to Russia, or France to Ukraine?
France is providing Ukraine with an additional €2 billion in military aid, which includes anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, drones, and more. This was announced by Macron yesterday at a joint press conference with Zelensky. It would be very interesting to hear from a military expert who is helping more—France helping Ukraine, or North Korea helping Russia. It’s an intriguing comparison.
But overall, I want to emphasize again that the presence of these “Mitrofanushkas” in the American White House is a serious problem. Not for America—America will manage, I have no doubt about that. I believe that American democracy will digest Trump and all his so-called Red Guards that he’s surrounded himself with. But the consequences for the world, for Europe, for Ukraine—that’s where the real concern lies.
Q&A Link to heading
Alright, this concludes the first part of our stream. Now I’ll move on to answering your questions. So. We have a few questions regarding…
Promise to Watch the Katz–Zhdanov Debate Link to heading
Here’s a question from Alexander Kravtsov, one from Natalia, and a few others. Questions regarding the Katz–Zhdanov debate. It’s over two hours long, and I resisted for a while—I understood that I probably needed to watch it, because yes, we are interested in understanding what’s happening in the Russian political emigration space. It may seem like a storm in a teacup, but still—it’s our teacup, and the storm matters. So it’s something we need to be aware of.
I’m making a commitment to watch it today and share my thoughts tomorrow. Of course, I’ll comment with my own opinion. I don’t think it’ll become outdated by then—especially since, in the grand scheme of things, these debates don’t influence anything directly. So, yes.
On the Rise in Russians’ Living Standards Before 2008 Link to heading
And once again, I want to address the wave of outrage over my supposed praise of Putin—about how, during the period from 2000 to 2008, the economy was growing, and so on. Well, it was growing. What can I say? The economy grew. I can’t change that. Yes, it was a remarkable fact. It was a period of skyrocketing oil prices, an extremely favorable situation, absolutely ideal foreign policy conditions. Everyone was gazing into Putin’s eyes, searching for his soul, and so on. Schröder, who was the Chancellor of Germany at the time, was a passionate supporter of Putin. I don’t remember the exact quote, but he practically called him a model statesman.
In short, everything was going his way—luck, good fortune, a winning streak, call it what you will. Yes, the economy really did grow. And yes, I still maintain that despite the rolling back of freedoms, despite the thickening fascist fog, at the same time there was a genuine improvement in material well-being. On average. Not just among billionaires, not just inside the Garden Ring—overall, living standards were rising, and it can be said that, in purely material terms, residents of the Russian Federation were living better during that period than at any other time in Russia’s history.
Yes, that’s how it was. And of course, Putin had nothing to do with it. It was thanks to a very favorable international economic climate—above all, oil prices. Right?
Could Signalgate Be a Distraction? Link to heading
Artyom—Artyom Shevchenko is a sponsor of our channel, for which he deserves a big thank-you. His question:
Doesn’t it seem strange that the news about this chat and the negotiations are surfacing simultaneously? I know you don’t like conspiracy theories, but maybe Trump is clumsily trying to create a distraction, so people talk and criticize this instead of their idiotic behavior at the negotiations?
You know, it’s not just that I don’t go in for conspiracy theories—it’s that, first of all, unlike you and me, Trump doesn’t consider their behavior at the negotiations idiotic. I think he genuinely believes these are brilliant, exceptional negotiations. That’s the first thing.
Second, even if that were the case, trying to cover up a failure by dumping a bucket of garbage on your own head—well, that’s just bizarre. I really don’t think there’s anything close to what you’re suggesting going on. This was an actual blunder—something that can easily be explained by plain stupidity. There’s no need to look for a conspiracy.
No, this was really just a screw-up. And it never would’ve come to light if that editor-in-chief hadn’t made it public.
Suggestion to Invite Sergey Medvedev and Konstantin Sonin Link to heading
And here’s a question from Marat:
I recently watched a conversation between Sergey Medvedev and Konstantin Sonin on Trumpism. Sonin gave a thorough professional analysis of the current state of the U.S., while Medvedev has a broad erudition. I’ve always enjoyed listening to him. I think either of them would make a great guest on your channel. Do you have any plans to invite them?
I think yes. I think it’s interesting. At the very least, I will send out an invitation. How they respond—I don’t know. Both of them are in high demand. But I will definitely extend the invite. If they accept—great.
English-Language Channel on Trump’s Lies Link to heading
So, Sergey has a big proposal. His idea is:
To create an English-language channel with the symbolic name “The Lies of Trump and His Team,” where one would call out Trump, Vince Whitcoff, Musk, and others for their lies, ignorance, rudeness, etc.
Well, the idea is clear. The scale of this project is such that… Well, there are two issues. First, the project itself—I understand what it entails. If we’re talking about a separate, dedicated channel, that’s a very serious undertaking. Second, the fact that it’s in English. That all requires a huge amount of effort.
I’m not ready—sorry for the tautology—I’m not ready to say whether I’m ready for that. At the moment, I’m not. I don’t yet see how or where I could carve out the time to create something like this. It would be a workload comparable to what I’m already doing overall. I’d need an extra life, extra hours in the day, an extra month of life, an extra year, and so on. So for now, while there’s plenty to do, I only have one life, and there are only 24 hours in a day. Attempts to increase that number haven’t succeeded so far.
Maybe the Problem Isn’t Trump, but the U.S. Link to heading
Sergey Kirichenko posed a big question—or perhaps a critique—which I think deserves a response. He writes:
You mentioned Roosevelt, but lately I’ve been wondering—how is he, fundamentally, different from Trump? Let’s look at the facts. First, he recognized the USSR after it had already destroyed its peasantry, started political purges, and had a dictator at the helm. And all for money. The U.S. was the main engine of Soviet industrialization—Trump plus here, says Sergey. Second, he supported in WWII a country that, until just recently, had been allied with Hitler in attacking Poland—and before that, Finland. So again, Trump x2. He gave away half of Europe to a bloodthirsty dictator without the slightest reflection—unlike Churchill. So Trump still has a long way to go to match his ‘great predecessor.’ So is it really all about Trump? Maybe the problem is the U.S. itself—safely tucked away on its beautiful island across the ocean?
Well yes, the fact that they’re safely across that beautiful ocean is certainly part of the issue. But still, I’d rather not suggest that Trump and Roosevelt are more or less the same. Frankly, I see nothing—absolutely nothing—in common between these two presidents. In fact, they’re diametrically opposed in many respects.
Let’s go through this point by point.
First, regarding the U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union: the U.S. recognized the USSR in 1933—last, let me emphasize, among the major Western countries. Dead last. Others recognized the Soviet Union back in the 1920s—1924, if I’m not mistaken, or even 1922. I don’t want to dig through sources right now, but in the 1920s Germany, Britain, France, Spain, and virtually every major Western country had already recognized the USSR—8 to 10 years before the U.S. So there’s no “special guilt” on Roosevelt’s part here. If the whole of Europe had refused to recognize the USSR and Roosevelt had done so alone, that would be a different story. But when the U.S. was the last to do so, you can’t really fault Roosevelt for that.
Second, about the U.S. becoming an ally of the USSR in WWII. At that point, the U.S. had remained neutral for over two years—from 1939 until December 1941. They only entered the war after Hitler declared war on the United States. Hitler declared war. So what were they supposed to do? Naturally, two blocs formed. More than two years had passed since the Munich Agreement, and the realities of the war made it inevitable that the U.S. would align with Stalin. There was no alternative, since Hitler had attacked both the U.K. and the U.S. again—he declared war on the U.S., not the other way around. So it was only natural that the U.S. and USSR became allies. To criticize that is strange—especially when Churchill did the same.
Third, the idea that Roosevelt “gave away” Eastern and Central Europe to Stalin. That’s a serious charge, and one worth examining in detail. The idea of “Western betrayal” isn’t just about Munich—it extends to what happened at the Tehran and especially the Yalta Conferences. Yalta is often seen as a symbol of betrayal—along with the Potsdam Conference. These were moments when the U.S. and U.K. made concessions to the USSR. And yes, during the Warsaw Uprising, for instance, the Allied position was seen by the Poles as a betrayal. The same goes for the Czech uprising. After the war, the postwar division of the world included the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact, COMECON, etc.
Who bears responsibility? Roosevelt and Churchill. There were secret agreements between them and Stalin—like the exclusion of the Baltic states from the Atlantic Charter. That was an obvious betrayal of the Baltic nations.
At the Yalta Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt accepted most of Stalin’s demands. This subject really requires the commentary of professional historians, not just me. For example, British historian Max Hastings argued that Roosevelt and Churchill had very different postwar visions. Hastings claimed Churchill wanted to continue the war in Europe—essentially launch a third world war, this time against the USSR—to prevent Stalin from seizing Eastern and Central Europe.
Yalta, for many commentators, is a symbol of betrayal—and there is some objective basis for that. For example, the head of the U.S. delegation at Yalta was later accused of spying for the USSR. Yes, Churchill had a more forceful stance and was perhaps more perceptive than Roosevelt. Supporting that view is the so-called Operation Unthinkable—a plan for a third world war, drafted by Churchill, that involved driving Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe by force. It was essentially a plan for war against the USSR.
That plan was presented to British military leadership, and their analysis showed the USSR had 264 ground divisions to the U.K.-U.S. alliance’s 103. The Soviets also had air superiority. The conclusion was bleak: starting a war with the USSR would be long, bloody, and extremely costly, with huge Allied casualties. So the plan was scrapped.
So yes, you can criticize Roosevelt. You can criticize Churchill too. But after the war, neither Britain nor the U.S. was ready to fight Stalin. At least, no military expert proposed doing so. Politicians and commentators? Sure. But not Roosevelt, and not Truman either—though Truman took a much tougher line on the USSR. Still, none of them chose to start a third world war—and perhaps that’s understandable.
Why Doesn’t the UN Recognize Crimea as Russian? Link to heading
A question from Viktor Khrunov:
In this stream, you said that the U.S. will never recognize Crimea as Russian—saying, basically, how would the UN or Europe even continue to exist after that? But what about the Golan Heights, which, by the way, Trump recognized? And nothing happened—Europe and the UN were neither hot nor cold. Just one country, besides Israel, recognized it, and everything went on fine. No collapse, not even a strong “tut-tut.”
Well, many did object—but still, I think it’s not quite correct to equate the U.S. recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights with recognition of Crimea as Russian. First of all, when I spoke of catastrophic consequences, I meant if the United Nations were to recognize Crimea as Russian—that would be catastrophic. If it’s just the U.S.—say, through a statement from Donald Trump—that would certainly be strange, but not catastrophic. But if the UN recognizes it, then yes, that would be catastrophic.
As for the Golan Heights: I think it’s very odd to equate recognition of Crimea as Russian with recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli. The Golan Heights, for decades, were a location from which Israeli territory was regularly shelled. Israel faced a policy of annihilation from neighboring Arab states. It’s more or less clear: they occupied the heights so they wouldn’t be killed. That’s it.
From Ukrainian Crimea, there was never any threat to Russia. So putting these two cases on the same level strikes me as very strange. Israel was fighting for its survival. The Golan Heights were a strategic position from which Israel was under constant fire. What does Crimea have to do with any of that? Was there any threat to Russia from Ukrainian Crimea? I think it’s a very, very strange analogy.
Could Putin Derail Negotiations and Anger Trump? Link to heading
So, a question from Bush:
At the very beginning of Trump’s presidency, there was some hope that, faced with harsh reality, he’d realize Putin was untrustworthy and would flood Ukraine with weapons out of spite. But Trump and his team are clearly abandoning Ukraine. Is there still a chance that Putin might do something so brazen that Trump would see it as betrayal and end up helping Ukraine after all—or is it time to give up on that hope?
You know, Putin may not be the brightest man, but he does have a certain instinct for power and self-preservation. So he’ll try to avoid that. Nothing like that is going to happen. He’ll keep saying things like, “Under the leadership of the great Donald Ivanovich Trump, we are moving toward peace.” That’s it. There will be no crossing the line.
In that sense, I think it’s time to let go of that hope. Alright?
Closing Remarks Link to heading
That wraps up this morning’s stream. I’m not sure if I’ll be able to prepare a Mediafrenia or Trumpofrenia episode today, but I’ll try. So if it works out, watch for announcements—we’ll run something at 8:00 PM. With that, I conclude our morning conversation. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives! All the best to you. Please take care of yourselves.
Source: https://youtu.be/FHOpNPgLjUs