Trump demanded to “kill” Voice of America. The Council of Europe created a tribunal for Russia’s crimes that will not be able to prosecute Putin. Marco Rubio refused to support new sanctions against Russia. A NATO summit in honor of Trump, or why Zelensky wore a suit.
News Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 26. It’s 7:40 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what’s happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
The World of Half-Measures Link to heading
What’s happening in the world right now can be described as us living in a kind of half-hearted, powerful global state of half-measures and half-results. The world is full of successful compromises whose outcomes leave you unsure whether to be happy or disappointed.
For instance, the Council of Europe has signed an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for Russia’s crimes against Ukraine. The document was signed in Strasbourg by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Eisenberg C., and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky. But three people have been exempted from prosecution: Putin, Mishustin, and Lavrov. In other words, the tribunal can only initiate proceedings against President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov after they leave office.
Well, that’s understandable, in a way. Mishustin and Lavrov could realistically be out of the picture. But as for Putin—it’s obvious that he’s immortal. Or, maybe not immortal in general, but definitely Immortal in the political sense. Until that time, the tribunal may conduct investigations, gather evidence, and prepare indictments. But all this time, this criminal trio will remain beyond the reach of the law.
The tribunal will be powerless while they remain in power, unless their immunity is lifted by Russian authorities. And that’s just an absolutely mocking clause, because imagining a Russian government lifting Putin’s immunity while he’s still in power is absurd.
So this is exactly that bastard of a compromise, because, as we know from reliable sources, the countries that supported the tribunal initiative actually disagreed on this very point. The restriction on lifting immunity—especially Putin’s—was pushed by the United States. Essentially, it came at the behest of the United States. Let’s be honest—it came at Trump’s behest.
As a result, the European Union issued what can only be called, at best, a highly questionable message—essentially turning a lifelong dictatorship into a competitive advantage. The more crimes the regime commits, the more protected it becomes. This tribunal, in other words, has had its claws and fangs pulled out from the start, turning it into a harmless, plush toy tribunal.
The Murder of Voice of America Link to heading
Well then. Donald Trump increasingly resembles a Roman senator who constantly demands that Carthage be destroyed. In particular, he called Voice of America a mouthpiece of the Democrats and a complete leftist catastrophic project, and urged Republicans in Congress not to vote for its funding. I quote: Why would a Republican want the Democrats’ mouthpiece to continue existing? Voice of America is a complete, catastrophic project. No Republican should vote to preserve it. And he concluded with a direct call: Kill it. That is, the President of the United States demanded to kill—Voice of America. Voice of America, which has existed since 1942, played a huge role in opposing dictatorships—from the Nazi dictatorship, the Soviet dictatorship, to the dictatorships in countries all over the world where they suppressed freedom of speech and violated human rights. And now Trump has proposed to kill it.
The Logic of Trump’s Team Link to heading
This is very characteristic of what the current American government represents. Secretary of State Rubio stated that the adoption of new sanctions by Washington against Russia would halt the dialogue between the countries regarding the war in Ukraine. That is, according to his words, this would lead to the prolongation of the war. An astonishing logic—if sanctions are not imposed, then apparently the war will end. Why on earth would Putin end the war if sanctions are applied against him? Marco Rubio said—and this is the construct in his head. Well, obviously, it’s not really his own head; it’s a construct he came up with to stay on Trump’s team. But in general, the logic goes like this: if new sanctions are imposed, the war will continue; if sanctions are not imposed, the war will stop. Incredible logic. By the same token, one could just as well say that if Ukraine is given weapons, the war will continue, and if not, it will end. Well, it’s obvious how it would end. So this astonishing logic is being demonstrated—well, in this case by Marco Rubio, who said that if the U.S. president imposes sanctions, it would essentially mean acknowledging that negotiations won’t happen anytime soon. But where do negotiations lead? We’ve already seen two rounds. Trump also told NATO allies that the situation in Ukraine has completely spiraled out of control and requires active measures. Apparently, this means war with Russia. You know, we’ve somehow gotten used to this Gromyko-like empty bucket. Nevertheless, it occasionally produces some monstrous sounds. Just think about it. Let me repeat this once again: the situation in Ukraine has completely spiraled out of control. So everything that happened before—over the past three and a half years—was supposedly under control, and the situation had not spiraled out of control. Bucha, Mariupol, the murder of civilians—all of that was under control. The only question is, under whose control was it? So that’s basically what’s going on inside the heads of U.S. leaders on an annual basis. One of the most important events—besides the 12-day war that ended with an unclear outcome (we’ll return to analyzing those results as new information emerges).
NATO Summit Results Link to heading
And now, the results of the recent NATO anniversary summit. This very summit, Marco Rubio—whom I’ve already quoted—suggested calling the Trump Summit. And he was actually right, absolutely right, because it truly felt like they were celebrating not NATO’s anniversary, but Trump’s. In particular, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte—well, I’m forced to quote here because it reflects the atmosphere among Western countries—sent a message to Trump, which Trump then showed to everyone. That is, it was a personal message to Trump, and he made it public. It began with “Dear Donald,” which is normal. But then came the phrase: “You will achieve what no American president has been able to achieve in decades.” You know, Putin is undoubtedly a master of deep spin, but in terms of flattery depth, Rutte has at least matched him. Because what does it mean to “achieve what no American president has achieved in decades”? Roosevelt, under whom the U.S., as part of the anti-Hitler coalition, won World War II. Reagan, who played a crucial role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War—these are, apparently, trifles. Clearly, they’re not even in the same league as Trump. Amazing. By the way, a BBC correspondent asked Rutte if publishing this personal—emphasis on personal—message to Trump made him feel awkward. Rutte calmly replied, “Not at all.” Awkward? No, because everything in that message is true. So yes, Trump is, of course, greater than Roosevelt, greater than Reagan. Greater than all presidents and all people in the world. I won’t even list them here. Also, Rutte—probably the best student in the school of sycophants this time—referred to the U.S. President as “daddy,” who sometimes has to break up fighting children. Again, journalists tried to question the reasoning behind such blatant flattery, which is still considered unseemly in the West. This is more of an Eastern style—it’s a Russian style, a North Korean style. That kind of deeply ingrained flattery. Not referring to all Asian countries—many of which are democratic and don’t condone such open bootlicking—but rather countries like North Korea, Russia, some Central Asian nations like Turkmenistan, and so on. This behavior is still uncharacteristic of the West. So they asked him—again, I didn’t jot down the exact quote—but essentially, doesn’t this level of flattery make him uncomfortable? Rutte replied that it’s a matter of taste. That it’s fair. That Trump is a good friend. So, in essence, the whole summit was held under the sign of pleasing Trump. And, in particular, the final communiqué also bore the mark of this intention—not to irritate Trump. The organizers tried to smooth over all the sharp edges, especially regarding Russia. For example, the word “war” was not mentioned even once in the final declaration. In last year’s communiqué, Russia was mentioned more than 40 times. It contained strong language, stating that Russia bears sole responsibility for the aggressive war in Ukraine and remains the most significant direct threat to the Alliance. This time, everything was softened—again, to avoid provoking Trump. As for specifics—I think I’ll get to Trump’s meeting with Zelensky in a few minutes—but for now, about Trump’s response to a question from Myroslava Neue of the Ukrainian BBC Service. She asked whether the U.S. was ready to sell the Patriot air defense system to Kyiv. Instead of giving a clear and articulate answer, Trump started probing the journalist’s personal circumstances. “Do you currently live in Ukraine?” Trump asked. To which she replied, “My husband is in Ukraine, and I’m in Warsaw with the kids because he wanted it that way.” Trump didn’t stop there and continued, “Is your husband a soldier now?” The journalist answered yes. After that, Trump again didn’t answer whether he was ready to sell Patriots to Ukraine. He said Ukraine wants to have the Patriot because it’s a wonderful weapon—but we need it ourselves. And so does Israel. We’re supplying it—Israel needs it. And as for whether we can sell it to Ukraine—we’ll think about it. Then he wished the journalist luck and asked her to send greetings to her husband, etc. At that moment, I was strongly reminded of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev’s famous remark: “There’s no money, but hang in there. All the best.” And he flew away. Trump did pretty much the same. It was impossible to tell from his answer whether Ukraine has any chance of receiving the Patriot system—or how the journalist’s location and her husband’s military service relate to Trump’s willingness to supply the weapon. It was, frankly, an astonishing scene.
The Meeting Between Zelensky and Trump Link to heading
And finally, the latest meeting between Zelensky and Trump. I want to note here that I haven’t seen an exact, detailed transcript of the dialogue—not even a thorough description of it. There are some individual remarks from Trump, some from Zelensky, but overall, judging by everything, while Trump’s general attitude toward Zelensky personally and Ukraine as a whole remains negative, the meeting itself was relatively moderate—at least, there was nothing comparable to what happened in the Oval Office. But here’s what I want to draw attention to. Ukrainian President Zelensky, whose participation in the summit was uncertain until the last moment—since there were concerns that Trump might be very angry and that seeing Zelensky might ruin his mood—still came to the summit, and for the first time in years of war, he wore a suit. I’m not trying to play the role of a society reporter here, commenting on outfits and such. But still, it was an obvious image shift. And it’s fairly clear that it was another attempt to appease Trump. I’m the last person to blame Volodymyr Zelensky for this—he has a country behind him. It’s clear that every move, every action—unlike for leaders of Western countries, for whom a cooling in relations with Trump might just mean less favorable trade terms—for Zelensky, it’s the lives of millions of his fellow citizens. So, in this case, any steps to appease Trump are fully justified.
But as for the rest of the NATO participants—I just have a question: how far can one go in the name of realpolitik, or rather, not in the name of realpolitik? Trump is known for his exotic habits and tastes. If tomorrow he demanded that everyone attending a NATO summit wear, say, pink fishnet tights—well, I wonder who would do it if he said it seriously, sternly, with that finger-pointing he always does. I don’t know who would go along with it just to get a low tariff or some other preferential treatment. Of course, tastes vary, but on Orban’s thick legs those outfits would look particularly spicy. It’s grotesque, yes—but still. You know, everything that’s been happening lately in international relations, particularly under Trump’s influence, keeps reminding me of Sinyavsky’s words about stylistic disagreements with Soviet power—which, he noted, were more important than political ones. And now I increasingly feel stylistic disagreements not only with the Soviet government or the Putin regime, but also with the West, which, for the sake of short-term gain, collectively kisses Trump’s ass, makes half-hearted decisions—especially regarding Putin. Maybe those decisions are technically right, but they’re just so, so revolting.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
So, dear friends, I’m moving on to answering your questions. I want to warn you right away that since I wasn’t able to answer all the questions yesterday, today’s stream will likely be quite long. So, as they say, it’s up to each of you—join in as much as you can.
How to Ask a Question Without Risking Your Freedom Link to heading
Tatyana Chernykh How can you ask questions without risking your freedom?
You know, it’s actually very simple. This is a very straightforward question, and the answer is obvious: there’s anonymity, there are pseudonyms. I honestly don’t care—what matters to me is that you sign the question in some way, any way at all. Tatyana Chernykh, Svetlana Belykh—whatever name you like. Or don’t sign it at all—that’s fine too. It’s just awkward for me to say “unidentified user” or “anonymous,” and so on. But it’s up to you. In this case, anonymity or a pseudonym is key. I don’t think anyone is going to track you down. Of course, it’s always technically possible to uncover someone’s identity—but this isn’t the kind of situation where someone’s going to dig in and investigate. A pseudonym is the best option.
Interview of Nabutov with Gordon Link to heading
Nadezhda Kotik My question was inspired by the interview of Kirill Nabutov with Dmitry Gordon. Nabutov said that in the 1990s, in his TV program “Adam’s Apple,” he raised the topic of the Leningrad blockade. It discussed whether the city’s leadership was right to decide under no circumstances to surrender the city, which resulted in the deaths of one million civilians. Nabutov was criticized for this back then, but the question remains unresolved for him even now. Why did this touch me so deeply? Because in my youth, in the 1970s, I also thought about it. Was it right to leave the residents of Leningrad to die a terrible, agonizing death and defend the city at the cost of their lives? Was that price too high? Cities like Kyiv, Minsk, and others were surrendered. Later they were reclaimed, but without so many mass graves. I once said this to my mother, and she forbade me to ever speak such thoughts out loud. She was probably afraid. Now we have a war, and in this light I think—what is the right decision: to surrender towns and villages or to fight to the end? I think now we should retreat and not bury thousands of people. But this question is very controversial. I’m not sure I’m right.
Dear Nadezhda, Let’s say this: for military experts, this dilemma does have an answer. What defines victory—territory seized or the destruction of the enemy’s army? What matters more—preserving land or preserving the army? And the answer seems obvious: of course, preserve the army. That means not clinging to every inch of land, but preserving the armed forces.
But here’s the thing. There’s the example of France, which retreated, lost territory, and ultimately surrendered the country, saving lives, yes—but ended up under German occupation. And without external help, it would have remained there. Then there’s the USSR’s approach—“women will give birth to more”—with utter disregard for human life. These are two extremes.
Now this issue is relevant in the context of criticism toward Ukraine’s military-political leadership. And there are many aspects to consider. First, what happens to the people living in the areas being abandoned? Include that in your analysis, dear Nadezhda. Consider the fate of the people left behind, handed over to the enemy. That’s one.
Second, there is always the matter of proportionality. It’s not an either-or choice—to retreat or to defend. It’s about proportional response. If we adopt a categorical imperative to abandon territory in any case just to save lives, then the simplest solution would be to surrender entirely and stop resisting. Then, yes, no one dies—at least, not right away. But then comes Bucha. Mariupol. Everything we’ve seen: “Kill them all, rob them all—just the way we like it.”
So I don’t think a categorical imperative to give up territory in the name of saving lives is viable. Because by giving up territory, you lose the country. Sure, maybe the remaining 30 million Ukrainians could try to move to Europe—a fantastical scenario, wouldn’t you agree?
There must be proportionality, definitely. But how to define that golden mean? That’s a question for military and political leadership—how well they can calculate where the line is, how long territory can be held at the cost of certain sacrifices. But I’m not comfortable with any absolute, categorical answer to this question.
On the Strategy of Praising Russian Generals Link to heading
So, Denis Lipsits. How do you assess the possibility of Ukrainian or Western media using a strategy of deliberately praising certain Russian generals, such as Mikhail Zelensky or Andrey Matveichev, in order to provoke an anxious reaction from the Kremlin? I mean, we’re talking about, so to speak, livestreams. Well, in short, isn’t this an attempt by Ukrainian and Western media to expose these generals and thus eliminate effective military leaders from Russia? So. So the question is whether this might be a tool of hybrid warfare?
I don’t rule out that this is the case. It cannot be ruled out. So it’s quite possible that this is an action within the framework of information warfare? Possibly. One just needs to know for sure, but it’s entirely possible. Perhaps you are right.
Will Putin Die a Natural Death? Link to heading
But Sokol of the mugs. Here comes a very long anecdote at first. Sorry, I won’t read it out loud—I’ll just read the actual answer and question. Or rather, the question itself: Do you think Putin will die a natural death? Because if so, we all face many more years without you, in hopeless, utter darkness.
Well, what can I say? You know, I don’t predict the future. Right. I don’t turn water into wine or swallow swords. So I can’t say for sure whether Putin will die a natural death or, so to speak, a violent one. But I just want to say that the death of a dictator is not the only—it’s one of the possible ends of a regime, but not the only one. There are also options like a major military defeat, which today may seem unbelievable, but one of the latest military appointees of Trump, a general who now, so to speak, heads NATO forces in Europe—he seems to have already taken up his duties. An American lieutenant general—he seems to have assumed his responsibilities. And he said he believes in Ukraine’s military victory. You see, he’s a general, a professional soldier, and he believes in Ukraine’s military victory. So it’s not just about the death of a dictator—defeat is also possible. And finally, no one has ruled out an internal coup either. So? As for your second conclusion—well, that one is open for debate.
On Punishment for the Russian Elite Link to heading
So. Oleg Ivanov Thank you for your answer. About collective responsibility. Apparently, I got something mixed up. I thought you were against it.
Well, I do often talk about the existence of several types of collective responsibility.
One more thing. What do you consider to be an adequate and fair punishment for the Russian elite? What do you consider an adequate and fair punishment for the “vatniks”? Same question for the silent approval crowd, those who are simply too cowardly to come out against the war but in fact support it. Given the distortion of global reality, there may be no punishment at all—no Nuremberg, no “repentance of the German nation,” in quotes. I mean the Russians. Nothing, you know? Really?
First of all, yes, there may be none. Punishment is entirely possible. And repentance may also never come. No one ever repented for the Prague Spring, or for Hungary, or for Afghanistan. No one repented for that. You see? That is, there is no higher justice that is somehow guaranteed by some kind of supreme earthly reason—there’s no such thing. Therefore, justice is established by people. And sometimes people don’t have the strength for it. So there is no guarantee—of punishment, repentance, or anything like that. It’s all in our hands, too. Second, as for punishment for the Russian elite and specific war criminals—that’s trial and prison. For the vatniks who go along with it, there can be no criminal punishment. And collective responsibility will lie in the hardships of life in a ruined country. That’s it. Collective responsibility is already happening—right now.
On the Impact of the “12-Day War” on Ukraine Link to heading
Mikhail. A question—or rather, if this were a discussion right now, I would say to the professor: I think you’re mistaken. The benefit for Ukraine is direct. This, as I understand it, is a question about what kind of impact the 12-day war has had and continues to have on the situation in and for Ukraine. So, Mikhail says that Russia lost an ally, a supplier of missiles, Shaheds, spare parts, and so on. Iran had all of that in abundance. That’s precisely why they were selling it. Now they need it themselves, including for R&D—specialists are needed at home. We also took out part of their scientific and engineering base. I mean, Iran must feel betrayed by Russia, especially since Iran has already announced the end of all supplies to Ukraine. So Israel knocked out the weakest leg of Putin’s stool, knocked out another one—North Korea—and he won’t be able to stand on the remaining two Russian-Chinese legs.
Well, I can say right away that there’s no talk yet of knocking out the North Korean leg. And as for the Chinese leg—well, it’s a leg, yes, but it’s complicated. So that’s debatable.
So is Iran now landless? And in the case of Israel, along with Baron Bibi, yes, it did play that role. The benefit is incredible. Despite my dislike of Bibi and Trump, the KGB and Trump. Both have a certain style. One has already freed himself from the law—Trump—the other has just taken over the judicial selection committee. Only this pair of rooftop crazies could bomb Iran’s nuclear program. No other American president would take such a risk. What if they already have a nuclear bomb?
I think you’re most likely mistaken, because in fact I believe Reagan or Bush could very well have done the same thing—could have hit them like that.
So, globally, Trump will need a distraction for the U.S. while they’re being bankrupted. Hyperactive Trump has only been in power for five months. China is scrambling for a reason. Militarily, there’s already a benefit to Ukraine. If South Korea were now teaching the North a lesson—that would clearly be good for Ukraine, in my opinion. I haven’t even mentioned the moral blow personally dealt to Putin. All of Russia’s allies—now Assad looms in front of their eyes. And so on. The BLOW to Putin is colossal.
So basically, Mikhail is arguing for the benefits of the 12-day war for Ukraine.
Well, what do you think?
Military expert Hrabskiy disagrees—he thinks it played no role. I tend to agree with Hrabskiy. Not because it’s him, but because I also think that way. I don’t see any—any… Yes, there is moral damage, but come on—what kind of morality are we talking about when it comes to Putin? He couldn’t care less. Absolutely couldn’t care less. Putin lives in a completely different world where morality doesn’t exist. So there’s no such thing as moral damage either. That’s that. And Mikhail wraps up with some nice words:
Glory to Ukraine! If we got past Pharaoh, we’ll get through this too.
Agreed. That part about Israel is correct.
Who Started the War with Iran Link to heading
Sergey Andryushchenko With all due respect to Igor Ivanovich, it wasn’t Trump who started the Iran-Israel war—despite all my disrespect for Trump.
Dear Sergey Andryushchenko! Of course, Trump did not start the Iran-Israel war, but it was indeed Trump who started the American-Israeli war (against Iran), which lasted a very short time. But it was still a war, because bombing another country is war. So yes, Trump started a war. He was the one who launched the American-Israeli and American-Iranian war. That’s just a fact—no judgment on whether it was right or wrong.
On Remarks Toward Europe Link to heading
Next is Anton’s question, continuing from my previous one. You called my remarks toward Europe fierce. Is that so? Are they fierce, but not unfair? Fierce? You said Europe is helping. Yes, it is. But that’s not my complaint. Europe needs to help much more. When I say Europe, I mean countries with leading economies—Germany, France, Britain, Italy. Each has a GDP of $1 trillion, and lately they spend around 2% on defense.
That’s not quite accurate, by the way. The figures vary, but in any case, it’s more than 2%. But fine.
Defense, rather. In Ukraine, sorry, we’re getting the scraps. If they wanted, they could’ve bought everything Ukraine needs from Trump.
That’s the question—because you’ve heard it—it’s not whether they’re ready to buy. The question is whether Trump is willing to sell.
So, you see, every time there’s a little qualification. And send their pilots too? Should we keep fantasizing? You asked, what to do? The citizens there—we’re told we should be thankful for what we have. Yes, we should be thankful. But I feel we must fiercely demand ten times more engagement, because Europe hasn’t come to Ukraine’s war. That’s the key phrase: Europe hasn’t come to Ukraine’s war. So Trump’s not a volunteer. Too bad—we could’ve bought everything possible from him.
Not a fact. You see? Not a fact. You know how it goes? “Hi guys—but I won’t give you any machine guns.” Like, hang in there, but most likely I won’t give you anything. I need it myself. That’s the situation.
You asked what European leaders should do? From my couch, I can suggest: where are the educational programs about the war, about Russia’s danger? It pains me to watch from my couch as Ukrainians die in the fourth year—at home and on the battlefield. No one really cares. And so on.
So let’s put it this way. Dear colleague, I just want—first, let’s structure this, because it’s a very common point of view, and I want to dwell on it a bit more. Dear Anton, let’s start by answering some questions for ourselves. Who exactly are you addressing your claims to—the European governments? Okay. Tell me please—did they make campaign promises to their citizens to protect Ukraine? Because we’re talking about democracies—we see ourselves as supporters of the European choice, of European civilization. And European civilization means democracy, elections, obligations to one’s citizens. So tell me, which European leader ever promised their voters to support Ukraine, to defend Ukraine, to go to war for it—to show up for Ukraine’s war?
Next question: the citizens themselves? Yes, most sympathize with Ukraine. But you say Europe hasn’t come to Ukraine’s war. Now I want to say something that will be taken badly, but still—tell me, did Ukraine come to war when Russia attacked Georgia in 2008? Just a simple question, right? Who came to Georgia’s war in 2008? Who? You see? That’s what I’m talking about.
It’s a very simple thing. Ukrainians and Europeans are normal people who don’t want to fight. Ukrainians didn’t want to fight when Putin occupied Crimea without a single shot. They didn’t want to fight, right? And everything started to change when the war in Donbas began—gradually it heated up. And the Ukrainian army started gaining muscle. Now it’s trendy to sneer at Europe for not wanting to fight. Polls show that around 14%, 30% in some places are ready to defend their country. And that’s just verbal readiness—what it means in reality is unknown. Tell me, before 2014, was it different in Ukraine? You see? Everything started to change when serious bloodshed began, when the war in Donbas started. And then it changed radically after February 24, 2022. That’s when Ukraine truly developed the kind of mass heroism we talk about today. Europe is currently living a very different life—the kind Ukraine lived before 2014.
Propaganda Methods Link to heading
Have you noticed that warring countries use four methods, including psy-ops, among Islamic and some non-democratic nations? They excessively praise their once-invincible countries—even when losing or already having lost the war. “Our proud people will destroy any enemy. We are always invincible. The enemy has been defeated by our people. Allah is helping us,” and so on. Second: the Russian method of propaganda describes the enemy’s situation in detail—mostly lies. “They’re doing terribly; we’re about to defeat them.” But they say little or nothing about their own losses. The main goal is to make the people believe in the delusion of victory, in the glorious leader and his henchmen. The goal is to brainwash everyone.
In civilized countries—though, by the way, there doesn’t seem to be any radical difference between Islamic propaganda and Russian propaganda, at least not in your description.
Third: in civilized countries, laws don’t allow lying or propaganda. They allow plenty of criticism toward their leaders so that mistakes are corrected in time, leaders stay alert, and the technological superiority of these countries is fully used.
Well, I can say right away that this somewhat overlooks what happens in civilized countries. There’s propaganda there too. Propaganda also exists there, and that shouldn’t be forgotten.
Fourth: the Chinese Foreign Ministry says nothing about anyone. Climb a tree and watch the tigers fight.
Well, I have to say—I still think China has propaganda too, which, of course, differs from Russia’s. And from that in militant Islamic countries. But it’s there. They have propaganda too. It’s not like they say nothing about anyone—no, they have propaganda, and plenty of it.
So, do you agree with my analysis of propaganda?
Well, with the caveats I mentioned—yes, I agree.
On Parodying Propaganda and “Room for Discussion” Link to heading
So. Here’s an important comment from a subscriber who goes by Verbov. Thank you for your time and response, even if it was offensive. I’ve been a long-time subscriber and have sent in questions and comments before. And now you accuse me of parodying Channel One and maliciously using AI. Even the reference to my presumption of innocence sounded mocking. I won’t argue or ask anymore. I’m just a fool, I guess. Once again, I’m convinced that even the most liberal Russian-speaking audiences have no room for discussion.
Well, dear colleague, I want to tell you right away—first of all, let me start by apologizing. I reread your question, and I want to explain that in the question itself—in your reasoning—there was a lot that prompted my rather harsh reply. Because, you see, when you derive Putin’s Munich speech from the Iraq War and then draw from there the collapse of the world order—though that collapse happened much earlier and was mostly linked to the Soviet Union—well, it’s hard to maintain world order when you’ve got a ghoul in the UN Security Council who incites wars, and aggressive ones at that.
The United States didn’t occupy Iraq or annex it as the 51st state. But Putin does that. So there’s a difference. And let me take this opportunity, since you have defenders here—I’ll respond more fully to their arguments, and here to your remark I’ll just say this: I was wrong in the disrespectful tone. It stemmed from my reaction to some of the illogical framing in your question and reasoning. They really did resemble, quite a bit, Soviet- or Putin-style discourse. Although I understand that your beliefs are far from either Putinism or Soviet propaganda. So once again—please accept my apologies. I’m truly sorry for having been too harsh.
Now to the arguments from the person defending Verbov—he calls himself “the young man”:
I don’t think Verbov’s question about international law was strange. There’s obvious logic in it. Why do you overlook that? If the attack on Iran had happened right after Kuwait or right after the use of chemical weapons, it would have been a different story—not so vulnerable and perhaps even a good presidential precedent. But Putin later intuitively sought something to rebel against. And this just happened to fit.
Let me say right away—the Munich speech, and I must object here because your setup is long and may blur the point—so, Putin’s Munich speech was mainly about relations with the West and NATO’s eastward expansion. His endless grievances. That was the context—not Iran, not Iraq. So the motives were entirely different. The speech was provoked by Russia’s international position, not by U.S. actions toward Iraq.
Then the young man—so he calls himself—talks about what should have been done and why:
The actions of the United States were inadequate and undermined world order.
Let me just say—when and how to respond to something… You’re saying, “if it had happened right after the use of chemical weapons, it would have been a different story.” Look—military operations take preparation. We saw that Israel attacked Iran—look how long it took. One of the main reasons Israel’s policy changed was October 7, 2023. But Israel prepared that operation throughout late 2023, all of 2024, and into mid-2025. That’s how long it took to prepare that response.
Your logic implies that Israel should have responded immediately. But that’s easy to say—like that old line: “Honor must be defended instantly.” When insulted, you slap someone. No need to prepare. But operations like those of the U.S. and allies in Iraq, or Putin’s actions, or Israel’s recent 12-day war—these require long preparation. So your argument about responding right away just shows a lack of understanding about how military affairs actually work.
Now about shifting focus. What was Saddam Hussein? To make it clear why I, for one, think the U.S. actions in Iraq—though maybe clumsy—had a sound premise. Because Saddam’s regime was absolutely monstrous. That’s genocide of the Kurds—literal genocide. Operation Anfal—what was that? Mortar attacks on the opposition. Horrific, bloody suppression of the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 1991. Massacres of Shia civilians. The 1982 forced expulsions. So many crimes—enough to justify a Nuremberg trial.
Executions of political and religious leaders. Saddam Hussein was a monster. So when you say this “undermined world order,” I’d argue—had that regime continued, critics of the West would have raged: “How can the West tolerate such a monstrous regime? Why not destroy it?” Especially one that was constantly preparing aggression—against Kuwait, against Iran. This wasn’t just a man oppressing his people—he threatened all his neighbors.
So I believe the attack, invasion, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and his eventual execution were completely justified.
Will fortification efforts help defend against a potential Russian attack on Europe? Link to heading
So, Margarita’s question: You of course know that Finland, the Baltic states, and also Poland are building defensive structures, in case an enemy from the East dares to attack these countries. Finland, in particular, is taking the issue very seriously. They plan to extend these barriers for hundreds of kilometers. And so on. So the question is: will these efforts to protect the borders help against a possible attack on the country? It brings to mind the Mannerheim Line during the Winter War—it held back the enemy a little, but didn’t help much. Though, of course, those were different times. It just seems to me like threatening a tank with a pistol—they might slow the attack down a bit but won’t prevent it. What do you think?
To professionally compare the Mannerheim Line with the fortifications now being built by the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, you really have to be an expert. And by the way, perhaps even a military expert specifically. Thank you. Thank you for the question. I think that perhaps when I meet with one of the military experts—maybe Sergey Borisovich Grabsky, or possibly Fedorov—I will ask them this question.
Now, from what I know, the Mannerheim Line during the first war held back the Red Army for two months. That’s significant. Two months of resistance. However, Mannerheim himself said its significance was greatly exaggerated. That is, paradoxically, the role, importance, grandeur, and effectiveness of the Mannerheim Line were largely inflated by Stalinist propaganda.
Because it was extremely inconvenient for Stalinist propaganda to admit that a small country like Finland managed to resist the vast Soviet Union so effectively. And so, as an excuse, they created—Stalinist propaganda created—the myth of the “impenetrable” Mannerheim Line. So in reality, Mannerheim himself assessed this structure quite modestly. He said it wasn’t really a continuous defense line—machine gun nests were rather sparse, and the fortifications themselves weren’t particularly serious.
So in reality, comparing the Mannerheim Line to modern fortifications is a task for a military expert. Yes, undoubtedly, any such fortification can be overcome. But even a delay—if they can manage to delay a potential Russian offensive for a couple of months—well, that would be more than enough for NATO countries to provide assistance. Because realistically, those two months would be extremely important. If we really do compare it to the effectiveness of the Mannerheim Line, then I believe it could be quite significant.
Forecasts about the war Link to heading
So, Mr. Stepan, your short-term forecasts about the war in Ukraine are often quite pessimistic and, unfortunately, often turn out to be accurate. At the same time, your long-term forecast is fairly optimistic—Russia cannot win this war unless Ukraine suddenly surrenders. And it won’t surrender. So, could you make one more prediction, based on everything we know? When, in your opinion, will the negative turn into a positive and the situation finally move toward Russia’s defeat—when will we pass some kind of turning point? I understand how difficult it is to make such a forecast, but what do you think, even in general terms?
You know, I rely on the opinions of several experts. Still, 2027—perhaps several lines may converge around that time. First, there’s the serious rearmament of the Ukrainian army. And the aid currently being planned—both military-technical and financial—mainly by European countries. That’s one side. On the other hand, there are also some effects beginning to show from the measures taken by Western countries to undermine the Russian economy. So, judging by everything, 2027—I say this very hesitantly—could turn out to be decisive, a turning point.
On debates and the beautiful Russia of the future Link to heading
So, a few questions regarding the debate about Plyushchev’s punishment between Matvey and Denis Kataev. I’ll say right away, dear Andrei, I didn’t watch those debates, so I won’t comment. RusAL is asking, as I understand it, also partly in relation to that debate. But here the question is specific, so I can answer. RusAL asks: You’ve probably heard or seen the debates about the army of the beautiful Russia of the future? First of all, I don’t believe in that Russia—but it’s not for me to decide, it’s for Russians. So the first question is: Do you believe in the beautiful Russia of the future? And also, there are questions about the Russian army, or as the opposition says. The question raises more questions. Reforming the army—into what, exactly? What kind of army will it become? And so on. Who will control this army? Should Russia be allowed to keep nuclear weapons? And so on. What’s your vision for this army? Or should Russia be completely demilitarized?
Well, I can say right away that there is no beautiful Russia of the future, and there won’t be. I’m sure of that. Russia must be completely dismantled and demilitarized to zero. That is, if Russia remains within its current borders. So the goal is demilitarization and definitely denuclearization. And everything else follows from that.
On Shmelev Link to heading
A question from Svetlana. Are you familiar with the works of Ivan Sergeyevich Shmelev? If so, could you share your opinion?
Well, naturally, I’ve read him. He’s a writer of a religious bent. I’ve read not only his literary works, but—as usual—I immediately distance myself from the role of literary critic. Yes, he is undoubtedly a talented writer, but in terms of worldview, he is extremely distant from me. Extremely. But that happens. For example, Dostoevsky is very close to me in terms of worldview.
Now, why is Shmelev not close to me? First of all, he supported Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union and saw it as the liberation of Russia from the Bolsheviks. You know, curing cholera with a plague—not the best idea. Then, in his works—not his fiction, but in his journalism and political polemics—you can clearly see the influence of Ivan Ilyin, one of the founders of Russian fascism.
He harshly criticized the liberal intelligentsia, which he believed had divided the people, and instead placed his hopes in patriots, religious folk, and so on. I read his letter to Ilyin where he spoke about the need to create a youth union of the Russian spiritual brotherhood. He also collaborated with a Nazi newspaper while in exile in Paris during the German occupation—the Parisian Messenger.
It was claimed that Shmelev said things like “God is with the Führer,” and so on. Although he later seemed to change his views when he learned more, such naivety is inexcusable. So Shmelev’s political and ideological views are not just alien to me—they may even be repugnant.
As for his literature—I think it’s good literature. That happens. Unfortunately, that happens.
On voice and tone Link to heading
So, Sergey: Lately, I’ve found myself thinking that your voice and tone remind me of someone from the past. I just realized who—after watching “I Serve the Soviet Union,” then “Morning Mail,” and “The Travelers’ Club” with Yuri Alexandrovich Senkevich. Your voice reminds me of his.
Well, I’ll be honest—considering some health issues, I’m hardly any kind of Senkevich nowadays. And now a question from Yuri—or rather, from Sergey. My apologies, Sergey: Did you ever have any contact with him? He really did travel during Soviet times. That was, to put it mildly, no small feat. What kind of person did you have to be to do that? Tell us.
Well, what kind of person? You had to be… you had to be the host of the Travelers’ Club. That’s how it was—it was kind of an export model. And yes, he really did travel. As the host of the Travelers’ Club, he had to go abroad, he had to show the world to Soviet citizens.
In addition to that, he climbed Everest, went to the North Pole—he really was a traveler. As for personal contact—there wasn’t any. Naturally, in the early 2000s—well, more like the late ’90s, early 2000s—I did come across him. He was a fairly active member of the Union of Journalists of Russia and a member of the Television Academy. So I ran into him at various events of that kind. But we didn’t have any personal interaction.
About the journalist Fallaci Link to heading
Question from Alexey Are you familiar with Fallaci’s journalistic work? How do you evaluate her work from a professional and personal point of view?
Well, let’s say, with a certain tinge of admiration. Because her counterpart in Russia would be Anna Politkovskaya. That is, Fallaci was a war correspondent and an absolutely brilliant interviewer—fearless, uncompromising. You see, journalism has many standards, because it has many facets. And one of those facets is the fearless war correspondent—not only war correspondents, but also those brilliant interviewers who peel back their interlocutors like a can of sardines. And Fallaci was exactly that. So, probably, admiration.
A Few Questions About Latynina Link to heading
Alright. A few questions about Latynina. Question from Anna. Yesterday, in your conversation with Caesar, you mentioned that everything had been clear about Latynina since the late ’90s. I started listening to her about five years ago. Could you briefly explain how she was different back then? She seemed reasonable to me, albeit right-wing. Now, of course, what she says is total trash.
You know, from the very beginning, well, her right-wing stance was quite pronounced. But there’s a line that separates someone who simply holds right-wing views—which I might have no disagreement with whatsoever—and someone who is a “rightist” in a more ideological or extreme sense. I once answered a question about the difference between a left-wing politician and a “leftist.” Similarly, a right-wing politician differs from a “rightist” in that the former just believes in more freedom, supporting the economy, teaching a man to fish rather than giving him a fish, and so on—the usual right-wing ideas. But the “rightist” proceeds from the idea of the law of the strong. You see? The law of the strong. If someone wins—then they’re right, because there’s some kind of truth in power. This romantic infatuation with strength is characteristic of “rightists,” not just right-wingers. And that ultimately leads to fascism. The law of the strong.
Latynina always had that. She always held a contemptuous attitude toward human rights activists, toward people in need of protection, toward human rights in general. The idea was: you must be strong, you must be able to defend yourself. If you win, you’re right. That was her worldview. And this was evident, for example, in her blanket dismissal of the Ryazan sugar story. Why? Because the FSB was the power at the time.
Gradually, this began to show more and more. At first, she supported Ukraine. Why? Because there was a feeling that Ukraine might win. And indeed, in the beginning, everyone who wasn’t totally indecent was against the invasion. Latynina still belonged to a relatively decent circle back then, and at first she hoped Ukraine could win. But when it became clear that it would be a long and difficult conflict, and that in fact Putin’s Russia was starting to make gains—the law of the strong kicked in. Once Putin had the ability to bomb Ukrainian cities, then he was “right,” because he was stronger. Whoever is stronger is right. That’s the logic, you see? The logic of the “rightist.”
Alright, Oksana? I’d like to know what the Anti-War Committee thinks about Latynina’s remarks? She seemed to be a member of it.
That’s actually very easy to find out. The thing is, after her most recent blatantly pro-Putin and pro-war statements, Latynina was removed from the Anti-War Committee’s website. I don’t know how decisions are made there—whether by vote or otherwise—but she is no longer listed. They’ve distanced themselves from her. Unfortunately, they didn’t make any kind of public statement, or at least I haven’t heard of one—they just quietly deleted her. That’s not great, honestly. I think they should’ve issued a statement, because otherwise it comes across a bit poorly. But what they think—that was expressed in that action.
On Parkhomenko’s Hatred Link to heading
Mikhail Khazanov My search for info about Sergey Parkhomenko’s hatred—I looked up Igor Yakovenko and found nothing. Even three artificial intelligences couldn’t find anything. The only match was on Parkhomenko’s channel, where Ambassador Alexander Yakovenko made a statement. I just can’t wrap my head around what you’re saying about Sergey. If it’s not too much trouble, could you share a link?
Dear colleagues! I can’t give you a link because I was responding to a question from a subscriber just like you, who, according to him, approached Parkhomenko with a proposal to support my initiative regarding human rights defenders, regarding the protection of prisoners’ rights. And in response, Parkhomenko—again, according to the subscriber—said that he wasn’t going to support anything that involved Yakovenko, because he couldn’t be on the same side with someone like Yakovenko under any circumstances, due to Yakovenko’s reputation. I was quoting those words. And I have reason to believe that this is possible.
Frankly, I was a bit surprised by Sergey Borisovich’s openly fierce language. Up until then, our communication—though infrequent—hadn’t given any reason to expect this. Perhaps it’s my position toward the liberal crowd that has weakened Parkhomenko’s attitude toward me. Maybe that’s it. But in any case, it’s not something I’m particularly interested in.
As for the link—I can’t provide a specific one for the reasons I mentioned. Look for it in previous streams. I’m just not ready to do that work. I answered the question as I understood it. I have no reason to doubt what the subscriber said.
Muhammad Link to heading
Alright, a question from the chat from N. There’s this speaker. It might be interesting to hear an Arab perspective on the 12-day war. This is about Muhammad, Muhammad, who came to Ukraine from Palestine to study and founded the first Arabic-language newspaper in Ukraine.
Well, what can I say? We’ll have to take a look, listen—if it’s interesting. Yes, of course, we’ll invite him.
About Yaakov Garbo Link to heading
Question from Nail Nelson. Please introduce us to the key points of the report by Israeli professor Yaakov Garbo.
Well, as I understand it, this refers to the report by the Israeli professor who presents completely different figures. He disputes the official Palestinian casualty numbers, claiming that there’s a huge number—much more than in the official report—of missing persons. He says the death toll is much higher than officially stated, and so on.
You know, I won’t present this to you unilaterally. The thing is, I can’t verify the data in this report. So the only thing I could possibly do, if I get the opportunity, is to organize some kind of debate between this professor and someone who supports the official statistics. That’s the only way. Because I can’t, not being in a position to verify those numbers, present them to the audience as fact. So the only viable option is to present the report with counterarguments—have someone take the official position. There’s the official Israeli position, and there’s Professor Yaakov Garbo’s report—they need to be compared side by side. That’s the only way.
About Mikhail Kasyanov Link to heading
Question from that bastard Jones Could you invite Mikhail Kasyanov as a guest?
I can say right away—no problem, if it’s possible. Well, first of all, of course, I know Mikhail Mikhaylovich, but I don’t know—he might agree, he might decline. Invite him? I think yes, it’s a good idea. I actually have a list of people I’d like to talk to, and Mikhail Mikhaylovich is on that list.
About a Universal Language on the Planet Link to heading
And now a question from that bastard Jones. Also, I don’t remember exactly, but I think I heard you say that the most optimal path for humanity is globalization—perhaps in the context of Putin’s isolationism. So how does that align with national identity? Wouldn’t it be better for humanity to realize that language is unified, that there is one single language?
I didn’t understand your last sentence. Then translate it into that “single” language. What single language? Who has a single language? Those who speak Swahili and those who speak Japanese—do they share a single language? I don’t know, maybe I just didn’t fully grasp what you meant. But if you’d like, clarify in your next comment and I’ll try to understand. Sometimes I manage.
About Auslender Link to heading
Question from Karolina Grey I’m subscribed to Sergey Auslender’s channel. So basically, he should be invited.
Agreed? Agreed. Thanks for the reminder.
About the “LSR” Link to heading
Alright. Don Poncho from the chat. A follow-up question from the conversation about the Legion. Russian POWs are switching sides to the Freedom of Russia Legion. How can we be sure they won’t switch back? How are they tested for loyalty, for their adoption of new ideas—different from the propaganda of the Russian world?
You know, I regret that your question didn’t come up before my meeting with Caesar. I would have directed it to him. But as I understand it, there’s a very thorough vetting process. There are indirect reports indicating that the screening is quite strict, and many don’t pass it.
Moreover, despite Ukraine’s seemingly open-armed approach toward defectors and POWs, the process—what they call “Animate”—isn’t some kind of oil-smooth or sugar-sweet affair. The conditions are quite tough. If someone behaves suspiciously, they’re immediately rejected—there’s a hard sieve, a real filter in place. That I know for sure.
As for how it’s organized—well, if someone from the Freedom of Russia Legion, like Caesar, or someone from other units is willing to come on, we’ll definitely talk about how this vetting works. It’s an important topic.
About the series “Operation Carpathians” Link to heading
A question from Sokol Kruzhki. In the 24th year, the first season of the series Operation Carpathians aired on Russian television. What is your opinion?
I haven’t watched the series. I think I should check it out. Well, I can’t guarantee that I’ll actually watch the series. The series. So to speak. I’m not sure that even if I had 20 lives, I would spend one of them watching such series, but. Well, if necessary, let’s skim through it. Let’s put it this way—if it works out. I’ll give a report.
About the tribunal Link to heading
Olga Borovskogo Why won’t the tribunal judge them while they’re still in office? Are they really afraid?
Well, I explained it in detail, in great detail. In fact, in the main part of our stream I explained that it was pressure from the U.S., from Trump specifically. That is, he absolutely doesn’t want to offend Putin, because—well, then Putin will take offense and won’t pick up the phone. That would be a nightmare!
About Jewish antisemites Link to heading
Is that so? Tatyana, please explain the nature of the phenomenon. A Jewish antisemite just doesn’t make sense to me. Anti-Zionism among Jews is a fairly common phenomenon—more or less understandable. But antisemitism is a paradox, and yet it exists.
Indeed, this phenomenon—I’ve analyzed it in detail, broken it down to what you might call the molecular level in my research on the Jewish people in Russia. But overall, this phenomenon has been studied. In 1930, Theodor Lessing published a book titled Jewish Self-Hatred. And this phenomenon has been researched—well, by Lessing. That is, Jewish self-hatred is described as a kind of neurotic reaction to external antisemitism, where some Jews would adopt or even exaggerate the main tenets of antisemitism. So, in fact—Lessing quite thoroughly, when I was doing this research, I studied his book—he gives specific, real-life examples of Jewish self-hatred, like Arthur KGB, or Walter Keith—Kyle, rather. But the most vivid example of this phenomenon is the writer Otto Weininger. In his case, Jewish self-hatred reached such a level that, in a fit of hatred for his own identity, he committed suicide. In his book Sex and Character—incidentally, this was at one point a very popular book in the Soviet Union. It was considered that anything not aligned with Marxism was reflected in Sex and Character, which was definitely not Marxist. So this is a vivid example—he took his hatred of his Jewish identity to the extreme, to its logical limit.
Now, for instance, Kenneth Levin, a historian and psychiatrist, argues that Jewish self-hatred may stem, firstly, from Stockholm syndrome—where part of a population that is targeted begins to accept, in classic Stockholm fashion, the views of their oppressors. And secondly, from a kind of infantilism: children subjected to abuse often blame themselves, convincing themselves that they’re bad. So they try to change. And how do they change? By trying to stop being Jews. So, that’s the story. Nowadays, I think, there are far fewer examples of Jewish self-hatred than there were during times when persecution of Jews was widespread in Europe. But still, you come across such examples—even books, very curious ones, written by antisemitic Jews. In Israel, there are plenty. Israel is, after all, a very democratic country.
The word “praz(d)nik” and Kravtsov Link to heading
Is that so? A question from a subscriber named Glubokovodny. Igor, would you resign if you were the Minister of Education after making the mistake in the word “prazdnik”? You know, that famous message from Sergey Kravtsov, who wrote a greeting to Artek and signed it with “praznik” without the letter D.
Well, it’s very hard—hard to put myself in Mr. Kravtsov’s shoes. Simply because I don’t know how I would have ended up in his position. More importantly, what I would do in his place. Well, probably yes. It’s probably a disgrace—a serious disgrace.
About working “in a circular panorama” Link to heading
So, an unidentified subscriber asks: When you worked in a circular panorama, you also said, “Dear colleagues, our department head also started his career as a factory worker.” I wonder how today’s intellectuals behaved in a low-cultural, working-class environment?
Dear colleague, I mean—of course, you could have shown off and greeted the crew at work by saying something like “Dear gentlemen” or “Respected colleagues,” but that’s exactly the point. No, of course not. That kind of address wasn’t used. In fact, there were no such greetings. Officially, the two accepted forms of address were “comrades” and “citizens.” But come on, it would’ve been absurd—when I worked not only as a mechanic at the circular panorama but also as a subway locksmith, and did some work as a loader too. And of course, calling someone a “colleague” would’ve been taken as a joke, or as sarcasm, or even mockery. So no, such a form of address wasn’t used.
You know, I think intellectualism shows itself in something else. It’s not about trying to distance yourself from what you call a low-cultural working-class environment, but in respectful treatment of people. I still feel that way. I don’t keep in touch with anyone I worked with at the circular panorama, or in the metro either. But from memory, I never placed myself above anyone else. Sure, I read books and had just started studying at the philosophy faculty while working as a laborer. But I never thought I was smarter or better than them. And that’s sincere. That’s not posing, not some kind of pretentious, brainy attitude.
So that’s that—no “intellectual” greetings. Intellectualism shows in being respectful, in listening to people, being interested in them. I’ve always had that curiosity about people, about behavior. In fact, I conducted my first sociological research while working in the metro, surveying my teammates. That was real sociology. I tried to understand—and wrote my first texts, my first articles—about the social dynamics within the crew. How relationships formed and were structured. Using geometric methods—well-known ones. I tried to understand the differences between different crews. I had the opportunity. So this curiosity about the world around me—it was always there. Both as a researcher and as a humanist.
About “thieves in law” Link to heading
So, Lenin asks: Is the so-called institution of “thieves in law” a unique phenomenon, or does it exist outside of Russia and the CIS countries as well?
You know, exactly. Well, it’s known that organized crime—and the institution of “thieves in law” is one form of organized crime—exists not only in Russia and the CIS countries. But since the institution of “thieves in law” originated during Soviet rule, it has a distinctive style—an imprint of the Soviet system. So in that sense, it is a unique phenomenon. But otherwise, it’s undoubtedly part of what’s called organized crime, the mafia, and so on. I can say that I’ve done a lot of work on this. You’ve touched on a topic I could talk about for hours, since I once took part—somewhat—in the creation of the scientific sociology center under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and conducted research within that institute. So I have a great deal of material.
Now, as for your question—who do you think are more vile: Yaponchik, Kalashov, Ded Khasan, or the leader of the Kumarin-Bykov OPG, the Orekhovskaya group? Well, which is worse—plague or cholera? I don’t know. I think it’s all individual. Among all of them, there are truly repugnant figures. You know, I’d put it this way. Let’s be clear. There’s a certain romanticizing going on. Since I’ve studied this problem as a sociologist, I’m deeply outraged by the romanticization of both “thieves in law” and OPG leaders. For example, the glorification of Bykov—the infamous gang leader in Siberia—or the romanticizing of certain “thieves in law” in fiction and films: noble “thieves in law” with their own codes of justice. Absolute nonsense. Total nonsense. And it infuriates me. Glorifying all this filth for the sake of a good story—this is a real problem. A serious problem.
There is absolutely nothing admirable there. And who among them is more disgusting? They’re all the same. Also, there’s this myth that “thieves in law” — the so-called “blues” — have a code, that these criminal sports leaders follow rules. It’s complete rubbish. All those “codes” disappear instantly when it comes to money or power struggles within the groups. They’re worth nothing. Especially since the institution of “thieves in law,” which was born during Soviet times, had completely degenerated by the end of the USSR. That’s when the so-called “mandarin” system emerged. It’s no coincidence that at one point, 90% of all “thieves in law” were based in Georgia. And Mikheil Saakashvili had to take extraordinary measures to dismantle that institution in Georgia. So no—there’s no nobility, no honor left in it at all. Alright, next question?
Criteria for thinking Link to heading
Another question, as I understand it—from Misha: What are the main criteria of critical thinking, and how can it be developed?
Well, look, I’m not going to give a full lecture, of course, but first—it’s the ability to analyze and structure information. Second—to evaluate the reliability of sources. To distinguish facts, opinions, beliefs, and identify bias or manipulation. So how do you develop it? Read—read books, compare information, learn to draw your own conclusions, take multiple sources and try to compare them. There’s no other way. Run all information through a comparison with your own knowledge or with other sources. And most importantly—create your own reputation system, meaning determine for yourself who is a reliable source based on whether you’ve found that source to be truthful. But that’s an individual effort. That’s what’s called being an informed consumer of information.
On the EU’s role in the war. Hungary Link to heading
Sergey Molchanov: I don’t understand why EU members tolerate this miserable Orban. This is the poorest country in the European Union.
First of all, it’s not true that it’s the poorest country in the European Union.
And I don’t think Biden is to blame for this. If the entire EU can’t do anything about one pigeon cooing nonsense everywhere, then what’s the point of such a European Union?
You know, if you have a cockroach in your apartment, it doesn’t mean you should throw out the whole apartment. That’s the first thing. Second—Orban comes and goes, but Hungary remains. So what does it mean to “tolerate”? Hungary is a country that’s a member of the European Union. The EU is based on voluntary membership and does not provide for expulsion. That is, in order to join the EU, a country has to go through a specific procedure. And you’ll agree—it’s not an easy one, as we see from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. But once a country joins the EU—yes, then you have to try to take its interests into account and work with it. But again—Orban comes and goes. Hungary stays. They admit not the leaders or heads of state, but the country. That’s how it works.
Vera Kovalchuk, also about Orban: I’d like to comment not on the main topic, but on Orban’s attitude toward Zelensky—what he says is simply unacceptable. Why do Western leaders stay silent and never call him out? He once even said that Ukrainians are all scammers and should be avoided. That’s not an exact quote, but pretty close. It’s just verbal genocide. Or do you disagree?
I agree. I completely agree. I’ve said exactly that. But you see—what does it mean to “call him out”? Again, this isn’t kindergarten or some classroom where there’s a teacher and a misbehaving student. Orban has his own position, which he voices, and there’s the EU mainstream—the position of its leaders, which is diametrically opposed. There’s still freedom of speech. So Orban retains the right to spout nonsense. Freedom of speech doesn’t mean freedom only for correct speech, right? What matters more is that the number of Ukraine-haters or Ukrainophobes is limited—to Orban and a few others. That’s the truth. So yes, he has the right to spew that absurd filth about Ukraine. And then what? Should we chase him with a stick? No.
And now a third question about Hungary—again from Vera: How did a country like Hungary end up in NATO? Is there some secret or trick to it?
You see, how did Hungary get in? Talks about Hungary joining NATO began before Orban became prime minister. If I’m not mistaken, he became PM in 1998. And negotiations about Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joining NATO started in 1997. So again—they weren’t admitting Orban, they were admitting Hungary. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland were admitted as part of the next wave of NATO expansion. It’s no coincidence that when Putin made his infamous pre-invasion statement, and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov declared that NATO should pack up and roll back to its 1997 borders—that was exactly the line before Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic moved toward NATO membership.
That’s the context. It wasn’t Orban who got admitted—it was Hungary, a European country by geography and, at the time, by spirit. Yes, over two terms Orban has turned that country into a kind of mafia state—yes, that’s true. But I emphasize again: it was Hungary that was admitted, not Orban. And Hungary’s movement toward NATO began before Orban came to power. So yes—this happens. Again, Trump is now leading the U.S.—does that mean the U.S. should be kicked out of NATO? Of course not. Trump and Orban come and go, but the country remains.
About uranium trucks and Israeli knowledge Link to heading
A question from Yulia: In the previous episode, someone asked how the movement of uranium from the Fordow mine to Fordow could have gone unnoticed. Actually, two days ago I watched an interview with Grigory Tamar on Ukrainian television. He said that Israeli intelligence saw the truck movements from that mine even before the explosions, but didn’t get a green light from Trump to act. He also said that Israel knows the enriched uranium is now outside Iran, but didn’t name the country.
Well, alright. That’s another piece of information.
About “parallel life” Link to heading
And then the question—this continues yesterday’s conversation about experiments. THE QUEEN. And I promise not to go deeper into this topic anymore.
Yes, please—I’ve had enough of cosmic intelligence.
Igor, I haven’t read scientific articles about the brain’s properties, but I’ve come to believe that our brain is a kind of filter, valve, or better yet, a gatekeeper to another physical reality. And when its function is impaired—like in delirium tremens—the brain allows things into our consciousness that it normally shouldn’t. The other side—children. Have you noticed that children under seven see things that adults can’t? The structure of a child’s brain differs from that of an adult. I feel like there is another life running parallel to ours, and it somehow intersects with ours—especially when the brain malfunctions or is still undeveloped. It’s like a weakening of the boundary between something. What do you think about that?
Dear Yulia, you have a very well-developed artistic perception of the world. I’ve noticed that in many of your comments. That’s great—it’s a creative, artistic view of reality. You have a vivid imagination. But there are also objective facts, objective knowledge. There’s science, and what you’re describing has no relation to it. You see, what you’re saying could be great material for a sci-fi story or a fantasy novel. That’s all I can say about it. I’d be interested to read a sci-fi story based on what you’re describing—it might be fascinating. So—yes.
About enriched uranium Link to heading
A question from Mikhail: Why did you assume that enriched uranium is or was stored at Fordow? There are centrifuges there. Enriched uranium still needs to be turned into metal. Yes, it would be interesting to hear your discussion on how nuclear bombs are assembled—a bomb, that is, production—with an expert who’s actually assembled them. I don’t know. There are channels out there where specialists talk about this, after all.
Maybe I just need to understand what the point of this discussion would be. There are specialized channels—so maybe, maybe it does make sense to invite a specialist to our channel. But on what exactly? On how to produce a nuclear bomb? Who knows. Maybe. Maybe, yes. Thanks for the suggestion.
What did Trump win in Iran? Link to heading
Nadezhda, a user: How could it have been under IAEA control if they weren’t allowed in? Who’s lying?
“She,” as I understand it—that is, the nuclear bomb production facilities. So—no, no one’s lying here, dear colleague, dear Nadezhda. It’s very simple. Before the Israeli strike on Iranian facilities, the IAEA was definitely present—IAEA experts and staff had access to Iran’s nuclear sites. And only after the Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iranian facilities did the Iranian parliament approve the suspension of cooperation with the IAEA and passed a law. That was after the 12-day war. They passed a law in the Iranian parliament restricting IAEA inspectors’ access to the country. So before the 12-day war, access existed. They were present. No one is lying.
About the nuclear program Link to heading
So, an unidentified user asks: I don’t understand—what exactly did Trump win? For Iran it was just a mosquito bite. So where’s the victory and what is it?
Well, in my personal opinion, it wasn’t just a mosquito bite. Excuse me—30 generals eliminated, significant portions of nuclear facilities destroyed, a large number of top nuclear scientists killed. That’s not a mosquito bite. That’s me taking the position of a Trump defender here.
Grigoryan: I don’t understand what’s even up for debate. I support Israel, but we have to be objective. The nuclear program wasn’t destroyed—just delayed a few months. The generals will be replaced. New engineers will be recruited. The Iranian regime remains completely intact. Israeli civilians are dead. There’s been a lot of destruction. Is that a result? A victory?
Well, yes. I see a range of opinions here—from the belief that this was a crushing victory to what we’ve just heard from our colleague Grigoryan.
Then there’s a comment from someone calling themselves “Stupid Mongol”: Weakening Iran’s nuclear program means nothing, because thanks to Trump’s will and Netanyahu’s cowardice, the Shiite mutant managed to smuggle out the enriched stockpiles. And so on.
So yes, that’s another take—also critical of this so-called 12-day war’s success.
Now a comment from Max: Very strange feeling. After these 12 days, it’s impossible to tell whether the nuclear program was destroyed or not. The Iranians say: there’s a hole where the program used to be, not an actual program. One of those times when I’m inclined to believe Trump—he says the nuclear program was destroyed, personally by him, as if he personally dropped the bombs from the bomb bay. Netanyahu backs Trump’s words, saying that together they completely destroyed the project—yet then immediately adds: “Yes, they’re rebuilding it, but we’ll destroy it again.” An important slip-up. Trump clearly doesn’t understand anything. From his words, Israel and Iran have been fighting so long he’s forgotten why. But Netanyahu should understand. My opinion: the program was damaged but not destroyed. Trump didn’t plan to do anything. All talk of some clever coordination with Netanyahu is nonsense. Netanyahu took the risk and launched the operation to destroy the program, hoping to draw the U.S. in. But he failed. Trump joined and exited the operation, called the 14-bomb strike a brilliant victory, forced Israel to stop, and left Netanyahu no choice but to call it a victory. I don’t know whether there was a real chance to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. I just understand that this window may not reopen. Iran now knows its air defense vulnerabilities. Next time won’t be so easy. Tehran will bury its facilities deeper. The regime remains. The rhetoric remains. No one got anything out of Iran. I’m glad Haifa residents will sleep peacefully—but for how long? While Trump celebrates a grand Arab-style victory and Netanyahu promotes it as his first triumph, the only real strategic winner might be the Iranian regime. I hope I’m wrong.
Well, I think you, dear Max, are moving a bit too close to siding with those celebrating Iran’s victory. I don’t believe Iran has anything to celebrate. They’ve taken serious hits—serious ones. That much is clear. That it wasn’t a crushing victory? Yes. But to say Iran achieved a strategic victory—I don’t think that’s objective. But again, time will tell.
A question from Kedr: Israel never officially announced the elimination of Kane. That was just a rumor. On Twitter, 19 other Iranian generals were reported killed, including two of Kane’s direct superiors.
No, I… I’m not sure. Maybe you know more. I did read something about that person—Kane—being eliminated, but I can’t recall exactly where right now. Maybe I’m mistaken. It needs to be checked.
And second—sorry, but your question isn’t accurate. There’s no contradiction between victory and the fact that nothing is over. The Six-Day War was clearly a victory, and yet nothing was resolved.
You know, I’d still insist the question is fair, because it depends on what goals are set. The Six-Day War was clearly a victory, because Israel repelled its enemies—their goals weren’t achieved. That’s a victory. But here, the stated goals were the destruction of the nuclear program and, reportedly, regime change. So yes, there is a contradiction. Again, this is about how the question is framed. You know, I don’t know a single public opinion poll that doesn’t cause complaints. I’ve been conducting polls for decades and I always encounter someone who waves the questionnaire and says: “What idiot wrote this nonsense?” There’s never been a single case without such skeptics or critics. That’s true of Levada, Gallup, or any polling organization. That’s just how it goes.
Closing words Link to heading
So, dear friends, we’re wrapping up our morning stream. As you can see, it went on for more than two hours. But that’s because yesterday I had limited opportunities to answer your questions. I hope to keep it to at least an hour and a half going forward.
Dear friends, thank you for your patience—those who listened. Please stay in touch. Once again, I feel uncomfortable when I respond sharply, but sometimes the questions are just baffling. I don’t hold back my emotions. Sometimes I use irony—maybe I shouldn’t.
And with that, I’m ending our morning session. See you next time! Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives! Until next time!
Source: https://youtu.be/WNa2Mt3D5OA