Putin explained that he would first “finish off” Ukraine, then place it under “external control,” and only after that begin negotiations. The debate between Zhdanov and Katz showed that Putin can rely on them.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is March 28. It is currently 7:41 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Putin stated that he would first crush Ukraine and then change its government Link to heading
Yesterday, during a meeting with the crew of the nuclear submarine cruiser Arkhangelsk, Putin, in my opinion, made things completely and definitively clear regarding the true meaning of what is referred to as the negotiation process. Judge for yourself. So, yesterday he stated—well, obviously these were staged questions. The supposedly interested sailors of this submarine crew were asking what was going on, what was happening with the negotiations, what was happening on the battlefield, and so on. And Putin was providing “clarity.” Clearly, this was just a platform for him to express certain positions.
So, first of all, he said that Russia is persistently and confidently moving toward achieving all the goals declared at the beginning of the Russian invasion. Then he added that, until recently, he used to say “we’ll push them,” but now “there is reason to believe we will finish them off.” I leave it to seasoned cynologists to interpret the nuances between “pushing” and “finishing off,” but it’s absolutely certain that neither of these has anything to do with a negotiation process.
So, Putin claims that Russia is gradually but persistently and confidently advancing toward achieving the objectives of what they call the “special military operation.” He boasted that strategic initiative is fully in Russia’s hands along the entire front line. He talked about how “our troops, our guys” are advancing, liberating one territory after another. He then stated that the Luhansk region is now almost entirely under Russian occupation, and much of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions as well.
In other words, the attitude is that the war continues and no one intends to agree to a ceasefire. Then he explains why. Of course, there’s the routine phrase: “we are for a peaceful resolution.” But Putin raised the question—who exactly is there to sign a truce with? Who should we sign peace with? And then he launched into the usual narrative about Zelensky’s illegitimacy and how the Nazis are in power, and how the terrifying Azov Regiment is effectively running the country, since Zelensky is illegitimate, therefore Azov is the current authority.
These are the fairy tales Putin told the Arkhangelsk crew. But in reality, it was a message, a signal to the world that he has no intention of agreeing to any ceasefire. There will be no cessation of hostilities anytime soon.
Then he introduced a completely new idea—or at least one that hasn’t previously been pushed into the public discourse in such a serious way. He said there’s no one legitimate to sign anything with, as all Ukrainian authorities are illegitimate because they derive their power from an illegitimate president. And then he introduced a concept of how, in his view, to get out of this situation.
This is Putin’s perspective, and I’ll quote directly. So, here’s the quote: “In principle, of course, it would be possible under the aegis of the UN, the US, and European countries—of course, with our partners and friends—to discuss the possibility of introducing temporary administration in Ukraine in order to hold democratic elections, to bring to power a capable government trusted by the people, and then begin negotiations for a peace treaty. With such a government, one could sign legitimate documents that would be recognized worldwide and be reliable.” End quote.
He refers to precedents in places like East Timor, Papua New Guinea, and so on. So, from what was quoted, something obvious follows: first, Putin expects to defeat Ukraine—essentially to capture it and achieve what was declared at the very start of the “special military operation”: demilitarization and denazification, which means regime change and maximum control. At this point, it doesn’t matter which regions are being discussed. Most likely, this won’t be limited. Again, I’m only talking about Putin’s plans, his intentions.
So this would mean taking control of a significant part of Ukraine, changing the government, and then installing external governance. It’s clear that during this “external governance,” the key role would go to some pro-Russian forces. It’s no accident that he mentioned the involvement of “our partners”—so Belarus will probably be involved, maybe Hungary, maybe Slovakia. So, a coalition of “our partners.”
To sum up, Putin has no plans for a ceasefire in the near future. He has no plans to stop the war. We must not proceed from an illusion of peace. Everything else is just a cover operation.
These are obvious points, after which, it seems to me, all the fog should have cleared. I don’t know about the fog in Trump’s head, but anyone capable of understanding articulated speech should agree that these kinds of statements are incompatible with any genuine intention to enter negotiations. The man said clearly: he does not want to negotiate with Ukraine’s current leadership. He intends to destroy the Ukrainian state as it exists now. Period. It was said absolutely clearly and distinctly.
External governance, followed by a government that suits Putin—it’s a very clear and understandable plan. Another matter is that, of course, none of this is actually feasible for Putin. Because what’s happening on the battlefield right now doesn’t correspond at all to these ambitions.
Theoretically—speaking with military experts—it might be possible to occupy the entire Donetsk region. Maybe. But beyond that, it’s absolutely unrealistic. That’s not only the opinion of military experts, but also anyone paying attention to what’s going on.
Nonetheless, Putin clearly does not intend to stop. This plan is in his head, and he is trying to implement it. There are absolutely no moves from his side toward a ceasefire.
The only remaining question is: how long will Trump be willing to accept these statements about a supposed willingness for a truce at face value? How long will he tolerate this kind of spin? That’s a rhetorical question, I think. For now, he’s willing. Clearly willing. He’s not yet ready to take a tougher stance against Putin.
So, for those of us who, like myself and like any normal person, are hoping for peace in the skies over Ukraine—unfortunately, that’s unlikely to happen anytime soon. Again, I’d love to be wrong, but based on what we see and hear, it’s clear that nothing will come of Trump’s peace initiative. And as for what happens next—we’ll see how he responds.
Announcement of the Rare Earth Deal Discussion Link to heading
There’s another event that I probably won’t comment on today—I’ll comment on it tomorrow, because tomorrow at 12:00 we’ll have economic expert Lipsits joining us. And it’s with him that I’d like to discuss the published final version of the resource deal proposed by the American administration. I think it will be a very important conversation, because according to this deal, Ukraine is essentially losing its sovereignty—at least, that’s the opinion of many analysts. Tomorrow at 12:00, we’ll hear from Lipsits on this topic.
The Zhdanov–Katz Debate Link to heading
And one more topic that, in my opinion, probably wouldn’t deserve much attention under normal circumstances—but since I promised to talk about it and since it’s currently at the center of attention—we’re talking about the debate that took place on March 24 on the Dozhd channel, a debate between Maxim Katz and Ivan Zhdanov. Maxim Katz is a well-known blogger and educator. Ivan Zhdanov is the director of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK).
Honestly, I think the topic and the debate itself from March 24 on Dozhd are not worth serious analysis. But nevertheless, since it really is the main event in the opposition and émigré circles right now, it’s worth addressing at least because it illustrates the current state of Russian political emigration.
The debate lasted more than two hours. I’m not sure it’s necessary to go into detail about the core of it. The very subject of the debate is already a diagnosis. It was a detailed breakdown of accusations brought by Ivan Zhdanov and his organization, the FBK, against Maxim Katz. The essence of the accusation is that Katz’s wife, Paulina, and her advertising agency cooperate with Kremlin-controlled companies—VK, National Media Group, Gazprom Media. According to Zhdanov, she helps bloggers sell their content to Kremlin-linked firms.
If we consider the fact that the central subject of a debate between people who call themselves opposition figures is Katz’s wife—if there are no other topics in the world more important than his wife’s ad agency—that alone says a lot. I spent two hours on this, as promised, since it sparked some interest. And the whole time I kept thinking—aren’t people dying in Ukraine right now? Isn’t Alexander Skobov fighting his own front in Russia? Isn’t there anything more pressing happening in the United States?
Yet somehow, out of all the events in the world, the key issue is that Katz’s wife is helping bloggers with ad placements on VK. Over two hours of this. Katz, in turn, accused the FBK of sending targeted messages asking people to paint graffiti, which then leads to their arrest and prosecution. This is, admittedly, a more serious accusation—because it involves real legal consequences.
Neither Katz’s nor Zhdanov’s explanations hold up very well. Zhdanov responds to every accusation by calling it a public denunciation. Katz does the same back to Zhdanov. In truth, the arguments aren’t convincing. But if you try to dig through this disgrace—which both men, without question, sunk into—Katz’s arguments were more weighty. His accusations against FBK involved real criminal cases, which makes them more serious.
I checked the comments—perhaps the most interesting part of the whole debate. There were over 20,000 comments, and almost all of them supported Katz. I didn’t read every single one, of course, but I scrolled through most and didn’t find any in support of Zhdanov. That alone makes the outcome of the debate fairly obvious. Initially, the vote showed 60% in favor of Katz and 40% for Zhdanov. Then, for some reason, the numbers changed. But from the audience’s point of view, Katz clearly won. Over 20,000 comments in his favor—that’s hard to fake. Even if you tried to boost it with bots or AI, it wouldn’t look that organic. And he was simply more convincing during the debate.
Still, that doesn’t mean Katz won—because they both lost. Absolutely. The lack of a sense of proportion, of awareness of what’s actually happening in the world, is stunning. I can’t imagine that serious people would choose to make Katz’s wife’s ad agency the main topic on Dozhd—one of the most serious platforms for Russian political emigration.
Zhdanov, in terms of behavior, was the textbook manipulator—constantly twisting things. I won’t go into specific examples, but when someone tells you that your organization sends people to paint graffiti that gets them jailed, and your response is “that’s a public denunciation,” that’s just beyond the pale. The constant distortions and straw-man arguments were blatant. He’d attribute things to Katz that were the opposite of what he actually said. It was dishonest and obvious.
As for Katz—it became crystal clear (even though it already was) that he is not a politician. He’s a blogger, educator, entrepreneur, a person who knows how to make money in various ways. But he has no connection to politics. That’s absolutely obvious. He tries to play politics, but he is not a politician.
And most importantly, neither of these figures—who call themselves opposition—has the slightest chance of influencing Russian politics. They have a following, even inside Russia, but no real political influence.
All of this is quite sad. I think if this somehow made its way to Putin—which is unlikely, since it’s so minor—he would be deeply satisfied. Putin can be pleased with both Katz and Zhdanov. So, that’s the sorry state of things.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to your questions, I want to once again remind you that an important topic is the increasingly evident parameters of the resource deal. We’ll discuss this topic tomorrow at 12:00. And today at 19:00 we’ll have Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky. Now, I’ll move on to answering your questions.
On the Division of USSR Property Among the Republics Link to heading
Sergey Baranov
In your opinion, how civilized and fair was the division of the former USSR’s assets among the brotherly republics? Was it done justly, considering each republic’s contribution? After all, projects like Baikonur, Plesetsk, the BAM railway, the development of Siberia, the creation of the nuclear shield and weaponry, exploration of the northern territories, and much more were carried out by people of all nationalities. Yet in Russian discourse today, all of this is attributed solely to Russians. I’d love to hear a thoughtful analysis on this topic. Not only representatives of modern Russia but also of the former Soviet republics could help present a broader view, alongside strong experts. Sometimes it’s infuriating—only Russians built everything, while the rest just sang and danced, and now they enjoy the great legacy. They don’t really want to hear about things that exploded, like Chernobyl, either.
Dear Sergey! I think this is truly an interesting topic. Honestly, it never occurred to me that it could be something to take on. I just hadn’t planned to. But yes, it is an important subject. I’m not sure there can be a universal analysis of it, because it’s a topic worthy of research by an entire institute, I’d say. However, I do know that studies of this kind are being conducted in a number of republics. These republics are calculating the balance among themselves. Overall, I agree—it’s an interesting issue and we could try to approach it somehow. What’s needed here isn’t slogans or declarations, but numbers. Just hard data. I think we could do such an investigation on our channel. I’ll think about who might be able to contribute. I personally wouldn’t be able to handle it myself, but with the involvement of some experts, I believe it could definitely be done.
Is External Governance of Gaza Possible? Link to heading
So, a question from Yulia.
In Arab-Israeli relations, has a patronage-type solution ever been considered? For example, could the United Arab Emirates—where, like in Gaza, the majority are Sunnis—partially settle the territory of Gaza, develop tourism, and at the same time help uplift the hungry and angry children? It seems to me this would be the optimal option. The main obstacle, of course, is Iran’s ayatollahs, whose goal is to destroy Israel. But there’s no other solution besides the patronage of more developed Sunnis over the less developed. What’s your opinion?
Dear Yulia, I think that if we step away from such a somewhat straightforward approach—where residents of the UAE would resettle Gaza—that’s a bit utopian, you understand? Because the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, is a country with a high standard of living, a very prosperous country. And imagining that they would move to a place like Gaza… It’s hard to see how anyone could realistically consider such a population transfer. I think that idea is about as far-fetched as Trump’s idea of relocating two million Gaza residents somewhere else.
However, the broader idea that Arab states—Middle Eastern countries—could play a key role in resolving the Gaza issue is very much present. An Arab-led solution likely seems the most realistic. I just doubt there’s the political will among Arab states for that. That’s where I have my doubts. They consistently express sympathy for the Palestinian people, and they provide some support, but to say they’re ready to take such radical steps as patronage or deep involvement—not yet. That’s not something we’re seeing so far.
On Inviting Viewers to the Channel Link to heading
So, a question from subscriber Stanka.
Have you ever considered inviting one of the three most popular Ukrainian bloggers—Dmytro Gordon, Oleksiy Arestovych, or Anatoliy Shariy—as a guest on your channel? And what about inviting some of your active subscribers who regularly participate in the comments, like Pan Stepan, for example?
Regarding the second part—I’d say, in principle, yes, it’s possible, and it’s worth thinking about how it could be done. First of all, I’m not sure that everyone who actively participates and comments would actually want to appear on screen. I assume this question is about appearing live, not just a remote or text-based dialogue. Not everyone would be comfortable with that. Second, we’d need to assess whether the person can bring any exclusive information. But overall, it’s an interesting idea, a good one, and I’m open to working in that direction. As always, the devil is in the details.
As for the first idea, I have to say I’m highly skeptical. Let’s go through the names. Starting with the most obvious—Anatoliy Shariy. I honestly don’t understand what the point of a conversation with him would be. Tell me—what would the discussion be about? Trying to expose him? He’s already clear as day. Why invite him—just to prove he’s a pro-Russian collaborator? That’s already obvious. Plus, he definitely wouldn’t come, but that’s beside the point.
Same with Arestovych. Why invite him? This is someone who already has a much bigger platform than our channel. I don’t see the point. He’s currently very much a manipulator. His main mode of communication now is a kind of trolling—saying he’ll definitely be president of Ukraine, that only he can save the country, and so on. Both Arestovych and Shariy, to me, are not conversation partners—they are more like subjects of study, just like Trump supporters, or Solovyov, or Skobov. I simply don’t see the point in inviting them. And the likelihood of them agreeing is close to zero anyway.
As for Gordon, the situation is more complex. But even there—I’m not particularly interested. If you, dear colleague, can explain why, I’m willing to consider it. Though I still don’t quite see why he would want to come on our channel either.
So, regarding the first question—I don’t see the point for now. But the second question—yes, inviting viewers as guests is interesting. We just need to work out the candidates, topics, and overall format.
On Sergey Mokhnatkin Link to heading
Dima Ivanov
Were you acquainted with human rights activist Sergey Mokhnatkin? Say a few words about him.
You know, unlike, say, Alexander Valeryevich Skobov, with whom I’m well and closely acquainted—and I hope he also considers me a comrade—I only knew Mokhnatkin in passing. I ran into him a few times at mass events, at protests, at various marches, and interviewed him several times. But I wasn’t closely personally acquainted with him—not in the sense of sitting down for long talks. It was only in the context of those public demonstrations and interviews I did with him.
But what can I say in a few words? He was truly a person of crystalline integrity—a man who would not break. They broke his spine, but they couldn’t break his spirit. Despite serving multiple prison terms and constant beatings—he was beaten regularly in prisons and detention centers—they never managed to break him.
He was someone who simply could not tolerate injustice around him. He would stand up for others, even knowing full well that it would result in criminal charges against him.
And something that really touched me about Mokhnatkin was his attitude toward animals. That cat—a wild cat he tamed in the prison camp—and how he later worked to get it out of the camp. When he was released, they wouldn’t let him take the cat, which he had been feeding and caring for. So afterward, with the help of lawyers, he actually went through the effort to free the cat from the prison. That moved me deeply.
He was, without question, a man of principle. I place him with pride among the few people who represent the honor of our resistance in Russia—a small group, but one that truly commands respect.
Kremlin Propagandists’ Obsession with Writing Link to heading
Viktoria Hart
How do you explain this passion for compulsive writing? Everywhere you look—so-called “talented writers” like Simonyan, Zakharova, Rogozin, Surkov, Lavrov, and so on.
You know, I think the main reason is a lack of self-awareness, the absence of a sense of humor about oneself. You see, each of us—literally everyone—wrote poems as a child. Who didn’t write a little poetry growing up? Who hasn’t, in some form, dabbled in creativity—be it drawing, singing, quoting poetry, making festive posters for home holidays, and so on? We all have some creative impulses. But to put that out publicly—you need to completely lack a sense of humor about yourself.
This uncritical self-perception stems from the fact that each small-time official is surrounded by a large number of sycophants constantly telling them how brilliant they are. And so, amateurish literary experiments, which many people engage in privately, end up being published—because these people are told it’s genius. And they lack the self-irony to see that it’s just flattery.
It’s the result of this environment. And there’s another element too—this graphomania is a bit like what Nero had. He saw himself as a great performer. They already have everything—power, money—but what they lack is glory. That desire to add something else to power and wealth. Some chase cultural artifacts, others try to stand out through “creative” works, and some go digging for noble ancestry. Power and wealth aren’t enough—they want something grander.
So yes, it’s all quite ridiculous. Especially when you read poems by someone like Lavrov or the others. Very amusing indeed.
On the Term “Liberal Crowd” Link to heading
Question from Lemeshev
What do you mean by the term “liberal crowd”? Would you say Viktor Shenderovich is part of this liberal crowd? He used to appear on Echo, now he’s on Gvozdi and Dozhd.
Well, let me start with the first part. The “liberal crowd.” Shenderovich is definitely part of the liberal crowd. And by the way, the liberal crowd also includes—though I tend to use the term critically—people like Alexander Plyushchev, who I think is simply a good journalist. Or Viktor Anatolyevich Shenderovich, whom I overall view with warmth and sympathy, despite the fact that we’ve had very heated debates, including exchanges with some resentment and even insults—though mostly from his side toward me. Still, I respect him.
So, this isn’t to say that everyone in the liberal crowd is inherently bad. What is the “liberal crowd”? It’s largely an artificially created community that emerged after Putin cleared out the entire media landscape, leaving behind maybe one and a half small islands—primarily Echo of Moscow. So the liberal crowd became a gathering space. People flocked to Echo because there were no other platforms for public expression by those critical of the Putin regime. That’s where everyone ended up—Echo and, to some extent, Dozhd. These were artificially maintained oases of pluralism. And that’s essentially how the liberal crowd was born.
As a result of this forced congregation in a limited space of public dialogue, a subculture formed within the crowd—certain codes, censorship, an insider-outsider dynamic. This had a fairly negative effect on the opposition environment as a whole. Because the “commander” was Venediktov, with his well-known “school of journalism”—a topic worthy of a separate discussion. What kind of journalism school was that?
It created a situation where the notions of good and evil became distorted. Where a pro-Kremlin Duma deputy could share airtime with Margarita Simonyan or Maria Zakharova—everyone mixed together. The idea of collaboration with a fascist regime wasn’t presented as something inherently wrong.
So in my view, the liberal crowd is a fascinating subject for sociological research. I’ve tried to delve into it several times but always lacked the time and energy. And now, we can already talk about the history of the liberal crowd, which has significantly split in two. One part became an émigré structure; the other remained in Russia—and that’s a very different story. So yes, it’s a very interesting phenomenon.
Are Sakharov and Skobov Comparable? Link to heading
And one more question. Is Sakharov comparable to Skobov? Has there ever been, in all of Russian history, someone who, while locked up in the regime’s dungeons, attacked the regime so fiercely?
Now, as for the question—whether Sakharov is comparable to Skobov. You know, I’d offer this kind of analysis. Comparable in what way? The scale of the personality is one thing, and the historical role is another. There’s also a problem when we compare a living person with someone who has passed—because the project called Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov is complete, and we can speak of it as a finished legacy. The project called Alexander Valeryevich Skobov is still ongoing. So comparing a completed human project with a still-unfolding one is always risky—that’s just a small caveat.
Now, to the core of it. I believe that in terms of the scale of personality, Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov and Alexander Valeryevich Skobov are indeed comparable. Both possess extraordinary courage. Both have intellectual honesty. If we talk about how they compare as thinkers, you know—I would perhaps even place Alexander Valeryevich slightly higher. Again, I’m talking about personal scale here.
Moreover, it’s hard to compare the views of a person who passed away over 30 years ago with someone who is alive today—that naturally complicates things. But it’s absolutely clear that if we’re talking about historical figures and a person’s role in history, then of course Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov is significantly larger than Alexander Valeryevich, simply because the platform was completely different, the level of recognition was completely different. He was truly a world-renowned figure, and he had the megaphone, so to speak.
It’s like comparing two singers—one of whom sings with their natural voice, and the other through an amplifier. Comparing someone speaking without a microphone to someone speaking into a loudspeaker—it’s not the same. The voice carries differently. Though now, the things Alexander Valeryevich says from prison are starting to be heard.
So that’s the difference here.
Did Putin come to power on his own? Link to heading
So, Ruslan constantly writes, simplifying his texts, his style of writing. And here he has two questions and one request.
And the first question is, why do you take March 27, 2000, as the starting point of the fascist Kremlin ghoul’s Reich? After all, the fascist Kremlin ghoul became the head of that agency and, at the same time, the Secretary of the Security Council in 1998. From that moment on, the fascist ghoul held full unlimited power in Russia. From that moment, the ghoul acquired absolute power over Russia, thanks to which the ghoul removed Yeltsin from power and in early August ‘99 appointed himself as successor and chairman of the government, the prime minister. As for August ‘99, yes. As for Yeltsin, he couldn’t, relying only on democratic institutions like the parliament, oppose an ordinary agency headed by the fascist ghoul. The unusual agency threatened Yeltsin and his family. Therefore, Yeltsin was forced to yield and appoint him as successor and prime minister. And then came the second Chechen war and the Ryazan sugar. Yeltsin was a good, kind, honest, and principled man. May he rest in peace.
Dear Ruslan! Everything you’re writing is very far from reality. With all due respect, nothing resembling what you’re describing ever existed or took place. Here are just the facts. They exist. You can repeat “ghoul, idiot, indeed a ghoul Putin” all you want, but… Well, let me start with the facts. Before Putin became president, first of all, he was never the Chairman of the Security Council. In 1998, he was the Secretary of the Security Council, and the Chairman of the Security Council was Yeltsin. That’s the first thing. The second is more important—much more important. Never, especially during the 1990s, especially in the 1990s, the “Chekists,” as they’re often called—FSB, KGB—never held full political power in Russia. You’re jumping ahead there with a request to invite Felshtinsky. Let me just say right away that Yuri Georgievich Felshtinsky is always a welcome guest on our channel. But that is actually a major misconception that Yuri Georgievich Felshtinsky describes in his books—that the KGB was the political authority in Russia. That’s a mistake. That’s not true. The State Security Committee, its predecessors the NKVD, MGB, and today’s FSB—never, not for a single second in the history of our country, Russia, held full political power. During the Soviet Union, full political power belonged to the Communist Party, which controlled the KGB. Yes, the KGB had some power. But, firstly, that power was variable—sometimes more, sometimes less—but always under control, always without the slightest exception. In the 1990s, it was a period of diminishing KGB influence. That’s it. So everyone who was there and understood at least a bit of what was going on at the top levels knew perfectly well that, yes, the KGB was split into several parts—so to speak, there was an attempt to pull out its poisonous fangs. Unfortunately, it didn’t work. But the KGB was never at the top of political power. And, absolutely and without any doubt, Putin could not have appointed himself. That is, saying that he somehow, absolutely, gained absolute power in 1998 and removed Yeltsin from power—well, that’s just… well, that just means not knowing what really happened. And the idea that he appointed himself as successor is, of course, complete nonsense. I mean, we all saw this up close. We saw who voted and how. We saw that it was entirely possible to prevent the vote. So to speak, the vote for Putin—we saw—I’ve already told the anatomy of that process a hundred times. You see, by name, who voted how. And it could have been prevented. So all of this is, of course, total nonsense. And as for that claim that “my agency” threatened Yeltsin and his family, and that’s why Yeltsin was forced to yield and appoint him—none of that has the slightest connection to reality. So, and regarding the assessment of Boris Nikolaevich, I don’t want to dwell too much on it, but saying that he was a good, kind, honest, and principled man—well, I don’t want to paint Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin as some spawn of hell, but nor do I want to see him as a paragon of virtue, like the current Anti-Corruption Foundation portrays him—shame on them. I mean the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Nevertheless, I also can’t agree with your interpretation. So yes, everything was really quite different.
Why wasn’t a nuclear strike carried out on Moscow in 1945? Link to heading
And the second question—the second question from Ruslan.
Why, in September 1945, when the United Kingdom and the United States already had nuclear bombs in their arsenals, didn’t they launch a nuclear strike on Moscow and burn the damned evil empire to hell once and for all? And at the very least, such a strike could have been carried out in November 1952, when the UK and the US already had thermonuclear weapons.
Well, look. The question is more serious and based on some actual facts, indeed. So, yesterday, yes? Yesterday we talked about this same topic, and I mentioned Churchill’s plans, which differed greatly from Roosevelt’s. Churchill had what was called Operation Unthinkable—it was essentially a plan for war against Russia, primarily for Poland, to help Poland get out of the Russian-Soviet occupation zone. But I explained in detail yesterday that when Churchill presented this to his military staff, they simply laid out the numbers—tanks, divisions, and everything else. And it was clear that the Soviet Union had absolute dominance on land, meaning that in a land war, yes, there was some advantage in terms of strategic aviation, but in a land war, the United States and the United Kingdom would lose outright. So, in principle, well, I would definitely try to bring in some military historian here, but in general, the opinion that Stalin, if he had wanted to, could have reached the English Channel—given the Soviet Union’s enormous superiority in ground forces—that’s probably true. That’s probably true.
As for nuclear weapons, you see, nuclear weapons—well, first of all, let’s start with the fact that the UK did not have nuclear weapons in 1945. The UK only obtained nuclear weapons in 1952. So theoretically, yes, such an attempt to destroy—yes, they probably could have destroyed major Soviet cities. But I’m not sure there was any consensus at all. You see, I’m just inviting you, dear Ruslan, and everyone listening to me now, to immerse yourself in the atmosphere of 1945, when the world was in euphoric celebration over the victory against Nazism. A monstrous war had just ended, in which 70—if I’m not mistaken, 77 million people worldwide had died. The prestige—just think about it—the Soviet Union’s prestige in the world was very, very high. There was no consensus in the world for such a war against Stalin’s USSR, you understand? Nuclear bombings of Soviet cities would have been received extremely negatively in many countries, including European ones.
Where did McCarthyism come from? Dear Ruslan, just think about it—where did McCarthyism in the United States come from? It arose as a reaction to the massive spread of far-left, including communist, ideas—even in the United States. And I can—and just now, when I mentioned Operation Unthinkable—that was Churchill’s idea, but the United States was not ready to participate in that. And only the United States had nuclear weapons at the time. You understand? The UK only got them in 1952, after the Soviet Union already had them. You see? So it’s a utopia—it couldn’t have happened, because the United States wasn’t willing to participate, and for understandable reasons: the U.S. itself had no consensus on a nuclear strike or nuclear war with the Soviet Union, considering the massive pro-Soviet sentiment at the time. And this was the case in Europe too—in France as well. Let me remind you, the Communist Party was extremely influential after World War II—in France, in Italy, and so on.
So there could be no consensus on this kind of war against the Soviet Union, especially with nuclear weapons, which only the United States possessed. The UK didn’t have them. And by the time the UK got them, the Soviet Union already had them. So it’s a utopia.
And now your request to invite Felshtinsky—I’ll say again, Yuri, thank you, dear Ruslan, for this request, because, well, you reminded me once again. And of course, Yuri Georgievich Felshtinsky, despite all our disagreements, is a welcome guest on our channel.
Could there be a listening device from Putin in Trump’s portrait? Link to heading
A question from José:
What do you think about Zhernov’s suggestion? That there could be a listening device in Trump’s portrait from Putin?
Well, I feel more or less the same way I feel about Professor Solovyov’s idea that Putin is lying in a refrigerator. And that his doubles are constantly walking around and telling stories. About the same, you know? I mean, what kind of idea is that—a listening device in a portrait? In Trump’s portrait. What, the intelligence, counterintelligence, and special services of the United States are completely incapable of detecting a bug? I mean… well, anyway, to put it simply—it’s like: “Putin’s in a fridge, there’s a bug in Trump’s portrait.” That’s what I think. And in that sense, Zhernov—well, yes, he’s basically in the same camp as Professor Solovyov.
Why did Russia pay off the USSR’s debts? Link to heading
And Elsa’s first question:
If all the Soviet republics were equal, then why did Russia pay off the USSR’s debts? If common assets are divided among all, then common debts should be paid by all. Isn’t that right?
Well, you know, yes, they were equal, of course. And I must say that this whole illusion that Russia was somehow the “first among equals”—no, I wouldn’t say that. In terms of subjectivity, Russia was far from first among equals, because the basis of power in the Soviet Union was the Communist Party, and Russia was the only republic that didn’t have its own Communist Party. It didn’t exist because the Soviet leadership understood perfectly well the danger that as soon as Russia got its own separate Communist Party, there would essentially be a dual power structure. The Russian-Soviet leaders understood the danger of dual power very well, that Russia, being half the USSR in terms of population and potential, could blow up the Soviet Union and create a competing power center. So, to politically castrate Russia—this was the foundation of numerous protests from Russian nationalists in the USSR, who were occasionally incited and would periodically raise their heads. There was the so-called “Russian Party” in the CPSU—this is a poorly researched phenomenon that constantly lamented that Russians were being humiliated and oppressed, that they didn’t have their own Communist Party, and so on and so forth.
So this political castration of the RSFSR was directly tied to the understanding that once the USSR gained political subjectivity, dual power would emerge—which is exactly what happened when the RSFSR gained political agency under Yeltsin. As soon as that happened, the Soviet Union collapsed, because dual power emerged.
Now, as for why Russia paid the debts. Well, I’d like to draw your attention, dear Elsa, to the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was the so-called “zero option” agreement—this was, if I’m not mistaken, in 1993. The Russian government declared that it would assume all obligations of all the former Soviet republics to repay the USSR’s external debt. And simultaneously, all those republics renounced their claims to a share of the Soviet Union’s foreign assets. This was the deal known as the “zero option.”
So Russia took on all the debt. I don’t know, by the way—this might be a good question for an economist. You could probably find this in open sources—was this truly a “zero option”? The external debt was known—about $100 billion, slightly less. But the total value of all foreign Soviet assets—how much was that worth? I simply don’t know. But probably that’s also publicly available somewhere. Anyway, it was called the zero option.
So, this inequality only arose after the collapse of the USSR. Yes, inequality definitely arose then, because it was specifically Russia that declared itself the legal successor, it was Russia that inherited the UN Security Council seat, consolidated all the nuclear weapons, and so on, right? And at that moment, inequality emerged—undoubtedly.
Whereas during the existence of the Soviet Union—well, in terms of political subjectivity, there wasn’t really… Well, of course, since Moscow was both the capital of the Soviet Union and of Russia, there was a certain imbalance for obvious reasons.
Can anything replace reading books? Link to heading
Ilya writes:
My acquaintance works as a teacher in a private school, teaching children foreign languages. In our conversations, she pointed out that a significant portion of her students, aged 7 to 16, are unable to compose even a short story—sometimes not even in their native language. One of the reasons she sees for this deficiency is that her students practically don’t read books, which undoubtedly contribute at the very least to the development of imagination. Moreover, the students express a general aversion to reading. In this regard, the question arises: can anything today or in the foreseeable future fully replace reading books?
You know, I risk provoking the anger and disdain of people who are, let’s say, under 70—or even more so, under 50—but I believe that nothing can replace reading. Nothing can replace reading—not audiobooks, not wonderful videos, lectures, seminars, and so on. The very process itself. The process of reading is, first of all, about concentration. You focus. I mean, theoretically, you can walk around with a book, but it’s a completely different way of consuming information. So I think no. I think nothing can replace reading. In this sense, I believe that every media revolution is, on the one hand, a form of progress, and on the other hand, something is lost. And in this… you know, it’s no coincidence that one of the least foolish people in history—Socrates—was against the introduction of writing. He believed that writing would cause a great deal to be lost in human thought. Well, I’m not ready to go that far. But at the very least, when it comes to reading, yes—I think it’s irreplaceable. Books are irreplaceable.
On the Recognition of the Golan Heights Link to heading
Aleksei:
In this morning’s “Rome” you avoided answering Viktor Khripun’s question about the U.S. recognition of Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and instead effectively answered a different question—why Israel captured the Golan Heights. Please answer the following: First, did Israel violate international law by effectively annexing part of Syrian territory? Second, did Trump violate international law by recognizing this annexation as lawful? Third, is Israel obligated to return the captured territories in the future? Would the threat to Israel’s security from Syria—specifically from the Golan Heights—disappear?
You know, I’ll start right away with the third question. I think yes—if. I think yes. If. The threat from the Golan Heights disappears—if a situation arises in which a new Syrian government clearly demonstrates that there is no longer any threat to Israel from Syria, and this is convincingly proven—then yes, then I think that Israel should return those territories.
Now, regarding the main issue—I didn’t avoid the question from my interlocutor Viktor Khryapa for no reason. I explained why Israel captured and holds the Golan Heights, because it matters. Otherwise, it looks like some unprovoked aggression, like Putin’s seizure of Crimea. So here, it’s clear. And you know? From the point of view of international law, of course, aggression is bad, illegal, and unacceptable. But here’s the question, you see—who was the aggressor? For decades, the aggressors were the Arab states attacking Israel—Israel didn’t attack anyone. Arab states, including Syria, participated in several wars against Israel. And fundamentally, the question arises: can a state, in response to aggression, create a situation that prevents future aggression—create a buffer zone, so to speak? Yes. And what responsibility lies with the aggressor?
I just want to draw your attention to the very nature of current international law. Over a long period, Israel was attacked, threatened, shelled, and declared a target for destruction. Tell me—where was international law during the Yom Kippur War? Where was it during other numerous wars? Where did international law go, and how was it applied during the monstrous October 7 terror attack? Where was international law then? That was a violation of international law too. But what was the consequence, and who—what mechanism—who’s the “international policeman”?
You see, the peculiarity of international law is that it exists—but there’s no international policeman to guarantee its enforcement. That’s it. And so a situation arises in which the State of Israel—constantly under threat, constantly within firing range, even now—and forced to ensure its own security, including assigning responsibility for aggression—had to establish that responsibility on its own.
Syria attacked Israel three times. And while today I personally have more sympathy than hostility toward Syria—because yes, it’s a country that suffered terrible genocide—and I deeply wish Syria well… this country attacked Israel three times. And each time, the goal of the attack was to destroy the State of Israel. So, to some extent, yes, this was annexation, and one can say it was a violation of international law.
But on the other hand, in the absence of an “international policeman,” Israel compensates—because no one else but Israel can guarantee its own security. Therefore, Israel determines the measure of responsibility for the aggressor. No one created a mechanism to hold the aggressor accountable—Israel had to do it on its own. So Israel, in effect, punished the aggressor. If you like, call it vigilantism. But it’s the kind of vigilantism that, in my view, is justified in the absence of a proper international court. After all, no one put the aggressor on trial in an international court. So Israel was forced to act in this “vigilante” manner.
Now again, regarding the third question—I firmly believe that although it would be very difficult for Israel to return the Golan Heights, nevertheless, I believe it would be able to do so if Syria—despite its current reputation and the many suspicions surrounding its current leadership—I still hope that these are people capable of genuinely abandoning aggressive policies. If that’s the case—if my hopes, which may seem naive to some, come true—then I think, in principle, Israel could return the Golan Heights to Syria.
As for Trump—well, I honestly don’t quite understand how one can talk about Trump and “law” in the same breath. Trump and the law are completely incompatible concepts. He recognized it simply because he wanted to help Netanyahu at the time. So—so there you have it.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
Dear friends, with that I’m wrapping up our morning stream. Once again, before officially ending it, I want to remind you that tomorrow at 12:00 we’ll have economist Professor Lipsits joining us. We’ll be discussing, among other things, the final contours of the resource deal. And today at 19:00, Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky will be on. I believe it’ll be an important and interesting conversation, considering all the recent events. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov and to Ukrainian political prisoners.
Source: https://youtu.be/jx9tRuPdKYA