Trump is battling the courts and losing Musk. Zelensky offers real negotiations, while Russia insists on trolling. What is Putin’s main resource?
Main Theme Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 30th. It is 07:41 in Kyiv, and we are continuing our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in Ukraine, in the world, and of course, in our own souls.
Resistance to Trump in the Courts Link to heading
First, the news from the United States of America. Right now, it’s a powerful generator of news, understandably related to a certain someone. Well, the first thing I’d like to note is that this battle between the democratic state and the dictator, or the man who would like to become a fascist-type dictator in a democratic country, is intensifying. The democratic country is resisting. First and foremost, this resistance is occurring through the main democratic institution, which is the courts.
Trump commented on the decision of the Federal Court of International Trade, which overturned the tariffs that Trump had imposed, and Trump stated that they are destroying the country. After this, of course, the Trump administration filed an appeal, and the appeals court suspended the decision of the Manhattan court for international trade. Well, I won’t recount Trump’s hysterics. He’s outraged, saying that the judges of the Manhattan court are traitors. And the only reason they overturned his decision, according to him, is hatred of Trump.
After that, the federal court — actually, no, the appeals court of the United States overturned the decision. So, for now, it’s clear that everything will ultimately end up in the Supreme Court of the United States, which will put an end to this dispute.
The essence is very simple: Trump is demanding dictatorial powers in economic matters. The court is trying to uphold the US Constitution. In this case, we’ll see what the Supreme Court decides. But there are other decisions of Trump and his administration that the courts are challenging. In particular, the federal court in Boston blocked Trump’s decision to ban Harvard University from admitting foreign students.
So, that happened yesterday; basically, the status quo remains. Nevertheless, it’s absolutely impossible to imagine that this is the end of it. Everything, of course, will again fall to the Supreme Court. First the appeals court, then the Supreme Court — if, again, the appeals court sides with Trump. So for now, foreign students can continue to study at Harvard, though how long that will last is unclear. Nonetheless, the battle between Trump and the judicial system — essentially between Trump and the democratic state of the USA — continues.
Elon Musk Leaves Trump’s Team Link to heading
The second piece of news is that Elon Musk is leaving Trump’s team. Today, there will be a briefing of sorts, in which Trump will bid farewell to Elon Musk. He is definitely leaving the Department of Government Efficiency. I think it would be possible to sum up the results separately with some figures. By the way, I don’t know if we’ll manage it today, but at 8:00 PM we have a very important guest. I’m announcing an extremely interesting conversation, especially given what’s happening right now in the United States, with American and Ukrainian political scientist Igor Naumovich Aizenberg. It will be very insightful to talk to him about what’s going on in the United States. And, by the way, to sum up the so-called “oprichnina” created under Musk.
It’s clear that not only Musk is leaving, but also the key members of his team. So, it will be very interesting to draw some conclusions. A preliminary conclusion we can make is that, as a result of Musk’s activities, which were supposedly aimed at reducing government spending, the actual spending has increased. It’s astonishing — it’s something reminiscent of the effectiveness of the Belarusian Lukashenko system. I was really struck by the news that there is a potato shortage in Belarus — it takes real skill to make that happen. Any attempt to introduce this sort of Soviet-style regime ends up, for example, causing a sand shortage in the Sahara. And here we have a potato shortage in Belarus. So, by trying to reduce spending through administrative measures, they actually ended up increasing it.
In any case, Musk is leaving. And that’s a good thing. Because, first of all, it definitely creates some obstacles for the 2025 program and all those hopes for techno-fascism that Kevin Curtis’s supporters, among others, embraced. In fact, this whole thing was largely connected not just with Yens, but also with Musk. So I think it’s a good thing. The reason is clear: Musk is actually connected to the real economy, unlike Trump. So, naturally, he was outraged by the actions Trump was taking. In particular, it’s known that Musk harshly criticized the tax reform for failing to reduce the federal budget deficit. In short, everything happens for the best. In reality, Musk’s departure is good news.
Trump’s Endless Deadlines Link to heading
Finally, the third thing that happened is that it turns out that the rubber deadline that Trump set for Putin has no limit at all — it just keeps stretching. I just want to read out some excerpts from this never-ending deadline saga. So, Trump’s statement from April 27: “Within two weeks, we will know if Putin wants peace.” Then there’s Trump’s statement from the 19th — two weeks later, or really, almost three weeks later. On May 19: “Within two weeks, we will know if Putin wants peace.” And finally, on May 28, yet again, Trump’s statement: “Within two weeks, we will know if Putin wants peace, in principle.”
It’s like he can just keep singing this same tune endlessly. In reality, this rubber deadline of Trump’s is some kind of built-in feature of his speech and the delivery mechanism of his messaging. He can keep repeating this refrain endlessly. It reminds me of that little song: “Popov is not good at math.” This endless chorus can be repeated forever. So the hope that Trump will ever stop this seems utopian to me.
Kellogg Said Russia’s Concerns Are Legitimate Link to heading
Finally, the last thing that can be said today about the United States is the absolutely fantastic statement by Trump’s special representative, Kellogg, who many of my colleagues, experts, and political scientists have described as the most pro-Ukrainian member of Trump’s team. Well, he’s now come out with the following: absolutely astonishing. He said that Russia’s concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion are legitimate. Here’s the exact quote, from his interview with Life News: Kellogg opened his mouth, and these sounds came out: “Russia’s concerns about NATO’s eastward expansion are legitimate.”
It’s interesting to wonder how to interpret this. I understand that nobody is going to admit Ukraine to NATO — that’s clear. But why say that Russia’s concerns are legitimate? That’s absolutely unclear. What business is it of Russia’s if, for example, Georgia wants to join NATO? Or Moldova? Moldova, for instance, wants to join NATO. No, Russia forbids it. So recognizing the legitimacy of Russia’s concerns basically amounts to recognizing its right to some kind of exclusive authority or power over the countries of the former Soviet Union. In essence, this is an acknowledgment of Putin’s supposed right to keep these post-Soviet countries in his sphere of influence.
There’s a practically invisible line between this statement and acknowledging the legitimacy of Russia’s war, of its invasion of Ukraine. In reality, I think this is a monstrous statement that demonstrates the level of degradation of anyone who joins Trump’s team — truly a deal with the devil.
Russia Drags Ukraine into Futile Talks Link to heading
As for what’s happening in Russia — here, too, there are some astonishing developments. First of all, it turns out — as we know, on Monday — that Russia is proposing to hold talks in Istanbul. So it’s basically like Groundhog Day all over again: Istanbul again, Medinsky again, and again total pointlessness. Because this so-called memorandum they’re proposing — well, as you remember, after the last talks it was said that everyone would go and do their homework, to come up with ideas for how the war should end, what the memorandum for establishing peace should look like.
Ukraine has already long since provided both Russia and the United States with its version of this memorandum. But Russia, via Lavrov — this was two days ago — said that they wouldn’t show anything until the Ukrainian side arrived at the talks. So it’s completely unclear what Ukraine is supposed to bring to the table, because the Russian memorandum is a secret. Although there was a leak — Reuters has already reported on it all — but still, as far as I understand, the names of the Russian negotiators and the Russian president aren’t Reuters. So it’s a pretty strange story.
But basically, the point is that there’s supposed to be some sort of surprise — what’s written in this Russian paper is unknown. But apparently, the goal is to make it as hard as possible for the Ukrainian delegation to prepare for the talks. And, of course, there’s a regime of total secrecy around the negotiations themselves, so that, God forbid, nothing leaks out to the global public. Peskov once again emphasized that the Kremlin does not intend to reveal the conditions for a ceasefire with Ukraine. And he even said he doesn’t know whether these conditions are included in the Russian draft memorandum at all. So it’s completely unclear what’s going on here.
In reality, the essence of this negotiation farce is that Ukrainian President Zelensky is constantly offering genuine, real negotiations. For example, his latest proposal is for a tripartite meeting. Initially, he proposed a one-on-one meeting with Putin, but since Putin is afraid of that — you know, like in that folk saying, “she’s not coming alone, she’s bringing the blacksmith” — Zelensky is offering to let Putin bring his blacksmith, his protector, Trump, and proposes a three-way meeting: Putin, Trump, and Zelensky. Naturally, Russia isn’t agreeing to that, either, because Putin is afraid to meet Zelensky even with Trump at his side.
So instead, what’s being offered is more trolling, led by Medinsky. In reality, it’s not actual negotiations, just more imitation. Naturally, with Medinsky involved, there won’t be any real negotiations. It’s just a cover operation. Russia will keep fighting, Trump will keep covering for the war with his rubber deadlines — every week he’ll say, “just two more weeks.” And Putin, during all this, will keep escalating the shelling.
Putin’s Inexhaustible Resource Link to heading
Now, regarding the very sluggish discussion in the expert and media circles about how sanctions will soon be imposed, or oil will collapse, and so on, and that Putin won’t be able to keep fighting. Dear friends, I think these illusions about Putin being unable to keep fighting are based on the assumption that he has some sort of finite resource. Sure, there’s a finite resource of money, but money can be printed. There’s a finite resource of weapons, but weapons are still being produced. Moreover, there’s another piece of news — from China — that China has completely stopped supplying any spare parts and selling drones to Ukraine and Europe, while continuing to supply drones — one of today’s main weapons — to Russia. So, the exhaustion of the means of killing is not yet foreseen in Russia.
But in reality, there is an absolutely fundamental, most important resource that Putin has, which is undoubtedly people. Once upon a time, Sechin’s statement that people are the second oil really resonated with many. But actually, he was wrong. For Putin, people are the first oil — they are more important than oil itself. And this is being vividly demonstrated right now, because the main thing is, of course, the absolute zero value of human life.
I paid attention to a recent investigation by the BBC together with Mediazona, which identified by name the Russian soldiers who met their end in Ukrainian black soil. These are, I emphasize, the names of Russian soldiers identified by name — 110,608 of them. I can immediately say that the real number is significantly higher. There are some indirect indicators — cemetery counts and so on — but that’s what they have physically documented: the names of these people, who they were, whether they were contract soldiers, convicts, career military, and so on. Also, by region, which is most important.
Why do I still say that this is Putin’s practically inexhaustible resource? Because regionally, the disparity is enormous. For example, for men from Altai and Tyva, the likelihood of dying in Ukraine is 30-40 times higher than for Muscovites. Why? Well, it varies — sometimes it’s volunteers, sometimes it’s convicts. But overall, Tyva is in the lead by a huge margin: 120 “Cargo 200” per 10,000 men. Next is Buryatia with 91 per 10,000, and Altai with 89 per 10,000. In contrast, Moscow — so, Tyva has 120, Moscow just 3. There’s the gap. Buryatia has 90-91 per 10,000, Moscow three per 10,000.
So what is this inexhaustible resource? It’s not just that the value of human life is zero — though they do get paid for it — but from a self-assessment perspective, it truly is zero. And the meaning of this inexhaustible resource lies in its unevenness. This unevenness creates a kind of potential difference: Moscow, the region geographically close to the centers of decision-making and with the strongest media presence, remains calm — no growing cemeteries here, and “Cargo 200” trickles into Moscow very slowly. This ensures the calm of the imperial center.
Even though protests in Russia are impossible, this is an extra guarantee that, even if they do arise, they will in no way affect Putin’s policy. The essence is that it’s mainly the outskirts that are sent into the meat grinder. And this also guarantees that there won’t be any protests even remotely. In these absolutely impoverished regions, where there is already sky-high mortality without any war and poverty reigns, the army serves as a social elevator. For someone in total despair, there’s the opportunity to go to war and either end up underground or become fabulously rich. There’s an obvious correlation between life expectancy in these regions and the number of people volunteering to go to the front — for money, of course. So, the list of regions with high combat losses largely overlaps with the list of regions with low life expectancy.
Regarding the real number of losses — meaning killed — estimates range from 170,000 to about 250,000 people. Including the wounded, the figure certainly already exceeds 1,000,000. In reality, the main price, the main resource for Putin, is the zero value of human life, especially on the outskirts of Russia. This difference, this potential difference, is truly the foundation of what is very similar to a perpetual motion machine of war. The perpetual motion machine of war in Russia is driven by the zero value of human life, along with the fact that this value is even lower on the outskirts than in the center of Russia. Thanks to this, there is generally quite a high level of social calm. There’s no major social tension in Russia today.
So those who hope that increased mortality will somehow lead to social protest will be very disappointed. Therefore, the only thing that can really stop the war is not sanctions, not some huge growth in casualties. It is weapons — weapons that can be given to Ukraine, and that will ultimately destroy Russia’s military potential. When Putin runs out of Uralvagonzavod tanks, when he loses his airfields, his means of delivering equipment — oil depots, command posts, runways, aircraft, and so on — then the war will stop. There appears to be no other way to end this war. As for this negotiation farce, it is absolutely clear — it’s just a cover operation.
Answers to Your Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to your questions, I want to remind you that today we’ll be having a conversation with Igor Ivanovich Aizenberg. Once again, I want to emphasize that, with the greatest respect to other experts, he is the person who, in my opinion, gives the most accurate picture of the situation in the United States of America. That’s why I’m very much looking forward to this conversation myself, and I highly recommend that you join us at 8:00 PM to watch and listen to our discussion. Now, let’s move on to answering your questions.
On the Invitation of Yuri Rashkin Link to heading
A question from Elena: I’d like to hear your opinion about Yuri Rashkin. Recently, friends recommended him to me. I listened to him for the first time today on Channel 24. I really liked his stance. Maybe there’s a possibility and a desire to invite him to your program.
Here’s the thing. Yuri Rashkin’s position really does coincide in many ways with what we’re discussing here. He’s definitely a supporter of Ukraine and absolutely against Trump. So, it would seem there are no obstacles. But here’s the story. Yuri Rashkin invited me to his show, Rashkin Report, quite a few times, and I was a guest there. Everything was fine until that well-known falling-out with Yuri Borisovich Shvets. You might remember that incident — Shvets claimed I was on the payroll of Andriy Yermak, that Yermak was paying me. Moreover, he claimed that I was actually in Ukraine, being held hostage by Yermak, and if I didn’t say what the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine demanded — who, according to Shvets, was paying me — I would be deported to Russia. This revelation, to my huge surprise, meant that any critical remarks I made about Shvets himself were allegedly because of Yermak’s influence.
At the time, I said I’d like to see the receipts for these payments. I’m always curious when someone claims I’m paid by the KGB, the FSB, the CIA, Mossad, or Honduran intelligence — the latest theory being that Yermak is paying me. I’m genuinely interested: where’s the money? Shvets kept lying about this supposed arrangement. I want to stress again that I’ve never expressed any evaluative opinions about Yermak or other Ukrainian politicians. You know my position — I don’t evaluate Ukraine’s internal politics. Of course, the idea that Yermak is paying me is pretty amusing, but I’d like to see at least some of that money!
Anyway, this nonsense became the basis for some cooling in my relationship with Shvets. For some reason that I still don’t understand, Rashkin decided to jump into this story, and he started saying nasty things about me. Completely unclear why or what exactly he was talking about — he didn’t seem to get the substance of my exchange with Shvets but still took Shvets’s side and said these harsh things about me. I didn’t respond because I really don’t see the point of making a fuss over nothing. But after that, I did start to question the idea of inviting Rashkin. Rashkin hasn’t invited me since, and I’m totally fine with that — it’s normal. If people want to invite you to a conversation, they do; if not, they don’t — that’s fine. I don’t feel I’m lacking for platforms to speak on.
As for the idea of inviting Rashkin here, I never really considered it in the first place. Because while his position overlaps almost entirely with mine — I don’t know if there are any subtle differences — I don’t see much new insight coming from talking with him. Unlike, say, today’s announced conversation with Igor Ivanovich Aizenberg, which I see as having great potential, I just don’t see that with Rashkin. Plus, this weird episode has effectively blocked that possibility.
Differences Between the Terms “Finnish” and “Finland’s” Link to heading
So, Viktor Khripun: Igor Ivanovich, good afternoon. I’m confused. At some point, you did a primer on when to use “Finnish” and when to use “Finland’s.” I understood that if it relates to the state — for example, the university — it’s “Finland’s.” But if it’s about the people — for example — then it’s “Finnish.” Today you called the President of Finland the “Finnish President” and the war the “Finnish war,” even though the President doesn’t relate to the people. Could you please explain once more what’s called what?
You know, dear Viktor, I’ll confirm once again that, in principle, according to the rules of the Russian language, “финский” (Finnish) refers to the Finnish people, and “финляндский” (Finland’s) refers to the state. So if I called the President of Finland “финский,” that was a rather unfortunate slip of the tongue, of course. It’s not a “Finnish President,” obviously. It’s the President of Finland. That was a clear slip. So, well, I misspoke — it happens; the tongue can get tied up. Let’s not lose our minds over it.
On the Higher Intelligence Link to heading
So, Soul Not Curious isn’t really asking, but rather asserting: You deny the existence of proof for a higher intelligence? But isn’t the very existence of the universe and us proof of this? Modern science has shown that microscopic changes in one of the approximately 400 physical constants would make the existence of the universe impossible. So who made these fine adjustments? Clearly not chance, since there are too many of them. Chaos only begets more chaos. Can you imagine winning the lottery several hundred times in a row without a single misstep? No. So how did Earth and the universe manage it?
Dear friends, I think at some point I’ll stop discussing the existence of God altogether, because it’s getting repetitive. You see, some people see proof of a higher intelligence in a cute cat’s face, others in something else. You know, there’s a long history of arguments for the existence of God. Let’s look at Kant’s analysis of these arguments and how he shows their inconsistency. Let’s bring up a whole host of explanations as to why this kind of argument doesn’t hold up.
The point is that you can’t prove the existence of a higher intelligence based on your own premises — everything you’re saying is a product of your own (or our) minds. Nature itself doesn’t care about this. What you’re describing is simply a result of human cognition and nowhere else. You’re referencing modern science, right? But what is modern science? It’s human reason. So you’re creating a circular argument: you’re using the conclusions of human reason to prove the existence of some cosmic intelligence.
As for how order can emerge from chaos, I can simply point you to the way chemical reactions work: mechanisms of self-organization exist. There are countless processes by which order can arise from chaos. There are processes of entropy, sure — if you don’t sweep for a long time, you get dirt everywhere, that’s natural. But there are also processes of self-organization. Life itself is one example of how order emerges from chaos.
So, in that sense, none of these arguments work as proof of the existence — or the nonexistence — of a so-called higher intelligence. Bertrand Russell’s famous “teapot” example addresses this beautifully: Russell, who was a staunch atheist (unlike me, I’m an agnostic), demonstrated the impossibility of disproving the existence of God. His example of a small teapot launched into space — you can’t prove it doesn’t exist somewhere, but that doesn’t mean you can prove it does.
So, the impossibility of proving the absence of the teapot does not mean you’ve proven its existence. That’s basically how it is. So all these supposed “proofs” of God’s existence have, in fact, been pretty thoroughly debunked — first by Kant, then by many generations of atheists.
I, unlike the atheists, don’t believe that the lack of proof for a supreme intelligence is itself proof that it doesn’t exist. In other words, what can’t be proven doesn’t necessarily mean it doesn’t exist. That’s all.
On Futurology and Stanisław Lem Link to heading
Yaroslav Vasilyuk: I’m interested in your opinion as a philosopher. Do you consider futurology a separate branch of philosophy? Have you read Stanisław Lem’s “Summa Technologiae” and so on?
Dear Yaroslav, first of all, futurology is a direction of social thought, not a separate branch of philosophy, because futurology encompasses not only philosophy but also economics, sociology, technology, and so on. So, let’s say, futurology and philosophy are intersecting sets. Without a doubt, it’s not an independent branch of philosophy — it’s a separate direction within other social sciences as well.
As for Lem — well, listen, the man wrote “Summa Technologiae” (I don’t remember the exact year, but it was in the 1960s — and I think not even the late ‘60s, more like the mid-‘60s). And it’s truly, let’s say, inspiring? I wouldn’t say it’s mind-blowing, but it is inspiring. It’s impressive how relevant it remains today — a book written in the 1960s that seemed like science fiction at the time, yet today it’s all real, at the cutting edge of science. He described virtual reality, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence — he described everything that we’re living with today. Lem wrote all this in the 1960s.
So what does that mean? It means that soon it will be — well, already over 60 years since he predicted all of it. Lem is, without a doubt, a major thinker.
Atheist or Agnostic Author? Link to heading
A question from Kyiv: Igor Yakovenko, you’re a fierce atheist. Why do you call yourself an agnostic? Agnostics doubt something if there’s no evidence. But you don’t doubt — you flat-out assert without evidence that there is no God or intelligence.
Well, colleague, you’ve gone a bit overboard there, because I certainly don’t deny the existence of intelligence — at least not in some of my interlocutors! As for the rest, I’ve just explained my position in detail. I’m not asserting, let alone without evidence, that there is no God. I’m saying there’s no proof of it. That’s all. The evidence you offer, in my opinion, doesn’t hold up. So I’m still an agnostic, not an atheist, and certainly not a “fierce” one, as you put it.
On Inviting Eduard Topol Link to heading
Lyudmila Zavalskaya: If possible, please invite Eduard Topol. And you know, I’d like to underscore this once again.
I’ve already spoken about my criteria, and I’m still not quite sure what the collective gain in our knowledge would be if I invited him. Let me put it this way: the idea hadn’t really crossed my mind. Let’s think about it once more.
On Inviting Satarov Link to heading
Frukt Frukt: Could you invite Satarov?
Yes, absolutely. I think that Georgy Alexandrovich Satarov and I have a friendly relationship. I could invite him — he’s been on our channel before and has participated in discussions, although it was quite some time ago. But yes, he’s a very interesting conversationalist. So, probably yes, probably yes. Thank you for the idea. Especially since we have jointly worked on more than one or two projects in the past. So, yes.
Pavel Selin Link to heading
Robert: Igor Alexandrovich, someone recently suggested I listen to a guy named Pavel Selin to dispel my liberal illusions. I’ve got plenty to read and listen to already. Should I bother with this or is he just a political philosopher and publicist? Do you know him and what he’s putting out there?
Dear Robert, if you already have plenty of current reading lined up, I wouldn’t advise getting sidetracked. Although, in principle, there’s no such thing as too much knowledge. Pavel Selin — well, it’s all rather muddled. He’s very layered, but let’s put it this way: here are some clear points. He believes that the only real form of legitimate authority is the power of a monarch. He’s a staunch monarchist. He’s always talking about the necessity of sacralizing monarchical power through God. He constantly tries to formulate how to do this properly in Russian — in short, he wants to make Trump’s power sacred through God somehow and basically turn Trump into a monarch. Same goes for Putin.
So, essentially, he’s someone who in the 21st century wants us to establish a hereditary monarchy with a father-tsar. He’s a convinced monarchist who’s trying to stretch his archaic ideology over the modern world. So basically, he wants to dismantle modernity — which is based on reason — and return to the paradigm of religion, pushing for hereditary monarchy and rejecting elections. He criticizes elections as political theater, while saying that monarchy is good, the church is good.
What is this? Well, it’s some guy who’s mastered the jargon and is pitching it to everyone. He does have good delivery — he doesn’t cough, unlike me! — and he’s younger. But the content of his speeches is basically this: take Trump, crown him, anoint him with something in the name of some god, and everything will be wonderful.
Osin and Criteria for Appearing on Other Channels Link to heading
And Max from Israel — Max is a sponsor of our channel, for which I’m extremely grateful. Max has two questions: Yesterday, for the second time, I saw you on a stream hosted by someone named Gaisin. That’s why I’m asking this question a second time — maybe I missed it before. So, first: do you know who Osin is and what his views are? And if so, do you consider it appropriate to participate in his streams — even if those Tesla streams aren’t about Gaza or the Israel war? I remember you took a clear stance with Svetlana’s situation at one point. Sorry, but Osin is way ahead of Svetlana in this regard. Really hoping for an answer.
Dear Max! First of all, before going on any channel, I always try to find out at least a bit about it. There were actually two people involved: Denis Ugryumov and this guy named Ruslan. Honestly, I didn’t clarify which syllable to stress in “Osin” — but probably it’s “Osin.” This Ruslan — who is he? He’s a Tatar social activist, journalist, and the chairman of the World Forum of Tatar Youth. Besides that, he’s a columnist for “Idel.Realii,” a branch of Radio Liberty.
What are his political views? He’s a supporter of Ukraine — absolutely clear about that and speaks out forcefully in favor of Ukraine in this war. He’s not an agent; he advocates for the independence of Tatarstan. That’s all I know about him.
If I understand you correctly, you’re saying that you know about his antisemitism? I personally don’t know of any such thing. In our two conversations, there was no mention of antisemitism in any form.
Regarding Roman Grigoryevich Svitan, the topic of his antisemitic statements was widely raised in the press, so I asked Roman Grigoryevich directly about them, quoting his own words. He countered, we exchanged views, and after that, our interaction ended.
There’s an important difference here, dear Max, and I want to highlight it because it matters to me. It’s about who is inviting whom. If I invite an expert to my channel, then my standards for that expert are much higher than if I’m just appearing on someone else’s channel to answer questions. There are certainly limits in both cases, and if you think — and perhaps you have a good reason — that this person holds antisemitic views, I’m willing to check it out myself. That will take some time, and it’s quite possible that I will stop going on his channel.
But the difference with Svitan is that I was the one inviting him as an expert — I was bringing him into our shared space. That’s a significant difference.
So, regarding Ruslan Gaisin, I haven’t once heard anything remotely like that from him in our two interactions. He asked me questions — I answered. And I believe, and still believe, that having access to other audiences is important. The chance to communicate with different audiences seems very important to me.
For now, I don’t see a problem. But I’ll look into it. If you think this person holds views that are incompatible with ours, I think that’s something we can investigate and perhaps draw conclusions.
About the Shelter Security System Link to heading
So, Louis? What is the international European security system for shelters? Could you elaborate a bit on that?
Recently. Relatively recently, there was an agreement made during the contacts between Finland and Ukraine. And thus this international shelter system came about. Its essence lies in the creation of several thousand, in the construction of several thousand shelters in Ukraine, which will be carried out by Finland. That’s essentially the idea. In other words, it’s a shelter system that is indeed being created in Ukraine with the money and efforts of Finland. That’s all I know about it.
About Timestamps Link to heading
Why call yourselves that, dear friends, if you want me to call you by your names, please write them down and sign your messages. It also helps with finding questions because sometimes there are over 1000 comments, and it’s not easy to find questions among them. So please write the word “question” and sign your message. It’s simply more comfortable for me to address you as you’d like, rather than by the names that YouTube assigns. So, here’s a technical question. I understand that you’re tired of questions about timestamps for answers in the 7-40 program. But when? When will you solve the problem? For example, today’s first question. There are several similar questions, meeting with Putin, and it’s not interesting for me, so I have to search for the moment when the new question is read out.
Yes, I agree. Right now, we’re experiencing some difficulties in our work. I think we’ll overcome these temporary difficulties. I mean, these are not technical glitches, but more about the human factor. People get sick, people… well, let’s say people get sick. That’s all I can say about that. Because I can’t do it myself—it’s pretty hard to talk and set timestamps at the same time. And it’s done by real people, who, among other things, also get sick.
About Osechkin’s Human Rights Activities Link to heading
Pain is more powerful. That’s what this person calls himself. Don’t you think that all this exposure of the horrors of the prison system? Osechkin was at one time a very good tool for scaring Russians who didn’t want to go to war. “Look, guys, this is what happens in the zone. You won’t get away with it without a mop. Better to go to war. Maybe everything will end quickly and without suffering.” Another question: what do you think about the anti-Maidan actions? Osechkin, who at one time was besieging all your orange revolutions in Ukraine, seems like no one remembers that now. Osechkin is a human rights activist.
As for the second question, well yes, people change, views change, and now. Now. Osechkin is definitely a human rights activist. I think that what he… what concerns his revelations about the prison system. Your construction, you know, is so convoluted and conspiratorial. Osechkin exposes the prison system. And all these tortures are supposedly so that people will go to war. Well, I must say, I take off my non-existent hat to your inventiveness. But this, you know, is too, too original a construction to be actually real. You can make up a lot of such convoluted constructions. For example, to say that we shouldn’t kill Russian officers because that creates mobility in the Russian army, mobility and life, and so on. You can make up a lot of absurd things like that. Forgive me, but your hypothesis that exposing the torture system in Russian prisons will make more people go to war—that’s in the same category. You know, don’t kill Russian officers because that creates vacancies and thus dynamic changes in personnel that benefit the Russian army. Well, your construction seems to be of the same kind.
And about the fact that yes, indeed, Osechkin once supported the occupation of Crimea and opposed the Maidan—well, yes. But again, people change, you understand? I’m not his lawyer, I’m not going to turn him into some sort of hero. But the fact that now, in my view, he’s doing real good, that’s a historical fact.
Why There Are No Demands for the Liberation of Occupied Territories Link to heading
The Good Wolf asks. In negotiations, one side proposes its conditions. The opponents either reject them, partially agree, agree, or offer their own conditions. Why is there no alternative proposal for lifting sanctions that includes the liberation of occupied territories? I’ve never heard of it, they haven’t even hinted at it. What do you think this is related to?
You know, I don’t know. First of all, I don’t know what the actual content of the memorandum from Ukraine’s side is. I think it’s probably there. But again, you understand, there are two absolutely non-intersecting, non-overlapping positions: Russia’s position and Ukraine’s position. I’m sure that Ukraine’s position does include the liberation of occupied territories. So it seems to me that maybe you’re even wrong here, but it doesn’t really matter, you understand? These are positions that are absolutely irreconcilable. So criticizing someone for not saying something… I think that the correct position would be to demand not just the liberation of occupied territories, but also the borders of 1991. But what’s the point of stating it? Well, probably it should be stated, but it has no practical significance—it’s purely symbolic. That’s Ukraine’s position, that’s Russia’s position. There’s a chasm between them. And that chasm can’t be bridged without destroying Russia’s military potential.
About Erdogan’s Influence on Putin Link to heading
Ilya. A question, a comment. For me, it’s obvious that you can and should talk to Putin from a position of strength. Unfortunately, there’s no hope for Trump, and there’s no Churchill, Reagan, or Thatcher among European leaders at the moment. But there are at least two leaders who know how to put the upstart from St. Petersburg in his place: Xi Jinping and Erdogan. I doubt the former can be swayed to the side of good versus evil, since China has its own understanding of those terms. But the latter, Erdogan, can be swayed to someone’s side, you can interest him with something. For example, with EU membership. Perhaps there are other incentives. Especially since Erdogan is more sympathetic to Ukraine and Ukrainians in their brave struggle than to Putin’s Russia. And it’s unlikely that Putin would dare treat Erdogan the way he treated the president of Brazil. Is such a scenario with Erdogan possible? If so, why hasn’t it been attempted? What are the reasons?
Dear Ilya, I think you’re somewhat overestimating Erdogan’s capabilities. He’s trying. Erdogan has his own, so to speak, imperial geopolitical ambitions. He tries to be a mediator. But to think that Erdogan can be a tool of pressure on Putin, I think that’s a mistake. After all, while Putin really depends on China, he definitely doesn’t depend on Erdogan. And Erdogan doesn’t have the resources to pressure Putin. I think you’re somewhat overestimating this.
About Models of Societal Structure Link to heading
So, Watson, married. Someone named Igor writes that Watson Senate asked about what future projects exist today besides communism and capitalism. I’d like to say that concepts like communism and capitalism are hopelessly outdated and don’t reflect today’s reality. Currently, there are three active projects trying to be realized: the digital concentration camp project in China, the hub project nurtured in Davos and championed by Xi in Europe, and the 2025 project that Trump is building. There’s also the libertarian project in the spirit of “Millei” that rejects the state altogether, since digital technologies now allow society to be governed without a state. And all those “Musks” are now ahead of NASA. But this is too utopian for the moment. I’d like to hear your opinion on this. I’d also like to point out to Igor that these projects are well described in their YouTube videos.
So, dear colleagues, first of all, that’s a very strong simplification. And I have a question. You see, there is an enormous diversity of projects that exist, first in people’s heads and second, are actually implemented. You’re reducing everything to three projects. But what project would you classify the Putin Reich under? What project would you classify North Korea under? Reducing the Chinese project to just a digital concentration camp is a mistake. It’s a much more complex project. Let me remind you that China is still led by the Communist Party. So it’s definitely premature to dismiss communism altogether if you take North Korea, if you take that same China. Yes, it’s definitely a different kind of communism, not the one Marx and Engels prescribed. But it’s nonetheless a communist idea. Which of the three projects would you fit that under? You’re reducing everything to three. And what about Iran? And Saudi Arabia? Where would you place them?
Now, about the 2025 project, it’s not an active project, but rather an idea that’s obviously not being realized. There were some attempts to implement this dark enlightenment, but we see that even the idea of techno-fascism, which included Musk’s involvement in this project, is clearly not being realized. Especially when you say that Millei abolishes the state. Excuse me, what are you basing that on? Some statements? Yes, he’s reducing the state, but he’s certainly not abolishing it. He’s still a state figure, he heads a state, he’s the president, so he’s still a state institution. Millei doesn’t abolish the army. Millei doesn’t abolish the police. Millei doesn’t abolish the security services. Millei doesn’t abolish the tax system. That’s all the state. So saying he abolishes the state is somewhat odd, yes?
So, yes, and the very idea that capitalism and communism are outdated—yes, they’ve modernized, but they’re certainly not outdated because the foundation, if it’s based on private property, is still capitalism. And people, political scientists, and economists still use the terms capitalism and communism. What does that mean? Why is the Putin system a departure from capitalism? Because here private property rights are very heavily restricted by the state. And so it’s a very specific, very ugly form of state capitalism. This system works. These terms are used. So I devoted a lot of time yesterday to this analysis. But, in my opinion, to force everything into the Procrustean bed of three concepts is, well, strange. If you take what you call the “Schwab project,” well, meaning Klaus Schwab, it’s implemented differently in different European countries. Reducing it all to a Procrustean bed is odd. So the diversity of projects hasn’t gone anywhere.
About Whom Russians Will Choose Link to heading
Julia, you really don’t like thought experiments.
Why would you think that? I actually do like thought experiments. I just have certain demands for them. Well, all right, then,
you don’t like thought experiments, but still, somehow, Putin is gone. And there are real, honest elections in Russia. Among the candidates are Navalnaya, Yashin, Nadezhdin, and Girkin. Guess who will win? In truly fair elections? Precisely him and the patriots of the great martyr. Girkin will be welcomed with open arms. Remember Zhirinovsky. My question is, is there any sense in honest elections in post-totalitarian systems? Mark Feygin said that democracy in Russia can only be introduced forcibly, under strict control and with strict enforcement of democratic laws for many years. At first, I agreed with him, but then I remembered the sad attempt to introduce democracy in Afghanistan and similar countries. It turns out that if you’re really honest, it’s the same cycle again. Girkin, Motorola, Platon Lukin—after all, the deep people want precisely those kinds of figures.
First of all, I’m not arguing with him in this case because I haven’t heard him say such things. But the very idea that democracy should be forcibly introduced in Russia—here’s my delicate question: who will be doing the forcing? Who is this external force that will be introducing democracy in Russia? Who? You see? It’s hard to imagine someone occupying Russia, or… This idea was very popular in the early ’90s. Well, yes, in the early ’90s there was this idea of a Russian Pinochet. In fact, it was on this idea, among others, that the window of opportunity in Russia slammed shut. Because people thought that democracy in Russia had to be forcibly introduced. And for that, you had to preserve state television, which would hammer away. But in a good way, right? Reformist television that would forcibly hammer liberal ideas into the heads of Russians. For that, you had to preserve the KGB, rename it to the FSB. So you had a tool of violence, and you didn’t need to hold honest elections. Because otherwise, who knows who might get elected. The people are rather “so-so.” So this is an absolutely flawed, deeply flawed idea. That’s the first thing.
Second. You’re boiling it all down to—well, Girkin. I wouldn’t overestimate his electoral potential because, you see, unlike Zhirinovsky, Zhirinovsky was a storyteller, a populist. Girkin isn’t a populist, you see? So Girkin’s potential is actually quite small. But never mind that—it’s not even the main point. The point is, I emphasize once again, that Russia in its current form has no prospects for anything normal. The reality is that Russia is an empire that’s pregnant with disintegration. And we shouldn’t stand in the way of that disintegration. So in what direction is movement possible? Well, let’s say in the Urals Republic, there might be different options, different movements that aren’t the worst. In the Siberian Republic there could be options. Even in the same Muscovy, it’s quite possible. And there, I’m not sure Girkin or someone like him would win. But even if someone like Platon does win, well, at least that dragon doesn’t have poisonous teeth, and then they’ll work it out themselves.
So once again, I emphasize that the prospect of creating a beautiful future Russia—whether by force or naturally—simply doesn’t exist. It’s just not there. And trying to find that prospect through some sort of cunning schemes seems pointless to me.
About Inviting Supporters of Dark Enlightenment to the Channel Link to heading
A question from N. Please tell me, are there Russian-speaking supporters of the dark enlightenment whom it would be possible to talk to on a stream to understand the essence of their views? It’s clear that thinking together is hardly possible, but for the sake of studying it would be extremely interesting, if possible.
Dear colleague, if there are… Well, to say that someone has read these books and is exactly a supporter—maybe not. Although, in principle, Dugin, for example. Here you go: the brightest example of a supporter of this dark enlightenment is Dugin, who has essentially aligned himself with it. And really, the essence of dark enlightenment is the rejection of liberalism, the rejection of democracy, and, so to speak, a return to this sort of medieval dictatorship, but under a modern flag. No one is rejecting computers, no one is rejecting modern technological achievements. But with an archaic political system—Dugin, here you go. All the obscurantists, all the obscurantists, so to speak… Yes, and Putin, too, is among them. He can be considered one, although, of course, he never says anything about it. But overall, all this archaism is, so to speak, the stance of dark enlightenment supporters, implicitly—even if they don’t know it. And in its pure form, well, Dugin—there you have it, get acquainted.
The Number of Losses in the Second World War Link to heading
Svetlana, in your previous stream, there was a reproach, a question from Pavel about demographic losses. Pavel said that Ukraine lost 5 million people during the so-called Great Patriotic War. The number of people who died in the Second World War is the subject of numerous studies. And then Svetlana points out that victims among Ukrainians, citizens of the USSR, and natives of the USSR are estimated separately at 6–10 million. I’d be grateful if you could address this.
So yes, I agree. The thing is, Pavel’s question repeats itself, or rather, he somehow expands on it, and I’ll address it later. His point was not that the number of Ukrainian casualties was 5 million, but that he compares that number to what he sees as demographic losses after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And on that, he builds, so to speak, his apology for the USSR. I’ll get to that later when we get to his question. But overall, thank you. Yes, you’re absolutely right. Of course, the number of victims among Ukrainians, among the natives and residents of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, was much greater than 5 million. You’re absolutely right.
Is It Okay to Call Putin by His First Name and Patronymic? Link to heading
A question from Vladimir It grates on my ears when I hear someone, especially Putin’s opponents, refer to him by his first name and patronymic. As I understand it, in Russian and in Ukrainian, this form of address is used for someone you respect. But I hear it used by obvious opponents of Putin. For example, Dmitry Oreshkin, Oreshkin, Viktor Shenderovich, and many others. I’m against calling Putin “Vladimir Vladimirovich,” for example. Infantilism, in my opinion. Or, well, it’s clear how, but calling him by his first name and patronymic also doesn’t sit well with me. As they say, it grates on the ear. Why is this? Am I missing something in language norms, or are the speakers somehow charmed by this ghoul, without even realizing it?
Dear Vladimir, well, I don’t really share your perspective on this. You see, just because I, for example, sometimes call this ghoul by his first name and patronymic—it’s not necessarily out of respect, you understand? Sometimes it’s an intentionally pointed detachment, sometimes even irony. You see, for example, in the “Mediafrenia” program, by the way, it hasn’t been on for a while—well, apparently on Saturday we’ll have to do it—in “Mediafrenia,” we pointedly use the first name and patronymic for people we have absolutely no respect for. And it doesn’t mean respect at all. It’s just a kind of device. You know, the Russian language, like any other, is quite flexible. And so there’s no respect in this. If I refer to someone by their first name and patronymic, it doesn’t necessarily mean I particularly respect them. In some cases, yes, it’s respect. But in other cases, it can be an intentionally pointed distancing. So no, there’s no particular tone of respect here. And certainly not some sort of charm or anything. It’s just not there.
Why Take Trump Seriously Link to heading
Alex Ivanov, you’ve stopped answering all questions like before. Either you’re too busy, not interested, or just ignoring them. So, third try. Why bother with convoluted analysis of a clinical idiot? Your definition is too soft. Trump is a degenerate, all his actions are posturing by an indecisive dilettante, who will seem utterly worthless for four years, enriching his “Ivanka” clone where he has a stake. He’s a coward because of his complete incompetence. Why not create a “Clown” section? His actions are satirical—he’s a zero, and analyzing his nonsense seems like a strange activity.
Dear Alex! You see, we could extend the list of epithets about Trump, and I’d agree with all of them. But there’s one fact that still forces me, and not just me, to analyze his nonsense. He’s the leader, the president of the most powerful country in the world. He’s the most powerful person on the planet, with the greatest potential to influence world events. This is a person whose nonsense we must listen to, because to some extent, yes, to some extent actions can follow from this nonsense. So it’s important. So, you see, if—well, I’ve already said it all. It’s too important what this person thinks and says. So you can judge him however you want, but he still remains the most influential person on the planet.
About the Catastrophic Consequences of the Collapse of the USSR Link to heading
So. And here are a few questions from Pavel. Tucker, there are several. The first question. Many sociologists have recently started using demographic statistics to evaluate the quality of certain actions of the state authorities and ongoing state processes. But there’s very little trust in economic statistics. From this perspective, the destruction of the USSR had catastrophic consequences. And this is not about the rights of sperm. It’s when, due to a decline in living standards, people can’t eat properly, get medical care, and, as a result, die more often. In Ukraine in 1990, 630,000 died, and in 1995—793,000. Will you insist that the subsequent rise in mortality in Ukraine, which followed the destruction of the USSR—without war or epidemics—is not a catastrophe? That the loss of 5 million people in peacetime is not a catastrophe? That the Holodomor was not a catastrophe? There was no war.
You know, first of all, you need to clarify the numbers. The decline in the population of Ukraine was not only and not even primarily due to mortality, but, firstly, to a drop in the birth rate and emigration. Quite a large number of people left Ukraine. Freedom—do you see what the thing is? Freedom often comes with a drop in living standards and worsening in some areas. But Ukraine gained independence, it gained freedom. That price of freedom turned out to be not very low, in fact. So your use of the processes that happened in Ukraine after it gained freedom to compare them with the Holodomor… Well, I’ll leave that entirely on your conscience, entirely on your conscience, you see? Because the Holodomor was a situation where people were literally dying of hunger. Do you even know anything about Ukraine? But after it left the Soviet Union, did you see people dying of hunger on the streets and roads of Ukraine? You see? It takes a certain mindset to compare what happened in Ukraine after 1991 with what happened in Ukraine in 1932–33. You have to really want to do that, you have to really love the Soviet Union and really hate an independent Ukraine. You see? It’s a completely fantastical idea about the world. I understand, dear Pavel, that you really love the Soviet Union. That’s clear in all your questions. But not to this extent.
Now, the second question. Do you acknowledge that Putin doesn’t plan to restore the USSR? That he really dreams of an empire? And you immediately return to the idea of Putin’s place in the USSR. Do you really believe, writes Pavel, that he needs a union of countries and peoples that’s so free that they could leave whenever they want, just like what happened with the USSR? Dear Pavel, do you really believe that the Soviet Union was a union of countries and peoples so free that they could leave whenever they wanted? You really don’t understand that the Soviet republics only left the Soviet Union when the situation arose where it simply collapsed, when, after the GKChP coup and that adventure, the Soviet Union just fell apart. Real dual power emerged for the first time in the Soviet Union, when real power emerged in Russia, in the RSFSR, and it actually became an alternative to the federal center. And then the collapse began. Can you imagine the Soviet Union collapsing like that under Stalin, or under Khrushchev, or under Andropov? So, in fact, the very statement that the Soviet Union was a union of countries and peoples, so free that they could leave whenever they wanted—well, that shows you must have lived in or know about some other Soviet Union, one I have nothing to do with and never lived in.
About Power in the USSR Link to heading
So? Third question, Mike. Michael Mann has argued in the fourth volume of “The History of the State” that the USSR was not a communist dictatorship but a polycracy, which coincides with my experience and observations. You insist that it was a dictatorship of communists? So, what, there were 20… well, 20 million communist dictators, I guess. Or, if you can, formulate and justify your point of view.
You know, you’re making a slight substitution here. The thing is, it was not a dictatorship of communists, and certainly not of 20 million communists. After all, some communist working somewhere in a brigade or a kolkhoz, holding a party card, had no dictatorship. There was a dictatorship of the Communist Party. And everyone who lived in the Soviet Union, and had at least some idea of how it was structured, knows perfectly well that decisions were made in the Politburo, and these decisions were the decisions of the Communist Party. In other words, it was a sort of order, an order of sword-bearers, if you will, that had absolute power, and that power belonged to the Communist Party. That’s it.
You’re referring to someone who said that in the Soviet Union there was a polycratic form of government. Well, let’s break down what a polycratic form of government is. It’s the kind of power that’s characterized by the separation of powers, which provides for the existence of several centers of power. That is, when power is separated: head of state, government, parliament, courts, constitutional control bodies—this is what polycratic governance means. It’s characterized by decentralization of power. Nothing like that existed in the Soviet Union. Anyone who has any idea how power was structured in the Soviet Union knows perfectly well that there was no separation of powers. There was the power of the Communist Party, all decisions were made at the national level by the Central Committee. At the republic level, the central committees of the union republics, and further down, the regional party committees, district party committees, city party committees, and so on. There was no separation of power.
I don’t know if you didn’t live in the Soviet Union, or if you’re just a big admirer of the USSR who’s nostalgic for it. And you know, still yearning for ice cream that cost 20 kopecks. So, there’s no need to substitute this thesis. No one says it was the power of communists—of course, 20 million communists didn’t have any power. Power belonged to the party, which, under the principle of democratic centralism, didn’t allow for any power by individual communists. It’s a simple thing, well known to anyone who lived in the USSR.
About the Impossibility of Putting People at Risk by Calling for Protest Link to heading
The fourth question from Pavel Combining pessimism in understanding with optimism in action is a recommendation for those fighting fascism in their country from Gramsci. The understanding that you’re up against a monster, an axis of evil, shouldn’t make you freeze and become helpless like a mindless puppet. You need to act, confident that the little grain of sand you throw into the gears of the fascist state machine will jam and break it. Why do you consider this advice wrong? Is it because you don’t like its leftist undertones?
Dear Pavel, don’t put words in my mouth. I have a very specific question. “Act” means what, exactly? What would you advise someone—well, I’m not sure if a person fighting Putinism is your ally or not. I have some doubts about that now. But what would you advise someone in, say, Urupinsk, or even Moscow, who wants to fight Putinism? Specifically. You talk about grains of sand—what exactly do you mean? Sabotaging trains? Great idea! Do you recommend that? Are you doing it yourself?
So, yes, there are definitely people like that. But I won’t recommend that to anyone for a very simple reason: I don’t do it myself. You see, I don’t do it myself. I certainly won’t recommend it to people while sitting in Vilnius, because that’s a path straight to prison. Wonderful. Gramsci had the right to say such things because he was in prison himself. He had the right. Skobov has the right to say such things and give such advice, but I do not.
So you see, what should be advised, what exactly should that grain of sand be? Just show a concrete path that would allow you to destroy the state mechanism of Putin’s Russia and at the same time not end up in prison, where you’re quite likely to vanish forever. And if you’re showing a path straight to prison, you must have the moral right to do so. So that’s roughly it. My position is very simple: keep your wits about you, maintain a real, sober mindset.
A sensible approach to life through communication. Right now, there is a way to communicate with like-minded people, even from deep within Russia. I don’t see any other option. Or indeed, emigration. And all these “grains of sand” of yours—that’s complete nonsense. Well, yes, it’s a way to end up in prison. If you have that kind of determination, show us by example.
Closing Words Link to heading
So. With that, we’re wrapping up our conversation for today. I just want to remind you once again—it seems to me to be a very important conversation today with Igor Ivanovich Ayzenberg, which will take place at 8:00 p.m. We’ll be talking mostly about what’s happening right now in the United States of America, and of course in Ukraine as well, since he’s also a Ukrainian political analyst. With that, I’m ending our morning stream for today. Glory to Ukraine! Take care of yourselves! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives! See you at 8:00 p.m.! Goodbye!
Source: https://youtu.be/nqUFa3k1n_o