Trump lifted sanctions on Syria; this country will soon no longer be a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Russia is deepening the conflict with Azerbaijan. Russians have suddenly overfulfilled the plan for “developing civil identity.”
News Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is July 1st. It’s 07:42 in Kyiv right now, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what’s happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.
Airport operations suspended in Russia Link to heading
Fresh news on how the war is, after all, reaching Russian territory. As a result of Ukrainian drone strikes, the airports in Kazan, Nizhnekamsk, Saratov, and Ulyanovsk have suspended operations. These are the most recent developments. In other words, it’s quite a wide area. We see that practically the entire Volga region is under attack.
Deterioration of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan Link to heading
The most significant event happening right now—at least among those occurring in the former USSR—is the deepening rift between Russia and Azerbaijan. What’s particularly surprising is the extent to which Russian security forces are actively fueling this rift. Let’s break it down.
The most recent developments: three employees associated with the propaganda media group “Russia Today” have been detained in Baku. One of them is a videographer named Guseinova, who was filming a search at the office of Sputnik Azerbaijan—a media outlet overseen by Margarita Simonyan. (We’ll talk more about Simonyan later.) Yesterday morning, Azerbaijani law enforcement raided Sputnik’s editorial office. The Interior Ministry of Azerbaijan stated that Sputnik’s accreditation was suspended back in February, yet they continued operations through illegal financing. Later it was reported that the editor-in-chief, Igor Kartavy, and managing editor, Evgeny Belousov, were also detained. Azerbaijani media claimed they were FSB officers—whether that’s true or not, I can’t say, but Azerbaijani outlets made the accusation.
Right now in Azerbaijan, it has become quite fashionable to criticize Russia—and this criticism is coming from state-owned or pro-government media. These outlets are harshly attacking the Russian authorities in general, and Vladimir Putin in particular. One article states: “In terms of bloody purges, Putin has surpassed even Stalin.” Another article, also from a pro-government source (and given the limited number of opposition outlets in Azerbaijan, most fall into this category), describes a law enforcement raid in Yekaterinburg as a punitive operation.
The reason for this outrage is clear: certain Yekaterinburg law enforcement officers, clearly proud of their political zeal, launched a raid on the local Azerbaijani diaspora. They killed two people—confirmed to have been unarmed—and injured others. Fifty people were arrested. These so-called law enforcement “geniuses” must have thought they were doing Putin a big favor. I can only imagine how the conversation went in the local police department—something like this:
The chief tells his team during a morning meeting: “Word is those Azeris are getting cocky. Their plane went down, and now their top guy demands a personal apology from Putin—and compensation, no less! Putin told him to get lost. But seriously, what nerve! Let’s go pay a visit to the local Azeris and show them who’s boss. Arm up, go in hard, so they remember not to step out of line.”
Of course, this is a fictionalized dialogue, but it captures the general tone. Suddenly they “rediscovered” a 24-year-old case from 2001. Then, coincidentally, one of the detainees was connected to a minor alcohol poisoning incident from four years ago. At this rate, they’ll blame them for the Kennedy assassination next.
As for Azerbaijan’s response—I don’t feel sorry for Dmitry Kiselyov’s and Margarita Simonyan’s subordinates. They weren’t killed or maimed, and everything seems to have been handled relatively politely. But the broader point is this: Azerbaijan today is not what it was just a few years ago. Russian intelligence services’ failure to grasp these changes is simply mind-boggling. Azerbaijan has become a regional power. It’s no longer willing to accept Russia’s condescending attitude. Even though President Aliyev has always carried himself with dignity, he once avoided openly challenging Putin. That’s no longer the case.
Now, Azerbaijan confidently disputes Moscow’s dominance in the South Caucasus. Its victory in the Karabakh war gave Aliyev a strong sense of national power. Backing Azerbaijan is the powerful Turkish army—and Turkey operates on the principle of “one nation, two states.” That’s a strong foundation. So when Azerbaijan downed a Russian plane, even if it was a mistake, the lack of an apology was serious. There was no acknowledgment of guilt, no disciplinary action. That’s something Azerbaijan cannot forgive.
This loud and serious response from Baku indicates that the balance of power between Russia and Azerbaijan has shifted significantly in recent years. Even before the Karabakh victory, Azerbaijan had the region’s largest economy and population—larger than both Armenia and Georgia. It proved its military superiority in that conflict.
Then, after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s position in the South Caucasus weakened dramatically. Azerbaijan has taken a clear stance: it calls the Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine “occupied territories,” and although it hasn’t sent Ukraine humanitarian aid, its political position is unmistakable. Russia tried to win Azerbaijan over for a long time, ignoring the fact that Baku was increasingly siding with Ukraine.
But the relationship is asymmetrical. Azerbaijan doesn’t particularly need Russia, while Russia needs Azerbaijan quite badly. Azerbaijan, along with China, is a key window to the outside world for Russia. Major gas pipelines run through it, as well as the North-South transport corridor connecting Russia to Asian markets.
So where is the Russian Foreign Ministry in all this? What are they doing? Tonight, we’ll discuss that in more detail during the next episode of Mediafrenia—Episode 143, airing at 10:00 p.m. I still hope we’ll go live.
For now, I’ll just say that the Russian State Duma also shows zero understanding of the current Azerbaijani reality. For instance, Zatulin declared that Azerbaijan has long ceased to be a friend of Russia and is playing a double game. He thinks Baku’s reaction to the Yekaterinburg raids is just an excuse to pick a fight with Moscow. As if murdering two Azerbaijani citizens is no big deal.
I don’t know what Zatulin actually understands about Azerbaijan—he’s supposedly an expert on the CIS. But his comments are baffling. Azerbaijan is a nation with a strong national identity and solidarity. So first losing dozens of lives in a plane crash, then having two more people deliberately killed on Russian soil—that’s a very big deal.
Zatulin seems totally oblivious to this. And to top it all off, in response to worsening relations with Russia, Azerbaijan is strengthening ties with Ukraine. There were just consular consultations between the foreign ministries of Ukraine and Azerbaijan in Baku. They discussed the current state of affairs—and clearly, they’re growing closer on multiple fronts.
In the end, it’s a classic case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” That’s where I’ll leave this section on Azerbaijan.
Trump Lifted Sanctions on Syria Link to heading
And I want to talk about important events in the Middle East. Besides the consequences of the war, the 12-day war, it seems to me that a very important event has taken place. It just happened that Trump lifted sanctions on Syria. That is, he… This happened yesterday. Yesterday he signed an executive order lifting the United States sanctions on Syria. This is important primarily because the fall of the Assad regime means a significant weakening of Iran and, in fact, represents a rather serious shift in the situation in the Middle East. That is, the situation becomes much more favorable toward Israel and much less favorable toward Iran.
In addition, the White House, the Trump administration, announced that it is instructing the Secretary of State of the United States to review the status of this organization which, in essence, is now a governing structure. That is, this organization — Hayat, Ahrar al-Sham, the rebel group that essentially overthrew the regime — or at least played a decisive role in the fall of the Assad regime. So now this organization should no longer be considered terrorist.
And beyond that, the Secretary of State has been instructed to reconsider Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism. This is a rather serious move that fundamentally changes the structure of the Middle East. So, it seems to me that the developments are generally quite positive.
Of course, the United States will be monitoring closely, because this organization, which has now essentially come to power and from which the current Syrian leader emerged, has a rather problematic — let’s say — credit history. It had roots in Al-Qaeda. However, at present, this organization does not seem to have any terrorist intentions. Nevertheless, the United States will naturally keep a close eye on how the situation in Syria develops going forward. So I believe there is hope that everything will turn out well.
Now... I’m having some trouble with my computer. Just a second. I apologize, I literally need just a few minutes… I don’t think more than a minute is necessary to… to… Okay? Okay, excuse me. Looks like everything’s fine now. As always, the tech acts up right on time.
Announcement of Mediafrenia Link to heading
So, before I move on to answering your questions, I want to let you know that most likely, today at 8:00 PM, we’ll have another episode of the program Mediafrenia. There are quite a few curious things to discuss. As a preview, I’d like to say that some truly astonishing events are happening in Russia. For example, the head of the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs, Igor Barinov, announced that Russians have fulfilled and even overfulfilled the plan for developing a sense of civic identity. We’ll be talking about that this evening. Just imagine — Russians now have a strong sense of civic identity.
In addition, Margarita Simonyan declared that she intends to resurrect Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Dracula. Quite the ambitious agenda. On top of that, she also stated that Pashinin is the anus of the Antichrist — also very important information. Meanwhile, Solovyov claimed that the entire conflict between Russia and Azerbaijan was orchestrated by British intelligence agents.
There’ll be a lot more. So, in short, today at 8:00 PM, we’ll talk about this and other important and interesting events.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Now I will move on to answering your questions.
On the Resettlement of Peoples in Modern History Link to heading
So, a question from Dolche Poncho. And Igor Alexandrovich, are there examples of forced resettlement in modern history? Operation Lentil and the Crimean Tatars in the late 1980s. What happened after that?
Operation Lentil actually happened much earlier. But okay, let’s break it down now.
What happened after? — writes Ficha. Did those people return? What happened to their homes? Was it all handled legally? What happened to their homes?
Well, the fates of the Chechens and Ingush, and that of the Crimean Tatars, were actually different. I’d say that the Crimean Tatars, like the Volga Germans, had the hardest fate. Because if we go in order — what happened after? The deportation of the Chechen and Ingush peoples took place on February 23, 1944. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR was abolished, and this was a massive tragedy for both the Chechen and Ingush peoples. Tens of thousands died during the deportation and exile.
Later, in response to widespread calls — after 1956, following the denunciation of Stalin’s cult of personality — decrees from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and RSFSR launched the process of restoring the Chechen-Ingush Republic. But initially it was only a partial decision, because returning was forbidden. They were no longer labeled as criminal peoples, and the special monitoring was lifted, but return was still banned. The reason is clear: instead of the Chechen-Ingush Republic, the Grozny Oblast had been created and resettled with people — secondary settlement, as we’ve often discussed — from central regions of Russia, as well as from Georgia, South Ossetia, Dagestan, and other regions. And this was done deliberately to prevent the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Republic in the future.
In addition, there was a serious attempt not just to deport these peoples or label them criminal, but to erase them completely — from memory and from the map. Mosques were looted, cemeteries destroyed, gravestones were used for foundations and curbs. Books in Chechen, Ingush, and Arabic were burned in the squares of Grozny. It really was an attempt to erase them. Even the names of the peoples were erased — streets and squares were renamed. Everything was done to wipe the Chechen and Ingush peoples off the face of the earth.
But after the rehabilitation in 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Chechens and Ingush who were then in Kazakhstan understood that they had been rehabilitated — and that meant they could return. So they began returning en masse — without any official permission from the authorities. This created a complex situation because they were returning to the territory of the former Chechen-Ingush Republic, but other people, of other nationalities, were now living in their homes, and naturally, this led to conflicts.
Later on, the authorities of Grozny Oblast strongly resisted, but eventually a decision was made to somehow return them to the former territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic. The republic was eventually restored. This meant that settlers who were living in the homes of Chechens and Ingush began leaving in haste. Initially, the ethnic makeup was not in favor of the returning peoples, but over time, things normalized, and the republic was restored — though not within the same borders as before the deportation. Still, things gradually returned to the state we see today.
The situation with the Crimean Tatars was fundamentally different. Honestly, I still don’t fully understand why, despite researching the issue. I don’t understand why the Crimean Tatars, unlike the Kalmyks, Chechens, and Ingush, were not allowed to return to Crimea and why their autonomy wasn’t restored. There are memoirs from Mikoyan where he writes that the reason the Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic was not restored was that its territory had been resettled by other peoples, and they would have had to be relocated. But excuse me — wasn’t that exactly the case in the Chechen-Ingush Republic? And yet, the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return.
So clearly there was something else. Possibly some personal animosity. Stalin? In short, I won’t speculate, because I just don’t know for sure. And since there are probably many people from Ukraine and Crimea in our audience, you probably know the reason better than I do.
Still, the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea only began in the early 1990s, after a resolution by the USSR Council of Ministers. The Crimean Tatars started returning to Crimea, but since other people were now living in their homes, this led to problems with land seizures and territory disputes. Naturally, there were conflicts.
So that’s the story. These repressed peoples had very different fates. Even though they all suffered, the Crimean Tatars suffered the most. That is a historical fact. They were the last to be allowed to return to their homeland. And after the annexation of Crimea, many of them had to flee once again. So among all the repressed peoples of Russia, the Crimean Tatars were the most repeatedly and harshly repressed.
Why Don’t the Roma Have Their Own State? Link to heading
Now the next question is from Nail Vakhitov A. Why do you think the Roma don’t have their own state? And what is your attitude toward them? Well, my attitude toward all peoples is the same.
So why don’t the Roma have a state? Usually people ask this in comparison to how the Jews got a national state while the Roma did not. The fact is, the Roma have never had their own state, even though they are a large people — around 15 million. It’s a sizable population, but historically they never had a unified territory. There is no land that the Roma have historically claimed as their homeland. Their ancestors migrated from India, and to different parts of the world. They often moved and never really settled in or became attached to any particular place, and they don’t have a territorial identity.
So while the Roma certainly have a strong national and cultural identity, they don’t have territorial roots. When I was working on a project at Radio Liberty with corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Arutyunov — a demographic map of Russia — I tried to understand the structure of Roma national identity. And I came to the conclusion that it’s a stateless identity. In fact, this lack of statehood is something the Roma regard almost as a virtue.
Yes, there were attempts in the Soviet Union — it’s known — several times there were efforts to create a Roma autonomy. For various reasons — although these efforts even had some support from the party leadership of the USSR — in the end, it came down to a few individual enthusiasts. But overall, the idea of establishing such a state-like entity within the USSR failed.
So Roma identity is connected to preserving their traditions and culture, but not with control over a specific territory. They’re a unique people in that way — truly unique.
About General Lebed Link to heading
So, a question from a kind writer. A benevolent person writes: The question was inspired by the periodic discussions on the channel about General Lebed. I remember that in the 1990s, he was sometimes compared to General Matvei Shaposhnikov because of his behavior in August 1991. And my question is based on the assumption that if a hypothetical Shaposhnikov had been in the Russian army, he too would have said on February 24, 2022, “I do not see an enemy before me.”
Well, let me explain. This is no longer the benevolent person writing—this is me. Let me clarify that these words—“I do not see an enemy before me”—were said by General Shaposhnikov when he was ordered to crush and shoot the protest in Novocherkassk with tanks. That is, he was given a direct order. He looked, saw unarmed workers, and said that he did not see an enemy before him, and he refused to carry out the criminal order. As a result, he was dismissed. A criminal case was initiated against him. Given his merits—he was a war hero—he wasn’t imprisoned, but he was subjected to non-carceral forms of repression. That’s how it was. Let me continue the question.
I was interested in the personality of the real SHAPOSHNIKOV. What amazes me most is how he managed to preserve himself in the conditions of Stalinist repression. And here’s the question: how did Putin and the Putin regime succeed in doing what Stalin failed to do—purge the army of all possible SHAPOSHNIKOVs?
You know, I think Shaposhnikov was a combat general, a general who had fought. And participation in the war was, in general, an important factor for many. These were people who had won. And this was, after all, the early 1960s. There was still that spirit of true victory—not a frenzy, but a genuine spirit of victory. And that definitely played a role. So yes, he was a unique individual. There were very few such cases. An open protest, a refusal to follow orders for humanistic reasons—very rare. So he was a unique person.
As for the question of how the Putin regime succeeded in doing what Stalin failed to do—purging the army of all possible SHAPOSHNIKOVs—well, in fact, not entirely. Because even Lebed, in some ways, was that kind of person. Of course, he was different, not like Shaposhnikov, but still, he was someone clearly not ready to carry out any and all orders. And the result is known—he was killed. The same goes for Rokhlin—General Rokhlin. Another example of a general who retained some political agency.
The destruction and elimination of political agency from the army was a top priority for Stalin and post-Stalin leadership. We know that Khrushchev and Brezhnev closely monitored to ensure that the army had no political role. The last flash of agency in the army came after Stalin, when Zhukov was still Minister of Defense. Then the army still had some elements of agency. But after he was dismissed and forced into retirement, the army was left completely without agency—completely under the control of party organs and security services. The army was under dual control. It was through this that all potential Shaposhnikovs were removed from the army—by placing the army under dual control of the party and the secret services.
And after the party collapsed, they moved to individual selection. That is, people were either removed or selected strictly on the basis of loyalty.
One minor question remains—why did Shaposhnikovs still appear under Stalin, but under Putin, perhaps even more than under Stalin, they did not? Well, the army Stalin had was, ultimately, an army that had taken part in victory—in a massive war. And it was simply not possible to rely only on obedient cogs, gray little mice. Therefore, figures like Shaposhnikov emerged. Because you could not win such a war relying solely on absolutely loyal and politically obedient people.
Putin’s war is completely different. Putin is waging war against an opponent who is obviously significantly weaker. Stalin had to fight an enemy that, at the very least, matched him in military potential. So the task was entirely different. Which is why it was impossible to fully purge the army back then.
How Ukraine’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Could Affect the End of the War Link to heading
So, a question from Viktor in Samara. I still can’t understand how Ukraine’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could affect the end of hostilities. Would Putin, upon learning this, immediately withdraw troops from the occupied territories? If nuclear weapons can’t be used, then how can they serve as a deterrent before a war has even started? That makes sense in some contexts. But in this case, it makes no sense at all. Explain it to us in the simplest terms.
Dear Viktor, of course, the acquisition of nuclear weapons would not immediately end the war. In general, this is a very hypothetical issue, because if we move from the realm of wishful thinking to the realm of reality, then clearly, in the foreseeable future, Ukraine will not obtain nuclear weapons for the simple reason that any attempt to acquire them would trigger a strong political reaction from its European and American allies. So that won’t happen.
But in principle, if and when Ukraine does acquire nuclear weapons, then—right now, of course—that would not end the war. However, since we live in a world where there is a real possibility that after this hot phase of the war ends, Russia will still exist and continue to pose a threat, then preventing a future phase of the war is exactly where nuclear weapons would come into play. Attacking a nuclear-armed state involves a different level of risk.
That’s why I think, overall, the transformation of Ukraine into a powerful military state might include, in the long term, acquiring nuclear weapons—if and when there is a pause in the war, some period of preparation for the next phase, and so on. In that context, the need for nuclear weapons would become both relevant and feasible. Because as long as Ukraine remains in acute need of constant support from Europe and America, the creation of nuclear weapons is, of course, not possible.
On Reading Books and Achieving Success Link to heading
Is that so? Arkady Mikhailov. You were asked about reading books in connection with achieving success in life. In your opinion, there is a connection, but only indirectly. I disagree. A person reading books relevant to their professional field—say, an engineer—always moves directly toward success. A good engineer in the 20th century, when relocating, never had housing problems, even if they wrote syllable by syllable. And we’re talking about a decent apartment by the standards of the time. They were given one almost immediately. Would you agree? The circumstances of achieving success were indirect only for non-technical and non-productive individuals. Of course, there were exceptions. For brown-nosers, success was sometimes greater than that of good engineers.
You know, dear colleague, I must say that I, well, don’t quite agree with your assessment. And here’s why. Because, you see, you’re talking about upskilling, about investing, so to speak, in this kind of engineering capitalization—in other words, increasing engineers’ competence through reading books. But here’s the thing, you see? If I understand correctly, we’re talking about specialized literature, but specialized literature can quite well be read online. That’s why the conversation is really about books—about humanities literature. Specialized literature? Why not? Specialized literature still? Yes, of course, of course. Those are also books, they are books, without a doubt. But the difference between reading this kind of literature online and on paper isn’t very clear, especially since there are many articles and so on. So, in short, I don’t quite agree with this interpretation. Right. Although, it’s quite possible—I don’t know, since I’m not an engineer—that maybe you, maybe you’re right.
“From Moscow” and “to Ukraine”? Link to heading
A question from Alex Here’s the confusion. I’m Ukrainian, my first wife is Russian, a true Muscovite, both of us have higher education. She graduated from the Plekhanov Institute and is very proud of it. And when I said “from Moscow” [“с Москвы”], she would get very angry and correct me. And when she said “to Ukraine” [“на Украину”], I would correct her too—Why do you keep saying “to Ukraine,” shouldn’t it be “in Ukraine”? She fell silent and didn’t know what to say. The question is—do even smart, well-mannered Muscovites get confused, or are they doing it on purpose?
You know, I don’t think—although maybe—they’re doing it on purpose. I wouldn’t rule out that many people, even knowing how it should actually be said, do it deliberately to show their disregard for the feelings of Ukrainians or for the linguistic norms that emerged due to the changing relationship between Russia and Ukraine.
The situation with these prepositions in standard Russian is very simple. Before 2014, it was generally a superficial issue. That is, yes, the vast majority of people in Russia—including those who didn’t have any imperial sentiment, like me, for example—used to say “na Ukrainu” (“to Ukraine”). Because, yes, that was a certain norm in the Russian language. I’m not getting into whether it was right or wrong, or into those discussions about whether Ukraine was considered a state, an island, etc.—that’s all disingenuous.
The issue is very simple: as soon as the situation escalated—when Crimea was occupied and war broke out in Donbas—several markers emerged. For example, the black-and-orange St. George ribbon became a sign of someone who supported the occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. And the preposition “na” (“to Ukraine”) became another such marker. Ukrainians clearly said—what the hell? We’re a country, a sovereign state. So it’s “in Ukraine,” like “in Russia,” “in Kazakhstan,” “in the USA,” and “in Ukraine.”
Immediately, people who respect Ukraine’s national feelings and sovereignty said, “No problem, of course.” The overwhelming majority of my acquaintances reacted instantly. And I must say, as someone who deals professionally with the Russian language—as language is the working environment for a journalist—I know for sure that one of the key drivers of language change (since language is mutable and norms evolve) is politics. Under political influence, language changes.
And the norm instantly changed for the majority of reasonable people. A new norm emerged: “in Ukraine.” So people who continue clinging to the now imperial-sounding norm “na Ukrainu” are simply people who lack any respect for others—for other peoples.
You know, it’s like those who enjoy dragging metal across glass. Even when you say it’s unpleasant, they keep doing it. Or someone who smokes indoors—when you say it’s unhealthy and uncomfortable, and they say, “I’ll smoke if I want to.” It’s the same kind of thing. I think it’s just tactlessness.
So as for whether they’re smart and well-mannered—I’m not so sure. It seems to me that by now it’s clear to everyone that these prepositions have become a marker that divides Russians into imperialists and… let’s say, those who are not.
How is the vector of humanity’s development formed? Link to heading
Mikhail Khramtsov Thank you for the comment on my remark, I agree with it.
Indeed, more than anything, I… Why am I reading this out loud? Because what follows is precisely an attempt. Mikhail Romanov’s comment offers a different, alternative reading. So,
“The proper approach, apparently, is more feasible as a strategy and tactics of politics. And the ‘ought’ is more. And the ‘ought’ is greater. Who? Philosophers? Or is there no such division? It all depends on personal preferences. Is anyone trying to form the vector of humanity’s development? Let’s not consider the Freemason theory. Or is it formed spontaneously, depending on the situation? Or is it not formed at all? Are we just groping in the dark? Do humanity’s thinkers consider what we want to achieve and what needs to be done to get there? Or is there a vague understanding, but still no common clarity — like the movement ‘Ours’ — a blind march toward an abyss, hoping we’ll somehow make it through.”
Dear Mikhail! Well, in fact, all the debates about the presence or absence of ideology are precisely discussions about the vector of humanity’s development — or of a particular people, or of a specific state. Ideology is exactly about that. When you ask whether anyone is trying, so to speak… whether anyone is trying to form a development vector — yes, they are. Those people who are politicians, who are carriers of one ideology or another, are indeed trying. Communists, for example — they tried very hard and are still trying to form the vector of humanity’s development. The Church is trying — that is, those churches that serve as a kind of foundation for political ideology. Well, like Christian Democrats and so on — they are trying to form a development vector. Practically all ideologies — communist, Nazi, fascist, liberal, social democratic, anarchist — they all strive to shape humanity’s development vector. But since the situation is such that there are many of these vectors, humanity moves in a kind of fluctuating trajectory. That is, not strictly in one set direction, but sometimes the resultant direction, sometimes another. In other words, a kind of balance or equilibrium arises from the summation of different applied forces. So yes, they are definitely trying. Ideology is precisely about shaping the vector of humanity’s development.
On creating a program about how Russians ended up in their current madness Link to heading
So, a question from Katerina, Katerina from Odesa: Maybe you have the opportunity to do a program from a scientific point of view? How did Russians end up in such madness? During Soviet times, of course, we had no access to information, but now it would be interesting from a social science perspective.
Yes, that’s an interesting, interesting idea. I think that, to some extent, we will try to do that. The thing is, since this is in a Telegram channel chat, it’s essentially a live exchange of opinions. And here’s Leonid, following up on Katerina’s point, writing:
Yes, that would be very interesting. Here’s a thesis for a future discussion. Nowadays, in the era of the internet and unlimited access to information, you can find anything you want. But the internet has become a propaganda tool even more powerful than television — especially with the rise of social media. At first, it was about interest groups, finding classmates, and so on. Then came news feeds, and it became possible to share news and memes. Let’s remember those “We can do it again” plaques, and the lists of Ukrainian cities supposedly founded by Russians — thousands of them. This means propaganda can be spread via the internet disguised as folk creativity. That’s how Russians ended up in madness.
Well, let’s put it this way — that’s one side of the program Katerina from Odesa is talking about. In the end, I think it’s something worth thinking about.
On Tinkov’s words, or why the Russian people don’t want democracy Link to heading
So, here’s another big, long question from Gloomy Donkey. Tinkov. OSSETIAN. On Russia’s prospects. I told my son: when I die — in Russia — undoubtedly, another window will open. Don’t even think about going there and investing. I understand there’ll be 500% profit. Don’t go there. Not for beautiful women. Not for the 500%. It’s simply cursed land. It’ll be another NEP. End of quote. Quotation marks — and Gloomy Donkey continues: If you look at what happened after perestroika — for me, that’s NEP. Just that the original NEP lasted seven years, and this one — 30. A bit longer. Foreigners came, brought in technology, equipment. Then Stalin kicked them all out. Same thing here. Over 30 years they built all these Danone factories, etc. Now they’ve been taken over, and they’ll sit on them for another 30 years. Then they’ll all die, new ones will come in, and it’ll start all over again. This will all be temporary because the Russian people don’t want democracy. That’s the key idea of Gloomy Donkey. The Russian people don’t want democracy. That’s the core. They don’t need it. That’s the problem. And here’s another key point from Gloomy Donkey: the problem is not Putin. Putin is a reflection of the people, writes Gloomy Donkey. He’s just a good marketer. He simply gives people what they want. Please comment on this. According to this position, the root cause isn’t Putin, but the Russian people. An imperial, slavish people. Slavish not in the literal, physical sense — I have to clarify that, so no one nitpicks the term. And a postscript: a big request not to manipulate by substituting a couple thousand inmates for the entire 150 million population of Russia — I have to ask this explicitly, since such tactics have been used repeatedly and they undermine the rule of exception.
Right? Well, let’s say this — look. The worldview is clear. At least in Gloomy Donkey’s head. So it turns out that Putin is not to blame. He’s a democrat, right? He’s doing what people want — a democrat. So he’s not guilty; he’s just a reflection of the people. A mirror. And the mirror’s not to blame. The issue isn’t with Putin. Putin isn’t guilty. Second, according to this view, he’s a good marketer. Meaning, he knows how to sell people something they wouldn’t buy from a bad marketer. If he were a bad marketer, they wouldn’t have bought into fascism. You see what you’re actually saying? Since Putin is a good marketer, he’s managed to sell Russians all this fascism. If he were a bad one, they wouldn’t have bought it. So he knows how to sell people what they wouldn’t otherwise accept.
But what’s really going on? If we step back from this oversimplified worldview that Gloomy Donkey is promoting, here’s the reality: the general population is passive. It’s scared. It’s not ready to leave its comfort zone. You’re saying that Putin does what people want. But I don’t recall people, at the end of August 1999, demanding bombings. In September 1999 — I don’t remember any nationwide call to blow up apartment buildings. This whole Ryazan sugar setup — where was the demand for that? You say Putin does what people want — but Putin blew up buildings to come to power. I don’t recall people asking for war against Ukraine in 2022. There was no public mood for that, no such demand. Sure, there were isolated crazies like Zatulin or Girkin, but the majority of people weren’t calling for an invasion of Ukraine.
And I don’t remember any mass public demand in the early 2000s to destroy NTV. People watched NTV — it was the most popular channel. There was no movement to shut it down. This is a simplified view of reality. The real picture is different. I’ll try to offer you, Gloomy Donkey, and everyone else, an alternative model. Imagine the population as a big body, a large organism with certain pain points or buttons. And along comes someone — okay, you want me to use the term “marketer”? Fine. A marketer comes along and presses certain buttons. If it’s Putin or Hitler, they press particular buttons in this social organism — and it moves toward fascism or imperialism, and so on.
Another person might come to power and press different buttons. So it’s not that the people are inclined only toward one direction. There are many possibilities within them. And Putin plays certain strings. There are others — untouched. He activates the imperial ones. He plays the darkest, basest notes in people’s souls — and those resonate.
So assuming that all Russians — or as you prefer to say, “Russians,” even though there are many non-Russians too — assuming they’re all hellspawn is wrong. That’s oversimplification. Yes, as a result of Putin’s actions, and not only Putin but the war too, many Russians have indeed become hellspawn. But they weren’t born that way. That’s the point.
This notion that within the population are many buttons, and a skilled pianist can press different keys — and depending on which ones are pressed, the resulting “melody” varies. You could, maybe not play the Moonlight Sonata, but something halfway decent. Or you could get Murka. Or you could get Shaman’s screams: “Ya russkiy!”
It all depends on which keys of this social body you press. So I tried to explain a different worldview — one that I believe is more accurate than the oversimplified version offered by Gloomy Donkey.
Christianity – the pinnacle of Judaism’s development? Link to heading
Lemeshev. In response to your subscribers’ questions, you’ve repeatedly emphasized that Christianity arose as a sect within Judaism. Did I understand you correctly?
Well, of course, you understood correctly. Right away, I’ll say yes, you got it right.
But let me clarify something. Do you mean that in terms of form or content? If it’s about form, no issues. But if you’re referring to content and this topic matters to you, next time I’m ready to offer a well-reasoned counterargument and show that Christianity is actually the pinnacle of Judaism’s development.
And here Lenin thanks for the reference to the study “The Jewish People in Russia: Who Belongs, How and Why.” Dear colleague, you see, the question of contrasting form and content doesn’t seem particularly relevant here. Christianity arose as a sect within Judaism—it’s just a fact. Historically, that’s simply how it was. There were quite a few sects within Judaism of various directions. And Christianity was one of the sects within Judaism—just by fact, by form, and by content. It arose as a sect within Judaism.
As for whether Christianity is the pinnacle of Judaism’s development—well, there are different viewpoints on that. What does “pinnacle” mean? What criteria are you using? Are you saying this is the pinnacle and that’s the bottom? I mean, I don’t know. That’s a question that requires establishing some kind of coordinate system—where is the top and where is the bottom, you know?
And that’s a topic of discussion—I agree with you—it’s a matter for a religious studies scholar, a pointed discussion. And here, since I consider myself a specialist in the sociology of religion, I think I could take part in such a conversation. I’m not sure it would interest a broad audience, but again, this is a matter of setting up a coordinate system. If we establish a proper coordinate system and agree on it—that’s key. And I have serious doubts about that. I don’t think we’ll find impartial interlocutors.
Now, I am an impartial interlocutor. Why? Because I relate to Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism—and Islam—equally. But people who belong to one confession or another probably can’t even be participants in this conversation.
About Depression Link to heading
Yulia, what do you think about the phenomenon of depression? On the one hand, it sometimes feels like bad weather that you just have to wait out. But overall, depression reminds me of the chemical formula of a baseball ring, where a person seems to send themselves around and around. And even if they take antidepressants, they don’t really break this ring. It seems to me that the only way out is to perform basic acts of love, even if it’s through force of will. Like, for example, forcing yourself to go outside and feed the crows. Do you have your own views on depression, its causes, and how to overcome it? As I understand, the number of antidepressants is growing year by year, but so is the number of people who need them.
Well, the topic of depression is vast. So I’ll have to respond briefly. Naturally, natural antidepressants include work, sports, movement, love, nature, and so on. But very often, a person needs help. And of course, antidepressants can also be an option. So here, there are a lot of issues, but they need to be addressed specifically. Because in general terms, everything seems clear to me. But as soon as we start getting into specifics, that’s when the problems begin.
About Solonin Link to heading
They seem to be raising a question Igor Aleksandrovich, could you please share your opinion on Solonin? I know, I know you’ve already spoken about many people and it’s possible to find that. But the list someone compiled—I haven’t been able to find it. Solonin was recommended to me as a historian and someone trustworthy, but when I looked at his channel, I was shocked by his opinions on Ukraine. I’m speechless. Why is someone who isn’t even a citizen speaking out here? I’m staying silent for now, though not really silent, to be honest. But this is TASS. Recently, our government published a list of harmful bloggers not to be promoted. I have a strong feeling he belongs on that list too—and should pack his bags and head to Russia.
Well, I don’t want to comment right now. Solonin is a prominent figure, and I’ve already spoken about him multiple times. So I just want to say that unfortunately, that list hasn’t been updated in a long time. In the description of each channel, there’s a section with details—there’s a button there called “Igor Yakovenko’s Opinion.” That’s what it is—not a very modest name, I suppose—it’s marked with an abbreviation, if I’m not mistaken. It’s the correct one. You can tap it, and it opens a fairly extensive document where, at least in the past, I shared my views on various people. I haven’t updated it in a while.
About Tamara Morshchakova Link to heading
So what now? An anonymous person asks What do you think, Tamara Georgievna MORSHCHAKOVA—have you seen the film about her on Meduza? A few words.
Well, dear colleague, I haven’t seen the film on Meduza about Morshchakova. As for who she is—my attitude toward her is one of deep respect. She was truly one of the most honorable members of the Constitutional Court. I remember well how, in September 1993, she was among the absolute minority of judges who voted against—voted against Zorkin. Against recognizing Presidential Decree No. 1400 as grounds for his removal from office. I have mixed feelings about the events of 1993, but I believe that kind of stance—that is, Zorkin’s clear support of Rutskoy and Khasbulatov—was flawed. And the fact that Tamara Georgievna Morshchakova openly opposed Zorkin’s position—I consider that an act of courage. Also, regarding Yeltsin—back in 1993 she seemed to defend Yeltsin, but in 1995 she opposed him when she challenged the deployment of troops to the Chechen Republic. So, she acts out of a commitment to the law, not to individuals. A very respectable person.
About “Nasha Russia” Link to heading
So, a question from Ion. What do you think of the show Nasha Russia? I haven’t watched it myself, but since Sheitelman talked about it, I’d like to know your opinion on the show.
You know. It’s honestly quite difficult to watch comedy shows on Russian television these days, because, well, all of them—like Comedy Club, Nasha Russia—they’re, first of all, not that funny, in my opinion. And second, they always include a certain kind of provincial undertone. It’s a kind of humor that stays within certain boundaries. But they never dare to joke against the authorities. At least that was the impression I got. So, I don’t know. Let me repeat—I wouldn’t want you to take me as some kind of expert on Nasha Russia.
Yuval Noah Harari Link to heading
Right. And the second question from Ion, Your opinion on Yuval Noah Harari
He’s a very good historian. A very good popularizer. You know, I’ve seen his books in stores many times, I even flipped through them. And I realized he’s a good science communicator. But I never bought any of his books—not because I think I’m somehow above that kind of popular writing. It just seemed to me that he comes across like Captain Obvious. In other words, they didn’t grab me. Maybe that’s just subjectivity. Maybe it’s snobbery? I don’t know. But many times I stopped by his books, picked them up, flipped through them, but never actually bought one. Although, judging by the massive print runs and his immense popularity—he’s, I don’t know, a guru, universally recognized. I also didn’t really like the situation with the Russian edition, because in one of his books, there was a section on post-truth—in the original English version, that section was based on a quote from Putin, based on Putin’s lies. In the Russian edition, that section was altered. Instead of Putin, they substituted Trump’s lies. And from what I found out, the author agreed to it. I feel like, in doing so, he effectively joined the ranks of those same post-truthers he criticizes. It seemed to me that in this case, the author, the historian, betrayed his own principles. So, that’s how I see it.
On Whether Ukraine Is Moving Toward Democracy or Authoritarianism Link to heading
A question from Viktor. To start with a quote from the newspaper: Sociologists explained why some Ukrainians believe that authoritarianism is developing in Ukraine. Opinions among Ukrainians about whether Ukraine is moving toward democracy or authoritarianism are split. This is shown by the results of a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 50% believe Ukraine is more likely moving toward democracy, while 41% pointed to the development of authoritarianism. Another 9% were undecided. Those who pointed to authoritarianism were given an open-ended follow-up question asking why they think that. The most frequent answers included restrictions on freedom of speech or media pressure—18% of those respondents. Another 14% mentioned concentration of power, 13% general dissatisfaction with events, and 12% corruption, the work of the Central Committee, etc. Particularly illustrative was the perception of concentrated power and lack of elections—18% of those who see authoritarianism mentioned one of these. However, when recalculated, that translates to only 7% of the total population. And here comes the commentary—the question is: is this sociology or manipulation? Because if you divide any survey results by the total population, then all results become negligible.
Dear colleague, Viktor, I really don’t understand where you got that from. I trust your quoting, but excuse me—if it says right at the beginning that the results of the poll showed opinions are split, 50% say democracy and, if I’m not mistaken, 41% say authoritarianism, then that’s what it is. Where does the 7% come from? I don’t understand that. I don’t see how that makes sense. I strongly doubt that you can calculate it that way. So, I don’t know—if someone really made that conclusion, I have serious doubts. I’ve spoken several times—well, at least a few times—with the director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Mr. Paniotto, as well as the executive director and other sociologists. So I don’t think they would write such nonsense. Most likely—this is my hypothesis, I stress—it may have been some unqualified journalists who interpreted it that way. But no sociologist would write that. If the question is asked and 50% say democracy, 41% say authoritarianism, then no further recalculations are necessary. Those numbers are clear and understandable. If the sample is representative, then that is the equivalent of applying it to the entire population. That’s all. What more do you need? Where the 7% figure came from—I have no idea.
Timestamp Question Link to heading
So, Bella Donna writes in outrage stream duration 02:42. Still no timestamps. Channel admins, do you have a conscience,
Dear Madonna! Do the channel admins have a conscience? Well, this stream does have timestamps. You just didn’t see them. It happens—we all get tired, we all get confused. So, the timestamps are there, have a look and you’ll find them. And I can guarantee you that the channel admins do have a conscience. They are very, very conscientious and decent people.
On the U.S. Supreme Court Decision About Birthright Citizenship Link to heading
So? A question from Lara—actually, more of a comment. It was the right decision to end birthright citizenship. This is about the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that sided with Trump. It was the right move—birthright citizenship was being abused. Women were coming specifically to give birth there. And how many children of Russian officials were born in the U.S.? It’s time to put a stop to this. The country has turned into a ditch. I’ve been to towns near New York—it feels like you’re in Latin America or who knows where. Immigration really should be controlled. Even if the socialists and humanists don’t like it.
Dear colleague, what you’re expressing are your preferences, your views about how America should look. That’s all fine—you have every right to that. But there’s this thing called the Constitution, you see? There’s the 14th Amendment, which Trump violated. And if the Constitution can be violated on this issue, then it can be violated on the First Amendment too—freedom of speech could be canceled, and then other amendments, and eventually the core articles. So, really, it’s simple. There’s the law, and there’s the Constitution. You say, “It was the right move. It’s time to put a stop to it.” Then change the Constitution. That’s what this is about. You see, either there’s the rule of law—or there isn’t. If you want the population of the United States to be a different color and that’s your reason, then change the Constitution. That’s all there is to it.
Again About Novikov and Zelensky Link to heading
So, Korney Prokhorov Still, if we return to Novikov, Igor Aleksandrovich, you avoided his main criticism of Zelensky. You acknowledged it as fair but chose not to comment on it. You said you don’t comment on Ukraine’s internal politics, so I’ll ask the question. But answer only if you wish. Why didn’t Zelensky postpone the Poroshenko case until after the war and instead chose to pursue it now—when, frankly, there are more urgent matters than Poroshenko?
Well, I’m not ready to agree with that. That’s not the core issue. Novikov’s main complaint against Zelensky isn’t actually about Poroshenko. It’s that Novikov sees Zelensky as a bad, bad, bad president. And he sees Poroshenko as a hero, and Zelensky as not one. In short, his main idea is that Zelensky needs to be replaced—now. How? Just by gathering everyone together and saying, “Let’s change him”? No. That would mean elections. The problem is that the majority of Ukraine’s population doesn’t want that. That’s it. So the real question is: what is Novikov actually trying to achieve? He wants elections to be held now. But, according to broad public polling, the Ukrainian people don’t want that. And besides—it’s simply not feasible. Just realistically—it’s not possible.
More About Novikov Link to heading
So, Lyuda Novikov is telling the truth. And be objective.
Well, fine—you believe he’s telling the truth? I’ve analyzed what he says. Yes, partly he tells the truth, but most of what he says is not true. And that can be demonstrated point by point.
About Netanyahu Link to heading
So, moving on. Dear Igor, we respect and value you greatly, but regarding Netanyahu—you’ve got quite a few inaccuracies. Sorry, but his wife is accused of returning bottles. I personally saw her returning bottles at a nearby beer kiosk. The courts and the leftist movement are against Netanyahu. He’s the victim of something unthinkable. Burning with envy, they want to remove him. Sad, frightening—but that’s how it is.
You see, I don’t know anything about bottles. What I do know is that there are several cases—and in one of them, it involves gifts worth $250,000, or over 200 thousand dollars. That’s not about bottles. And that’s just one case. Look, with Netanyahu, all this court stuff has been going on for a long time. There was a period when I used to write articles for the Israeli press, so I processed all of this personally. That’s why I know these court cases well. And they’re definitely not about bottles. And beyond all that, there have been attempts to take over the judiciary. It’s a complete parallel with Trump—a push to create a super-presidential, essentially authoritarian country, where the separation of powers becomes a fiction.
On the Actual and the Normative Link to heading
And Asbest asks a question, was looking for Mikhail Khromov’s question to laugh, and didn’t find a question—more of an opinion or interpretation.
It seems to me this isn’t exactly about the actual or the normative, but here—I apologize, dear colleague Arestovich—Mikhail Khramtsov himself confirmed that it was indeed about the actual and the normative. And now I quote Asbest’s comment:
“and more directed at young nations maintaining their existence. National-historical roots were lost not by accident. In return, we received industrialization and modernization. We transitioned into modernity, yes. But something important was lost. I’d say—humanism. It feels like it’s somehow connected to national identity. Meaning, a humane person can’t just be a person. He must be a Ukrainian, Georgian, Jew. But when stepping into global communication, it’s foolish to do so in a loincloth. There are rules, and beyond that, by overemphasizing the national theme, we revert into the past and rapidly fall out of modernity. And humanism doesn’t grow in the process. That’s the paradox.”
So, I’m trying to extract the core from your vivid and figurative comment. First of all, the author of the question you couldn’t find is Mikhail Khramtsov—he just confirmed that his question was indeed about the actual and the normative. Now, as for your interpretation—it’s rather interesting. But you know, I’m not sure that humanism is closely or linearly connected to national feeling. Let’s try to rationalize your idea—to give it some dynamics. So what is the connection between humanism and national identity? Does it follow—this is just a hypothesis—that the stronger one’s national identity, the more humane one is? Let’s try a thought experiment. The extreme form of national feeling is Nazism. Right? Meaning, as national identity grows and fills the whole person, that person becomes a Nazi. That’s the ultimate form of national identity. So by that logic, humanism equals Nazism? I get that I’m oversimplifying, but still. I’m not convinced that a person with a weak sense of national identity—for instance, people who consciously suppress their sense of nationality—can’t be a humanist. I know people who say: “I don’t care if I’m a Jew, a Ukrainian, Russian, Kazakh, whatever. I could be an elderly Black man for all I care.” And to say such a person can’t be a humanist—I don’t know, I don’t think so. On the other hand, if you do see some kind of connection, what kind is it? There are different types of connections. Linear? Definitely not. Threshold-based—only if some minimum is present? That doesn’t really work either. No matter how I look at it, your hypothesis seems, to me, unconvincing. Maybe I misunderstood you. If so, please—it’s very important to express your thoughts precisely.
On Internal “Migration” and “Emigration” Link to heading
Because I’m often asked—this next question is directly related to the precision of wording. Natalya Zamkova asks: I think the question was about internal emigration. A person meant the internal state of someone who disagrees with the politics and ideology of their country, but has no opportunity to openly express their opinion. They have no allies or like-minded people around. So the person withdraws into internal emigration—that is, they don’t support or they condemn what’s happening, but only inwardly. There are such internal emigrants in today’s Russia as well.
Dear Natalya, here’s my response. You see, I’m reading Ildar’s question. In Ildar’s question, it says migration, not emigration. So I responded accordingly. Internal migration means movement within a country—it refers to things like industrialization, moving from village to city, settling Siberia, all that—internal migration. That is, population relocation within a country. And then there’s internal emigration, which is what you’re talking about. Maybe Ildar did mean “emigration” and just wrote “migration” by mistake—that can happen. But then the question needs to be phrased precisely. I mean, I can’t guess—I’m not a mind reader, especially with people I don’t see. I read the text, and it said “migration, internal migration.” So I spoke about that.
Closing Words Link to heading
So, dear friends, this concludes our morning stream for today. Thank you for your patience. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander Skobov and all Russian political prisoners! By the way, Skobov has written two remarkable texts in which he engages in a debate with me, despite the unequal conditions. I will allow myself to respond to him. Alexander Valeryevich is an extremely honorable person, and I believe that one form of support is precisely this kind of discussion. He is a thinking person—and by thinking, he exists. So: freedom for Alexander Skobov, for all Russian political prisoners, for Ukrainian POWs. See you at 8:00 PM. Goodbye.
Source: https://youtu.be/bjAEfXXK8Tc