On Monday, indirect (shuttle) negotiations will take place between Russia and Ukraine, involving Ukraine’s fierce enemies. The collapse of Tesla as a prelude to the collapse of the United States.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is March 21st. It’s 7:42 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what’s happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Ukrainian Strikes on the Engels Military Airfield and Russia’s Parallel Strikes on Civilians Link to heading
Well, first of all, let’s say it’s both good news and bad news — or rather, good news. The good news is that Kyiv — the Armed Forces of Ukraine — struck the airfield in Engels, and ammunition continues to explode there. This is good news because it means that this ammunition won’t be launched at peaceful Ukrainian cities and won’t kill any Ukrainians. In fact, this happened in the Saratov region. The governor of that region, Roman Basargin, reported that Ukrainian drones struck the airfield in Engels — the location where heavy Russian bombers are based — and right now, secondary detonations of ammunition are still ongoing. It’s good news because each of those munitions could have killed Ukrainian civilians — but didn’t.
On the other hand, in parallel — not in retaliation, but in parallel — Russia is striking Ukrainian civilian cities, causing destruction. In particular, there were strikes on Odesa and Sudzha. Notably, these are definitely not military targets. So, this is an asymmetrical situation: Ukraine strikes a military airfield, and Russia responds by targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.
The Future Talks Are Completely Undermined by the Composition of the Russian Delegation Link to heading
Now, regarding the events scheduled for Monday — parallel negotiations are set to take place. There will be talks between the Russian and American delegations, and also between the Ukrainian and American delegations. The structure of these negotiations is typical shuttle diplomacy. But first, I just want to say that, in my view, this diplomacy will be destroyed by diplomacy itself. This attempt at shuttle diplomacy, this effort to somehow bring the positions of the Russian and Ukrainian delegations closer — is entirely undermined by the composition of the Russian delegation. I want to focus on this in a bit more detail, because it concerns the participants from the Russian side: the head of the Federation Council Committee on Foreign Affairs, Grigory Karasin, and the advisor to the FSB director, Sergey Beseda.
So, who are these people? Sergey Arestovich Beseda is a colonel general, and until recently, he headed the FSB’s Fifth Service — the Service for Operational Information and International Relations. He is most known for two episodes in his biography. First, during the height of the 2014 Maidan protests, he was in Kyiv under the official pretext of assessing the level of physical protection for the Russian embassy and other Russian institutions in Kyiv. But the real goal of his visit was to convince Yanukovych to violently suppress the Maidan. He tried to meet with Yanukovych, but was not received. Still, his mission was precisely to push the confrontation into a brutal and forceful direction.
The second notable episode in Beseda’s biography is that it was his false intelligence that formed the basis for the February 24, 2022 invasion. According to investigations by journalists Soldatov and Borogan, he was later arrested for corruption and for knowingly providing false reports about the economic and political situation in Ukraine. This information, however, is not confirmed by Russian sources. But it’s clear that, simply by his role as head of the FSB’s Fifth Directorate, he was the one providing this false intelligence on Ukraine’s state of affairs — intelligence that led Putin to launch this insane provocation. So, he’s a very telling figure.
The second participant in these talks is Grigory Karasin. He is currently a senator and head of the Federation Council’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Previously, he served as the official representative of the Russian president when the president submitted a request to the Federation Council for authorization to use Russian armed forces in Ukraine. So essentially, here are two hawks — particularly hawks and fierce haters of Ukraine. The participation of these individuals in the negotiation process simply destroys the process itself. Because it’s well known… I mean, as an alternative they could’ve sent, I don’t know, Dugin or someone like that, maybe the mad priest Tkachyov — with just as much potential as negotiators.
So in fact, by the very composition of the negotiation team, Putin has sabotaged the process. It’s clear there can be no trust, no hope of real dialogue with these people. By the way, it’s still unclear who will participate from the other sides. But it’s obvious that the Russian side will be represented at a very low level. Both Karasin and Beseda are clearly not people with serious political weight in Russia today. It’s also obvious that the U.S. side will not be sending any top officials. Who will represent Ukraine is also unknown at this point. But according to Zelensky, Ukraine will be represented by a technical team.
So, that’s the setup. According to a Chinese ecologist who shared this in an interview, the format will be shuttle diplomacy — indirect talks between Russia and Ukraine. As he described it, one group will sit in one room, the other in another, and they’ll walk back and forth — something like shuttle diplomacy in a single location. That’s the structure. I think, in principle, this could work. If it’s all just walking from room to room, then perhaps some informal exchanges might happen on the sidelines. The idea itself is not a bad one. Because even if the talks are technically indirect, in practice — with no physical barriers or separation — the delegations might run into each other, and these indirect negotiations could turn into informal direct ones.
There’s nothing stopping Russian and Ukrainian delegates from having a face-to-face chat, even unofficially, if things go well. But the toxic nature of the Russian delegation clearly prevents this. In reality, it seems to me that Putin, by choosing this delegation, is deliberately blocking the talks. Overall, his actions show that he intends to stall negotiations, drag them out, and clearly has no interest in peace. The makeup of the negotiation team proves that. As do the nighttime missile strikes on Odesa and Sudzha. So I think everything is pretty clear here. Essentially, this is absolutely toxic behavior.
Confirmation That Putin Has No Intention of Ending the War Link to heading
And one more thing — another factor that supports this view — is Putin’s conversation with participants of the recently concluded congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. There was a closed-door session, and according to information from some of the participants, during this closed meeting Putin told them that he advises entrepreneurs not to be naive and not to expect an end to the war. Essentially, he said something similar more generally during the open session, when he mentioned that no one should expect the sanctions to be lifted, and so on. But in the closed meeting, he directly advised industrialists and businesspeople not to count on the war ending. So, I think it’s all fairly obvious: Putin has no intention of stopping the war. This is evident in his direct statements — including his advice to Russian businessmen — in his specific actions, like the strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, and in the composition of the negotiation delegation. So yes, we can say that even the preliminary agreement reached during the Trump-Putin talks on halting infrastructure strikes can be considered dead and buried.
Replacement of Ukrainian Population in Occupied Territories Link to heading
Apart from that, what else is happening in this situation? There’s an acceleration of the process I would call the assimilation of the occupied Ukrainian regions. What do I mean? I mean Putin’s recent decree, according to which Ukrainian citizens who, in Putin’s view, have no legal grounds to be in Russia must either leave the country or, as the decree states, “regularize their legal status.” I won’t go through all the points of the decree — its essence is that in the territories occupied by Russia, primarily the four regions — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson — and also previously occupied Crimea and Sevastopol, Ukrainians living there must either leave if they don’t acquire Russian citizenship, or go through a rather complex and humiliating process involving medical examinations, passing a Russian language exam, and a Russian history test — naturally, in the Medinsky version — and so on.
So, essentially, this is an attempt to either force Ukrainians out of Ukrainian territory or somehow “reformat” them into Russians. That is, they must either accept Russian citizenship or go through this humiliating process of being smoothed into the Russian regime. To me, this seems like a partial population replacement procedure in the occupied territories. It’s part of a broader effort to assimilate these areas — like what happened with Crimea — to truly transform them into part of Russia. It’s like in street football, there’s the concept of something being “played out” — a rule is broken, but after some time, people say, “Well, it’s played out,” meaning there’s no longer any punishment because time has passed, everyone’s used to it, and so on.
Now, for example, the recent American initiative to recognize Crimea as Russian reflects that such a scenario is indeed possible — even though it’s clear this won’t be implemented at the international level, it still shows a kind of normalization of the occupation. And Putin’s actions — replacing the population and pushing Ukrainians out of these territories — contribute directly to that normalization.
The Influence of U.S. Policy on Tesla Link to heading
As for what’s happening — just a few words about what’s going on in the United States of America. I think a very symbolic event is the collapse of Tesla. In a way, it reminds me of a statement made by General Motors President Wilson when he was being confirmed as U.S. Secretary of Defense. During Senate hearings, he said, “What’s good for General Motors is good for America.” That phrase was very well received, and he was promptly confirmed as Secretary of Defense. Today, Tesla has, to some extent — though the comparison isn’t perfect — taken on the symbolic role that General Motors once had. And so what’s happening now may, in a way, be a prelude to what could happen to the United States itself.
Because due to Elon Musk’s actions — or more precisely, his words — Tesla has lost nearly half its value. By the beginning of this year, Tesla’s stock had dropped almost by half. At the end of 2024, its value was $1.4 trillion, and now it’s around $750 billion — nearly a 50% loss. This is undoubtedly linked to Musk’s behavior — his unchecked statements on various topics. Ultimately, this has led to a decline in sales — for instance, in Germany, sales dropped by 76% in February compared to the same period last year. Similar trends are seen in other European countries as well.
And now there’s a global movement emerging — its participants regularly picket dealerships, not just in the U.S. but across Europe. It’s also fair to say that some of the blame for Tesla’s collapse lies with Donald Trump himself. The issue is not just Tesla — a number of major American companies have lost a total of $5 trillion on the stock market due to Trump’s actions. So to some extent, it can be said that Trump’s policies, and Elon Musk’s behavior as part of those policies, are the cause of very serious setbacks for the U.S. economy.
Of course, I’m not making any rash predictions about Tesla going bankrupt — that’s a topic to discuss with experts. I have some doubts that Tesla will go bankrupt. And I’m not a fan of catastrophic forecasts regarding the American economy. But nonetheless, the enormous damage the U.S. economy has suffered as a result of Trump’s policies is quite clear. Personally, I’m less interested in the state of the American economy — I’m not a U.S. citizen, and that’s ultimately an issue for Americans. But I do think there is some hope — hope that Americans will start to feel the consequences of Trump’s policies on their own skin, and that eventually the protest against these policies will become strong enough to make their continuation impossible. That’s the hope, at least. But how things will actually turn out — we’ll see in the near future.
Nevertheless, There Is Hope for Monday’s Talks Link to heading
We are watching Monday’s events with great interest, no doubt. Although, in my view, the composition of the delegation and Putin’s position predetermine the failure of these talks. Still, we’ll see — after all, as is often the case, I truly hope I’m wrong, because peace in Ukraine is a value for which I’d be more than happy to applaud. I’d even support handing Trump — and Elon Musk, for that matter — every peace prize in existence through the end of the 21st century. But let’s not make any predictions, because the forecasting horizon today has really shrunk to just a few minutes.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, dear friends, I want to mention that today at 8:00 PM we’ll have a conversation with Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky. Don’t miss it. I think it will be interesting — considering the pace of current events, I believe Andrei Andreyevich’s analysis will be in very high demand. Now, moving on to your questions.
Suggestions for Future Guests Link to heading
Well, let’s say this is not so much a question as a suggestion from Misha.
He suggests inviting Andrey Bilzho as a guest — the same “Masyanya’s advisor,” as Andrey puts it. It would be interesting to hear a psychiatrist’s assessment of the mental state of both Putin and Trump.
Well, I can say right away that this is certainly an interesting suggestion. Thanks for the reminder. I’ll think about it — maybe it really does make sense to have a conversation. Especially since Andrey Bilzho is not just any psychiatrist, but also a rather vivid publicist, cartoonist, and so on.
The second suggestion is to invite Andrei Soldatov, editor-in-chief of Agentura.
That’s also a good idea. I remember having some conversations with Soldatov and Borogan a while back, but I honestly don’t even recall why those talks didn’t happen. They’re interesting investigative journalists. So yes, I think we will consider inviting them.
And the third suggestion is to invite Ekaterina Kotrikadze as a knowledgeable American affairs expert.
Well, I’m not sure — I’ll have to think about that and listen to what she’s been saying recently in the U.S. Lately, Ekaterina Kotrikadze is much better known as a general commentator, almost a symbol of TV Rain — a kind of symbol of that liberal crowd, to which I have quite a critical attitude. But again, I emphasize: if she’s to be invited specifically as an expert on American affairs, I’m not very familiar with her in that role — I’ll have to take a closer look. Thank you again for the suggestions.
Why Panasenkov Is Seen as a Propagandist Link to heading
A question from a user with the nickname “Domino without a leg.”
How could it seem that Panasenkov is working for the Kremlin? He constantly mocks the Kremlin, the war, and all its main figures.
You know, first of all, since I’ve looked into Mr. Panasenkov’s work quite thoroughly — both in connection with “Trumpophrenia” and the “MediaPhrenia” program — I can say with certainty that for every one satirical jab at the Russian authorities, he has about a hundred aimed at Ukraine. So the ratio is quite telling. The mockery of Ukrainians — not to mention the names he calls them — really allows one to conclude that what he says, his rabid Trumpism, and everything he spouts about the war and his derision of Ukrainians, all of it is very beneficial to the Kremlin. So in this case, your argument doesn’t hold up.
And beyond that, you know, the fact that he is a well-known publicist and is living in Russia without being touched — that doesn’t always prove anything. Just because someone is in Russia and engages in public commentary without facing any consequences, that doesn’t automatically mean they’re an FSB agent. And I want to be clear: I’m not claiming he is. You know my position — I don’t consider it right to make accusations without irrefutable evidence. So I’m not accusing him of that. But the assumption is entirely possible — precisely because he freely walks around Russia, freely engages in this kind of public commentary, faces no restrictions, no real consequences, no criminal charges, no prison — unlike many others who end up jailed for a single post.
So yes, there are grounds for suspicion. Another thing is that there’s no proof — and that’s why I’m not assuming anything. But I also don’t think it’s right to forbid others from speculating.
Why Vikhareva Isn’t Making Videos Link to heading
And user II Ponte asks:
Do you know what happened to politician Elvira Vikhareva? The last video on her channel was four months ago.
Well, I don’t think anything terrible has happened to Elvira Vikhareva. I haven’t had any contact with her for over a year now. But I do regularly come across her posts on Facebook, so I believe she’s more or less fine — at least nothing serious has occurred. As for why there are no new videos on her channel, that’s most likely due to YouTube being blocked in Russia. So I think that’s the reason. Again, I’m not aware of any personal issues — maybe there are some, but I don’t know about them. At the very least, it’s clear that she’s alive, and also clearly still free. As for everything else — that’s something to clarify, and probably not with me.
Is Trump’s Proposal to Control Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants an Attempt to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Development? Link to heading
Natalya Volkova:
It seems to me that Trump’s brilliant idea to bring Ukraine’s nuclear power plants under American control is a way to prevent Ukraine from developing its own nuclear weapons.
I don’t know — I’m not sure. The thing is, Ukraine is perfectly capable of developing nuclear weapons, and doing so doesn’t necessarily require using nuclear power plants. I think this idea generally fits into Trump’s broader tendency to expand his influence, take control of territories, assets, and so on. It’s a manifestation, I’d say, of Trump’s sort of territorial-gastronomic dissatisfaction — he acts like a land registrar, trying to gobble up whatever he can.
As for the idea of preventing nuclear weapons development — first of all, it’s clear that Ukraine has no such plans now or in the near future. And the notion that controlling nuclear power plants could somehow block nuclear weapons production seems rather strange to me. At the very least, I don’t see any connection there.
Should Radio Liberty Be Supported at the State Level? Link to heading
Andrei Sych:
A question inspired by the recent shutdown of Radio Liberty and Voice of America — should democratic countries in the modern world disseminate objective information among the populations of non-democratic states? Should this be a matter of state policy, or should non-governmental organizations take on that role? What are the risks of each option?
Dear Andrei,
As for this — I believe the first option is more appropriate: this should indeed be a matter of state policy. If some non-governmental organizations take on this function, they still need some kind of support — primarily from the state. In theory, they could establish independent structures, create foundations, receive funding, and so on. But fundamentally, it makes more sense for democratic governments to do this — primarily because such a mission is economically unprofitable.
Creating a media outlet that broadcasts, say, to Iran, Afghanistan, or Russia is clearly a losing proposition. If your target audience is in Russia, for example, it’s obvious there won’t be any advertising revenue — no advertiser would invest in such a platform. So this is a loss-making endeavor. That means someone has to fund it — and that should, first and foremost, be the governments of democratic countries, since they are interested in maintaining a unified global economic space where trade is possible — if only for that reason, not to mention the humanitarian reasons for supporting people.
That’s why I think the first option — state support — is the right one. It’s very unfortunate that the United States has stopped doing this and is overall abandoning principles of humanism, solidarity, empathy, and so on. That’s a very sad development.
About Alexander Shelest Link to heading
Ivan Vasilievich:
Why did you stop giving interviews to Alexander Shelest? How do you assess his journalistic work from a professional standpoint?
You know, I didn’t immediately decide to stop professional communication with Alexander Shelest — it was a decision that came gradually. And here’s why. As you know, I generally try not to scrutinize the past or political positions of Ukrainian journalists I give interviews to. And I had the same approach with Alexander Shelest.
But the thing is, the most recent conversations — or rather, interviews, because that was the format — became something very strange. The journalist who invited me to express my views kept interrupting me and began voicing his own, often opposing, opinions. I’m not against that kind of format — again, there are different genres. People often criticize me for occasionally expressing my own views when I invite experts. But let me clarify — I don’t position myself strictly as an interviewer. I can take on that role, but in our discussions — which are explicitly called “Thinking Together” — that’s the concept of the segment, just like we have the “7:40” segment, which is more of a monologue.
When I invite experts, it’s for a segment titled “Thinking Together.” That means it’s not a pure interview — it’s a conversation, where we think together. So yes, I allow myself to reflect, to share hypotheses, and occasionally to debate or counter the guest. But if Alexander Shelest wanted to invite me to a “Thinking Together” style discussion, then I’d need to understand his position — his views — and whether he is acting not just as an interviewer or journalist, but also as a political scientist, sociologist, or economist. And I don’t know any of that about him.
You see, Mr. Shelest presents himself as a journalist and interviewer, but then steps out of that role — interrupting, trolling, trying to disprove my points — and not by offering an alternative view, but simply by cutting me off. I’m not necessarily against that — but it requires a different format. And as a conversationalist or co-creator, Shelest just doesn’t interest me much.
Also, frankly, I’ve come to realize that it’s like casting pearls before swine — Shelest’s audience is entirely made up of “vatniks” (pro-Kremlin loyalists). That no longer feels worthwhile to me. It’s one thing when someone like Gozman would go on Solovyov’s show and try to reach a massive Russian audience with meaningful ideas — that’s a mission. But I’m not prepared to take on a similar mission with Shelest’s audience. So I calmly made the decision to end that communication, because I no longer see the point.
Why Are Democrats Silent in the U.S. and Why Are There No Protests? Link to heading
A question from Liana:
Why are Democrats in America silent? Why are there no rallies or protests against Trump’s policies? Things aren’t so free and easy there anymore.
You know, first of all — there are protests. There are demonstrations and rallies. They’re happening in almost all 50 states. But I’m ready to agree with you, dear Liana, that they’re not happening as massively as one might expect. And that’s where the Democratic Party isn’t really playing the role of an organizing force.
This likely has to do with the deep crisis within the Democratic Party — a crisis that became fully apparent during the election campaign, when the party’s figureheads were, on one hand, Joe Biden — who, quite clearly, due to his physical condition (and in other ways too), isn’t exactly a fiery party leader — and on the other hand, Kamala Harris, who hasn’t really proven herself. If you actually take the time to read the Democratic Party platform, it’s quite reasonable and logical. But the issue lies in how that message is communicated to voters — how well and convincingly it’s delivered.
So I believe the leadership potential of the Harris team is, to put it mildly, lacking.
Suggestion to Create a Show on a Given Topic Link to heading
Alex Anderson:
Not long ago, someone in the comments suggested doing something like a “Question of the Year” award. That’s obviously a hard thing to implement. So I’d suggest adjusting it — not “Question of the Year,” but “Question of the Week” or “of the Month,” based on the number of likes or your personal preference. And the topic of that question could become a separate episode with a proper runtime — a more in-depth response. You’re often asked philosophical questions, the kind that naturally go beyond the scope of the 7:40 format. So how about a segment called “Conversation on a Given Topic”? Or is that too out of place and too labor-intensive in today’s historical circumstances?
No, I think — yes. It is certainly time-consuming, and it would definitely be a separate project. But I want to thank you, dear colleague, for the suggestion, and I’ll give some serious thought to how to implement it. It’s an interesting idea. In particular, the question and the ongoing debate around the issue of justice — that, I think, deserves a separate conversation.
The only fork in the road for me is whether to do it as a monologue or to invite a guest. That’s the question. And actually, maybe I should pose that as a poll on our channel — to see what the audience thinks. I don’t know, I’ll have to think it over. The choice really is between making it a personal reflection or inviting a guest. But then the question is: who would the guest be? Who could you invite as a meaningful opponent in a conversation about justice? I don’t know — I’m not sure. The topic of justice has so many layers and dimensions. Take, for instance, thinkers considered extreme right-wing liberals, like Friedrich von Hayek, who was generally very dismissive of the idea of justice — especially social justice. He saw it as a silly, almost communist fiction. I would actually enjoy debating someone like that — an ultra-libertarian. But again, that would be a debate — a different genre altogether.
So I’m not sure yet. I need to think carefully about how to present the topic properly. There’s value in a monologue, in a debate, and in some kind of joint reflection. So yes — I’ll need to give this more thought.
Could America Transfer the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Russia? Link to heading
Tatyana:
And who guarantees that if the Americans get approval from Ukraine to own the Zaporizhzhia NPP, they won’t then legally transfer it to Rosatom? When it comes to nuclear technology, France is much more advanced than the U.S. in this area.
As for the Zaporizhzhia NPP, I think the discussions between Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky regarding its ownership are somewhat irrelevant — because at the moment, the Zaporizhzhia NPP is under the control of occupying forces. So how — how could Zelensky hand over ownership and control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP to Trump when it isn’t even under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces? A lot about this situation is unclear to me.
Suggestion to Feature Sevastyanov in “Trumpophrenia” Link to heading
A melancholy Sweet Donkey complains that I missed his question and reposts it. Once again — I’m sorry. I’ve said many times that there are plenty of reasons I might miss a question. Maybe it was asked after I had already compiled the list — I do this at night, jotting down the questions you submit. So it’s entirely possible that you posted it after I’d already written mine down. There are also various other technical quirks I won’t go into. So please don’t be upset with me if I miss some questions — it’s not intentional, just circumstantial.
Now, to the question from Donkey:
Why haven’t you included the Trumpist Sevastyanov in Trumpophrenia? His sarcastic jokes about Trump’s actions or statements — especially when there’s no decent response — sound particularly cynical. Some of your usual Trumpophrenia figures also lie or spout nonsense, yes, but they don’t put on a jester’s hat when it comes to uncomfortable questions.
I simply hadn’t seen it. I haven’t come across Mr. Sevastyanov acting as a Trumpist, which is why I didn’t include him. But I’ll look into it. If he turns out to be a worthy representative of that disreputable tribe, then of course, he’ll be featured. I have very few limits when it comes to choosing characters for criticism. Of course, there’s the “censorship of friendship” or “censorship of gratitude,” as one might say. But as it happens, those who deserve criticism are neither my friends nor people to whom I owe anything for support during the various twists in my biography. So no — I haven’t yet faced a situation where I felt I should criticize someone but didn’t because of personal loyalty. Not so far, at least.
Why Is Putin Fighting Ukraine and Not Lithuania? Link to heading
Dima Dragun:
If you put yourself in the enemy’s shoes, then logically, you should lock down the hopeless 2,000-kilometer front (in Ukraine) and open a new one in Lithuania — with Trump’s tooth as collateral.
I’m not sure that if you were in the Kremlin, in Putin’s place with his mindset, you’d see things that way. For Putin, Ukraine is a fixation point — Lithuania is not. Yes, of course, Lithuania is seen as an enemy, but Ukraine is the obsession. The occupation of Ukraine, turning it into a country dependent on Russia — that is Putin’s key geopolitical goal, his way of overcoming what he sees as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. There’s that well-known saying: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire.
Putin desperately wants Russia to remain an empire — and not because of Lithuania, but because of Ukraine. So Ukraine is much more important to him. And secondly, Lithuania is a NATO member, so testing the strength of Article 5 — I don’t think Putin is ready to do that today. At least, that’s my take.
Suggestion to Invite Genis Link to heading
Pan Stepan:
Would you consider inviting Alexander Genis for a conversation? After all, he’s not only an outstanding cultural critic and a good writer, but also a fierce anti-Trumpist who closely follows sentiments in American society.
Well, I can say right away — yes, that’s a good idea. We’ll think about it and look into inviting him.
Why Putin Has No Intention of Ending the War Link to heading
Andryush:
Igor, how can you be sure that Putin won’t move to end the war, when we don’t really have information about the state of the Russian economy or what Trump might do to make him stop? The Biden administration has only imposed 3 out of 10 possible levels of sanctions over the past three years. There are still plenty of pressure tools — like sanctions against the entire shadow fleet, giving Ukraine the full range of weapons, NATO’s influence on global oil prices, etc. Maybe Putin, realizing this, wants to end the war quickly while Trump is still in power, and not wait for collapse in the next year or two.
You know, I’m offering this as a hypothesis — but I’ve just spent a significant part of our conversation pointing out that, so far, there’s no sign Putin intends to end the war. Just a few brief points. First, it’s the Trump team that claims Biden’s sanctions were “3 out of 10.” I don’t know who came up with that scale or how it’s measured, but so far we haven’t seen Trump proposing any additional sanctions. He’s only preserving what Biden already did.
The idea that Trump plans to flood Ukraine with U.S. arsenal weapons is so far completely unconfirmed. What we are seeing, rather, is pressure on Ukraine — all the carrots are for Russia, and the stick is for Ukraine. That much is visible.
And regarding the economy — sure, we don’t know everything, but we’re not totally in the dark either. There are experts whose opinions I respect, and some information of my own. And there’s no evidence yet that the Russian economy is collapsing to the point that Putin is unable to continue the war — clearly, that’s not the case.
And again, looking at Putin’s behavior, there’s no indication that he’s aiming to end the war. I think there’s already enough evidence for that — including everything we’ve talked about today.
Are There Any Results from the Nevzlin Investigation? Link to heading
Aleksei Bushuev:
Could you please tell me if there are any updates on the official investigation? Nevzlin-gate?
You know, as far as we’re aware, the investigation is ongoing in Lithuania and Poland, but no evidence has yet emerged to support the version presented by Volkov and Maria Pevchikh. By the way, the very term “Nevzlin-gate” carries a presumption of guilt, so I suggest we avoid using it — at least until there is concrete proof of Nevzlin’s direct involvement in the attacks on FBK staff. So far, no such evidence has surfaced beyond the statements made by Volkov and Pevchikh themselves. There are no other compelling proofs. At least, the courts have not reached that conclusion — not yet, anyway.
Why Do Russians Struggle with Empathy? Link to heading
Shum:
The start of the 2022 war raised the issue of the pathological lack of empathy in the majority of Russians — and the reasons behind it. I actually like your explanation that in an extremely aggressive environment, people spend all their resources on their own survival, leaving none for others. But I have my own hypothesis I’d like to discuss with you. Fact: empathy isn’t just sympathy or compassion — it’s conscious, specific emotional understanding of another’s experience. You have to first put yourself in the other person’s place, understand what they’re feeling, and only then empathize. And this step — putting yourself in someone else’s shoes — requires not just emotion but also intellectual effort, which, in my experience, the average Russian rarely makes. That’s the core of my hypothesis: Russians often lack empathy because they don’t try to intellectually process others’ emotions. Though maybe that’s not even a hypothesis — it’s a fact too. So the question is: why don’t they take that step? Is it due to lack of intellect? Because they’re satisfied with their worldview? Or something else, what do you think?
Look, dear colleague, there’s a famous principle from the Russian prison system: “don’t trust, don’t fear, don’t ask.” And survival in Russia — and I do mean survival — in many ways mirrors prison camp psychology. In this highly automated society, under intense pressure from the state, just like in a prison camp, showing compassion can reduce your chances of survival. If you help someone else, you lose. All your resources are directed toward self-preservation.
So when we talk about “intellectual effort” — well, in Russia, the primary effort required for most people isn’t toward empathy, but toward surviving. I’m not talking here about the wealthy, who’ve lost all sense of empathy in the course of ruthless competition. I’m talking about the bulk of the so-called “deep people,” who are focused on survival — and empathy drains their strength. To help someone else means you lose resources for your own survival.
Yes, of course, having empathy, mutual aid, and solidarity would ultimately improve chances of survival — but under such harsh authoritarian pressure, where collective action is crushed, the logic of “don’t trust, don’t fear, don’t ask” becomes a survival mechanism. And there’s no room for empathy in that logic — no room for mutual help. That, I think, is the core of the problem.
One More Suggestion for Future Guests Link to heading
Vsevolod Vladimirov:
Could you invite Michael McFaul to your show? He’s always interesting to listen to. I’d also love to see Mikhail Kasyanov as a guest. And more frequent appearances from Kasparov and Shenderovich would be great too.
All your suggestions, dear Vsevolod, are noted and we’ll do our best to invite them. We haven’t had Michael McFaul on the program yet. As for Shenderovich and Kasparov — yes, I’ll invite them whenever they have time. Regarding Mikhail Mikhailovich Kasyanov, I agree — it makes sense to have him on. I have no objections, and if you’re interested, let’s hear from him.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
That’s all for our morning broadcast today. A quick reminder — at 7:00 PM we’ll have a conversation with Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky. Don’t miss it. Wrapping up for now — please take care of yourselves. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian POWs! All the best! See you at 8:00 PM!
Source: https://youtu.be/pI307BOHniA