War is a mother to some. How not to become cannon fodder. Why The Economist is lying about the elections in Ukraine in July. The battle for Le Pen as the rallying point for all the brown forces on the planet.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April second, here in Kyiv. Right now, it’s 07:41 in Moscow and in all the regions within this time zone. And we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.
War Billionaires Link to heading
Well, let’s start with Russia as Russia. First, about those for whom war is a mother. Yesterday, the American Forbes published its 39th ranking of global dollar billionaires. And there are some very curious things in it: among Russian dollar billionaires, there are 15 new ones. That is, those who became billionaires just recently, literally over the past year of war—during 2024. And in this ranking, there are also 24 billionaires who were considered Russian last year but are now listed as representatives of other countries. These include such remarkable individuals as, for example, the widow of former Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, Elena Baturina, who is now British—she represents Elena Baturina, and she is now British. A little shout-out to the Muscovites who voted for Luzhkov. Then there’s former LUKOIL vice president Fedun, who is now—I’m not sure how to put it correctly—a citizen of Monaco? Monaco… not sure. That needs to be clarified. But in any case, he’s now also a foreigner. Co-founder of Alfa Group, Kuzmichev—he’s now French. Former president of Alfa Bank, Pyotr Aven—he’s now Latvian, of course. Another big shout-out to Leonid Volkov. Well, Usmanov with his $16 billion is now, of course, Uzbek. And Mikhail Prokhorov—remember that hope of the liberal crowd? Another big hello to all the liberals who were thrilled by him and his sister. He, with his $11 billion, is now Swiss. Well, that’s the kind of hard life they lead—they have to change their homeland. Over the course of the war, they’ve all gotten a lot richer. Now let’s move on. Well, I won’t list them all now—there’s a huge number of people who became Israeli, representatives of other countries. So, in short, they’re all doing just fine.
Spring Military Draft in Russia Link to heading
And now about those for whom war is not so favorable. I mean those Russians—and first and foremost those who, as of yesterday, are now at risk of becoming cannon fodder. In fact, very serious things are happening. To the tune of talk about how peace is supposedly about to reign in Ukraine, Putin is intensively preparing for a new offensive. As for how realistic this new offensive is, we talked about it the day before yesterday with Sergey Ivanovich Grabski—most likely, it isn’t. But nonetheless, Putin is trying. And now, indeed, the second day of the draft is underway.
This draft is radically different from the previous ones because, first of all, the goal is to conscript 160,000 people. That’s significantly more than last year. The spring draft then was 135,000 people—now it’s 160. And under much harsher conditions. There are raids. In addition to raids in sports clubs, at people’s residences, on the streets, and so on, the risk of ending up at war is significantly higher. A shocking statement from the Ministry of Defense claims that the draft has nothing to do with the so-called “SVO” (Special Military Operation). But in reality, of course, the situation has changed dramatically. It was already very grim.
The actual risk—what percentage of conscripts are being persuaded or forced to sign a contract to be sent to Ukraine? I don’t have those figures. Maybe some human rights defenders do. But the number of documented cases—cases where conscripts ended up in Ukraine, including those who were captured or died and ended up in Ukrainian soil—is growing. Importantly, what radically changed was a law passed two years ago, in April 2023. Sorry—I wasn’t prepared, don’t have notes at hand, so I’m confused. But two years ago, they changed the rule that a conscript could sign a contract only three months after entering military service. Now it can be done immediately. That is, you get conscripted today and can sign a contract as early as the next day. And you must wait until the end of mobilization to terminate the contract. So effectively, a person gets to the draft office, they start working on him, and he can immediately sign a contract to be sent to Ukraine. So clearly, this creates additional risks.
Here’s what I want to say to people in Russia who are listening to me right now. These are parents, and I know we don’t have a large youth audience, but still, there are viewers between 18 and 30 years old, including those from Russia. So I’m addressing these people: avoid the draft at any cost—at any cost. This applies to both parents and to men aged 18 to 30. What are the options? I won’t go into justifying why you should avoid the draft—if you need that explained, then it doesn’t need to be explained. What are the options?
The best, though difficult, option for many is to leave the country. Everyone knows this—no need to campaign for it. But obviously, that option isn’t viable for everyone. If that’s not possible, the second option is to seek exemption. This year, getting an exemption due to illness or medical conditions will be very difficult, because draft boards have received orders—this can be stated with confidence. The goal of drafting 160,000 people means that practically speaking, unless you’re missing limbs, you’ll probably be drafted. I think medical commissions will look the other way on everything else. It’s very tough.
What other options are there? There are also more theoretical ones. For example, someone with a Ph.D. is exempt from conscription for active or compulsory service. In theory, some draftees might have a degree—someone under 30 might have defended their dissertation. But the chance of doing that quickly, especially for people aged 18 to 20, is extremely low. But in any case, it’s worth knowing that this method exists.
Now let’s move on to the more realistic options. One is applying for alternative civilian service. There’s a long list of professions—266 categories—that qualify as alternative service. Unfortunately, this too is a real but difficult route, because the work has to be done in institutions approved by the Ministry of Labor. And beyond that, it can’t be done immediately. If you’re choosing alternative civilian service now, that means you should’ve submitted your intent six months before the draft. So if you’re just now deciding to go this route to avoid being sent to almost certain death in Ukraine, it’ll only help for the fall draft. You’re already too late for the spring one.
Ultimately, there is one last option—a final option—and that’s outright refusal. If none of the others work, if none of the other three or four paths are viable, then I would, for the people close to me, choose even this extreme route—draft evasion. Which brings fines and, in the end, criminal charges. But in my deep conviction, the choice between prison and the army now clearly favors prison. Because a shameful death in Ukraine is perhaps the worst thing that can happen to a person in today’s circumstances. That’s the situation.
Trump Plans to Run for a Third Term Link to heading
Now then—what would a 7-40 broadcast be without the main source of news? Without Trump? On Sunday, Trump told NBC in an interview that he is, in principle, considering the possibility of running for a third term. He said something like, “Many people want me to do it. But I mostly tell them we have a long road ahead. You know, it’s still very early.” And when asked whether he was joking, he said he wasn’t. But how exactly does he plan to get around the 22nd Amendment? Trump said there are methods by which it can be done fairly easily.
Well, different options are being discussed. In reality, there are no legal ways to do this. The idea of repealing the 22nd Amendment, which prohibits a third term, still looks pretty far-fetched. So, right now, we’re witnessing a fairly decisive clash between a democratic country—because the United States of America is undoubtedly a democratic state—and a leader of fascist leanings who aims to head that country. Well, the main battle lies ahead. So we’re watching this unique historical experiment that the United States has undertaken with great interest.
The Brown International Link to heading
Now the main topic of today’s discussion is the Brown International and the attempt to stop this rightward shift in global politics, this resurgence of the brown plague across planet Earth. The day before yesterday, a French court found Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party, guilty of misusing European Union funds and banned her from running in elections for five years. This, as it were, is a breach in the otherwise tight ranks of the brown movement—it caused a sharp reaction among her colleagues in this far-right international.
Notably, those who voiced support for Le Pen included, first and foremost, Orban, of course. Orban posted on social media the classic Solidarity slogan “I am Marine.” Italian Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the populist League party Matteo Salvini also voiced support for Le Pen, saying that “those who fear the voters’ decision often resort to court rulings. You can’t scare us, you can’t stop us. Go forward, my friend”—those are Salvini’s words. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni expressed a similar stance, as did the right-wing Brothers of Italy party. Naturally, Geert Wilders from the far-right Party for Freedom in the Netherlands chimed in too.
The same goes for Santiago Abascal, leader of Spain’s far-right Vox party, who posted a photo of Le Pen and said they won’t succeed in silencing the voice of the French people. And so on. Of course, there’s also the Romanian presidential candidate George Simion, who is running for president of Romania. Naturally, Nigel Farage, one of the main far-right campaigners in Britain, also spoke out in support of Le Pen. And, of course, the American fascists couldn’t stay out of it either—here we have Elon Musk, who blamed everything on the radical left, stating that when the radical left can’t win through democratic elections, they abuse the judicial system to jail their opponents.
Naturally, former Brazilian President Bolsonaro voiced the same opinion, calling it “leftist judicial activism.” In short, the entire Brown International has rallied to defend Marine Le Pen.
Now, are court rulings a serious tool in fighting this far-right surge across the planet? I don’t think so. I think the problem is this: the far-right currently has energy—something their opponents lack. We can see it in the situation in the United States—it’s a litmus test. The far-right has momentum. They may not have a clear and logical program, but they have energy. Just like the energy that brought Hitler and Mussolini to power. That’s exactly what the centrists and moderate left are lacking.
By the way, the far-left does have that energy. Unfortunately, what’s happening now is the center is being hollowed out. And the main problem behind the far-right’s success—the Brown International’s success—is the weakness of their opponents. We see this now in the United States, in France, and in other countries. The key task now is to create a clear, understandable, energetic alternative agenda. The opponents of fascism didn’t have that in Germany in the 1930s, nor in Italy in the 1920s. In Russia in the 1990s, it wasn’t there either.
Fascism is like a gas—it fills any void. A void has formed, the absence of a coherent, energetic program or appealing ideas among centrists and the left. And here are the results. Meanwhile, the far-left has an energetic idea on offer. So essentially, as an alternative to this far-left energy, provocations are beginning to win out. That’s the situation.
As for court decisions—they’re something of a palliative. If you can’t win electorally, well, at least this way. It’s still a method, after all.
The Decline of Western Journalism Link to heading
And since it has already become something of a tradition to end every one of our 7:40 broadcasts with a discussion about journalism, I’ll give yet another example, unfortunately. Discussions about journalism these days are no longer limited to the topic of “media-phrenia,” that is, what’s happening in Russian propaganda outlets. Increasingly, the subject of our critical reviews is Western media. Sadly, they have long ceased to be the gold standard of journalism.
Following yesterday’s discussion of that scandalous New York Times publication, now there’s a piece in The Economist. It stated that presidential elections in Ukraine could take place as early as July. Just think about that—The Economist believes that Ukraine could already be holding presidential elections in July. That’s what the publication said this past Sunday.
Well, what can I say? Congratulations to The Economist—they lied. Because under current Ukrainian law—even if we imagine that Trump somehow managed to make peace happen—even if we assume a lasting peace is established in Ukraine, Ukrainian legislation mandates that presidential elections must take place 90 days after the end of martial law. At the moment, martial law is in effect until May 8. If it’s not extended, then in the best-case scenario—imagine a fantasy where Trump earns his Nobel Peace Prize and peace is restored in Ukraine—even in that case, if martial law is lifted, the earliest presidential elections could happen would be August. Not July—August.
One election campaign alone takes three months. On top of that, we understand that demobilization must occur first. Because as long as so many people are on the front lines, holding elections is extremely problematic. Additionally, if we are to take this seriously—not throw out such completely irresponsible claims like “elections will be in July”—then we have to start with updating the voter registry. The registry is based on pre-war data. A lot has changed during the war. Some people have died. Millions of Ukrainians have changed their place of residence. Several million voters are abroad. Some are moving within Ukraine, some within the EU or other countries. People are fleeing occupied regions and combat zones—some from Kharkiv, some from Kherson.
We have to determine where all these people are and where they’ll vote. It’s a colossal technical task. On top of that, how do you organize voting abroad? If you expect people to come to consulates or embassies, it’s pure fantasy to imagine several million Ukrainian voters showing up to vote at diplomatic missions. That won’t happen. Diplomatic missions can’t organize that, and setting up voting stations outside of those institutions in a way that would inspire public trust would cost enormous money and effort. It’s just not realistic.
So, if we’re truly serious about holding elections, decisions will need to be made—either online voting or mail-in voting. Both options come with enormous questions. So in reality, this claim—this throwaway line about “elections in July”—I don’t even know what the people who write this stuff are thinking. How do they expect any of the things I just mentioned to be addressed? Yes, it’s a solvable problem—but it’s one that requires several months of work after peace is established in Ukraine. Only then can electoral procedures begin.
Absolute irresponsibility—that’s all I can say about that publication. Just as with the irresponsibility that accompanied the New York Times article. So yes, using old Soviet-Stalinist language, all this “kowtowing to the West” is a real problem today. Something needs to be done about it. I don’t know—maybe there should be some kind of serious consultations about how to restore trust in Western media outlets. For people like me—let’s be honest, for Soviet-born folks like me—trust in Western news sources used to be a cornerstone of our worldview. If The Guardian wrote it, it was trustworthy. If The New York Times wrote it, it was trustworthy. If The Economist wrote it, it was trustworthy. And now?
Well, now we find ourselves in a new reality—a world where post-truth has taken over almost every information source. It’s a tragedy.
Answers to the questions Link to heading
I’m moving on to answering your questions. Just a second, let me find how I can do it. Now?
How has the author become worse because of the war Link to heading
So, a question from Sasha:
You said that war makes all of us worse, and you feel that yourself. Can you explain how this manifests? Personally, I’ve noticed I’ve become callous. I’ve almost completely lost sympathy for my fellow countrymen after cars with the letter [symbol] started appearing on the city streets like strangers. I started catching myself involuntarily wondering—are they fascists or not? There he is, coming out of the same store I just came from. Carrying groceries home. But what if he gets into a car with that damned swastika? And when he gets home, over a bribe or a bottle of vodka, starts praising Putin? And how does it manifest in you?
Well, let’s put it this way—direction. For me, dear colleague, the direction of degradation I notice in myself is roughly the same. Indeed, when I look at the frontline reports, I see the number of Russians killed. I don’t feel pity. That’s, well, let’s say—a slide in the direction of Babchenko. Not to that extent, of course—I’m not going to shout “Burn, burn bright” or write something like that. There’s a line I absolutely won’t cross. I will never find myself in the same trench as Babchenko under any circumstances. That’s where the line is—precisely that “burn, burn bright” thing. But I also will never boast about not feeling it; I’m ashamed that I don’t feel compassion for people, for example, who are dying now in the Belgorod region. But that’s a fact. I truly don’t feel compassion for them. What’s happened is a selective empathy. That is, without a doubt, degradation. Yeah. But this war—it draws a line between “us” and “them.” The enemy for me now is the Russian occupiers. That’s it. That’s military burnout, military degradation. There’s also intellectual degradation. It’s become harder for me to reflect, harder to, well, engage in self-education, frankly speaking. We’ve all gotten worse. I can see it in the writings of people I’ve always respected and whose opinions I’ve always relied on. In this sense, war is just like the camp—Shalamov was right. He wrote it very accurately. He was a wise man. The camp, prison—these things don’t make anyone better. And neither does war.
Why do Solonin and Veller keep rooting for Trump Link to heading
So, you’re asking—
I have a question: why do these Trumpists, like Solonin and Veller, support Trump so strongly and present all his failures as part of some cunning plan that we just don’t understand yet?
First of all, I wouldn’t categorize Solonin so firmly as a Trumpist—he actually holds a more nuanced position. But as for Veller, you know, the smarter ones—people like Solonin, like Illarionov—have already stopped supporting Trump. And those who, as you said, explain away all his failures as some brilliant secret plan… well, frankly, that’s a sign of cognitive issues. Usually, when you listen to them, you realize these are people—well, I don’t want to say outright that they’re stupid or fools, but they really do lack analytical skills. Why not just say it? Yes, in fact, they’re just not very bright. What can you do? That’s how it is. The smarter ones are already starting to distance themselves from Trump.
About Zelensky saying “Russians” Link to heading
Tatyana Klimova:
I really hate writing comments, writes Tatyana Klimova, but this really struck a nerve. So, Zelensky is right to call all Russians enemies and not say “Rossiyane”? What have we done to deserve that? Russians from the Baltics or the Caucasus? I was born in Lithuania—does that make me Lithuanian? No, I’m Russian. Why does he lump me in with people from Russia? Doesn’t he think about how many Ukrainians living in Russia are now sitting in enemy trenches? And how many Ukrainians in the Russian Duma are voting for the war? Or when Lithuania was raising money for Ukraine, was it only Lithuanians contributing? No Russian names there? How many Ukrainians in Lithuania and Poland have shown their true colors—wasn’t it Ukrainians who committed sabotage in Vilnius? Should we start generalizing too? Usually when I see this online, I scroll past with my own opinion. But when the president says this—if he’s already this tired and saying things like that, what will happen in a year? If he doesn’t get rest, will he propose to “solve the Russian question”? People will find a justification for him again. Sorry for the emotion, but honestly, it hurts.
You know, dear Tatyana, when I answered a previous question yesterday about the terms “Russian” and “Rossiyanin,” I unfortunately didn’t clarify with Ukrainians whether the Ukrainian language actually distinguishes between these terms. As far as I understand, this is a real issue. So before making any judgments here, I’d like to clarify—does the Ukrainian language really distinguish between “Russian” (ethnic) and “Rossiyanin” (citizen of Russia)? Because, to my shame, I still haven’t managed to learn Ukrainian in the more than three years since the war began—just haven’t had the time. But I can see a potential problem here. Maybe it’s not even a real issue. But if it is—if Zelensky really has changed his rhetoric, then, well, once again, I’ll say this: war makes everyone worse. You have to understand, war leads to burnout. And I’m the last person to criticize Ukrainians for a sharper attitude toward Russians. That said, of course, you are absolutely right. And of course, Russians—ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking people—who are fighting in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, they’re still Russians. They’re serving in Ukraine’s military. They’re political Ukrainians, members of the political Ukrainian nation. So yes, there’s a certain understandable confusion here. And if we’re talking not about the Ukrainian language but about Russian, then we know that all Soviet citizens, regardless of ethnicity, used to be called “Russians”—for example, in English-language media, in the U.S., in Europe, everyone from the USSR was called “Russian.” That’s just how it was.
Where is the author’s Silver Button Link to heading
Sergey Alexandrovich:
Did YouTube give you the Silver Button? You should have gotten it for 100,000 subscribers.
To be honest, I haven’t kept track. I don’t know, I just don’t really understand the point of this Silver Button thing. There’s a Gold Button too, and so on. I don’t know, maybe—since we’re now just a little short of 300,000—maybe it’s already there. I just don’t know what to do with the Silver Button, where to put it, or how to press it.
Migration as the foundation of humanity Link to heading
A question from Vladimir:
Today, I have a question about something that’s on everyone’s mind—in democratic countries, authoritarian ones, and everywhere in between—the issue of migration. In many places, it’s even considered a problem. As a mathematician, I try to reduce any problem down to axioms. If you look at migration from that angle, it’s an essence—something inevitable. It can’t be canceled, avoided, or truly regulated. It’s widely accepted in science that humanity, what we call Homo sapiens, originated in Central Africa. If there had been no migration, there would be no Russians, no Italians, and so on. Migration is a driver of human development—it cannot be stopped or governed by laws, just as Darwinian evolution can’t be halted or legally codified. Migration has always existed and always will, and it can only end with the extinction of humanity. Can you, as a sociologist, explain why people in every country can’t accept that migration is like the sun—it rises and sets daily, inevitably, regardless of our will?
You know, dear Vladimir, I’ll start with an analogy. Maybe it will explain something to you or make you see the situation in a new light. Among the rights and freedoms of man, there is the freedom of movement. That’s a fact. And indeed, every person is born with the freedom to move. I can walk where I want. But this freedom, in everyday terms, is limited by someone else’s front door. I can go where I like—but I must stop at the door of someone else’s apartment. Is that outrageous? No, it’s normal. Just like my freedom to swing my arms ends at the tip of someone else’s nose. Same thing here. Yes, migration is absolutely a natural human urge—people want to go where they want, and so on. But then comes the right of states to decide whether to receive guests. That’s all. I think that’s a very clear explanation. Every state, created in the interests of its citizens and population, sets its own rules. Some open the gates wide; some open them, but not for everyone. Others, like the Japanese, for instance, have a very strict immigration policy. They mostly don’t accept outsiders—well, they do, but under the guise of scholarships or internships. Their employment system is based on the idea of internships. Overall, they try not to let foreigners in. Meanwhile, other countries throw their doors wide open. So, just like there’s a right to visit, there’s a right to set the terms for receiving visitors. I think that’s perfectly reasonable.
Why isn’t Trumpophrenia coming out Link to heading
So, Mari asks:
Will Trumpophrenia be released, or have you been banned from doing that kind of show?
Dear Mari! You know, I honestly can’t even remember the last time I had a boss who could forbid me from doing anything. I’m trying to recall, and I just can’t. It’s been quite a while since anyone could forbid me anything. So no, of course no one has banned me from doing Trumpophrenia. On the contrary—it’s always there, stuck in my head like a red-hot nail, reminding me I need to make it. But I just don’t have the time. It’s a pretty labor-intensive thing, because to put together a Trumpophrenia episode, I have to listen to many hours of, frankly, not very pleasant content, yeah? Then pick the timecodes, then… well, long story short, it’s real physical work. I was supposed to release Trumpophrenia on Sunday—didn’t make it. That’s how it is. See, this is the difference—this is the difference. As a video blogger, which is what I am now—well yes, I have a small team—but it’s not a media outlet, you see? A media outlet has a newsroom, obligations. Back when I worked in media, yes, I guaranteed it—the publication would come out strictly on schedule every time. Now, my only firm commitment is putting out the 7:40 show every day. So far I’ve been sticking to that, plus MediaPhrenia, plus guests, plus appearing on other channels. And Trumpophrenia—that’s more of a side project. It takes a lot of time and effort, and unfortunately it hasn’t been very regular lately. But I’m working on getting back on track. So just hang in there a little longer.
About Vladimir Filatov Link to heading
Alexey:
A bit of an unusual question, but I’ll ask it anyway. Were you acquainted with the Moscow doctor Vladimir Ilyich Filatov? He was a blogger, publicist, a man of immense talent and sharp mind, a virtuoso of the Russian language, uncompromising and brave. Tragically, he passed away far too early. For me, it was an irreparable loss—like losing a close friend, a family member. He was a true individual, a bright, unique person. There’s no one like him now. Perhaps you crossed paths with him in your life? I’d be interested to hear your opinion on this remarkable man.
Dear Alexey! I wasn’t personally acquainted with Vladimir Filatov, but he was, as they say, a Facebook friend of mine—we communicated regularly. I always had the deepest respect for his posts. And I think he felt the same way about mine. We were like-minded individuals. That went on for several years. Then, sadly—I don’t remember exactly, but I think he passed away more than 10 years ago. And yes, it really was a great loss. I completely share your assessment of this remarkable man. Truly, it was something very significant. A very important figure indeed.
Why Yavlinsky is wrong Link to heading
A question from a subscriber named Zhuchok:
Why is Yavlinsky wrong? Is preserving his party at the cost of losing his reputation justified by noble goals? And then some kind words about me—thank you. And Zhuchok adds: I’m not defending Yavlinsky, by the way, and I never joined Yabloko, even though I supported him for many years.
You know, I think that making the preservation of the party your main priority, above all else—that’s a mistake. And here’s why: because a party is a means, not an end. The goal should be to promote certain interests and values on behalf of your voters. But when you betray your voters—because Yavlinsky has repeatedly betrayed his voters—then the support drops. He went from having several million supporters to now having maybe a tenth of that. You can check the election results. He voted for Putin in the State Duma, and he essentially encouraged participation in elections as a clear spoiler, even when it was obvious these weren’t real elections, just a simulation. All of this—this whole effort to preserve the party—amounts to a betrayal of his supporters.
Today, Yabloko is a party of “native blood,” you understand? During this war, Yabloko made its choice—it’s now a party on the side of Russia. That’s been stated both by Shlosberg and by Yavlinsky. So what can you say? It’s a betrayal of the very ideals that Yabloko once claimed to uphold.
About Portnikov’s statement that politicians are free from fear Link to heading
So, the next question:
I recently watched an interview between Portnikov and Rashkin. In it, Vitaliy expressed what I think is a rather debatable opinion—that all major politicians at the level of president or prime minister, as well as big businessmen and journalists, share a common trait: fearlessness. That all of them, whether smart or not, are persistent and unafraid of death. That’s why Vitaliy wasn’t surprised by how Trump behaved during the assassination attempt. Do you agree with that? Personally, I think Putin’s pathological fear for his life contradicts this. Could you identify any traits that are common to most major politicians?
You know, dear colleagues, when I’m in a situation like this—where I haven’t personally seen the Portnikov–Rashkin interview—I won’t be responding directly to that, but rather to the position you’ve described. So: no, I don’t agree, just like you, with the idea that all politicians, businessmen, and journalists are characterized by fearlessness and a lack of fear of death. I think that’s simply not true. It’s just a mistake. It’s a rather strange statement. And frankly, I’m not even sure it was made by Portnikov—or if it was, perhaps it’s been misinterpreted. I don’t know. Portnikov is a smart guy, and I doubt he would say something like that. That’s not meant as a criticism of you—I’m just expressing my doubts.
As for traits that are common among the people you mentioned—especially politicians—I’d say the main one is the desire for power. Power as a core value. That’s obvious. It’s banal, but unfortunately, general questions like this often lead to fairly banal answers. For politicians, it’s power. For businessmen, money. I think it’s all fairly straightforward.
How to determine that Gozman was effective on propaganda channels Link to heading
A subscriber with the name Concrete, Steel, Stalin, Wood asks:
By what metric do you determine Gozman’s effectiveness in participating on propaganda dumps? What made Gozman more effective compared to Ukrainians set up to be punching bags?
You know, in this case, I understand that it’s a very subjective parameter, but I go by my own perception. I saw how Gozman behaved—granted, it was a while ago—but still. I always got the impression that Gozman was persuasive, that he didn’t let himself be trampled, that he was always in good form and quick with a sharp reply. And overall, I think he managed to effectively hold his ground against all those bastards who attacked him—unlike the people I call “liberals on call,” “Ukrainians on call,” and so on. So, how else can you assess it? It’s subjective perception, of course. I don’t have any sociological studies showing that viewers responded more positively to Gozman and less so to others in similar situations.
How Gozman’s wife didn’t understand where she was going Link to heading
Second question from the same author:
You say you don’t understand and are surprised by the careless complacency of foreigners who visit Russia, since they are very likely to become bargaining chips—which I fully agree with. But how could the wife of a foreign agent not realize this, continuing to regularly travel to Russia until she was finally detained?
I assume you’re referring to the wife of Leonid Gozman, who is currently under house arrest. You know, this is actually very understandable to me. Intelligent and decent people—and while I’m not personally acquainted with Leonid Yakovlevich’s wife, I believe, based on various accounts, that she truly is a smart and honorable person—often tend to be trusting. Such people are often naive. And this isn’t the only case. Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, for instance, was trusting and naive. So was Valeriya Ilyinichna Novodvorskaya. They were incredibly intelligent, principled people—but they were also trusting and naive. So I’m not equating anyone here—God forbid, these are very different individuals. But nonetheless, the case of a smart, decent, educated person turning out to be naive and trusting—that’s something we’ve seen plenty of times.
Why Berezovets is called a combat political analyst Link to heading
Third question from the same author:
Why do you call Berezovets a combat political analyst? What does he have to do with frontline combat if he’s on Ukrainian TV almost every night and posts several YouTube videos a day from non-combat locations? When does he have time to fight? The man serves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a media spokesperson.
You know, let’s put it this way—nothing personal toward you, I’m just expressing my own view. What exactly do you need to be convinced that a person is serving? The fact is, it’s public knowledge that he is in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, that he’s part of some combat unit within the Ukrainian military. Yes, he occasionally appears for interviews, makes some posts. I’ve heard this kind of skepticism before—“how can someone fight and still give interviews?” I’ve got a vivid example: Kirill Sazonov, a regular guest on our programs. People said the same thing about him—“how can he be at war and still talk to you?” Well, now he’s in the hospital with a serious injury. Do you need someone to get wounded—or worse—to prove their participation in the war? Does someone need to prove it with blood? I really don’t feel comfortable even having to talk like this. But look—if Berezovets were a fraud, I’m sure there would be enough people in the Ukrainian military who would expose him. But that hasn’t happened. So I proceed from the belief that yes, he is a combat political analyst.
A thought experiment about a time-traveling “popadanets” Link to heading
Serafim Karnavalov writes:
Let’s do a thought experiment. You have the chance to live two more lives—one within the territory of the Russian Empire, the USSR, or the Russian Federation; the other in a different country. In which era would you like to live in the first case, and in which country and era in the second? This isn’t about your interest as a journalist, sociologist, or thinker, but from the point of view of an ordinary person who shares your worldview, your values, your convictions, and political beliefs.
You know, dear Serafim, your question certainly offers a lot of food for thought and sparks the imagination. If I understood you correctly, you’re inviting me to step into the shoes of a character from one of those popular fantasy genres about time travelers—popadantsy, people who fall into other times or places. That’s definitely a fascinating exercise—imagining yourself in a different era or another country, or simply in another time within Russia.
But the way you’ve framed the experiment actually cancels it out, so to speak. You’re asking me not to approach this from my interests as a journalist, sociologist, or just a curious person. You want me to look at it purely from the perspective of an “ordinary person.” But what does that mean? An ordinary person who doesn’t have the kinds of professional interests I do? You see, the only motive that would make me want to engage in this kind of game is precisely my interest—as a sociologist, a journalist, a thinker. That’s what would make this experiment meaningful to me.
Just from a practical, everyday perspective? Well, the idea of time travel, of ending up somewhere like the time of Ivan the Terrible—God forbid! So how could I separate myself from my professional identity? I am a person who is largely defined by those very interests you’re asking me to set aside. If the question were framed around professional curiosity, then yes, it would be a fascinating discussion. But just as an average person, as someone without professional inclinations—well, then I’d prefer to remain right here, in our own time, in the state I’m in now.
That said, of course, this whole idea of “popadantsy” always captures the imagination. It’s interesting—but interesting because of professional curiosity: sociological, journalistic, philosophical, and so on.
Closing statement Link to heading
So, that’s it—all the questions I managed to jot down seem to be finished. I don’t know if I’ll be able to do a show today. I’ve got quite a few appearances on other channels, so I’ll try, but I can’t promise. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom for Alexander Skobov, for all Russian political prisoners, and for Ukrainian POWs! All the best to you! See you soon!
Source: https://youtu.be/yL0lkcLSQzs