Russia marked its day with strikes on Ukraine. A summit in Odesa and Vučić’s demarche. Lev Shlosberg received a final warning.

Main Topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 12, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.

Historical Rhymes Link to heading

Three events happened on this day. In fact, three events occurred one year apart that largely predetermined the collapse of the Soviet Union and the nature of that collapse. In 1990, two events happened simultaneously on June 12. First, the USSR law on the press and other mass media abolished censorship. That was, essentially, an absolutely revolutionary act. For the first time since the Decree on the Press, which had promised such a law, this promise made back in 1917 was finally fulfilled in 1990. The existence of the Law on the Press and the simultaneous existence of the Soviet Union were, in essence, completely incompatible. It was, essentially, the clinical death of the Soviet Union. This event took place in the meeting hall of the Council of Nationalities of the Palace of Congresses. And at the same time, on that same day, the First Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR, which was meeting in the Grand Kremlin Palace, simultaneously adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. Exactly a year later, on June 12, 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the RSFSR. These three events were, in effect, three nails in the coffin of the Soviet Union. First, the Soviet Union could not exist without censorship. Second, the state sovereignty of Russia, the RSFSR, and the presence of a president in the RSFSR essentially created a dual power structure in the Soviet Union. That is, Russia, which made up half of the Soviet Union, gained its own statehood. As you know, in the Soviet Union there was a strict policy that did not allow the so-called “Russian party,” which demanded the creation and strengthening of Russian statehood, including the creation of the Communist Party of Russia. The RSFSR had no party of its own. The reason is clear. The clever Soviet leaders perfectly understood that this would mean dual power. They avoided this in every possible way. So, the declaration of state sovereignty of the RSFSR and Yeltsin’s election as president signaled the creation of dual power. In reality, the existence of the Soviet Union at that moment was, let’s say, a situation of clinical death. That’s the story. For some time, this day was celebrated as Russia’s Independence Day. There were many arguments and discussions about this. The holiday didn’t catch on, because no one could understand what the independence was from — independence from itself? Because it’s clear that Russia is an empire. And everyone understood that — both the supporters of the empire and its opponents. The absurdity of the name “Russia’s Independence Day” was obvious to everyone. So the name didn’t take root. No one understood what was being celebrated. Just another day off. No one objected to the day off itself, but polls showed that the vast majority of Russian citizens had no idea what the holiday meant or signified. Later, Putin proposed removing the name “Russia’s Independence Day.” The word “independence” was dropped. And that was the right move. It was then decided to celebrate “Russia Day.” By the way, this didn’t help people understand what exactly was being celebrated either. In general, in Russia there is a strange attitude toward holidays. Essentially, the only holiday people actually understand is New Year’s. Everything else is a big question mark.

Shelling of Peaceful Ukrainian Cities Link to heading

And once again, Russia marked its day with strikes on Ukraine. On the night of Thursday, June 12, Kharkiv was brutally shelled for the second night in a row. Shaheds, missiles. As a result, at least 11 people were injured. It’s very telling again: the targets of these strikes were a school, a kindergarten, residential buildings, and a fitness center. In other words, not a single military facility was hit. Among the injured were no military personnel — including four children. So this is what Russia’s day of disgrace looked like.

Vučić Did Not Condemn the Aggression Link to heading

Another important event I’d like to discuss with you today is that yesterday a summit was held in Odesa — Ukraine–Southeastern Europe. A highly representative summit. It was attended by the heads of state from Moldova, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Albania, North Macedonia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Slovenia, and others. What’s important? There was complete unanimity, with one exception, regarding the final summit declaration, which condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The only person who proudly opposed this declaration was Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. The Russian press — as usual, I went through it before our meeting — highlighted this fact, citing his proud statement that he was the only one who did not sign the declaration condemning Russia’s aggression. All others signed it — Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece — practically all countries of the Balkan region. The facts are obvious. Is condemning aggression good or bad? Everyone condemned it except for one person — Vučić. Vučić justified this by saying the declaration was harmful to Serbia. In an interview with Serbian media, he said he couldn’t sign a statement that included a call for sanctions against Russia, as he believed it would be detrimental to himself and to his country. Why do the leaders of all other Balkan — and more broadly, Southern European — countries not consider such a statement harmful to themselves? Well, Vučić does. Clearly, this points to special relations with Russia. This was Vučić’s first visit to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian invasion. And it was marked by such actions. At least during the meeting between Vučić and Zelensky, it was noted that he plans to help Ukraine with reconstruction. He pledged to take part in rebuilding one or two Ukrainian cities. Well, that’s good.

Sentence for Lev Shlosberg Link to heading

One more event I’d like to talk about with you today is that yesterday, the Pskov City Court placed Lev Shlosberg under house arrest for two months. His detention, which took place the day before yesterday, has been widely discussed. I decided to wait a bit to somehow summarize the situation once the Pskov court made a decision on what should happen next. In the end, the court apparently issued the most lenient ruling possible — house arrest.

What are the charges? Judging by available information — since the hearing was closed — there is no absolutely reliable data on the nature of the charges. However, there is a strong assumption — and it is known which article is involved: repeated “discrediting of the army.” Most people, both supporters and opponents of Shlosberg, believe this refers to a debate with academician Yuri Sergeyevich Pivovarov on the “Zhivoy Gvozd” channel, during which Shlosberg, as usual, said nothing particularly new. He accused people like me of belonging to the “foreign blood party,” while he himself made arguments in favor of a ceasefire in Ukraine — on absolutely capitulatory terms for Ukraine. In other words, just stop the fighting at any cost.

What happened is clearly perceived as a last warning. The fact that he was not imprisoned outright but placed under house arrest indicates that he was given a final warning — an almost open declaration: either leave the country urgently, or you’ll be jailed. Practically all observers and commentators agree that he’s being told he needs to emigrate. This is a familiar tactic: despite the ankle monitor, despite all the formalities, this is basically an invitation to leave. Staying means choosing prison. I am almost certain that Shlosberg will choose prison. It’s clear why. He has always said he must remain in Russia because he is a Russian politician and cannot see himself living in exile.

Why do I think this case deserves special attention? Because Shlosberg’s public stance is well known. He was one of the first — maybe the very first — person back in 2014 to present evidence of Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. His famous investigation into the burial of Pskov paratroopers. His anti-Putin position has been clear and well established. But later, after the full-scale invasion, Shlosberg — along with his party Yabloko and with Yavlinsky — took a different stance: immediate cessation of the war, a firm refusal to support Ukraine. This position might be interpreted as that of the “native blood party” — i.e., this is our country, and we can’t support any actions against it. In my view, this was a pro-Putin position.

But the nature of the current regime is such that any independent opinion is considered a crime. The absurdity of what happened to Shlosberg lies in the fact that his position is essentially no different from Trump’s. And even, formally, from Putin’s own position. Putin says, “We want peace.” Shlosberg says, “We demand peace.” But everyone understands that what Putin means by “peace” is different from what Shlosberg means. And this is precisely the difference that becomes grounds for threatening Shlosberg with prison. The Kremlin has deemed even the topic of peaceful agreements inappropriate. A call for peace — if not from Putin — is seen as betrayal. That’s the very telling aspect of this case.

For a long time, Shlosberg had expressed this same stance and remained free. The same goes for Yavlinsky, who says similar things — and he hasn’t been touched. Whether Yavlinsky will be targeted, I don’t know. But what’s happening now effectively means that the existence of any opposition inside Russia — except for the “opposition” of parties like the Communists or LDPR, which are indistinguishable from the ruling party — is no longer tolerated. In effect, anything other than demanding the destruction of Ukraine is now considered criminal.

Despite my deep ideological disagreements with Shlosberg, I firmly believe that this man must be free. This demand is one of the most important ones regarding Russia and the Putin regime today. Despite the huge worldview differences between myself, Aleksandr Skobov, and Lev Shlosberg, when it comes to their freedom, there’s no difference. It doesn’t matter what he said about Ukraine. The fact that he refused to recognize Ukraine as a victim of aggression — that doesn’t matter. He must be free. And, by the way, I don’t know — maybe he’ll be included in some future prisoner exchange. I would very much like that.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

Before moving on to your questions, I want to say that at 11:00 — very soon — we’ll have a conversation with Gennady Gudkov. Now, I’ll move on to answering your questions.

On the Nonviolent Position of the Russian Opposition Link to heading

Pan Stepan, A question about the nonviolent struggle of part of the Russian opposition, whose speeches in the European Parliament you referred to dismissively. Three questions. First: don’t you think that any anti-Putin activity is useful, and that it’s better not to oppose those who fight Putin differently than you do? Second: don’t you think that liberals like Kara-Murza are, by definition, incapable of leading tank columns and will never become new Prigozhins, but are capable of being leaders of velvet revolutions, of which Europe has seen many in the last 40 years? Third: if the Russian people prove incapable of the nonviolent revolution proposed by Navalny and Kara-Murza, then violent overthrow of Putin’s regime will only be possible by illiberal forces — Kadyrov, a new Prigozhin, Girkin, etc. Ukrainians and the West will not go to war in Russia, and there are no other military forces advocating a civilized Western path for Russia — nor will there be. It’s already clear that the Freedom of Russia Legion will not become a significant independent force separate from the Ukrainian army. Russia currently has no White Army.

Let’s go point by point. Dear Pan Stepan! First, regarding whether any anti-Putin activity is useful. Let’s once again clarify the positions of those who call themselves leaders of the Russian opposition — I mean Navalny, Kara-Murza, Yashin — as demonstrated during their appearances in the European Parliament. When Yulia Navalnaya is asked whether Ukraine should be given weapons and she replies that Ukrainian weapons kill Russians, so they should not be helped; when Yashin claims that we should not wish for Russia’s defeat but only for Putin’s; when all three are unable to answer the question “Whose is Crimea?”; when Navalny opposes funding Radio Free Europe and creates a channel whose main focus is fighting corruption — that is, helping replenish the Russian Federation’s budget and thus its capacity to kill Ukrainians — and so on… Well, due to all of these factors, I’m not prepared to consider their activity anti-Putin. Yes, formally they say they are against Putin. But I am not willing to perceive this entire activity as truly anti-Putin. I don’t believe this is simply another way, different from mine, of fighting Putin. I do not.

Second. Yes — and by the way, that Kara-Murza will not lead tank columns, well, I’m not capable of leading tank columns either. But the position is different: the position to help Ukraine, to finance and support it whenever possible, to influence decisions in the European Parliament. One could use that platform to call for arming Ukraine. Or one could use it to call for redirecting funding from Radio Free Europe to other Russian opposition media. These are completely different things. How they used the platform, in essence, shows that they are not anti-Putin.

Now, about velvet revolutions in Russia — there won’t be any. I can elaborate on that thesis, but I think the conditions for velvet revolutions existed at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Eastern European countries faced a situation where national liberation movements encountered little resistance. The Soviet Union — the source of suppression — vanished. That’s why velvet revolutions succeeded. Nothing like that exists in Russia today.

And third, regarding the White Army. Regarding the idea that no one will invade Russia — yes, I agree. But I think the logic of how the Putin regime might collapse lies in military defeat and the resulting internal destabilization. A massive influx of war criminals and occupiers returning to Russia — no regime can withstand that. I think Russia’s defeat will very likely — not necessarily, but likely — mean its collapse. And here, we will not need Navalny or the ideologists of the “beautiful Russia of the future,” but, let’s say — to exaggerate — ideologists of a “beautiful Siberia of the future,” a “beautiful Urals of the future” (I’m putting that in quotes because likely there won’t be anything beautiful about it). I’d say — ideologists of a normal future Tatarstan, a normal future Hungary, a normal future Russian Far East, and so on. That’s what I see as plausible. But for that, different people are needed. It’s unlikely that any of those who spoke in the European Parliament are suited for that role.

On the Opposition and on Svetov Link to heading

Nadya, As for the so-called opposition leaders — I called them impostors in my question, and I’m not going to take those words back.

Forgive me, dear Nadezhda, but is anyone asking you to? I completely agree with you.

Who and where elected these people as leaders? At the last rally in Berlin, their supporters were relatively few. By the way, there were traffic lights there too. So why didn’t you invite Svetov to the European Parliament? Quoting Krasheninnikova, who was there and complained that the turnout wasn’t great, because people were being lured away by others. I correspond with political prisoners in Russia — they don’t consider this trio to be leaders either. Moreover, they can say plenty of unflattering things about them. So who chose them as leaders? Asking for a friend.

Dear Nadezhda, I 100% agree with your position.

Why Russians are fascists and not communists Link to heading

A question from Hurricane: Igor, why are Russians in this war fascists and not communists? Those are goals from a hundred years ago. Do you see a difference between legal and illegal immigration?

Right away on the second question: of course I do. As for why fascists and not communists — well, I think the reason is simple. Putin doesn’t have a communist idea. He has the idea of restoring, so to speak, the territory of the Soviet Union — or rather, even more so, restoring the Russian Empire. But he absolutely does not aim to revive communist ideology. That’s why Putinism has more in common with fascism than with communism.

A question from MTS. Igor Aleksandrovich, you never said that the American administration is fighting not just migrants, but illegal migrants. Do you not see a difference between legal and illegal migration?

Of course there is a difference. Of course. The question is about the methods. You see, in California, the police initially handled these situations as very minor and localized incidents. And the police were 100% able to manage these small, local protests. But Trump needed to stage a provocation. Like any fascist-type leader, he tries to create a huge provocation in order to later carry out a coup. That’s how all such leaders act. So he staged a provocation. First, he sent in the National Guard, then the Marines, then started calling for the arrest of the governor of California — all to create destabilization. Now the protests are happening in almost the entire country. This is a pretext for declaring a state of emergency. And in that chaos, essentially, to try and establish a dictatorship. So at this point, the problem is far beyond migration. The real issue is an attack on one of the fundamental pillars of American democracy — states’ rights. And that is precisely what the Founding Fathers enshrined.

On Trump’s Intelligence Link to heading

A question from Katz Bey What do you think about the intelligence — the intellectual level — of Donald Trump? Starting from the 47th president Trump, I’ve been watching all his interviews and speeches. I even took the time to count how many words he knows overall. He has used 247 words from American English vocabulary. From those, he’s learned to construct 29 sentences. Since that’s not enough to appear smart and articulate in every speech, he has to repeat the same sentences multiple times. That’s the level of Trump’s mental abilities.

Dear colleague, I can neither confirm nor refute your very interesting content analysis. I extend a presumption of trust to each of you. So if this is indeed the case, it’s an incredibly interesting observation. I’m not entirely sure that Trump resembles a cannibal to such an extent. But if something along those lines is confirmed, then it’s a very compelling analysis. I agree — Trump is certainly not Socrates or Spinoza.

On Genetics and Different Peoples Link to heading

Alexander from Kyiv, Ethiopians are the best long-distance runners. Jews are the best chess players and scientists in exact sciences. Many Russians feel rejection, even condemnation, of everything different. I’ve observed this since childhood, even in my own family. Just remembered it now. Is this genetics or something else? And for some reason, a comment followed that you’re just a few years older than me.

Well, I’m glad to hear that. You know, dear Alexander, these are different things. Regarding Ethiopians — why are they so good at long-distance running? It’s a complex matter. Genetics absolutely play a role — they have genetic advantages. I won’t go into detail, but sports anthropology has long noted certain advantages, not just among Ethiopians but among Africans in general, and particularly Ethiopians. They are very efficient in oxygen use, have high endurance. There are also social factors — their living and training conditions, since Ethiopia is a highland country, which helps develop the lungs and cardiovascular system. Plus cultural factors — running is often a means of transportation there, not just a sport. It’s also prestigious because of their success in international competitions. But yes, there is definitely a genetic predisposition.

As for Jews, here it’s not genetics — it’s primarily sociocultural factors. When I conducted a major sociological study on Jews in Russia, I spoke to almost all the rabbis. In addition to a mass survey, about 2,000 Jews in Russia were interviewed using the snowball method, and we also held in-depth interviews with rabbis. One rabbi from the reformist movement — unfortunately, his name escapes me now — a relatively young, very bright, interesting person, answered the question of why Jews succeed so much in the sciences and chess. He said that when he served in the army, he noticed that people from Dagestan were all huge — because they wrestle from childhood, it’s a common activity starting from school. He said their shirt collars wouldn’t even fasten around their necks. But Jews have a different story. For over 2,000 years, they are the only people in the world who carved out a day off — Saturday — to read the Torah. And they’ve been reading and discussing it all the time. So they developed the habit of thinking, analyzing, etc.

Also, the kinds of occupations Jews were allowed in exile — mostly trade and moneylending — required calculation, analysis, and so on. On top of that, they were the first people in history to implement something like universal education — all Jews were expected to study. That started about 2,000 years ago. So these are sociocultural characteristics. While Dagestanis wrestled and excelled physically, Jews spent centuries reading the Torah and calculating. So there’s no genetics here — it’s about social and cultural context.

As for Russians — I don’t think it’s genetics either. Again, it’s a matter of sociocultural characteristics. The particular development of the Russian state system encourages that kind of condemnation of “the other.” So no, this too is not genetic — it’s sociocultural.

What the National Guard and Shlosberg Are Doing. The West’s Courage Link to heading

So, a question from Yulia What do you think the FSB and the National Guard do all day? There are no protests, but they still need to justify their salaries. Lev Shlosberg is now under house arrest. Could repressions on the scale of 1937 begin?

I don’t think so. There’s no need. You see, in 1937, when they came for dissidents at night, only a very small circle of neighbors knew — and even then, not always. But now the situation with Shlosberg serves as a warning to everyone. It’s a high-profile story. Any such arrest, in today’s environment of media transparency and resonance, becomes a clear warning. There’s no need to imprison hundreds of thousands — imprisoning just a few thousand is enough to instill fear. So I don’t think there’s any need for mass repressions comparable to 1937. The same goal is achieved by other means.

Why Brave Men in War Become Cowards in Peace Link to heading

And a second question from Yulia. Continuing the conversation about why brave fighters on the battlefield suddenly bow in peacetime before insignificance. Isn’t it because people don’t feel supported? Don’t you think that concepts like courage, freedom, democracy, bravery simply can’t exist in an enclosed space? If they stop working, they quickly die. Notice how the West didn’t save Ukraine and soon weakened itself. Just like some Civil War hero who stayed silent when his friend was arrested — and immediately lost his courage. Perhaps this resembles the properties of chemical elements. Maybe there’s some law here. What do you think?

I think it’s the other way around. The West didn’t support Ukraine because it had already weakened — not that the West weakened after failing to support Ukraine. The cause-and-effect relationship, in my view, is reversed. The cause and the consequence have been swapped.

As for your idea that bravery dies in a closed space — well, not quite. Yes, it disappears — but it disappears under certain conditions. You seem to imply that only those on the “right side of history” can be brave — if I understand you correctly. I don’t think that’s true. Fascists had bravery, Lenin’s guards had bravery. But when they no longer feel support — you see, for courage, some sort of reference group is necessary. One needs to feel that someone stands behind them.

In situations where a person loses that reference group — they no longer feel the backing of their party, their order of sword bearers, or whoever — then there’s no foundation for bravery. Bravery disappears when a person doesn’t understand… and let me put this in a slightly non-Russian way: “bravery to whom?” Whom are you brave for?

It’s one thing to face death knowing you have support, even if far away. It’s another to face it knowing you’re essentially alone — and perceived as a traitor by your own. That demands a completely different level of courage, one very few are capable of.

About the Poems Link to heading

So, Denis Liu is a fighter. The word “chelovek” sounds like “human,” but it means “man.” Meanwhile, in Ukrainian, “lyudyna”—a word of feminine gender—means a person.

Okay, fine. Yes, we already understood that. This? This is a bit of a repetition of what happened yesterday. Yesterday, everyone was explaining things to each other.

On “MEDIAphrenia” and the Importance of “TRUMPophrenia” Link to heading

A question from Denis Do you believe that the product, Trumpophrenia, will be more important for viewers than one about Putin and Trump? Journalists all over the world are discussing them, and your analysis of his words and actions becomes meaningless a month after publication. But when it comes to analyzing Russian figures—no one can do it as precisely as you. Can you tell who in the Russian parliament is just a jester, and who actually has influence? Just focus more on areas where you’re hard to replace. Namely, explaining to viewers who is who in the Russian Federation.

Yes. Dear colleague, I assume. Well, since indeed our Trumpophrenia has somewhat, somewhat slowed down, it’s temporary, I assure you, we will continue. You seem to have misunderstood what the Trump program is. Trumpophrenia is not an analysis of Trump’s QUOTES. That we do at 7:40 and in conversations with guests. Trumpophrenia is an analysis of Trump’s Russian-speaking fans. And no one else is doing that, by the way. So, all those Veller and Panasenko, you, and so on—no one is analyzing their Trumpophrenia. I think that’s a very important part of the work.

About Jesus Christ Link to heading

So, Yevgeny? It’s so great that the talk about cosmic intelligence has stopped. I have a simple and specific question. Jesus Christ, whose real existence you acknowledge, said “I and the Father are one.” It’s written in the Gospel of John, chapter 10. Then the quote continues: “For I did not speak on my own, but the Father who sent me commanded me to say all that I have spoken.” That’s chapter 12. Jesus said to him, “I am Putin I—excuse me, for God’s sake, that was a stupid slip. Sorry—I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.” That’s chapter 14. Was he telling the truth or lying? I want a clear answer in one or two words. In fact, I ask specifically for that. Can you do that?

Well, you know, I have a request—please don’t dictate to me how many words I should use in my response. I ask you, please, I’ll still answer the way I think is appropriate. The thing is, Jesus—I do indeed believe that he existed, and he was one of many Jewish preachers. Preachers’ words aren’t exactly truth or lies. They—they certainly aren’t truth, aren’t factual. The question is whether he was sincere when he said those things. As for whether what he said was true—I’m sure it wasn’t. Right. But was he sincere? That is, did he himself believe that he was telling the truth—I don’t know. Probably yes. Probably yes. I think preachers are in a state where they believe they are telling the truth. Probably, some of them were hypocrites. But judging by the fact that Jesus was indeed able to create his own—initially a branch of Judaism, and later become the founder of an independent religion—I think he believed in what he was saying. So, he was not telling the truth, but he was sincere in his, in his statements.

Zhenya Chirikova Link to heading

Tatyana Dmitrievna, this is a question from the chat. Could you invite Zhenya Chirikova? There’s a lot to talk about with her.

Well, I’ll say right away that, as I understand it, she’s a very respectable person. But I don’t yet see what there is for me to talk with her about. I don’t want the conversation to just be about her activities. Just being a mic stand so she can talk about what she does—that doesn’t seem like a reason to invite her on our channel. I think we can simply mention again that there is such a person—Yevgenia Chirikova—who is doing a certain kind of work. I don’t quite understand what we’d talk about with her.

On Stomakhin and Novodvorskaya Link to heading

So, moving on. Tatyana Dmitrievna writes Regarding Boris Stomakhin, you didn’t mention the most important thing—his hatred toward Russians didn’t arise from nothing but against the background of the Chechen wars. I remember his newspaper “Radical Politics” from day one, where Valeriya Ilyinichna Novodvorskaya, though not agreeing with him on everything, treated him with respect. And after his last prison term, he moved to Ukraine, where he remains to this day.

Well, as for Valeriya Ilyinichna’s attitude—as far as I know, it was mixed, but that’s not the most important thing. What matters is that Valeriya Ilyinichna truly was, is, and remains in my view a great human rights advocate. But she wasn’t good at judging people. Her attitude toward him, I think, is evidence of that—she didn’t really read people well. You know, she was a great person who looked at the world as a whole and didn’t distinguish details very clearly. Since I was also fairly well acquainted with her, interacted with her many times, I saw that her perspective was very specific—she saw the world broadly and saw it well. But smaller things, like us, she didn’t really notice, not very well. That’s not criticism, just my observation. She treated people kindly—everyone except her enemies. Those she hated—she knew how to hate. If you were on her side, she treated you well. Who you were didn’t really matter to her.

Now, about Boris Stomakhin. Dear Tatyana Dmitrievna, did you actually read what he wrote? And are you okay with it? Quotes like this: “Russians must be killed, and only killed. There are no normal, intelligent, educated ones among them you can talk to or hope to be understood by. There should be no distinction between civilians or combatants, willing or unwilling. Kill, kill, and kill. Drench all of Russia in blood. Show no mercy to anyone. Try to arrange at least one nuclear explosion on Russian territory.” You see? So who are these calls addressed to? The West? To arrange a nuclear explosion in Russia? Really? Nuclear war? Kill everyone—meaning children and women too. Then there’s this delicate question: kill Russians based on ethnicity, but spare the Tatars? So in Moscow, all the Russians should be slaughtered, but the Tatars and Jews spared—or should they be killed too? In fact, such emotionally charged statements, first of all, are completely unrealizable, and second, the devil’s in the details.

Should Lev Shlosberg also be killed—or because he’s Jewish, he gets to live? What about Aleksandr Valeryevich Skobov—should he be killed too? Or spared because he’s in prison? What do we do here? Should the Chechens be spared—so Kadyrov should live because he’s not Russian? Again, there are a ton of questions. I sort of understand what Stomakhin wants, but his views are, to me, absolutely repulsive. Just disgusting. I spoke at length about this yesterday—yes, I think it was yesterday—about Slovakia, and I explained that I believe what happened to him was monstrous, because he didn’t deserve prison. But his views are deeply repulsive to me. They really are—this kind of rhetoric only benefits Putin, because it becomes a scarecrow, a bogeyman that shows: “Look, they all want to kill you.” That’s it. So rally around Putin—he’ll protect you.

But the main thing—the utter senselessness of these calls. Who are they even for?

About Nevzlin Link to heading

A question from Ben. What happened to the Leonid Nevzlin topic? What’s going on with the investigation into the attack on Volkov?

I think the topic of Leonid Nevzlin has faded because there’s no evidence of his involvement in the incident. That Volkov was attacked with a hammer—at least, that it wasn’t done by Nevzlin himself—is obvious. That it was ordered by Nevzlin hasn’t been proven. So, I think this topic has died down precisely due to the lack of evidence.

About Marc Levy Link to heading

So the host is asking. I’ve listened several times on the French channel to speeches by the well-known publicist and writer Marc Levy. According to him, he has been to Ukraine more than once and debated with the host about the Russian offensive at the front. I’d like to know your opinion of him and whether you are familiar with his work.

You know, I’ve said more than once that I absolutely don’t want to step onto the field of literary criticism. I’ve read, I think, one or two of his novels. Right. But I absolutely don’t want to act as a literary critic. As for his publicist work—I haven’t heard it. So that’s how it is. Judging by your words, he’s on the right side of history. And most likely, yes, that’s the case. But I can’t offer any specifics.

About Negotiation and Capitulation Link to heading

Mr. Gentleman Is Ukraine planning to negotiate? They were offered a deal in 2022, but they refused.

Dear Mr. Gentleman, what they were offered in 2022 was capitulation. In fact, what was proposed—that communiqué or some kind of resolution, which wasn’t signed—was, essentially, a capitulation. So no one is actually offering Ukraine a negotiation. And Putin is showing that with all his actions. Zelensky is proposing a meeting. Putin refuses. Putin says: first, hold elections; withdraw from the territories I haven’t yet conquered; reduce your army; stop receiving Western aid. In essence, completely lose your subjectivity and disarm. That is, in effect, demilitarization means dismantling the Ukrainian army. Denazification means dismantling the Ukrainian state. Those are the talking points. So what is there to negotiate? That’s total and final capitulation.

A School Incident Link to heading

A question from Vladimir Given your experience and knowledge, I’d like you to analyze a situation from my youth. It happened in 1979 in Zhdanov. I was in the 9th grade at a regular secondary school. One of the teachers came to class and suggested we attend the funeral of a former student who had died in a motorcycle accident. At that time, the deceased was no longer studying at our school. Around 20 boys volunteered. The deceased’s mother was a member of some church or sect—I don’t remember which. We, along with others, arrived at the cemetery. The funeral didn’t start until a man around 40, dressed in a gray suit and driven in a Volga, arrived. He gave a 10–15 minute speech. I remember that the speech had a political subtext and that the speaker talked about the red dragon. Then he got in the car and left. Around 80 of us were then taken to a cafeteria to remember the deceased. At our table were us schoolboys and believers, also about 20 people. And so on. So. The school somehow participated in organizing our presence at the funeral. There’s no other way to explain why we were let out of classes for the funeral of a former student who wasn’t particularly notable. Plus, the principal was known to cooperate actively with the police—I’m sure with the KGB. What do you think—could this have been some kind of provocation or something else?

Dear colleagues, naturally, I can’t now, across time and distance, part the fog, so to speak, and say exactly what that was—it would be unserious. But from what you describe, it was clearly a personal initiative of the principal, possibly related to the parents of the deceased. You see, back then there was a lot of this kind of arbitrariness—personal whims, personal interests, and so on. What exactly happened here, of course, can’t be determined from this distance in time and space, but most likely it was some kind of eccentric move by the very principal you’re referring to.

On Hypotheses and Theories Link to heading

So, another very long question from Lemeshev. Igor Aleksandrovich, you accurately pointed out your Chekist friend’s remark about the difference between faith in God and quantum mechanics, emphasizing that quantum mechanics is supported by experience and practical application. In that respect, it’s undoubtedly a stunning, mind-blowing scientific theory. But when, essentially, the hypothesis of evolution and genius is called a theory, it involuntarily provokes irritation and even offense—especially since even the Riemann hypothesis is still called a hypothesis, because it’s unproven, for reasons we understand. Meanwhile, evolution and the origin of life have tons of weak spots, totally untestable experimentally. I’m talking specifically about evolution. Today, there are 1,000,000 million different species of plants, animals, insects, fungi, fish. (Fish, by the way, are also animals, as are insects, etc.) All radically different from each other. The simplest imaginable experiments with numbers don’t support that life on Earth is 4.5 billion years old—the rate of development must have been either staggering or… just staggering. Based on such diversity, the age of life on Earth should be closer to 100 billion years. I’m not even talking about [something else], which is called a theory. It’s astonishing, really, when quantum mathematics and evolution are presented as theories, but the Riemann hypothesis remains a hypothesis because it’s unproven—according to Hegel’s theorems, it might never be proven. Do you allow for the possibility that in 1000 years scientists, using conditional catalysts in laboratories, could experimentally show that a cockroach can appear from a “theory” in five years, and in 15 more years a dinosaur from a cockroach, and in 30 more years—an ape from a dinosaur? Sounds cartoonish, I understand. But replace millions of years with decades. Natural selection, mutations, and so on—and there you have it. A scientific theory. In this particular case, I see no real difference between religious thinking and belief in evolution. The supports are just too rotten.

Well, my dear—your last few lines… First of all, if the word “theory” irritates you so much, just replace it with the word “hypothesis.” We can say a couple words to each other on that. But first, I want to react to your last image. It immediately reminded me of one brilliant work. I think it was the very first story Chekhov published. There’s a very vivid quote—I’ll just quote Chekhov, because I think he said exactly the same thing. His character said the same as you:

“You say that man descended from apes—from baboons, orangutans, and so on. Excuse me, old man, but I strongly disagree with you on this important point. Because if man, ruler of the world, the smartest of all living beings, had descended from a stupid, ignorant ape, then he’d have a tail and a savage voice. If we came from monkeys, gypsies would be parading us around the cities.”

And so on. In other words, what you said about that experiment—where, as you said, a cockroach appears from theory, and from a cockroach a dinosaur, and from a dinosaur an ape—is essentially the same way Chekhov’s character perceived evolution. So it’s not a caricature—it’s a “letter to a learned neighbor.”

I don’t see why you wrote this. Now, as for the term “theory.” The theory of evolution, and everything you criticize, is—today—part of science. Unlike religion, it’s science. There’s the Miller–Urey experiment, where they placed a mix of hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and other inorganic compounds into a sealed vessel and ran electrical discharges through it at high temperatures. As a result, amino acids formed—from non-living to living matter. Well, not exactly living, but amino acids. Later, amino acids and nucleotides were produced in various other experiments from inorganic substances.

Then there’s Richard Dawkins—today one of the leading ideologists of atheism. In The Selfish Gene he lays out a personal view of evolution. Again—I’m ready to agree with you. If the word “theory” bothers you so much, replace it with “hypothesis.” Because at the moment, within the realm of science, multiple hypotheses coexist. That’s science. This isn’t religion.

There’s the “panspermia” hypothesis as well—that life’s building blocks may have come from space. That doesn’t contradict science either, even though it’s not proven. But still—whether it’s the personal view of Dawkins, or the Miller experiment, or panspermia—all of these are hypotheses.

And I’m perfectly happy, dear Lemeshev, to agree that the word “theory” can be replaced with “hypothesis.” No problem. If it makes life easier for you—I’m fine with that.

But comparing this to religion doesn’t work. Religion has no hypotheses. It has rigid dogma, and that dogma is based on nothing—absolutely no evidence. Not the slightest bit of proof for any religious doctrine. Whereas in science, there is evidence. Maybe not final proof—but the process of development continues.

Yes, I agree—we can consider these different hypotheses.

On Doctrines and Faith Link to heading

Right? Tony Kitay. So, as I understand it, this is a response to the claim that there is not a single example of practical application of religious doctrines. Moving on. Here Tony UN says: I can give such examples. Imagine that among you lives a genuinely unstable person who believes in God. That belief is the last thing keeping him in this world, or stopping him from taking the final step and causing great harm to those around him. Go ahead, take that belief away from him. Prove to him that God doesn’t exist, that he has been a fool his whole life for believing in it. Then see what happens. Putin doesn’t believe in God; faith doesn’t hold him back. You have to admit—it would be better if he did believe. But you don’t need to be Putin to cause serious harm on a local scale.

Well, I actually want to say something about the number of believers. You see, again, what does “not believing in God” really mean? Probably Tkachyov doesn’t believe in God. He says he does. You could say that every fanatic doesn’t believe in God—that’s one way to look at it. I think this is also a form of self-reassurance. The number of scoundrels who believe in God is not less than the number of scoundrels among atheists. Therefore, fighting Christianity from a pragmatic point of view is the dumbest thing one can do. But is someone really fighting Christianity? So now you’re accusing me of attacking a straw man again. There are specific situations. It’s impossible to calculate how many lives Christianity has saved even to this day, because no survey can capture that. No one will admit, “Yes, I’m completely unhinged. It would be better if I were isolated from people, but don’t worry, I never will [do harm].” And so on. The logic is clear, even if the introduction is long.

Let me name another type of benefit. Sooner or later, all of us will die. And among people who generally don’t think much—especially not about that—some just have the occasional thought once a month before bed: “I’ll die someday too, but not today, so it’s fine.” But for others, it’s very hard to accept this fact. So, to put it simply: what is belief in God, then? Life? It’s just a stage to go through. Go through it with dignity, and life will be better in the next world. But you, as a nonbeliever, come up to this person and say, “None of that is real. Ha ha ha! You’re going to die, they’ll bury you, and your corpse will rot in the ground.” There’s nothing he can do about that.

So—even if you’re right a hundred times—if religion helps even a small number of people maintain functionality and live a fulfilling life, then it’s better that it exists. You see, you’re breaking down an open door. I’m not denying that religion performs many functions, including that of providing comfort. That’s the point—you’re not getting it. We have no disagreement about the fact that religion serves certain functions. The same functions are served by myths, by fairy tales we read to children at night. That’s the point. But our discussion was about the truth of religious dogmas. And the truth of religious dogmas is not proven by what you’ve said—on the contrary, it’s disproven. What you’ve essentially demonstrated is the usefulness of deception. I agree. Lies for the sake of salvation are often acceptable. The usefulness of deception is often obvious. And there’s no need to push at an open door to prove that telling a dying person he’ll recover is justified—even if it’s a lie, it’s a lie for the sake of salvation. During war, for example, lies and disinformation can also be useful. But that doesn’t make them true. Our discussion is about truth, not the usefulness of lies. So, we’re talking on completely different levels.

About Trump the Immigrant Link to heading

So appreciated. Saying that Trump is the same kind of immigrant as Mexicans—you’re being disingenuous. Yes, Trump is an immigrant, an immigrant from Europe. The U.S. was built by European immigrants; immigrants from Mexico are building their own Mexico within the U.S. and are unable to adapt. Not because they’re worse, but because they have a different behavioral stereotype. This is the root of the conflicts. If they were willing to adapt, there wouldn’t be such animosity toward them from a fairly large number of Americans. In many ways, these discontented attitudes toward migration secured Trump’s election victory, as he was the only politician promising to fight illegal immigration.

Well, you know, as I was reading your comment just now, I immediately recalled the stance of Russians—Russian lawmakers and Russian nationalists—against migrants from Central Asia, saying we shouldn’t let them in, and that immediately raises the question: who will do the work? In reality, migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries—they perform specific jobs, they work, they work on construction sites, they do unskilled labor that is needed. They serve a purpose. And really, when you say they don’t adapt—well, you see? And then the next question arises: what about migrants from India? Are they needed or not? And then, following your logic, we would need to start a selection process among European immigrants. Immigrants from Germany—good, immigrants from, say, the UK—good. But what about Slavic immigrants—are they acceptable or not? Or is that already a no? And, say, Chinese immigrants—are they good or bad? So then we’re heading right down Trump’s path, where a list is drawn up of countries whose migrants are undesirable. And what is that, really? In my view, that’s Nazism. When you say that European immigrants are good and Mexican immigrants are bad—well, go ahead, continue down that path. That means we’re doing a selection: these are good immigrants, these are bad ones. But to me, that all stinks. And let me stress again, what’s happening in Russia regarding migration policy—when they say that migrants from Central Asia are bad—well, excuse me, then what makes this Russian nationalist policy any different from Trump’s? Nothing. They’re two peas in a pod. And the main point is this: no one is saying that illegal migrants are a good thing. The point is that Trump is using this migration issue to stage these provocations. The fight against illegal migration can absolutely be handled by the states themselves. But Trump—see, California is a Democratic state that has never voted for Trump, and Trump is using the situation to go after his political opponent. The governor of California is one of the most likely presidential candidates for 2028. So this is also an attempt to crush a political rival.

Trump and His Image Link to heading

So, another question from Alex Ivanov. Please analyze my observations and add your own. Trump is a coward. It’s obvious—he seems to get along with everyone at the UN, is on good terms with everyone, all smiles. With Putin, he’s the only one who’s “great.” A clear sign of a coward afraid of responsibility in any form. Everything he does is described with loud superlatives—“great.” A phenomenon supposedly never seen before in history—empty words, empty self-praise. Always the same, like a parrot. The facial expressions of a complete amateur. Let’s see what happens. I have some specific timelines in mind. Idiocy. Let’s talk about something more substantial, if possible.

Well, I think I’ve spoken on this topic many times. At the core of all this, firstly—and most importantly—is narcissism. Point one. Point two: clearly poor education and a clear unpreparedness to be the president of the world’s most powerful country. Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of chaos in his mind. Then there are the ideological underpinnings of a fascist sort—might makes right, imperialism, annexation of foreign territories, and an intense hatred for liberal democracy. That’s probably all I can add.

From Opponent Max Link to heading

Well then. A few comments from my regular opponent Max. About the idea that ending the war would be a disaster for Putin, since his regime has no substance. I actually think there is substance, particularly in Putin’s case. He’s sustained. But here it’s a play on words. Sustained by the FSB, the National Guard, the Interior Ministry, the Investigative Committee, the FSO, the SVR, the Federal Penitentiary Service, and so on. Are they going to rebel? Do they really need Kherson that badly? In such regimes, as we know from history, there’s just as much work in peacetime as in wartime, if not more. So, I’ll repeat my thesis: as long as there is “sustenance,” Putin is free to start or end wars at will.

Well, you see, you’re playing with words here, but when I talked about “substance,” I meant something else—the absence of ideology. But that’s not even the main point. From my point of view, beyond these institutions you listed, first of all, those institutions are made up of people—and for them, this is a colossal, colossal disappointment. It turns out our “father” was not a father, but we know who, right? The king is not a real king. A defeated king is not a real king. And propaganda can’t cover that up and pass it off as a victory, for example. Right now, after Putin’s operation, there’s clear confusion, clear disorientation. Let’s put it this way—even though that operation is significant, it’s still just a very painful slap in the face. But if there’s a knockout blow, no propaganda will be able to conceal it. Those who say that Putin could lose the war completely, and then the TV will just say he won—no, that won’t happen. It just won’t. Propaganda doesn’t work like that. That’s why over 600,000—actually closer to 1,000,000—ghouls, cannibals, and murderers flooded back into Russia. This isn’t the Cold Summer of 1953—this is something entirely different. And no country can withstand that. Just like Russia couldn’t withstand the massive influx of defeated soldiers—peasants in uniform—returning from the front as deserters, as broken and hopeless men pouring into the cities. What followed was, to a large extent, the result of defeat in World War I. So I believe defeat in war destroys empires. Defeat in the Russo-Japanese War significantly triggered the first Russian revolution, which, smoothly, through World War I, evolved into the February and then October revolutions. The defeat in the Afghan war became—if not the main one—then one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. So, in reality, this is a very serious matter. Empires do not tolerate defeat. So, I don’t think you’re right.

On Debates About Poland and Ukraine Link to heading

Another question from Max. Regarding historical discussions, just to clarify—I specifically meant Polish-Ukrainian relations. I believed and still believe that now is not the time for such debates; that time will come after the war. Today, Poland is taking in Ukrainian refugees, handling military aid logistics, and supporting Ukraine. What more do you want? As programmers say—if a piece of code works, don’t touch it. Now imagine a debate begins, some historian—there are all kinds—says something off. Russian agents instantly amplify it and the FSB injects it into the Polish information space. And so on.

So, in fact—well, I’m open to this. I understand your position: that now is not the time, so to speak. I accept your arguments. But that same position could apply at any moment. I mean, war or post-war. First of all, we don’t know—this discussion is actually already happening. And as for our channel, I don’t believe it will be the kind of event that could seriously worsen Polish-Ukrainian relations. There’s a huge issue here—telling the truth is always dangerous. You know the saying, “let sleeping dogs lie”? The sleeping dog is the very truth that’s dangerous. And I don’t know—I haven’t decided for myself. So, dear Max, I hear your arguments. But I haven’t decided for myself how far your arguments should go. Do you see? We already have all these taboos—taboos even on historical discussions. In Polish society, there’s not just the stance of Mr. Kulpa, who’s quite soft and very pro-Ukrainian. Mr. Kulpa is a Polish politician who is so pro-Ukrainian, he couldn’t be more so. But there are anti-Ukrainian politicians in Poland as well. All this exists, even without our discussions. That’s why I think an honest conversation between historians on this topic could even be useful. So despite fully understanding your arguments, I’m still not convinced you’re right.

Should We Get Involved in Ukrainian-Polish Relations Link to heading

Another question from Max. There’s another point I didn’t want to bring up, but it’s important. I play devil’s advocate and evaluate risks. It’s a delicate issue. I don’t want to offend anyone, and I apologize in advance. Let me use an analogy—they’re usually flawed, and mine is the most flawed of all, but it will get the point across. If some German blogger decided to host a historical debate between Arabs and Jews, I’d try to talk him out of it—even if he’s an anti-fascist and just a good person. He shouldn’t touch that topic. Trouble can come from any direction over the smallest thing. The memory issue is too sensitive. Ukraine and Poland are destined to live in peace and mutual respect. They’ll work it out between themselves. There’s no need to push anything. Everything will happen naturally, due to objective reasons. But any wrong word, any manipulation—or anything perceived as manipulation—can have real negative consequences. Did I understand correctly?

Yes, you understood correctly. The problem exists. And when you say they’re destined to live in peace and mutual respect—well, if only that were true. But there are real anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Poland, and there are Polish sentiments in Ukraine. That’s a fact. So—so you see, this is that kind of “caution germ.” Don’t poke it. It exists. These contradictions exist, these debates are happening. Unfortunately, they’re happening at an amateurish, spontaneous, and politically illiterate level. Trying to elevate this to an academic level—among historians, I think—is actually quite a sound idea. That’s where I see the value. That’s why, for now, I’m not organizing this discussion. But to say that I’ll never do it—no, I’m not ready to say that.

Korzhavin and Rassadin Link to heading

So, a question from Alexander So, you said twice that Korzhavin hosted the old segment in the new format. But it was actually Stanislav Rassadin. Yes, I was wrong, yes, it was a silly mistake, of course. It was Stanislav Rassadin.

You’re absolutely right. I got them mixed up. Why? I don’t know why that happens in my head sometimes.

Arshavin and Biblical Themes Link to heading

Serafim Lozhkin Returning to Arshavin—in the line “A man needs a wife,” I sense a biblical theme—Old Testament, the Gospel. God created man. Then God took a rib from Adam and created a wife for him. There are other lines about the relationship between a man and his wife. One may not believe, may be an atheist, but one cannot deny that nearly all literature and art are built on biblical themes. I think the wonderful Russian poet Korzhavin knew the Torah and was accustomed to such a view or concept as “man and his wife.”

Well, again, sure—one can base their works on biblical themes. But in this case, it’s not about a biblical theme. It’s about—well, yes, I agree. You see, the Torah—after all, it’s ancient. These are ancient texts that are undeniably based on—it’s a man’s world, it’s a male world. The Bible is a male world. That is, this is antiquity, an era in which the idea of gender equality simply didn’t exist. That’s obvious. And when you write a poem rooted in ancient concepts, you’re doing just that. It contains that—it contains this sort of masculinity. It includes the idea that a woman isn’t fully recognized as a person—she’s from a rib, right? So that’s part of it, part of that worldview.

On the Statement Made by Schoolchildren Link to heading

Elena Chernaya Regarding the schoolchildren discussing how many missiles it would take to destroy Ukraine. The spiral of silence, in my opinion, is irrelevant here. They shouldn’t be defended. Defended. They really do think that way. Children reflect what’s happening at home. What spiral are we talking about? This only shows that things have gone way too far in Russia.

Dear Elena! Well, I’m not going to repeat the entire question that was asked back then. It’s really about a very simple thing. Do you honestly think—are you certain—that 100% of people in Russia think about and want to figure out how many missiles it would take to destroy Ukraine? Are you sure it’s 100%? Are you sure it’s 99%? Are you sure it’s 90%? You see, are you sure that in every child’s home the parents dream of destroying all of Ukraine and talk about it at the dinner table—“So, how many missiles would we need to destroy Ukraine?” Do you think that’s how dinner conversations go in Russia? That’s not true. I don’t know what kind of representative communication you have with people in Russia. I know many people in Russia—excuse me, 40% of our channel’s audience is from Russia. Well, maybe less now, but overall about that much. Especially considering that, due to the ROC, many watch from inside Russia, though it’s logged as outside. So I believe about 40% are people whose children definitely aren’t discussing how many missiles are needed to destroy Ukraine. You see, there are a huge number of people in Russia who feel about this war roughly the same as you and I do. So this spiral of silence—no one denies that there are indeed many people. We’re arguing about the percentage. There’s no reliable sociology in Russia—that’s clear. Still, there are indirect indicators that allow some rough estimates. But the fact that so many conversations take on this militaristic tone—that is, of course, the result of the spiral of silence. Of course. Because speaking out—well, we were just discussing the Shlosberg effect: a person merely speaks of peace, says something like what Trump says, like what Putin himself says—but because he doesn’t say “we need to kill all Ukrainians,” he’s now one step away from prison. So the spiral of silence clearly exists. It’s exactly what ensures that conversations are held in that kind of tone—without objections. Because the people who have something to object with are staying silent. That’s all. It’s a very simple story.

Does Khodorkovsky Present Himself as the Leader of the Opposition Link to heading

Gennady Konovalov In response to your question about when Khodorkovsky appointed himself the leader of the Russian opposition—on his English-language Twitter, that’s exactly how he identifies himself: leader of the Russian opposition. Strange that you weren’t aware of this fact.

Well, maybe so. Strange, of course. There are many facts I’m unaware of. Thank you for enlightening me. I’ll definitely check it, but I truly didn’t know that.

On the Resilience of Ukrainians Link to heading

So then, a question from Igor Alexandrovich. I’m not going to try to match your expertise in designing, conducting, and interpreting sociological surveys, but I’ll try to share my thoughts on the poll conducted by KIIS. Look, they report that the majority of Ukrainians are not ready for territorial concessions. I came across a figure of 62–38—ready to concede if it means an end to hostilities. That’s in 2025. But in 2022, that number was close to 90%. I’m not sure what kind of integrated pragmatic trend can be applied to such figures. But what do you think the percentage of unyielding Ukrainians will be in, say, 2027 or 2029? Especially considering that, when analyzing the international, internal Russian, and economic situation, it’s fairly obvious that Russia will not run out of the resources needed for a prolonged low-intensity war. I bring this up in connection with the phrase in the title about Ukrainian resilience, and the question raised yesterday by Vitaly Portnikov: can the Ukrainian people be forced into surrender or submission? Apparently, they can—given the kinds of allies on each side. On one side, China, North Korea, and Iran are showering Russia—directly or indirectly—with electronics and weapons. On the other, the progressive West, afraid of its own shadow and sunk in tenderness.

I don’t think, dear colleague, that such a linear extrapolation can be made—like yesterday it was 80%, today it’s 62%, so tomorrow it’ll be the opposite: 38% steadfast and 60% not. No, I don’t think you can extrapolate that way. And as for this geopolitical framing—that China, North Korea, and Iran are flooding Russia with weapons, and the progressive West isn’t—well, excuse me, if we look at the ratio of money and the value of the weapons supplied to Ukraine versus to Russia, then clearly Ukraine is receiving more. And the weapons given to Ukraine—I’m not trying to take a cheerleader’s position here—are of much higher quality. Ukraine is getting aircraft; Russia isn’t. Ukraine is receiving modern weapons. Russia gets old Soviet weapons or not-so-new ones. Ukraine is setting up joint ventures to produce long-range missiles and drones. In Russia, nothing like that exists—there are no joint factories with China or North Korea, etc. So, I wouldn’t dismiss Western aid—it’s substantial and serious. Therefore, to say there will be a linear trend toward Ukrainians agreeing to what is essentially capitulation—no, I don’t think that’s going to happen.

On Terminology Link to heading

Pavel Alexandrovich, please stop calling the Russian military ministry the Ministry of Defense.

Well. Should I also add “hands at your sides,” right? “Yes, sir!” Dear Pavel, I simply can’t stop calling Putin “Putin” and start calling him “Pootler” or “Khuilo,” and so on. And I can’t stop calling the ministry—the Russian Ministry of Defense—by its official name. That’s, unfortunately, what it’s called. Of course, in some cases one might switch to calling it the Russian Ministry of Destruction, or something else, as people sometimes do. But still, let’s not fall into this magical thinking—that if you call Putin by some other name, he’ll disappear. No, he won’t.

On the Current State of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) Link to heading

So, Sergey Andryushchenko. To suggest that the FBK was working hand in hand with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office—that’s something else entirely. Remind me, how many criminal cases and arrests resulted from FBK’s work, excluding the arrests of FBK staff themselves? I have little respect for FBK’s political activity, but when it comes to investigations into corruption and elite palaces, I take my hat off to them.

Yes, I was ready to take my hat off and show full respect—before the war, and even during the war. You see, I’m not saying—I’m not claiming—that they’re working with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office. They’re working in the same direction. That is, the Russian Prosecutor’s Office conducts investigations, and there have been many arrests, especially in the Ministry of Defense—they’re jailing corrupt officials. You surely know that. So FBK is operating in the same direction: the Prosecutor’s Office jails corrupt figures, FBK investigates corruption. So they’re moving in parallel. FBK is working to reduce corruption, to reduce the scale of corruption in order to preserve the budget. What happens next—I don’t know if any measures will be taken based on FBK’s investigations. Maybe they will, maybe they won’t. But they’re working in the same direction, you see?

This is essentially the same point raised by Gennady Konovalov. Once again, I want to stress: I remain convinced that anti-corruption investigations in wartime are inappropriate. They are not, at this point, part of the fight against the Putin regime. They’re not relevant. They benefit the Putin regime. They’re a hint: “Hey, look, you’ve got weak points over here.” This highlights the shortcomings of the Russian economy—it’s a tip. I don’t know whether there will be a criminal case opened against that helicopter guy, but it’s a tip. Why do that? I don’t understand. And it’s certainly not part of the struggle against the Putin regime. Because corruption—Russian corruption right now—is Ukraine’s ally. A corrupt Russian official is a friend to Ukraine. Why fight those who are genuinely weakening the Putin regime? Who are reducing the effectiveness of the Putin economy? That I do not understand.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

So, dear friends, this concludes our morning stream for today. Let me remind you once again that at 11:00 we have a conversation with Gennady Gudkov. I believe it will be interesting, especially since we’ll be discussing topics I haven’t yet covered—such as the recent Security Council meeting and a number of issues that, in my view, Gennady Vladimirovich is well equipped to assess. 11:00, Gennady Gudkov. With that, I’m wrapping up our morning discussion. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander! Alexander Skobov. For Lev Shlosberg. For all Russian political prisoners. And Ukrainian prisoners of war. All the best to you! See you at 11:00. Goodbye.

Source: https://youtu.be/YMecVyn75eE