The results of the special operation “Easter Truce”: Ukraine and Russia accused each other of violations. Putin will not extend the truce. The end of the negotiation farce is approaching.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 21st. It is now 7:40 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
The Easter Truce Is Over Link to heading
A few hours ago, at midnight, the special operation called the Easter Truce came to an end. Well, this event had all the hallmarks of a special operation, because it was prepared in secret. Usually, when a truce is arranged, it is first proposed to the other side, the warring country. To declare a ceasefire. But in this case, it was sudden, like a night-time stab in the back, as they say. It was announced that Putin was declaring a truce, without coordinating it or even initially offering it to the Ukrainian side, without setting any terms or mechanisms for control. In short, just like Putin launched the invasion without declaring war, this sudden “special operation,” the Easter truce, was carried out in the same way.
Everything is well known. It is known that Zelensky immediately responded, stating that, of course, Ukraine would also cease fire. But given Putin’s credit history, given his reputation, it was clear that no one believed it. As of now, the special operation is over, and some brief conclusions can be drawn. As expected, both Ukraine and Russia are accusing each other of numerous violations of the truce. The President of Ukraine reported that Russian forces violated Putin’s declared Easter truce over 2,000 times. The only thing that didn’t happen during the ceasefire period—until midnight—was long-range strikes, apparently. So, in fact, there are documented violations of the truce. How much each side violated it, I cannot say. However, the Russian side is also reporting numerous violations. So, this was expected, traditionally.
Zelensky proposed an extension. Putin declared a truce for 30 hours. Zelensky proposed extending it to 30 days. It is already known that this will not happen. Putin said nothing; responses came from Peskov and Zakharova. Peskov said President Putin gave no orders to extend the Easter truce. In turn, Maria Zakharova stated that since the Ukrainian side violated the truce, there would be no extension. This was to be expected. It’s clear that this imitation, this truce mimicry orchestrated by Putin, wasn’t actually a step toward peace.
If, for example, there had been a 30-day truce, then it could be said that during this period, with real monitoring of the ceasefire, some movement toward peace could have occurred. Thirty days is a period during which negotiations, conditions, and maybe even a tiny chance for this horrific war to end could arise. But nothing like that happened. For the simple reason that Putin has no intention of stopping the war. And so, at midnight, one might say, the carriage of this truce special operation turned into a pumpkin.
Full-scale strikes resumed—not just violations of the truce, but real, large-scale attacks. There was a night raid by Russian drones, movement of Shaheds recorded, and air defense fire in several Ukrainian regions. Air defense was active in the Kyiv region. There were strikes on Odesa and Mykolaiv. Around 5:00 AM—just two hours before the start of this broadcast—there were reports of two cruise missiles flying over the Black Sea toward the Mykolaiv region. So far, I haven’t seen any confirmed data on destruction, but it’s clear that the war has resumed. The war continues in full-scale format.
It’s not very interesting to follow or tally who struck whom and how often. But it is clear: there was no real, full-scale truce. Trump, of course, expressed his hope that peace would soon return to Ukraine—as usual. But what’s notable here is the specifics. His recent statements suggest he hopes for a deal between Russia and Ukraine in the coming days, and that after this agreement is reached, Moscow and Kyiv will be able to do big business, and the U.S. will make a fortune. Truly astonishing, what goes on in that man’s head. The main thing, of course, is making a fortune.
So now, the key question is: what’s next? It’s clear that this special operation is over. It’s clear that the purpose of this special operation had nothing to do with ending the war. The main goal was to create an impression for Trump that Russia is also interested in peace. Here’s the argument: Putin declares an Easter truce. The main idea is to ensure that the United States, which is clearly preparing to exit this negotiation process, does not blame only Putin for the breakdown. Here’s the argument: look, Putin is for peace—he declares an Easter truce.
The position of the United States is becoming increasingly inadequate. Recent publications and statements indicate this. In particular, the Wall Street Journal published a major piece saying the U.S. is awaiting a response from Kyiv regarding the recognition of Crimea as Russian and Ukraine’s abandonment of NATO membership. Literally, the quote is: “This week, Ukraine is under pressure to respond to a series of far-reaching ideas from the Trump administration on how to end the war in Ukraine, including potential U.S. recognition of Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 and Ukraine’s withdrawal from its NATO bid.”
These ideas, according to the Wall Street Journal, were outlined in a confidential document presented by the Trump administration to Ukrainian counterparts in Paris on Thursday. That Paris meeting, where the Ukrainian delegation was led by Yermak, included American representatives Rubio, Katz, and Witkoff.
The U.S. Is Threatening Russia With a U.S. Exit From the War Link to heading
So, let’s briefly sum it up. Trump is proposing that Ukraine recognize Crimea as Russian and abandon its NATO aspirations. He’s threatening Putin with the idea that, if anything, the United States will pull out of the negotiation process. Honestly, both proposals seem like a manifestation of complete medical-level inadequacy. As for the proposal to Ukraine — I mean, I don’t know what you have to have in your head to suggest Ukraine recognize the occupation of Crimea. Ukraine’s constitution explicitly states its aspiration to join NATO. Yes, the constitution can be amended, but this proposal is completely unrealistic. It’s clear these suggestions are unacceptable.
There are two possibilities here. One is that these proposals are intentionally unrealistic, made to provoke Ukraine into refusal so it can be blamed for being unwilling to negotiate. The other is that they genuinely don’t understand what Ukraine is all about. In my view, both proposals reflect incredible cluelessness.
As for the pressure on Putin through talk of a U.S. withdrawal from the negotiations — these kinds of threats always remind me of the Br’er Rabbit stories from Uncle Remus. You know, the classic American tale where Br’er Fox is always chasing Br’er Rabbit, and the Rabbit, when caught, begs, “Please don’t throw me in the briar patch!” — which, of course, is exactly what he wants. Throwing him there lets him escape happily.
So the point is simple: threatening Putin with a U.S. withdrawal from the peace process is like throwing Br’er Rabbit into the briar patch — it’s exactly what he wants. For Putin, a U.S. exit led by Trump is a blessing, because it would mean Trump distances himself from Ukraine, and Ukraine loses one of its most powerful allies. Though, frankly, at the moment, all the talk about Biden’s aid to Ukraine is quite justified — because that aid is still allowing Ukraine to hold its ground fairly effectively.
So Trump pulling out of the negotiation process likely means the end of that aid. And that’s what they’re trying to use to scare Putin. It’s a bizarre attempt to pressure him with something that actually benefits him.
I’d like to remind you that the Easter truce came almost immediately after statements by U.S. Secretary of State Mark Rubio and Donald Trump — this was on April 18. Rubio and Trump both said Washington might withdraw from its mediating role in Ukraine negotiations. Rubio said Trump has already spent 87 days at the highest level trying to end what they call a conflict, and that the U.S. is approaching its “X hour.”
Then Rubio said, “We’re not going to fly around the world to endless meetings if there’s no progress. If the U.S., Russia, and Ukraine aren’t ready for peace, we’ll move on to other issues that matter to the United States.” Trump agreed, saying that if for some reason either side complicates the situation, “we’ll just say, ‘You’re fools, you’re terrible people,’ and drop the whole thing.”
It looks like this: from the beginning, it was clear that Trump’s mission was impossible. Yet Trump, with extraordinary ease, claimed he could end the war in 24 hours. This is like someone saying he can instantly lift a one-ton barbell, then, after trying, says, “Well, this barbell is weird — must be broken. I’ve got other stuff to do,” and walks away.
The incompatibility between the positions of Russia, Putin, and Ukraine has been obvious to any observer. But this claim of being able to lift a ton in a second — that was a sign of the utter inadequacy of the 47th President of the United States. What can be said here? It seems we are in the final stage of the negotiations, and it’s ending.
I can’t say I’m happy to be right — sadly, I was. All the arguments, discussions, hopes that “maybe Trump will succeed” — it was always clear he wouldn’t. But it’s still disappointing. You always hope for a miracle. Unfortunately, the miracle didn’t happen.
The End of Illusions Link to heading
But there is a bright side to all of this. Because all these negotiations—not only from Trump’s side, but also from European leaders—have created illusions. What was so bad about it, and why I’ve always spoken out against it, and why the term “negotiation-mania” came about, is first, because it breeds illusions. That’s a dangerous thing. And second, it legitimizes Putin. All these endless talks with Putin allowed him to break out of isolation—at least in relation to the Western world—and presented him as someone you can do business with.
The end of this negotiation process—I hope this is really the end, though of course many others will likely step up—but nevertheless, if and when representatives of the largest, most powerful Western country stop endlessly flying to meet with Putin and trying to strike deals, that will be a good thing. Because in reality, the war can only be ended through developments on the battlefield. And for that, Ukraine needs weapons. This is a very simple and clear truth.
The end of negotiation-mania means a shift to another path toward ending the war—ending it through the exhaustion of Russia, through the destruction of Russia’s military potential, through taking the war onto Russian territory, through strikes including on major Russian cities, primarily to eliminate military capabilities, not to harm civilians, but to eliminate military potential. And for that, long-range missiles are needed. Aircraft are needed. And this is a clear, simple truth.
It might finally become clear—even to Western partners—after this phase of negotiation delirium ends. I hope that we are very close to the end of this negotiation spell. And that, in itself, is a decent outcome, one that was partly brought about by this so-called special operation of the Easter truce.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to your questions, I want to mention that today, as usual on Mondays at 8:00 PM, we’ll have a meeting with Serhii Hrabski, and there are a lot of questions for him that I think we’ll discuss with you at 8:00 PM. And now, I’ll move on to answering your questions.
About Yuri Shvets Link to heading
Question from Brandt:
Igor Aleksandrovich, I’m subscribed to you and never miss an episode. At the same time, I closely follow Yuri Shvets’s broadcasts. I don’t even see much difference in your views—neither toward the Putin regime nor toward the war waged by that regime against Ukraine. But it pains me that you can’t find common ground. Maybe it’s worth making an effort to find mutual understanding at least on the topic of Trump. You two are nearly indistinguishable in that regard.
Dear colleague, I have no doubt that Yuri Borisovich Shvets and I share common views—on Trump and on Putin. That much is clear. But there are a few things to note. First, let’s clarify: what does “finding common ground” mean? Some time ago, Yuri Borisovich decided to focus on his own YouTube channel and stopped appearing on others. At least that’s what he stated. So, what exactly would this “common ground” entail? There’s really no big issue here. He doesn’t visit other channels, and he doesn’t invite guests onto his own. So what would it mean to “find common ground”? Should we just congratulate each other on birthdays? Sure, that’s probably a lovely thing.
Now, regarding substance: Yuri Borisovich Shvets has an unpleasant fixation—he says he supports Ukraine in words, but in practice he’s heavily focused on trying to expose the President of Ukraine, Zelensky, and the presidential office. I’m not suggesting that President Zelensky is a sacred cow beyond criticism. But this kind of fixation seems inappropriate given the situation of a country at war. Shvets constantly targets the head of the President’s Office, Yermak. I don’t really know how substantiated these repeated accusations of betrayal are. I just don’t think this is the most constructive focus at the moment.
So, here we disagree. I’m not trying to defend Yermak or make him out to be a sacred cow either—far from it. But the constant fixation on this seems counterproductive.
Second, in several of his broadcasts, Yuri Borisovich Shvets has, for some reason, claimed that I’ve been recruited by Yermak, that I’m in Ukraine, and that I’m terrified Yermak will deport me to Russia. I’ve tried to clarify that I do not drink the blood of Christian infants, I’m not some kind of… well, I tried to explain that I’ve been recruited by no one. Also, I’m not in Ukraine—haven’t been since the war began, and I’m not there now. So the idea that Yermak could deport me to Russia is pretty far-fetched.
How could Yermak deport me from Ukraine if I’m not in Ukraine? But Yuri Borisovich continues to insist otherwise: that I’m in Ukraine, on Yermak’s payroll, recruited, and terrified of him. Frankly, after hearing this nonsense—this ridiculous, silly lie—I don’t really feel inclined to continue engaging with him. I wish him good health.
Will Macron Bend to Trump? Link to heading
Tatyana Averina:
These Trump aides went to Macron to try to convince him to reduce support for Ukraine, since he and the future German chancellor are fully on Ukraine’s side and are the strongest and most prominent leaders in Europe—even if their support isn’t that significant and is mostly verbal. Still, words of solidarity are valuable, especially during such cursed times for Ukraine. Is Macron really going to cave to this old scoundrel Trump?
You know, I think the position of European leaders—and particularly Macron and Scholz—is that they are trying to do everything they can to at least not provoke Trump into breaking off relations. That is, they’re trying to play their part carefully, so to speak. You may have noticed, dear Tatyana, that the position of European leaders is multilayered. On the one hand, they understand that with Trump, there will likely be a cooling or even a break with Europe, and that Trump is turning away from Europe and from Ukraine. They get that, and this understanding is exactly what underlies the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” as Andrei Andreevich calls it. And that, without question, shows they are aware of what’s going on.
But on the other hand, their aim is to make sure that any initiative to rupture the relationship comes from Trump himself. They’re trying to do everything they can to not lose such an important ally as the United States of America.
Now, can we reproach them for this? Well, maybe. Maybe one could say they should take a more principled stance and say, “If you’re going to blame Europe for everything, then go ahead and stay behind your beautiful ocean.” Sure, that kind of stance might work in personal relationships—“Take your toys and go, I’m not playing with you anymore.” That’s fine for individuals. But when you have millions of voters behind you, and when the U.S. is simply too important to Europe to casually indulge Trump’s whims and play ego games—well, that’s a different story.
So honestly, I can’t bring myself to fully support your reproach, dear Tatyana. This talk of “bending to the old Trump”—sure, it’s unpleasant. But they’re making efforts to somehow keep America from abandoning Ukraine and from cutting ties with Europe altogether. At least, such efforts are being made, and they’re understandable.
Why Are Matviyenko and Yakovenko Considered Russian? Link to heading
The Foreign Ministry asks:
Kiryenko, Matviyenko, and the others—they’re not Ukrainians. You yourself say that by blood you’re half Ukrainian. But you don’t consider yourself Ukrainian. You identify only as Russian? Well, so do they—they feel Russian.
There are a huge number of comments—not even questions, really, but rather remarks—regarding the relationship between antisemitism and Ukrainophobia in Russia. You see? Regarding these particular individuals with Ukrainian surnames—here’s the key difference: they don’t consider themselves Ukrainian, and there’s also no Ukrainophobia directed at them. Just like I’ve never felt any Ukrainophobia toward me, despite having a Ukrainian surname and significant Ukrainian heritage.
So what’s the main difference? A Jew might not identify as Jewish, but in Russia, they still face antisemitism. I’ve spoken about simple, obvious things—primarily about the past, the Soviet Union. Yes, today Ukrainophobia clearly exists. Not just at the state level, where hatred of Ukraine is being stirred up, but also in everyday life—it’s noticeable now. Yes, we’re in a time of war, and now there is Ukrainophobia.
But I was mainly referring to the Soviet era. Tell me: do you know of any universities that refused to admit Ukrainians? Name a university that rejected applicants with Ukrainian surnames or those who identified as Ukrainian in the nationality section. There are none. But such things did happen with Jews. There were clear and serious restrictions on Jewish admissions—even into the Party, for example. They were blocked. That never happened to Ukrainians.
We know full well that in the later Soviet years, there were virtually no Jews in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. None. Ukrainians? Plenty. Can you give an example of a Ukrainian who changed their surname out of fear of persecution? But in the case of Jews, it was common. Many Jews changed their names, first names, patronymics, because it was simply dangerous to have a Jewish surname or Jewish identity in Russia.
These are obvious things. Trying to apply today’s situation retroactively to the Soviet era is absurd. That does not mean, of course, that there wasn’t long-standing state policy aimed at Russification and suppression of Ukrainian culture. I’ve said that a thousand times. But there’s a difference between state policy—which was clearly anti-Ukrainian over centuries—and grassroots-level Ukrainophobia. That didn’t exist.
Yes, there was imperial disdain toward all non-Russian peoples, certainly. A patronizing attitude. But nothing resembling a phobia. So let’s not force open doors. And once again: this in no way denies that state policy was consistently imperialist and anti-Ukrainian for centuries—through the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and post-Soviet Russia.
Holy Fire – a Fraud? Link to heading
Natalya:
What is your opinion on the Holy Fire? Is it not a miracle given to us by the Lord, or is it some sort of scam?
Dear Natalya, I’m not sure it’s worth citing the countless examples of investigations that revealed the Holy Fire does not come from the Lord, but is instead produced with a lighter or other perfectly ordinary, non-divine means. Such exposés have occurred many times—both in pre-revolutionary Russia and in other periods.
In the end, no one is stopping anyone from believing in miracles. But people who see things differently shouldn’t be forced to believe in these so-called miracles. This is a scam that has been exposed repeatedly. There have even been court cases against those who revealed the fraud, and they were acquitted. So there you go.
On the Advertising Law and on Pelevin Link to heading
Ilya, on the advertising law:
Why did you focus specifically on advertising? As I understand it, this had more to do with financial pyramid schemes. I’m curious about your general view on advertising. Sometimes old commercials from the ’90s pop up, and honestly, their quality is astonishing. Compared to today’s ad content, which mostly irritates or repels rather than attracts, the difference is huge. And why, in your opinion, did Pelevin choose to portray his “Generation P” through ad men and PR folks?
Well, there are several questions here. First of all, the advertising law wasn’t the only bill I developed and pushed while I was a deputy. Why advertising? Mainly because the situation in the early ’90s—before the advertising law was passed in 1995—was a complete disaster. The first version of the law was adopted in 1995, and before that, we saw total chaos. For example, financial pyramid schemes resulted in millions of people losing everything. Why? Because the core of these schemes was advertising. Remember that famous “Lenya Golubkov bought boots for his wife”? And so on.
So what did the financial pyramid consist of? The main money went into advertising. People were lured into MMM collection points. And besides MMM, there were hundreds of other similar schemes—like Selenge and various regional scams. In Krasnoyarsk, there was a project just like that called A. These all thrived due to the lack of advertising regulation. Ads ran freely. People didn’t believe Mavrodi—they believed the media. They believed television, they believed newspapers. If it’s in the paper or on TV, it must be true. So people brought their money. They sold their apartments, hoping for huge profits. Lenya Golubkov sounded convincing.
This was one of the factors that drove the need for an advertising law. Beyond people ending up rummaging through dumpsters, many were poisoned by fake medicines. There were countless harmful consequences from unregulated advertising. I remember trying to promote this law among journalists and getting heavy pushback. I recall a meeting in the Marble Hall of the Central House of Journalists, where I gathered all the top editors of Moscow’s central media—there was a huge scandal.
When I tried to explain that we needed an advertising law because public trust in the media was being destroyed—because victims of dishonest ads blamed the media—the editors didn’t want to hear it. Unregulated ads were bringing in tens of millions in cash directly to editorial offices. Editors and journalists suddenly became quietly wealthy. It was hard to give that up. So there was hysteria.
One of the key opponents of any advertising regulation was Pavel Gusev. He ended up saying, “Igor, you are the enemy of the free press,” slammed the door, and walked out. The problem wasn’t just the lack of a law—it was that without regulation, the media’s credibility was being undermined. At the same time, a very strict government-drafted advertising law was in the works. I tried to explain that if we didn’t pass a reasonable, media-friendly law ourselves, the government would impose a rigid one that could shut down any outlet under vague definitions.
I proposed a flexible, reasonable law. But the government had the power to push through something that could classify any ad as illegal. Sadly, greed and a failure to consider the public good—combined with the intoxicating flow of easy money—meant that many in the media didn’t support me. As a result, the stricter government version passed.
As for advertising in general—advertising is a key attribute of a free market. It’s also one of the main sources of media independence. If you don’t want to depend on the state or some generous sponsor, then advertising is basically your only alternative for financial autonomy. Besides that, advertising is a kind of guide in the world of goods and services—it’s a tool of competition.
So my attitude toward advertising is like toward a bitter medicine—useful, important, but it needs a prescription.
Now, as for why Pelevin chose to show his Generation “P” through advertisers and PR people—well, in the ’90s, especially the early to mid-’90s, ad men and PR people started to, if not rule Russia, then certainly wield immense influence. They created a parallel reality—that’s exactly what Pelevin was writing about in his novel.
I saw it firsthand in the mid-’90s—and arguably the 2000s were still under the influence of those same ad men. Giants like Video International were emerging. Yury Zapal—if anyone remembers him—and Mikhail Lesin. They were the generation that shaped a new, parallel reality. In the end, they formed the intellectual, creative foundation of Putinism. At first, they created the mad AI that helped get Yeltsin elected in ‘96. And then they all aligned with Putin.
I remember well a meeting of the Advertising Council, which I was also part of. There, they openly discussed supporting Putin. His main rival at the time was the Fatherland – All Russia bloc. I recall how Zapal and others brainstormed slogans to help Putin win. One that stuck with me was: “You don’t choose your Fatherland.” That was aimed against the Primakov-Luzhkov alliance. Creating a parallel reality—that’s what these people did. And that’s why Pelevin made them the heroes of his novel.
On Cartoons and Program Covers. “Takes one to know one” Link to heading
Ilya—another Ilya, Ilya P.—asks Alexander:
In my opinion, comment on this cartoon—I’m referring to the image I used on the cover of the Friday 7:40 stream. It’s a cartoon where Ursula von der Leyen’s head is placed on Hitler’s body, with a Nazi swastika made of her figure, pierced from one side by an American bayonet and from the other by a Soviet/Russian one. Ilya P. writes: This cartoon is no accident, not a misstep—it’s a method. The Russian dictator openly proclaimed this new way of fighting Western civilization back in 2020, when asked about Biden calling him a killer. Putin smiled and said: ‘When we were kids, we used to say: it takes one to know one.’ Without realizing it, he gave us the key to decoding almost the entire modern Russian disinformation campaign. I call this the mirror method. The key is not to think too hard—just take the most important ideas of your political opponent, declare them your own, and call your opponents the enemies of those ideas. This confuses outside observers. If both sides accuse each other of the same thing, how can one tell who is right? Who said it first? Who said it louder? Note the simplicity and the sinister genius of the method. Instead of convincing outsiders that the opponent’s ideas are wrong, you simply strip them of authorship. This is, in fact, Orwell’s predicted method of eliminating concepts in a specific form. Don’t you think that a cartoon like this—depicting anti-fascist Europe as a fascist, and actual fascists as anti-fascists—is a 100% continuation of this Putin-style mirror method?
Well, you know, you’re expressing your own thoughts—undoubtedly. But they’re also mine. The next question is: do I agree with this? Of course I do. There’s no question.
On the Virtue of Anti-Bourgeois Criticism. John Lennon, Bertolucci, Sartre Link to heading
Robert.
I have a question for you, writes Robert, primarily as a psychologist. Why is anti-bourgeois art and literature, and anti-bourgeois criticism in general, consistently considered a sign of virtue and progressivism in the West—even by those remarkable people, singers, artists, and writers who could only have flourished in a bourgeois world and who enjoy all of its benefits and opportunities? John Lennon was born a radical leftist and sang of a utopia and a world without property. He owned farms and land, often haggled with taxi drivers and couriers, and lived in a luxurious Manhattan apartment. Andrei Konchalovsky once recounted how Bertolucci, after watching his film A Lover’s Romance, told him in Europe that Konchalovsky was glorifying bourgeois vulgarity—after which Bertolucci irritably got into a luxurious red car and drove off to a nightclub. Sartre admired the USSR, failing to notice the Gulag and repressions, and when he visited some German Red student terrorist who had blown something up for ideological reasons in a bourgeois city, Sartre was outraged that the prisoner’s toilet was leaking in his cell. He called it a sign of extreme moral decay and a human rights crisis in the bourgeois world, and wrote angry articles about it. There are plenty of such examples. How do they all not realize that they preach what they themselves don’t practice? It’s not even ordinary hypocrisy—it’s some kind of sincere cognitive confusion. How is one to make sense of it? Where does this mental mess come from? Your not-so-favorite Koch wrote, quite fairly, that this is the subject of a separate study. But the entire world literature and art scene is actively anti-bourgeois. The only human aesthetic and ethic that lovingly and understandingly treats a person and doesn’t demand more of him than he can give is always used as a punching bag by all kinds of perverts who see themselves as the vanguard of humanity.
Well, as for Koch, he’s a separate case altogether, a separate diagnosis, a separate character. This is someone who’s your classic right-winger, to whom any form of humanism is perversion. This is well known. It’s no coincidence that nowadays in every stream of his, he openly expresses enormous sympathy and support for Trump and TASS, while constantly throwing mud at anything connected with Ukraine and its leadership. He admires the Ukrainian people, yet relentlessly trashes their leadership. This doesn’t mean that leadership is above criticism, but what it does mean is that his commentary is pathological. Every statement, every move—it’s hard to even understand how Ukraine is still holding together, considering that, according to him, everything the political and military leadership does is foolish and a catastrophic mistake. Anyway, never mind Koch.
Now, let’s look at the reasons for this truly anti-bourgeois sentiment among the global intelligentsia—literature, cinema, and so on. There are several factors here. First of all, there’s a general critical mindset. A critical attitude is an inherent trait of a creative person—whether a journalist, writer, or artist—it means having a critical view of the world. And this doesn’t just apply to anti-bourgeois ideas but to any societal structure in which an artist exists. By definition, an artist has a critical view of the world. So when religious ideology dominated, artistic types weren’t its cheerleaders—they were often its critics. For example, the Renaissance era came with anti-clerical sentiment. So people with critical mindsets always critique the society in which they live. Today’s Western intelligentsia lives in a bourgeois world. Therefore, their critical stance turns anti-bourgeois. It’s a simple thing, really.
People with critical perspectives who lived in the Soviet Union criticized Soviet realities. People with critical views living in bourgeois, capitalist Western societies—with free trade, capital, property rights, and so on—they criticize the society they live in. And there’s plenty to criticize. So they criticize it. That’s one part of the equation. The second part is the reason why, after World War II—and even before it, with the rise of fascism as a massive threat to humanity—there developed a distinctly Western cultural phenomenon. And it hasn’t gone away. Because, as it happened, one of the main enemies of fascism was the “red dragon”—red communism.
Now, of course, it’s fashionable to say the Soviet Union didn’t play a key role, that the main factor was Lend-Lease and so on. But the facts show that the vast majority of fascist divisions were destroyed, first and foremost, on the Eastern Front. That’s just a fact. It’s hard to argue with. Naturally, this doesn’t mean we should buy into Putin’s nonsense that the USSR could have won without Western help—that’s a lie. Especially the lie Putin tells that Russia alone, without the other Soviet republics, could have won. That’s sheer nonsense. But it also doesn’t mean we should deny the Soviet Union’s huge contribution to defeating fascism. The numbers speak for themselves. The number of divisions destroyed by the Soviet Union far exceeds those eliminated by the Allies. That’s just a fact.
So, based on that, and the fact that the USSR liberated a significant part of Europe from fascism—yes, that was later replaced in many countries by Soviet occupation instead of fascist—but many Western intellectuals, including artists and philosophers, showed a complete lack of critical thinking toward the Soviet project. That’s where the left-wing wave comes from.
The huge influx of leftist ideology, the politics of McCarthyism, the Red Scare in the United States—these didn’t just emerge out of nowhere. As ugly as that phenomenon was, the need to clean house from the overrepresentation of communists in universities, creative industries, and even government was real.
So those are the two main reasons, in my view, for this leftist slant among Western creative intellectuals: first, the inherently critical stance toward the world, which, in a bourgeois society, translates into anti-bourgeois sentiment; and second, the uncritical reverence toward communist ideology, inspired by admiration for the Soviet Union’s role in the anti-Hitler coalition. Right?
Why Do World Leaders Visit Putin? The Illusion About the Nature of a Dictator Link to heading
Ognevoy.
One question—why do they all go to him? Why? How long can you keep trying to find the man where there is simply none? Just a skin stretched over a monster?
Well, again, you know, it’s a misunderstanding—a failure to perceive Putin and the Putin Reich as something entirely different. Many in the West truly didn’t understand—and still don’t—that Putin is a being of a completely different nature. That Russia is a country in which, essentially, fascism has triumphed. Just like they didn’t understand Hitler. It’s the same story. They kept trying to make deals with him. The Munich Agreement. So this is not the first time.
On China and Taiwan Link to heading
Irina Baumann.
About China. You are so right about Taiwan. China will collapse on its own. My daughter has been flying there for the past two years. It’s a joint university project between the European Union and Taiwan. My daughter is a professor of economics, and she has a PhD student there. So, in recent years, Taiwan no longer dismisses the idea of the possibility of peaceful reunification with China. This process began in the early 2000s, after the return of Hong Kong to China. And with each year, Taiwan sees China less and less as a clear enemy, and more as… well, not quite enemies after all. In this regard, my question is: do you think what’s happening now in America could accelerate Taiwan’s reunification with China? If so, how might it? What might Taiwan gain or lose from this? And could it affect U.S. policy in Southeast Asia?
Dear Irina! Well, first of all, my answer will obviously be that of a layman. But overall, I think it’s a bad thing simply because Taiwan today is a democratic country. The standard of living in Taiwan is significantly higher than in mainland China. And it’s clear that this so-called reunification with China would just make things worse. A communist dictatorship is always bad. Always bad. So the spread of a communist dictatorship to Taiwan is a bad thing. What possible advantages could there be? I just don’t see them. I can’t imagine a communist dictatorship allowing some kind of democratic enclave to exist within it. I simply don’t have the imagination for that. So I think it’s unequivocally bad. That’s it. So the answer is simple: it’s bad.
Why Don’t European Leaders Corner Trump? Link to heading
Ivan Ivanov
Can you explain the weakness of Western politicians? Why can’t they ask one simple question: whose side are you on, Mr. Trump?
Well, I’ve already partially answered this question. They’re trying to preserve the relationship, trying to keep the United States from breaking with Europe, from drifting toward Russia, you see? There’s a clear goal—if, so to speak, Trump is leaning toward Russia, away from Europe, then they shouldn’t be encouraging him. They shouldn’t. It’s an attempt to hold him back. Can this be called weakness? Well, probably—it probably doesn’t look very good.
On Ukraine’s Future Without Economic Growth Link to heading
So. Two questions from Pavel. A question from a Telegram channel.
First question: is it possible without substantial economic growth?
Yes, Pavel cites figures that, in his opinion, indicate Ukraine’s dire economic situation. I’m not ready to comment on those numbers. I think we could dedicate a separate program to that, but with the participation of an expert, of course.
And then he asks these two questions: is it possible to imagine Ukraine continuing to exist as a unified state without significant economic growth? Well yes, and without answering these questions—without finding a way to catch up with or even surpass at least Vietnam—all of the heroism of Ukrainians, all the blood spilled, will have been in vain.
You know, dear Pavel, I completely disagree with you that the continued existence of the state as a unified whole is directly and causally linked to significant economic growth. States fall apart for various reasons, primarily if there are internal causes—but not necessarily economic ones. Right now, in Ukraine, there is absolutely no basis for such a collapse. There is a certain national unity among the Ukrainian people. There are no grounds for fragmentation or internal division. That kind of division existed before, but it doesn’t exist now. And this is despite the rather difficult economic situation. There is no direct causal relationship between collapse and a poor economic situation.
There are many countries—you’ve cited a lot of statistics showing Ukraine’s desperate situation compared to others—but listen, there are plenty of countries in far worse economic condition than Ukraine. Yet they don’t fall apart. Afghanistan is in a desperate state. There are no signs or trends of collapse. Many countries live in devastating poverty—compared to them, Ukraine is practically flourishing—and they’re not collapsing. So I don’t understand your logic here.
And besides all that, the heroism and spilled blood of Ukrainians is explained very simply: Ukraine doesn’t want to be a satellite of Russia. Aside from material well-being, there are also things like national dignity. Ukrainians don’t want to be second-class citizens. Earlier, I answered a question about Ukrainian surnames. People like Matviyenko, Kiriyenko—they have no Ukrainian national consciousness, that’s obvious. But there are people who do identify as Ukrainians and don’t want to be second-rate in their own country.
That’s it. And that’s a completely understandable desire—a desire to live in their own country, with their own culture, and be responsible for their own actions. The core idea Ukrainians are dying for is simple: to be left alone. To be allowed to live as their own country. That’s all. It’s a very simple idea.
As for material well-being—yes, of course it’s necessary. But for that to happen, first and foremost, Russia needs to leave Ukraine alone. After that, it’ll become clear whether Ukraine can thrive or not—that’s a different question. But again, there is no direct causal link between economic conditions and national collapse. The proof lies in dozens of countries in dire straits that are not falling apart.
What Can Be Opposed to Neoconservatism? Link to heading
The second question from Pavel.
It’s obvious that the Right-wing International is almost unanimously aligned against Ukraine, or at the very least, supports Putin. As is known, conservative ideology is based on two principles: “every cricket knows its hearth,” and the second—duty obliges. It’s clear that while the first principle aligns well with the actions of the Trumpists, Putinists, Orbánists, etc., they clearly have trouble with the second. So, two questions. First: to what extent, in your opinion, has the neoliberal principle ‘the more money, the fewer obligations’ influenced the current conservative position that ‘duty obliges’ now applies only to those without money? And second: what idea or movement, in your opinion, can be opposed to neoconservatism?
Well, let me start with the last question while it’s still fresh in my mind—there’s no such idea. That’s the problem. Neoconservatism is still opposed by liberalism. Liberal ideas remain the counterpoint, but again, let’s clarify some things—what country are we talking about? Because the situation varies significantly from country to country. For instance, in Germany, the idea of conservatism has been quite stable—it is essentially right-liberal in nature.
In Germany, you don’t have that stark opposition between liberalism and conservatism. The question for conservatives there is: what are we conserving? Conservatism means preservation. In Germany, the victorious coalition of the CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats represents a fairly centrist, even liberal idea. It’s also conservative in that it seeks to preserve liberalism to some degree. You could even call Stalin a conservative, or Brezhnev—because their goal was to preserve the communist regime. Conservatives are people who want to maintain traditional values. The question is: which traditions?
So, first of all, it’s not always necessary to counter neoconservatism with something else—it differs from country to country. Second, the main ideological opponent is still liberalism. Nothing else has been invented so far. The real question is: how can liberalism adapt to changing circumstances? That’s the key issue. So far, liberalism has not accepted that challenge. It has no real answer to the challenges of today. That’s the core of the problem in the United States and in Europe.
Now, as for your assertion, dear Pavel, I don’t really agree that the two principles you cited are the foundations of conservatism. “Every cricket knows its hearth”—that’s a bit reductive. Conservative ideology is first and foremost about preservation, about keeping traditions. Your interpretation of conservatism seems a bit oversimplified to me.
As for the neoliberal principle—“the more money, the fewer obligations”—I’m not really sure I agree with how you’ve phrased these concepts. Your framing of these principles seems quite questionable to me. So I’m not entirely sure how to respond to your questions when I don’t agree with the premises in the first place.
But the key point in your multi-layered statement is this: what you’re calling neoconservatism is, in fact, fascism. This is not exactly neoconservatism. I don’t agree with your conceptual framework, because conservatism is about preserving, and Trump has a vision for a global overhaul. Trump is not a conservative in the sense that he envisions a radical transformation of the planet.
Sure, Trump believes in two genders, maybe supports some “traditional” values—but he is not conservative in the traditional sense. He wants to abolish everything that was previously considered the norm in the United States: respect for the rule of law, protection of democratic values worldwide. That was traditional U.S. policy. How can Trump be a conservative if he wants to cancel it all? Redefine the world, break the alliance with Europe, change the entire geopolitical structure, ally with Russia, attack long-time allies, introduce tariffs against countries like Australia—when there was never such a precedent—and target allies like Canada?
Where’s the conservatism in that? He’s destroying everything the American statehood was built on. So I disagree with the very premise—it’s not conservatism, it’s fascism. If we agree on terms, then we can begin to discuss.
But once again, the most important question in your message is: what can be opposed to it? Unfortunately, the answer is that we need to find a way for liberalism to adapt to current realities. That hasn’t happened yet. So in that sense, I think your question is a valuable one.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
Dear friends, that’s it for now. I haven’t found any more questions. Dear friends, we’ll wrap up our morning conversation here. A reminder that at 8:00 PM we’ll have a meeting with Serhiy Ivanovych Hrabskiy. I believe it will be an important and interesting conversation. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander Skobov, Russian political prisoners, and Ukrainian captives! See you at 8:00 PM!
Source: https://youtu.be/Obd75Hlu_ik