Medinsky is once again leading the delegation, and the delegation consists of second-tier officials. Putin is once again deceiving the US and Europe.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 15. It’s 7:40 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflection on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
The Composition of the Russian Delegation Has Been Approved Link to heading
Let’s try to start, as if without commentary, by adopting a serious tone and simply describing the factual side of what is happening. Putin has finally approved the composition of the Russian delegation for negotiations with Ukraine. I want to immediately highlight an important detail. This news appeared on the Kremlin’s website at 10:50 PM, that is, once again close to midnight. An important detail. In other words, just a few hours before the negotiations are supposed to begin. At least he didn’t announce the composition of the delegation after the talks were over. You see, I couldn’t resist commenting. Sorry. So, who will head the delegation? Well, it’s already headed by the presidential aide Vladimir Medinsky. In addition, the delegation includes one of, if I am not mistaken, 11 deputies of Lavrov, Mikhail Galuzin. He oversees relations with CIS countries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Well, Ukraine is not a CIS member, but that’s irrelevant. Essentially, among Lavrov’s deputies, he occupies one of the lowest positions. Also included is Igor Kostyukov, who heads military intelligence at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin—I’ll describe him later. I won’t read out the list of experts because it has no significance. I can immediately say that there is not a single heavyweight political or expert figure. If I were to give an overall assessment of the entire delegation and the negotiators and experts, they are essentially a collection of office paperclips serving purely technical functions. The level of the Ukrainian delegation is several orders of magnitude higher. In fact, those authorized by Zelensky to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine are the head of the President’s Office Andriy Yermak, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba, and the Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov. So, in fact, these are top-level officials. After Zelensky, this is the highest level possible. I also want to highlight this discrepancy. The imbalance is incomparable. The disparity in the level of negotiators is a very telling feature. One more nuance: tomorrow, May 16, representatives of the United States of America are ready to somehow join or at least observe the negotiations—also at the highest level. Trump himself was ready to come, but it’s clear that since Putin won’t be there, he has nothing to do there. But the US delegation is also of the highest level—Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the President’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. In other words, it’s as high as it gets. One is effectively the second-in-command, at least in terms of international relations—the Secretary of State. The other is a personal friend of Trump, a very influential person—Steve Witkoff. So, again, it’s the highest level. Commentary to follow shortly.
Thus, Putin decided to return to the Istanbul format for negotiations with Ukraine in the most literal, or even Bucharest sense. The composition of the Russian delegation has been published, putting all the dots over the “i.” It is clear that Putin himself ignored the meeting. Why did the Kremlin keep the intrigue going until late at night, practically until the last minute yesterday? It’s quite obvious. Because if they had announced the composition of the negotiators on Saturday or Monday, which could have been done since the decision wasn’t made at the last minute, there would have been no interest in planning the meeting—it would have been zero. What’s the point of showing interest in some negotiations involving a container of office paperclips? Why?
As for the current negotiations, I still think they will take place. Although, in principle, there should have been a statement. To be fair, the Ukrainian side could have simply declared that they do not see the Russian delegation. Where are the people who at least somehow influence decision-making? You could also send a cleaning lady from the Kremlin, and what, are we supposed to talk to them? But that likely won’t happen, simply because Ukraine is still trying to play out this shameful game to the end. What else stands out? I must say that these negotiations differ significantly from those in 2022, because, indeed, you can’t step into the same river twice. Even during the 2022 talks, one of the obvious problems was the complete lack of independence of the Russian representatives, headed by—sorry—Medinsky. Medinsky literally had to run to the phone every minute and talk to the Kremlin to get instructions from the country’s leadership. They were incapable. The same Medinsky who led the talks then, along with others like Zaitchuk and Slutsky from LDPR—a rather peculiar company of clowns. They couldn’t formulate anything. They could state general theses, but were incapable of conducting substantive negotiations. Negotiations were just a set of declarations. Even back then, it was clear that the Russian delegation was unserious. But now, given that the most influential person—regardless of anyone’s opinion of Donald Trump—is actively involved in the negotiation process, it’s even more obvious. The President of the United States is the most influential politician in the world by status and by the scope of his powers. And in this context, when someone of Trump’s level shows interest in these negotiations, the figure of Vladimir Medinsky as the head of the Russian delegation becomes completely caricatured. Vladimir Rostislavovich Medinsky has absolutely zero political weight. He is an entirely comical figure—a pseudo-historian whose dissertation claims that historical truth is what corresponds to the state interests of a given country. This is outright buffoonery even by the standards of others. Medinsky has made himself a laughingstock among the historical and general public. He recently took the position of chairman of the Writers’ Union of Russia, having produced a heap of pulp under the title “Myths of Russia,” works in which the number of false statements matches the number of sentences. So, this is a caricature figure with zero political weight. The rest of the delegation is also extremely low-level because the Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for relations with CIS countries—Ukraine has never been a CIS member, strictly speaking—represents the diplomatic side. The military side is represented by General Fomin. I promised to speak more about him, but I won’t go into details. There were talks with the United States in 2021, and he was then called a robot with a piece of paper. And the rest I have already characterized as a box of office paperclips. It should be noted that when the media leaked information that the delegation would be headed by Lavrov and Ushakov, many pursed their lips, saying it wasn’t the right level. But Putin—I think intentionally—let that leak to later mock them, because in his mockery primarily aimed at Trump and Europe, he went even further, lowering the delegation’s level by two or three steps below Lavrov and Ushakov when he suggested Trump or his representatives talk to Medinsky. And you know, literally yesterday or the day before, in some interviews, I jokingly suggested that Putin might well send some of his elderly female supporters from his squads to the negotiations. And now it turns out it wasn’t entirely a joke, because in terms of their ability to conduct responsible negotiations, Medinsky is not much different from the ladies from Putin’s squads. I’m not really joking now because if you give them a phone, they can just as well call the Kremlin to coordinate every word. There’s no difference. They probably know how to use a phone.
Thus, the fog that had been thickening over Istanbul for several days has cleared, revealing complete gaping emptiness. I’m just curious—will Marco Rubio meet with Medinsky on Friday? And if he does, what will they talk about? Also, I wonder what further humiliations Trump might endure before he realizes he must either do what he constantly talks about—arm Ukraine to the teeth, thus destroying the Putin regime by providing Ukraine with the necessary weapons—or get out of this swamp of negotiations where Putin, who feels at home there, is eagerly dragging him.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Now I will move on to answering your questions. Before that, I want to say that at 9:30 PM we will have a meeting with Vitaly Portnikov. I hope that by then some initial steps will already be clear—what happened, whether the negotiations took place, or whether the Ukrainian delegation made a responsible and correct decision to say, well, listen, send someone appropriate or, indeed, Putin, come yourself, after all. You announced the negotiations—take responsibility. Well, we’ll see. So, at 9:30 PM—Vitaly Portnikov. Questions.
Is it okay to write the author’s name or Skobov’s on shells? Link to heading
So, Ilya Madison. Igor, is it okay to write on shells “for”? Why for Yuri Alekseevich? Yakovenko? Or to write “for Skobov”?
I just don’t know who Yuri Alekseevich Yakovenko is. If you still mean me, then definitely don’t write for me. That’s 100%. But for Skobov, yes, you should. The thing is, Ilya Madison is a regular participant in our chat. We currently have several people from our chat serving in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and he, in particular, is also, according to him at least, on the front lines fighting for Ukraine. So? Well, for Skobov, of course, you should. Definitely not for me. I’m absolutely not that kind of figure. 100%. Skobov, yes. By the way, when Alexander Chistov, also a participant in our chat, was previously on the front line, he constantly asked what to write on shells. I suggested, let’s write for Skobov, Skobov, Skobov. He was very pleased. He even proudly mentioned it in one of his speeches.
What was wrong with the Minsk Agreements Link to heading
Question from Donets Poncho. Tell us about the Minsk Agreements. What was wrong with them?
So. This question was also supported by Viktor Gulin and Larina. Well, it’s an extremely simple situation. The Minsk Agreements were agreements that had, in fact, complete legal nullity because they were signed, as they say, at gunpoint. At that time, Ukraine was in a very difficult position. And the essence of the Minsk Agreements was that, if interpreted as Russia did, Ukraine would effectively lose its independence, because Ukraine was being required to amend its Constitution and to hold elections in the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions under conditions where the border with Russia was not controlled by Ukraine. In essence, this meant integrating into Ukraine a Russian enclave—an armed Russian enclave—that, with an open border to Russia, would be freely supplied with weapons and personnel from Russia. It was a suicide scenario. Ukraine was forced to accept this because at that time the Russian invasion had created a critical situation. So. There was actually a very simple situation. Ukraine demanded first to close the borders, and only then to hold elections. This was a completely normal, lawful demand, which was, in principle, provided for by the Minsk Agreements if interpreted correctly. But the Russian side preferred to interpret them in such a way that the border would continue to be controlled by Russia, elections would be held, and afterward, this would become part of Ukraine—that is, two enclaves fully controlled by Russia would become part of Ukraine as armed enclaves.
Why Zelensky is Stronger in Direct Negotiations with Putin Link to heading
So, Vladimir Savoysky On Kurbanov’s broadcast, you said that a personal meeting between Putin and Zelensky in Istanbul would resemble a fight between a young Tyson and a retiree. Can you justify your point? It seems like nothing more than flattery to support the Ukrainian audience, since Zelensky has 20% of the country’s territory occupied, about a quarter of the population has left, the economy depends on international aid, and the army has been slowly retreating for many months.
You see, this is not about the balance of forces. Although, in fact, if we examine it closely, we could also analyze the situation in Russia, which is far from brilliant. But the point is about personalities. The balance of forces between Ukraine and Russia is determined on the battlefield. And this balance of forces is not exactly as you describe it. One could say that in over three years, having lost several tens of thousands of soldiers and about one million in total—if we count killed and wounded—Russia has failed to capture a single regional center. And today, indeed, Putin is experiencing certain problems, being in political and economic isolation. But this is about the negotiation clash, which is not a clash of economies, territories, or ammunition, but a clash of two individuals. And Zelensky, without a doubt, in this confrontation, since we understand that he is someone who is quick with words, younger, and who, over the past three and a half years of war, has gained a certain political muscle, because while Putin sat in a bunker, always in comfortable conditions, Zelensky was constantly engaged in extremely tough negotiations with the leaders of almost all countries of the world. Putin never had anything like that. Putin has never in his life—let me emphasize—never in his life participated in debates. Therefore, I think that in his clash with Zelensky, he would lose outright. That’s my opinion. Once again, in this case, it’s not territories or military potential that are competing, but personalities with very different political histories.
Chatroulette as a Cross-Section of Russian Society Link to heading
Anastasia Feinstein. Anastasia is a sponsor of our channel, for which we are very grateful. What do you think about Chatroulette as a method of getting to know what’s inside Russians’ heads?
Dear Anastasia! You know, as a certain set of examples, yes, it works. But like any media method, there is the problem of representativeness. Chatroulette, of course, has many distortions, because, first of all, the people who go into Chatroulette and spend time there are, let’s say, a special category of people. What makes them special is a separate question, but they are special, you see? Just like our Telegram channel chat “Igor Yakovenko, Mediafrenia.” Igor Yakovenko—it’s not representative in relation to the population of Russia or even to certain other categories. It’s a special segment that goes through several filters—the filter of activity, the filter of certain political views, and so on. Chatroulette, of course, is not politically biased in this sense, but nonetheless, the problem of representativeness exists, just as it does in any survey conducted through television, mass media, or, for example, when I conduct a poll on our channel—the representativeness is of the audience of our channel. Therefore, yes, it’s a normal method, why not? To gather some examples, without claiming that it’s the opinion of all Russians, of course, is quite acceptable.
Maxim Katz said that Putin enjoys the war Link to heading
Namesake, asks Igor. I don’t know if you listen to Maxim Katz, but his latest episode about the Istanbul negotiations explained everything to me. Or rather, it explained what I had already suspected. It sounded short and to the point: the only reason for the war is that Putin likes war. No negotiations, no losses—human or financial—will make him stop enjoying it. That’s the point. In this light, is there any point for you and your guests to keep dissecting nuances day after day, discussing details, making assumptions about the fate of this country? After all, all this information hustle is essentially incapable of changing this one reason for the war.
Well, let’s put it this way. So Katz said something. Do you perceive Katz’s words as the voice of heaven? That since Katz said it, we all have to shut down our YouTube channels, fall silent, stop talking, stop thinking, and accept this truth as divine revelation? That Putin started this war, that he likes it—I can agree with that. The only question is that, you know, he likes it now, but he may stop liking it if the war starts bringing him more problems than pleasure. That’s the first thing. But the most important thing is something else. I’ve been saying the same thing—you may listen to Katz, but not to me—I’ve been saying from the very beginning that Putin started this war, and he can’t end it not only because he likes it, but also because the consequences of ending the war would be much more severe for him than continuing it. That’s a much weightier argument than just “likes or dislikes”—tomorrow, his likes might change. But nevertheless, there are other opinions. You see, if you’re such a big fan of Katz, well, just listen to Katz. There are other opinions, other arguments. And I believe it’s right to keep thinking and to synchronize our intellectual and informational clocks not only with Katz. Frankly, I’m not very interested in him for many reasons, which I’ve explained in detail. But to synchronize these clocks with people like Kasparov, Lipsits, or Portnikov, with whom we’ll be talking today—that makes sense. And we’re not savoring nuances around whether Putin likes or dislikes something. Putin is not the only person or politician who determines the fate of this war. There are other players. And it’s this balance of forces that we are discussing—that’s what matters.
About the works of Vasily Shulzhenko Link to heading
So, Master Orban. What is your opinion on the works of Vasily Shulzhenko? What can you say about him and his paintings?
Dear colleague! I can’t say anything about him personally as an individual. I’m not acquainted. As for his paintings—well, let’s put it this way. I’ve said several times that I don’t really want to pretend to be an art critic or literary critic. But since his paintings undoubtedly have a certain political and social character, it’s possible to discuss them. You know, it’s a kind of very topical grotesque realism. A very relevant Russian rustic truth. For those who haven’t seen them—these are paintings that depict the Russian, Russian bottom in a semi-caricature, grotesque style. These are, well, essentially Sharikovs, who make up a significant portion of the lower strata of the Russian population. What seems important to me, and especially relevant now, is that the characters in Vasily Shulzhenko’s paintings represent the Russian world that Ukraine has encountered—the one that invaded Ukraine and committed atrocities in Bucha and Mariupol. This is the grassroots part of the deep people that make up a significant portion of the Russian occupation forces. I think this is very important. Therefore, I consider these paintings relevant. Moreover, I even used some of these paintings once or twice as a thumbnail for our streams and will continue to do so. So, on a five-point scale—five points. This is the kind of mirror which, of course, is distorted, as any artistic mirror is, but it needs to be shown from time to time.
Opinion on Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Machiavelli Link to heading
Question from George I’m interested in your opinion on the philosophy of Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Machiavelli.
Well, questions like this somewhat stump me. Because, you know, there are those little books, thin brochures. A few years ago—more than three years ago—I often walked around bookstores in Moscow and saw those thin brochures like “Nietzsche in Five Minutes,” “Schopenhauer in Five Minutes,” “Hegel in Seven Minutes,” and so on. There was also a wonderful book called “A Brief History of Everything”—you read the book, and you’ll know everything. That’s why I feel a bit lost when such questions are asked. You see, to talk about Nietzsche alone, you’d need to give a whole series of lectures just to somehow explain how you feel about him.
So, look, I have two approaches. The first is that, as I’ve repeatedly said, I view thinkers of the past and present, including contemporaries, as potential tools in my intellectual toolbox. That is, when I tackle a certain problem—intellectual, sociological, etc.—I use certain tools, and in some cases, I might take out the tools of, say, Niccolò Machiavelli, in others, those of Pierre Bourdieu, in others, Kant’s or Socrates’ intellectual tools. That’s my approach—it might seem a bit chaotic, but that’s how I live and work. And in my intellectual workshop, I have tools from each of these three people. They are relevant.
I have a question for you—and for myself—why did you put these three in a row? Why, out of the entire variety of thinkers, did you choose exactly these three? I can understand why Nietzsche and Schopenhauer ended up together, because they are very closely related thinkers. They have much in common. Nietzsche was, at least to some extent, a disciple of Schopenhauer. They share philosophical pessimism and what is called subjective perspectivism, and most importantly, philosophical voluntarism, which both raised on their banners. So they are indeed very closely connected thinkers. Machiavelli stands apart here. Perhaps he ended up in this row because he, too, preached a certain amoral—just like the other two—perhaps a kind of political cynicism. That’s possible. But he is also an interesting thinker who can offer a lot of useful insights, though perhaps to a lesser extent. So, let’s put it that way.
On the Zero Value of Life in Russia Link to heading
So. Viktor Krikunov You regularly say on your broadcasts and other channels that human life has zero value in Russia. But the amounts paid for signing a contract, for injuries, for death in Russia are hard to find elsewhere. It’s no coincidence that on propaganda channels, war widows are now being called 3-15. Maybe you meant zero value in the moral aspect?
Dear Viktor, it’s a very simple matter. You see, the fact that they pay large sums for contracts does not indicate a high value of human life. The policy of Putin, and the policy of the current Russian authorities overall, and the policy of the General Staff, the military leadership of Russia, is primarily expressed through meat assaults. Russia does not value human lives. It does not. The number of deaths is not a stopping factor. That is what is meant by the zero value of human life. It’s the 28 million dead during World War II. Overwhelming the enemy with corpses is the norm. “Women will give birth to more,” as Comrade Zhukov used to say. That is precisely the zero price of human life. And the fact that people are lured to the front with big money does not contradict the zero value of human life, because their lives are immediately sacrificed. They are worth nothing. That’s the simple truth.
Conspiracy Theory that Trump Is a Russian Agent Link to heading
So, friend of the Chekist asks Do you consider the theory about agent Krasnov to be a conspiracy theory or a working hypothesis? What would be the decisive indicator for you to definitely recognize that this is not conspiracy theory?
For me, without a doubt, the theory about agent Krasnov is a conspiracy theory. You know, I wouldn’t get too fixated on agent Krasnov here. Trump could very well be an agent of influence. And what’s decisive here? The existence of some kind of kompromat on him, perhaps. But an agent Krasnov would mean that the person was under development, and he definitely was under development, and as a result, he was made an offer to sign a statement of readiness to cooperate with Russian intelligence services. After that, a file is opened on the person, they are entered into the records, given an operational pseudonym—in this case, agent Krasnov—and from there, they are either paid money or not, and are periodically tasked. An agent is someone who formally cements their relationship with Russian intelligence services and then carries out specific assignments, writes reports. All of this is recorded and there is a file, or it’s stored electronically, which exists and defines their relationship with the intelligence services.
Well, I think none of that exists, you see? Because such things—first of all, considering the potential of American intelligence and other NATO intelligence agencies—such information would have inevitably leaked out; an event of that scale would most likely have become known. That’s why I think it’s highly unlikely. I can’t rule it out entirely, but it’s highly unlikely. It’s much simpler to explain everything by the fact that Trump is, indeed, ideologically very close to Putin. And yes, it’s quite possible that during his numerous visits to the Soviet Union, he indeed became an object of interest. Perhaps there’s some kompromat on him; it’s possible—I can’t rule it out. But I don’t want to speculate blindly. I proceed from the simple point that all of this is better explained by the fact that Trump has serious ideological convictions that align with Putin’s. He sincerely does not consider Putin his ideological enemy because he’s close to him. I think that in his worldview—which upholds the right of the strong—Putin is right. They, Trump and Putin, are the strong ones, so they are right. And Ukraine is weak, so it’s wrong. That explains everything much more simply.
The Mistaken Comparison of the War in Ukraine to the Korean War Link to heading
So, Vitalina. Why do you think that ending the war along the line of contact would be similar to the case of North and South Korea? China or Russia never annexed the territory north of the 38th parallel or recorded it in their constitution. This would rather be like the case of Königsberg and Germany, the Kuril Islands and Japan, or the territories taken from Finland. What’s the situation with those—when will the territories be returned? And the return of South Ossetia to Georgia seems more likely. And that will clearly happen sooner than the return of Ukrainian territories.
Well, I’m not able to assess the speed of that here. I’m ready to agree, ready to accept your version. I’m not sure there’s an insurmountable wall here. I’m ready to agree with your version.
How a Dishonorable Peace Differs from Yabloko’s Position Link to heading
Anna. How does the peace advocated by Yabloko differ from a dishonorable one?
Many were struck by my statement that, in principle, I would consider that a dishonorable peace—I think there was a separate question about that, and I will answer it shortly, I see that question, and I will respond to it. The point is that Yabloko, considering itself a certain political force, declares that there is no need to support Ukraine now. This is their firm position—that, as patriots of their country, they cannot support Ukraine, because that would mean advocating for the killing of their own citizens, accusing us—those who support Ukraine—of being a party of foreign blood, as if we are trying to gain some preferences by spilling Ukrainian blood. No normal person thinks that by the death of Ukrainians they can gain some preferences. Yabloko, on the other hand, is a party of native blood, because in this position—and I stress again—this is the fundamental difference between my position and that of Yabloko: in Russia’s war against Ukraine, I clearly side with Ukraine. I am against Russia—I emphasize this is key—I am for Russia’s defeat. Once again—I am for Russia’s defeat. But I understand that in the current situation, Russia’s defeat is a very distant prospect, and on the way to this prospect, a huge number of people—primarily Ukrainian citizens—could die. I am on Ukraine’s side, and therefore, while that peace may be a question of specific circumstances—not at my desire, but if a certain situation arises—then, in principle, a dishonorable peace is possible. Whereas Yabloko is on Russia’s side and believes that we should simply stop the war now. That is simply unrealistic. Yabloko demands the impossible, while I say that I am on Ukraine’s side, but if, not by my will, but if a certain situation arises, then, in principle, a dishonorable peace is possible. And? Mikhail—so, let’s get back to that question about dishonorable peace. Why do you always say “no, that’s not it, that’s not it”? Let’s return to that question now.
What Negotiations with Putin Link to heading
Mikhail Romanovich, question What new agreements with the Russian Federation can we even talk about if all the existing agreements from the 1990s and 2000s on Russia’s sovereignty and guarantees of its security have been violated? It should be clear that as long as this regime exists in Russia, all peace agreements will be violated.
All the more so, I have always said that all these negotiations are a fiction, that this is a swamp into which Putin gladly drags everyone, because he feels comfortable there. So I—I’m completely—so you are basically asking me a question that confirms my conviction? Of course, of course, my opinion fully coincides with what you expressed in your question.
Is There Already a Million Dead? Link to heading
So, Don UN asks Why do you say another million people will be lost? Is there already one? Is there already one?
He asks. Well, if we speak—well, look, first of all, there is official statistics and there are assumptions about how accurate they are. According to official statistics, the number of those killed plus those seriously wounded at the front is indeed approaching one million. That’s official. In reality, it is quite possibly higher. So that’s what I meant.
Question About the Uyghurs Link to heading
So, a subscriber with the nickname “anyone else”—that’s how the person calls themselves. Why are you concerned about the Uyghurs? What about national minorities in Turkey or Azerbaijan?
Well, you see, the question itself is framed—why not national minorities in Turkey or Azerbaijan? You know, when I read your question, the first thing that came to mind was this kind of joking sophistry: Turgeniev wrote “Mumu,” but the monument was put up to Pushkin. Unfair. Outrageous. That’s the kind of sophistry—when it’s elderberries in the garden and an uncle in Kyiv, as they say. Well, colleague. I was answering a question about—there was a specific question about China, not at all about Turkey or Azerbaijan. It was a question about China where it was suggested that it would be a great blessing if the Chinese occupied Russia, because the Chinese are very nice, very humane people. And I expressed doubt about the Chinese people’s humanity, since I said, look at what they are doing with the Uyghurs, for example. Is that humanitarian? Is that empathy? Not really noticeable. Look at what they are doing with their dissidents. Look at how they publicly execute, including dissidents. Well, somehow, I don’t feel a lot of empathy there. The question simply did not mention Azerbaijan or Turkey at all, you see? So yes, indeed—outrageous. Turgeniev wrote “Mumu,” and the monument stands to Pushkin. That’s the spirit of the question.
Putin Doesn’t Need to Attend Negotiations, He Just Needs to Capitulate Link to heading
Galina Kovaleva. Putin doesn’t have to go anywhere. Negotiators work out all the details, and the head of state signs the final version. Don’t you know that? And then Galina Kovaleva writes Of course, capitulation. Enough deaths already.
Well then, what’s the problem? Let Putin capitulate. What’s the issue? Of course, enough deaths. Let Putin withdraw the troops to the 1991 borders—or at least to the February 23, 2022 line—and enough deaths. So what’s the problem?
Putin’s Idea and the Absence of Ideology Link to heading
So, Yura Bandera, You say Putin has no idea. What about the restoration of the empire? Isn’t that an idea, dear colleague? An idea?
Yes, of course, Putin has an idea—more than one, in fact. But there is no ideology, no vision of the future, no understanding of what kind of country he intends to build, no understanding of what he offers to the world. You see, when the communists offered an idea to the world, behind that idea stood a fundamental theory, a fully developed, understandable ideology that captured half the world, if not more—especially if we count the intellectual strata. If we take the ideology of Nazism, that was also a fully developed ideology with a clear vision of the future. Here, the “Russian world” is a cloud in trousers—it’s unclear what it even is. That’s why no one takes on this idea of the “Russian world.” Yes, there is support for Putin simply as a strong partner. That exists in the world. But as for adopting the idea of the “Russian world”—that doesn’t happen. Name at least one country that has adopted or accepted the idea of the “Russian world” besides Russia—it doesn’t exist. This is not an ideology in the sense of a holistic vision of the future. It is directed only toward the past, you see? The idea of empire is directed toward the past—it doesn’t provide a picture of the future. The idea of restoring the Soviet Union, the idea of restoring an empire—this is mythology by its nature. Mythology is about explaining the past, but it is in no way a vision of the future. So, it’s not an ideology, but an idea—yes, it exists.
On the Role of Personality in History Link to heading
Elena Kaplan When I was a student at a technical university, I was forced to study Lenin’s works, and I was sure it was all nonsense, including the article “The Role of Personality in History.” But when Gorbachev opened the Iron Curtain and I escaped from the Soviet Union, I realized there was something to it. And today I see another example of Lenin’s correctness—in rich and strong democratic America, an outright fascist, sick with a superiority complex and dementia to boot, came to power and started disfiguring the country’s life. After Gorbachev left, Russia returned to Soviet ways. Maybe America will also return to civilization after Trump?
Dear Elena! Well, first of all, I’ll try to answer the main part of your question, but first, I would still like to restore justice regarding what is clearly an exaggeration of Lenin’s contribution to the philosophical question of the role of personality in history. His contribution is actually quite minimal. Even within Russian Marxism, Plekhanov’s contribution to the development of this theory—the question of the role of personality in history—is much more substantial than Lenin’s. His work on this topic is far more meaningful than Lenin’s.
Overall, it’s an interesting question because Marxists inherited a lot from Hegel’s philosophy, and they also believed that historical laws and processes would manifest under any circumstances—sooner or later, a bit easier or harder, but historical necessity would always break through. In such a framework, the role of personality seems minor because there are historical laws that act through individuals—it doesn’t matter who the person is, the historical laws act through them.
There is a certain range of opinions on the role of personality. There is indeed this Marxist tradition that continues Hegel’s logic, but it’s more of a terminological one. There is the belief that the law will be realized regardless of the personality. But this was most vividly expressed by Leo Tolstoy—in “War and Peace,” he completely downplayed the role of personality in history, especially the role of Napoleon, describing him as a child to whom adults gave ropes attached to the coach wall so that he would think he was steering the horse, but in fact, he was controlling nothing.
So, that’s one view. There’s also the opposite view. I think that the role of personality in history is real, significant, and under certain circumstances, it can be very important—it can substantially change the course of history. For example, I believe that Lenin’s and Trotsky’s roles in the October coup were enormous, and history could have taken a different path. Or, for example, from my studies of the sociology of religion, I am still convinced that in the era of Muhammad, in the early 7th century, the Arab tribes indeed felt the need for a new religion, but its actual embodiment could have been different, depending on Muhammad’s personality. If another prophet had emerged, even if successful, the religion might have been different—not Islam, but something else. Its specific outlines could have been different.
So I think the role of personality is huge, and, in particular, Trump’s role as a personality is very significant. As for the assumption that after Trump there will definitely be a return—well, if after Trump comes Vance, he is an even more serious figure. So again, I emphasize—these are just my views, I do not impose them on anyone, I simply answer questions. I do not think that history is a one-track path—this Hegelian and Marxist view that history is a one-way street from past to future. No, there are switches, there are options, and free will operates. Yes, there are stretches of history where deviation is impossible, but there are also turning points where the role of personality manifests, and much depends on which personality holds the levers of these switches. I tried to give some examples of this.
Could Zelensky Just Take Out Putin at a Personal Meeting Link to heading
Pan Stepan, I understand that Putin won’t come to Istanbul, but if he did, do you think there’s any reason why Zelensky—a brave man, a national hero of Ukraine—should not resolve the issue definitively at a personal meeting? Talking to Putin is a losing game for him. But with a weapon, perhaps using diplomatic immunity, he might be able to bring it in. Of course, this would worsen relations with Turkey, but maybe that’s a price worth paying? Or do you see other reasons why this wouldn’t be possible?
Dear Pan Stepan! Well, you see, participating in writing a fantasy novel of alternative history where Zelensky personally kills Putin—sure, we can play this game. But I think this is highly unlikely because, in such a situation, Zelensky would definitely be declared a terrorist. And the consequences for Ukraine, frankly, seem very, very uncertain to me. Despite everything, despite the tribunal, despite the fact that Putin is declared a criminal, nevertheless, violence and the physical killing of one president by another—it throws us back into some distant Middle Ages where one king or one military leader killed another in direct combat. Well, that’s something very remote. I think it’s impossible. I think it’s impossible precisely because of the consequences. Although, of course, it’s a beautiful fairy tale. There’s no denying that, but it’s highly unrealistic.
Inozemtsev’s Opinion on the Surrender of the Far East Link to heading
Sergey Andryushchenko Regarding S. Inozemtsev’s broadcast. It’s a pity you didn’t ask him to comment on Mikhail Savva’s statement about Putin handing over the Far East to China. Is there any real information about signed documents? Or was it more of a generalization on Mikhail’s part?
Actually, I did ask that question. I asked that question, and as far as I remember, Inozemtsev said that yes, indeed, the absorption is very serious.
How to Live and Endure Link to heading
Olga Trifonova. We are forced to stay in this country, and we must admit the inevitable, worst turn of events. History is turning backward. These times we studied as past, never imagining they would return. We read about people who lived then, in the 30s and 40s, and understood the monstrosity of what was happening. But it was impossible to imagine being in their place. How to endure, how to behave while sliding into constant depression, realizing that you cannot afford it? The thoughts are killing. You have spoken a lot about internal emigration. Yes, that’s how we live. But it’s getting harder when you completely lose hope, when even the art that used to save the soul is violated and bent by the authorities, and monstrous slogans compete only with ads. And your words, your example are always support and strength. If you can, please return to this question.
Dear Olga! You know, still, comparing our situation with that of the 30s and 40s, for all of us, including even those who have stayed in Russia and are repulsed by the Putin regime, the atmosphere is still much easier for us, much easier than for those who lived in the 30s and 40s. Because internal emigration still allows the possibility of receiving this kind of online support, to be in communication with like-minded people from all over the world. Our channel’s audience, though relatively small—by the way, I want to congratulate us all on recently surpassing the 300,000 mark—it’s not much, but still. It means that our ranks are slowly but steadily growing. But even within our relatively small, only 300,000-member channel, we see people from the most different countries—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, the United States of America, and the most unexpected countries. And this kind of community, even just within our YouTube channel, our Telegram channel—and these are not the only ones; surely you are subscribed to others as well—these online communities are forming, and they allow people not to be alone, to receive such intellectual and moral support. Therefore, I think that it is still easier for us—a small consolation, but nevertheless, compared to what was in the 30s and 40s, of course, much easier.
Request for a Broadcast About Sevastyanov Link to heading
Question from Dnipro Will you be able to fulfill your promise to make public your opinion on Yevgeny Sevastyanov’s Trumpism of the brain?
Well, no one said yet to look me in the eye. So, looking into the eyes, I answer—not yet, I haven’t gotten around to it. It’s just that this is a serious task. I actually have a problem with Trump—Trumpophrenia—simply due to lack of time, because it requires hours of watching videos, making excerpts, quotes, creating timestamps, and so on.
About Rubinstein Link to heading
And Kibaki? Sorry. Kibaki Veller. RUBINSTEIN Have you read the book “Balance of the Soviet Thermidor”? What do you think, if you have? Yes, I have read it. That book appeared in Soviet bookstores back in the late 1980s. I had it.
Well, what can I say? It’s by Yugoslav communist Pavlovich, who was executed by Yugoslav Stalinists precisely for this book—or at least for the views he expressed in this book. It’s a book about Stalinist repressions. That’s what I think. It’s a useful book, one of the first to appear in such an extensive format, but since then, much weightier studies have been published. So, let’s say, it was one of the first, but by no means the only useful book. When was it written? I believe it was in the early 1940s or the late 1930s? In general, a long time ago. But it was never actually published. At that time, Yugoslavia was still friendly with the Soviet Union, and therefore the book was quickly suppressed.
Where Does Such Cruelty in Russians Come From Link to heading
So. Nadezhda Kotik There is data that at the very beginning, Russian soldiers were given permission to do whatever they wanted in the occupied territories—do as you wish, there will be no punishment. So it turns out that these people always harbored a desire to kill, rob, and rape. They simply didn’t do it before out of fear of the law. Any normal person wouldn’t even think of torturing someone just because it’s allowed. And at the start of the war, it was Russia’s elite troops who came—not a rabble from prisons and back alleys. It seems these people harbored cruelty. They wanted to kill. They got a convenient occasion—war. We also all know from Ukrainians who returned to their homes after occupation about the piles of excrement left right on beds, even children’s beds, smeared on walls and ceilings—what is that? Why? Eduard Topol said in an interview that he foresaw this because Soviet soldiers did the same during World War II. Why is this in people? I don’t understand.
Dear colleague! Dear Nadezhda! You see, if we seriously, not just throw up our hands and sigh “how long, etc.,” but seriously try to answer your question, then overall, the Soviet, and then Russian, population has undergone several stages of deregulation. What do I mean? Several factors of degradation, degradation of norms and regulators. Let’s ask ourselves—what holds a person back from murder and looting? What holds a person back from defecating on a bed, from destroying property, killing people, committing atrocities, etc.? Certain norms hold them back, certain regulators, including, in some countries and societies, religious norms, fear of punishment, legal norms, morality, that very strict inner law of the soul. Over centuries, these norms were eroded, especially during the 74 years of Soviet rule, when ordinary human norms were destroyed, morality was declared a bourgeois prejudice, and religion was, of course, abolished. Instead, norms of communist morality were introduced, according to which there was first the class principle—not all people deserve support, not all people deserve empathy, and anything could be done to class enemies.
Then, when communist religion and communist morality collapsed, a gaping void appeared. There was simply nothing in their place. And in conditions where there are no internal regulators, no morality, no religion, only one thing remained—fear of punishment. And when, during the war, the fear of punishment disappeared, what was in these people’s souls manifested. That’s the first thing.
Second, another stage of degradation is that I insist that the Russian army—what I have been talking about so far applies to the entire Russian population—but the Russian army is, if a mirror of the Russian population, then a very distorted one, because the worst serve in the Russian army. Simply the worst, because the war is unjust, it’s an aggressive war, and the worst fight in the Russian army. Therefore, you see, general degradation. And one more stage of degradation is the Russian army, which is, so to speak, still at the bottom of the Russian population. So that’s the reason—that’s what it is.
Will Trump Stay for a Third Term Link to heading
Diana asks and congratulates on 3000. Thank you. What is your opinion about a third presidential term for Trump? Since in the US it’s impossible to adjust the Constitution like in Russia, could this adventurous president, when the time comes for the end of his second term, start a war with Canada or Mexico to stay for a third term? After all, history knows the example of Roosevelt, who stayed for a third term because of the war.
Thank you, dear Diana. Look, first of all, regarding the US Constitution. You know, our firm confidence that the very structure of the United States, its institutions, and the Constitution guarantee protection against the rise of some form of authoritarianism or even fascism was already somewhat shaken with Trump’s arrival. But even back in the 1940s, the brilliant logician Kurt Gödel, who created several outstanding mathematical and logical theorems, including the incompleteness theorem, emigrated from Austria when fascism came to Austria and was obtaining US citizenship. When he was taking his citizenship exam, Einstein accompanied him, as they were comparable figures—one in mathematics and logic, the other in physics—both emigrants.
During the exam, when asked about the political system in Austria, he said it was authoritarian, fascist. And in the United States? Gödel said that he had analyzed the US Constitution and laws and wanted to say that, from a logical point of view, the emergence of an authoritarian regime in the United States was quite possible. The examiner panicked, and Einstein reminded Gödel that he did, in fact, want to become a US citizen. Since then, this reasoning has been known as Gödel’s loophole. So, theoretically, given certain circumstances, the emergence of an authoritarian regime in the United States is possible.
Would it result from a war? I very much doubt that Trump would start a war against Canada or even Mexico. But the possibility that he might somehow try to stay for a third term—I think that cannot be ruled out. I am not sure about the success of such an idea, but that he might attempt it is entirely possible.
Why Hasn’t Russia Opened a Criminal Case Against the Author Link to heading
Vladimir Ivanovich, Why do you think Putin has not yet opened a criminal case against you for failing to fulfill your foreign agent obligations? My opinion is they don’t want to give you publicity, which means they’re afraid, they sense strength.
You know, dear colleague, the thing is—I don’t know. The issue is this: when I was forced to leave Russia, I found out that the police had come several times to my registered address, but I was renting an apartment and living at a different location. They explained that I was being accused of extremism. After that, I regularly received notifications via the government services portal, demanding something—essentially, from the authorities, enforcement officers were demanding various things, etc. It’s not that I’m afraid or anything like that—I just didn’t open those letters because I had some passwords for the portal, and frankly, I wasn’t interested, for one simple reason: after they stopped paying me my pension and blocked my accounts in Sberbank and Alfa-Bank, I completely lost interest in any personal matters. I still have a huge interest in everything happening in Russia, but no personal interest remains.
And there’s another reason. For many people, property in Russia is an issue. That’s natural—we’re all human. If a person has an apartment in Russia, they are forced to somehow preserve it, or they have relatives living there, or something else. I am in a somewhat unique situation because I have not a single square centimeter of real estate anywhere on planet Earth, including in Russia. I have no car, garage, apartment, bicycle, scooter in Russia—nothing. I have books that are stored in a warehouse. That’s all. So I don’t really react to these letters. Whether there’s a criminal case against me or not—I honestly have no idea. I don’t care. I certainly have no intention of fulfilling any obligations, and moreover, I’ve said several times that my chances of returning to Russia are probably zero. For me, Russia is now an object of observation, an object of remote study, but definitely not a place of possible residence in the future. So. As for messages from the police or enforcement officers—I receive them constantly, I just don’t pay attention to them.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
Well, you know, it seems that’s all the questions that were found. Dear friends, we are wrapping up our morning broadcast for today. I would like to remind you once again that at 9:30 PM we will have a conversation with journalist Portnikov. I think it will be interesting. I recommend not to miss it. Take care of yourselves. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom for Alexander Skobov! For Daria Kozyreva and all Russian political prisoners, Ukrainian captives. See you at 9:30 PM. Goodbye.
Source: https://youtu.be/RUn1FrJA7Og