After Whitkoff’s meeting with Dmitriev – the tragedy in Kryvyi Rih, after Putin’s negotiations with Whitkoff – the mass killing in Sumy.

Main Topic Link to heading

Hello, friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 14. It’s 7:41 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

Trump is healthy, unlike the hundred residents of Sumy Link to heading

Well, against the backdrop of what happened yesterday, a cheerful announcement came from Washington that President Trump is demonstrating excellent cognitive and physical health. He is fully ready to perform the duties of Commander-in-Chief and Head of State. Reuters reported that Trump underwent a medical examination, noting his height, weight, athletic achievements, and so on. Well, God bless him, as they say. So, Trump is healthy and cheerful, unlike the more than one hundred residents of the city of Sumy who suffered yesterday from a war crime committed by the Russian occupying army. Yesterday morning, two missile strikes hit the center of the city of Sumy. As a result, 34 people were killed, including two children. Another 117 people were injured. Among the wounded are 15 children. The strike was carried out by two Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Judging by the photos and the shrapnel marks on the walls of buildings, at least one of these missiles had a warhead loaded with shrapnel. A thousand marks on the walls indicate this. This is an indiscriminate weapon, which is prohibited by international agreements and international law from being used in populated areas and places where civilians may be present. The Russian occupiers, by launching these rockets at a regional center on a holiday — yesterday, I remind you, was Palm Sunday — committed another war crime. It is indeed a war crime, and its author is undoubtedly the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Putin, since launching an Iskander missile is not an action that can be taken independently by a unit commander — it is coordinated with the General Staff and, naturally, with the country’s political leadership. The use of ballistic missiles packed with shrapnel in a densely populated area is a violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention. War crimes. The reaction of the overwhelming majority of world leaders was more or less adequate. Indeed, some called it a war crime, others called it an appalling act, and so on. I would like to note the reaction of the President of the United States, Trump. He said the following quote: “I was told they made a mistake, but I think it’s terrible. I think the whole war is a terrible thing.” When asked what he meant by a “mistake,” Trump replied: “They made a mistake. Ask them,” leaving it unclear who exactly he meant. Neither Trump nor the White House named Russia as the perpetrator of the attack in their statements on the tragedy in Sumy. Once again, he shifted the blame. Last time he said that Zelensky started the war, now he blamed everything on Biden. Quote: “This is Biden’s war. It’s not my war; it’s a war that happened under Biden. I’m just trying to stop it so we can save a lot of lives.” The comments of Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine are also very telling. Quote: “The STRIKE by Russian troops on civilian targets in Sumy crosses all boundaries of decency.” Decency. Meaning that before this, the Russian occupiers were within the bounds of decency? Again — inadequate. I understand that many are already saying we shouldn’t listen to what Trump or his people say. Sorry, he is the president of a great country, this is his special representative, this is the language they speak, this is what they think. And that’s why it matters.

Pro-Putin Narratives in the U.S. Link to heading

And the negotiations? On Friday, negotiations took place between the U.S. President’s special envoy, Steve Whitkoff, and — before that, excuse me, let’s rewind to a week earlier. And so, after the meeting between Whitkoff and Dmitriev, Whitkoff informed Trump of Moscow’s key demand — the transfer of four Ukrainian regions under Russian control. Which means Whitkoff told Trump that fulfilling this condition would speed up the signing of a peace agreement. Earlier, in an interview with Tucker Carlson, he repeated the same thing. Which means China has taken a different position. Although it’s hard to say. Some talk about good cop and bad cop, but I can’t tell who’s good and who’s bad. Because if Whitkoff said that, based on the negotiations, he believes four regions should be given to Russia, he also said that Ukraine should be divided into zones of control. He later clarified, saying it’s not about dividing Ukraine, but about different forces controlling Ukraine. The Right Bank of Ukraine should be controlled by European armed forces. The Left Bank of Ukraine, currently under the control of the legitimate Ukrainian government, should be controlled by Ukrainian military. And the occupied territories, naturally, will be controlled by Russia. I don’t know what’s worse — China’s position or Whitkoff’s. Both, in my view, are absolutely, absolutely pro-Russian. Although, in general, there are, of course, disagreements in Trump’s circle regarding the Ukrainian issue. But all these disagreements are clearly within a pro-Russian framework. Trump stated that negotiations between the United States and Russia are going well. Quote: “I think the relationship between Ukraine and Russia can be good, and you’ll see that fairly soon.” Incredible. Especially how everything just keeps getting better and better. And indeed, we can see it soon — with each strike of Russian missiles, with each strike of Russian drones, with every Ukrainian life taken, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia keeps getting better and better. And then Trump stated: “The moment is coming when you need to either accept it or shut up. And we’ll see what comes of it. But I think everything is going well.” Who is supposed to accept, who is supposed to shut up — as always, in Trump’s stream of consciousness, nothing is clarified. As for Putin’s reaction to the talks with Whitkoff — I tried to find it but couldn’t. Maybe I searched poorly on the Kremlin’s website. On kremlin.ru and the Russian Orthodox Church site, there’s very little information. No video broadcast. The only photo confirms that yes, this meeting did indeed take place in Saint Petersburg. The only thing I found — and it was important to see the Russian side’s reaction — was Putin’s press secretary, Peskov, who described the dynamic of Russian-American relations as positive, but advised not to expect immediate results. He then noted with satisfaction: “Actually, everything is moving very well.” This was from Peskov’s interview with Pavel Zarubin.

Hope for Germany Link to heading

And just a few words about what’s happening. The most key, crucial events currently taking place in Europe. I would like to focus on the central point. The central phenomenon that is increasingly emerging in European politics today is the upcoming arrival of a new political leadership in the Federal Republic of Germany. Right now, of course, all attention is focused on Friedrich Merz, who is expected to become the next Chancellor of Germany in the near future. Even before coming to power, he spoke of the need to provide Ukraine with Taurus missiles, and now he is reaffirming this. However, this intention is accompanied by a huge number of caveats. In particular, he mentions that the supply of cruise missiles will be contingent on coordinating these deliveries with Germany’s European partners. Who he means by that is hard to say. As far as I understand, these missiles — and I may clarify this later today with Serhiy Maratovych Hrabskiy, whom we’ll be speaking with as usual on Monday at 8:00 PM — have many components that are not manufactured in Germany, particularly in Sweden. So perhaps coordination is required with the participants involved in their production. And I must say that under new political leadership, Germany really could become a center — a center of resistance to Russia, at least. There is hope. There is hope for that. Another important point Friedrich Merz made was that the Ukrainian army needs to go on the offensive. Up until now, it has only been reacting. And it’s time for them to have the ability to shape some of what’s happening. These are somewhat evasive phrases. However, they still differ significantly from what the political leadership of the United States has been saying lately. So, in the end, what we are now witnessing in the course of this — for us — main process (it’s clear that for the world, for the global economy, the main process is what I would call the “Trumpostroika,” a sort of attempt to collapse the global economy through its restructuring) — this Trumpostroika. I think we’ll talk about that separately. Possibly not in solo mode, not as a monologue, but in a dialogue with one of the major economists.

Negotiations Give Russia Free Rein Link to heading

As for what is most important to me and to most of those who are listening and watching right now, it’s what is being referred to as “negotiations.” I want to once again draw your attention, dear friends, to the fact that after Whitkoff’s meeting with Dmitriev, the tragedy in Kryvyi Rih occurred. Nine children were killed, along with 19 peaceful Ukrainian civilians. After Putin’s negotiations with Whitkoff and the UN, there was the mass killing in Sumy. And the fact that these mass murders — these two war crimes — could not have been carried out without Putin’s direct order is obvious.

It seems to me there needs to be — somehow, there must be — clarity. You know, sharpen the focus. There must be a clear understanding of what these negotiations actually represent. And Putin is conducting these negotiations — actively. These mass killings in Kryvyi Rih, the mass killings in Sumy, the shelling of Kharkiv, the constant shelling of Kyiv, the constant shelling of Odesa — this is the language Putin uses. This is the language Putin uses to respond to Trump. This is the language with which Putin is holding a dialogue with Ukraine and its citizens.

All of this — what happened in Kryvyi Rih, what happened in Sumy — these are replies, arguments within the context of negotiations. The clearer and sooner this is understood in Washington, in Brussels, in Berlin, and in other cities, the sooner an adequate policy will be developed in response to the threat that Putin’s fascism poses to the entire world.

For now, unfortunately, one side is negotiating with Iskanders, while the other is using words — and that is not communication. Do you understand? There’s no contact when words are answered with Iskanders. It’s not a dialogue; it’s a rupture. A language barrier — and I think this language barrier must be eliminated. Iskanders must be answered with Tomahawks, and Taurus missiles, and other appropriate arguments.

Poll: Can Trump Achieve a Ceasefire? Link to heading

On Friday — no, sorry, on Saturday — I posted a question on our website, on our channel: Do you think President Trump’s initiatives to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine will be implemented? Since then, 12,000 people have taken part in the poll. The responses were distributed as follows. Once again, the question was: Do you think President Trump’s initiatives to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine will be implemented? The answers were: Yes, they will be implemented — 4%; No — 88%; Difficult to say — 7%.

I believe that our channel’s audience, in my view, assesses the situation quite adequately, and clearly hears the language in which Putin is conducting negotiations. And this language in no way suggests that Trump’s initiative will be implemented.

Q&A Link to heading

Before moving on to your questions, I want to remind you that at 8:00 PM today, as usual on Mondays, we’ll have a conversation with a military expert — a Ukrainian military expert. Serhiy Hrabskiy. There are a lot of questions, and I think it will be an interesting discussion. Now, moving on to answering your questions.

I want to say right away, dear friends, that I won’t be able to answer all your questions today. I simply didn’t have enough time to write everything down. But I promise — I’ve noted the point at which I had to stop, so I will definitely respond to everyone tomorrow.

On Internal Emigration Link to heading

So, a question from Vadim:
What is the difference between internal emigration and conformism? For example, Prishvin went into internal emigration. What did his work turn into? Even his diaries.

Well, I think… You see, internal emigration and conformism can be seen as overlapping sets, but the difference between them is significant. Conformism is compliance; it can involve a kind of doublethink — a public endorsement of something you wouldn’t truly want to agree with. Conformism is the public display of a stance that wasn’t originally natural to the person. It’s about aligning with authority, with power, or with some opposing position.

Internal emigration, on the other hand, is generally a withdrawal from active engagement and a way of preserving oneself. Internal emigration may, in the end, be accompanied by conformism — so they can overlap. But internal emigration is, in essence, a quite respectable response to the challenge of a totalitarian regime. Conformism, by contrast, always carries a clearly negative connotation — it is a negatively colored phenomenon.

Not everyone can be a Skobov, as you know. Not everyone can leave, not everyone can walk their own Golgotha. Internal emigration is a respectable way to respond to the challenge of a totalitarian regime. Conformism, however, is a deal with one’s own conscience. The difference is radical.

As for the example of Prishvin — I don’t know, maybe unlike you, dear Vadim, I haven’t studied Prishvin’s creative legacy that deeply. I don’t know. Yes, he wasn’t a fighter, he didn’t actively resist and so on. But I’m not sure he is such a negative example. Right?

On Shelest Link to heading

Anton:
Igor, if you read this or perhaps someone heard something from you about Shelest — you did an interview with him back in the fall, where he was the host. Did you realize at the time who you were dealing with or not?

Yes, that’s a relevant question. Some time ago, I didn’t respond to another invitation from Oleksandr Shelest for an interview. That is, at a certain point, I made the decision to stop collaborating with him. And just recently, Shelest was sanctioned by Ukrainian authorities — he was officially labeled a propagandist, which is fair. The thing is, what Mr. Shelest represents has actually been fairly clear for quite a while. But there has been a certain evolution — or degradation, if you like — at least in terms of how it was reflected in my own interactions with him.

At first, I had a general sense, based on certain signs, that Shelest’s political stance was quite different from mine. But up to a certain point, he still positioned himself solely as an interviewer. He asked questions, I answered, and I operated under the assumption that he was a Ukrainian journalist. I believed I was speaking to a Ukrainian audience, and I considered it my right — and even my duty to some extent — to respond to questions and engage with Shelest’s audience.

Then something changed. This wasn’t a case of Shelest being a propagandist from the start. What happened was a transformation — at a certain point, when asking questions, he began to immediately insert his own openly pro-Russian, openly anti-Ukrainian positions. He gradually turned from an interviewer into an active — I’d even say aggressive — propagandist.

I respond quite calmly to things like that. Of course, I didn’t let it slide and took part in the debates — and sometimes those debates turned into arguments. At a certain moment, I realized that I was no longer dealing with an interviewer who was interested in my opinion, but rather with a propagandist who was trying to invite me on the show just like Solovyov used to — inviting Ukrainians or liberal voices for the purpose of ridiculing them in front of an audience made up exclusively of “vatnik” sympathizers and the like.

That’s when it became clear to me that further discussion and collaboration were pointless. When we spoke with presidential office adviser Mykhailo Mykhailovych Polyak, I asked how people end up being sanctioned. Why now, for example, is Shelest on the list? Why isn’t someone like Arestovych sanctioned? Or Latynina, who clearly acts as a Russian propagandist now — why isn’t she on the list either? The response was that you can’t do everything at once — it’s a process, and the Prosecutor’s Office, if I’m not mistaken, is preparing such cases.

And I can say, yes, people change. Back in the fall, the situation was different. But at the beginning of this year, all interaction ceased. I believe we shouldn’t label people prematurely. I often invite journalists and experts with whom I have serious disagreements — that doesn’t mean I must refuse to speak or engage with people who have different views from mine. The issue is the breaking point — the moment after which cooperation becomes impossible. That breaking point came at the start of 2025.

On the Strikes on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy Link to heading

Alex:
Tell me, please, why do people start calling the strikes on Kryvyi Rih and Sumy war crimes? I believe that every strike by Russia, even on military targets, is already a crime — because they attacked Ukrainians. Also, I wanted to ask you about Trump. Isn’t it time you summoned Mr. Yunus? That would be very interesting.

Dear Alex, I don’t “summon” anyone. I understand your tone, of course, but Mr. Yunus will be my guest — at least if he himself wants to. I’m in regular contact with him. This actually serves as an illustration of our previous question — I do have some fairly significant disagreements with Mr. Yunus on a number of issues. So what? We’ll continue to talk.

Now, as for war crimes — “war crimes” is a general term that refers to violations of international humanitarian law during armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions — there are several of them — list what constitutes a war crime. What is a war crime? It includes murder, torture, or enslavement of prisoners of war. The same applies to civilians — abduction and killing of hostages, unjustified destruction of civilian infrastructure, and so on. That is, actions carried out without military necessity.

So, I’m not going to — and probably couldn’t from memory — list everything the Geneva Conventions define as war crimes. But I think that’s enough. What happened in Kryvyi Rih and Sumy is clearly, purely, a war crime.

Killing an armed opponent in wartime is not a war crime. The war itself is criminal — and here I would draw a certain line. Yes, the war itself is a crime. But soldiers who kill the enemy on the battlefield are not considered war criminals. This is clearly demonstrated by the outcomes of the Nuremberg Trials. Those who were declared war criminals were the ones who started the war of the Third Reich, who incited it, organized it, and carried out war crimes such as — excuse the bluntness — the Holocaust, mass executions, and the murder of prisoners of war.

As for ordinary soldiers of the Third Reich who took part in combat operations, they were not declared war criminals. And in the process of denazification, they were not prosecuted.

So yes — the war is criminal, absolutely. And without question, every Russian citizen who finds themselves armed on Ukrainian territory is a legitimate target for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But to say that each of them is a war criminal — that’s not accurate. They are, without a doubt, subject to elimination the moment they are on Ukrainian soil. But war crimes are clearly defined actions listed in the Geneva Conventions. So there is a distinction.

About Pasha Technik Link to heading

Tamara Pumpiansky:
An unexpected question for you. Do you know who Pasha Technik was? What explains his popularity among today’s Russian youth? At his funeral, people sang the Russian anthem. What does that say?

Dear Tamara, you’ve raised a question that, I think, will probably require a separate program from me. The thing is, of course I know who Pasha Technik was. I’m following everything related to him, because for me this phenomenon — let’s say, the life and death of Pasha Technik, and the youth’s reaction to it — serves as an indicator. I see it as a kind of naturally occurring sociological study that shows the face of a significant part of today’s Russian youth.

This was a person who, first of all, made his life into a promotion of drugs. And secondly, his popularity is largely tied to the degradation of modern Russian youth. In any case, rap — as a form of artistic expression — has always been protest-driven. The real question is: where is that protest directed?

Pasha Technik didn’t aim his protest at the current Russian authorities. That’s precisely why he became so widely popular. Because today’s underground youth culture isn’t aimed at opposing the government. That’s a separate topic — what’s going on with the people around Comedy Club. There, everything is essentially turning into a mouthpiece for Putin. Pasha wasn’t a mouthpiece for Putin, but he openly embraced — well, not embraced, perhaps, but flirted with — fascist views. He flaunted them. His rap featured these ultranationalist tones.

But, as I see it, despite rap traditionally being a genre of protest — a kind of counterculture — his work lacked protest against power. Instead, it expressed protest against life itself. This idea of suicide through drugs — that’s the foundation of it. That’s why I see this as a sign of serious, deep-rooted degradation in a significant portion of Russian youth.

And the fact that people are now openly contrasting Pasha Technik with Viktor Tsoi — that, to me, is symbolic. Tsoi’s fans were chanting, “We’re waiting for change.” Pasha Technik’s fans? What we’re seeing is a demonstration of what has happened to Russian youth over the past few decades.

Since I absolutely don’t want to go deep into the purely artistic side of this, maybe I’ll ask Artemy Troitsky to join the conversation — because this is actually a big, serious discussion about the state of today’s youth subculture.

On New Doubts Among Trumpists Link to heading

Denis Petrovsky:
I’d like to ask again about the Trumpists. Recently, Svetlana Gerasimova started having doubts about Trump and just a few days ago said she’s apparently leaving that camp. It might seem like it’s just her personal opinion, but many Trumpists immediately started speaking harshly and negatively about her — especially since she’s doing interviews with Illarionov. The comments have also been brutal. Have new rifts appeared among the Trumpist ranks? And as for Andrei Korchagin’s statements — that’s a separate topic. It seems like hardly anyone is worthy of his praise. He’s the “true” one, and all his former allies are either wrong or not strong enough Trumpists.

Dear Denis! I have to tell you that the next episode of the Trumpophrenia program is delayed precisely because I’m trying to understand what’s going on there. The thing is, Trumpism — especially Russian Trumpism, though not exclusively — is a totalitarian cult. It’s just a massive totalitarian cult. In the United States, as recently assessed by political scientist Igor Naumovich Aizenberg, whom I deeply respect, the totalitarian cult encompasses about 30 million Americans. A truly massive, totalitarian cult.

Totalitarian — meaning an absolutely uncritical attitude toward the leader. As Trump rightly said, if he went out onto the street and committed murder in public, not a single one of his supporters would condemn him. And that’s true.

So here’s the thing — it turns out that in this group where Russian-speaking Trumpists are involved, they’ve formed little factions, they’ve made shared group chats where they coordinate their so-called struggle. You know, I have a certain number of like-minded people — bloggers, journalists — but I can’t imagine us creating some kind of joint chat to coordinate our actions. I just can’t picture it, you see?

But in their case — that’s what’s happening. And now they’re condemning defectors. Condemning these “Trumpist apostates” with rage. There’s very heated condemnation of Illarionov. And as you said, dear Denis, Svetlana Gerasimova is now being dragged through the mud as well. So, in short — it’s a cult. A totalitarian cult.

Theories About the Murders of Lenin and Stalin Link to heading

Question from Ilya:
You said that the theory about Stalin killing Lenin has some merit and gave arguments in favor of it. I’m curious — what theories about Stalin’s own death or murder do you find convincing?

Well, I’ll say right away — I don’t consider the theory that Stalin killed Lenin to be proven. Of course not. But I did present arguments suggesting that it could have happened, that it was possible.

As for the theories surrounding Stalin’s own death or murder — I think there’s more substance there. So much has been documented, researched, and investigated that the picture is much clearer. It seems more or less evident that if it was a murder, it wasn’t through poison or anything exotic like that. It was through a deliberate denial of assistance.

The fact is, this man lay for several hours in his own puddle, and no help was given. That, to me, is murder. Murder by inaction. As for the motive? Most likely, it was the desire to get rid of an extremely dangerous leader. So yes — this was a murder through denial of medical help.

On Russia’s Demands Link to heading

Natalia Volkova:
I’m observing a new tactic from the Kremlin in negotiations with us and Trump. For example, they’re asking to lift certain sanctions in exchange for access to rare earth developments. Or to unfreeze their assets in return for offering the U.S. participation in the Nord Streams, and so on. This essentially removes the original reason for these restrictions. And the reason is the war. The current Trump administration actively supports the Kremlin in this. They won’t even allow Russia to be called the aggressor or Putin a killer. Do you think I’m right?

Yes, I think you’re right. In fact, that’s exactly what today’s stream was about.

On the Lethality of Hitler’s and Stalin’s Regimes. Which Is the Greater Evil? Link to heading

Alexander:
Two questions regarding the comparison you made between the deadly nature of the Hitler and Stalin regimes, using the example of the Buchenwald camp. First, based on the figures you provided — the number imprisoned and the number who died — the mortality rate during the Nazi period came out to 22.4%, while in the GULAG system it was around 25%. You cited these numbers, and then drew a conclusion that surprised me. Yes, there is a slight difference in favor of Stalin’s regime being “more deadly,” but come on, Igor Ivanovich — is a 22.4% versus 25% gap really enough to declare, as you did, that “in the killer contest, the GULAG wins by a clear margin”? Can such a small difference in percentage justify such a sweeping conclusion? Not to mention that extrapolating Buchenwald to represent the whole Nazi regime, ignoring Auschwitz and the Holocaust, seems entirely irrelevant. Don’t you agree?

Well, you know, dear Alexander, I must say I didn’t fully present — or rather, I did complete my line of reasoning, but didn’t provide all the data. The thing is, Buchenwald, as a death camp of the Third Reich, existed for more than eight years, whereas in the GULAG system, it existed for less than five years. So we’re comparing mortality rates over unequal time spans — 22.4% over eight years and 25% over less than five years. If we standardize the mortality rate per year — which, as you correctly noted, would be the relevant comparison — the difference becomes much more significant.

So yes, the gap is quite convincing. And the “victory” of Stalin’s GULAG — in quotation marks, of course — over the Nazi death camps looks fairly conclusive in this regard. That said, I agree that, indeed, drawing sweeping conclusions from a single example was not my intention. It was an anniversary date, and I reflected on it and tried to offer a spontaneous thought.

Now, to your second — and, I think, more important — question, which I’d like to address more seriously:

Alexander’s second question:
Let me be clear, writes Alexander — I’m not trying to whitewash Stalin. Both regimes are absolute evil to me. But in the Russian-speaking internet space, I keep seeing these comparisons — and what troubles me is that they almost always end up favoring Hitler as the “lesser evil.” Isn’t choosing between horror and nightmare unnecessary? Moreover, concluding that the Hitler regime was less brutal than Stalin’s is not only historically inaccurate but morally dangerous. Don’t you agree?

Yes, I agree. Dear Alexander, I just want to clarify. The fact is, with the Hitler regime, there’s a clear final judgment. We have Nuremberg. We have the condemnation in Germany — the very country where that regime existed. Defending that regime is, in some cases, a crime, and in others, a matter of moral disgrace. Even the Alternative for Germany party — whose leadership was, in principle, open to revising history — when one of its former leaders suggested that Germans shouldn’t be ashamed of their past, he immediately ceased to be the leader.

In Germany, justifying the Hitler regime or expressing any sympathy for the Third Reich is political suicide — sometimes a crime, and always indecent. In short, there’s a consensus. The years of denazification were not in vain.

But the Stalin regime was never condemned. In Europe, yes — but in Russia, no. In Russia, Stalinism flourishes, you see? And so, of course, when comparing these regimes, it’s understandable that many — based on experience — feel differently. Because, you see, Hitler is dead. Stalin is alive. That’s the difference. That’s the real difference.

So perhaps there are distortions in such comparisons. But the danger of Stalinism today is very real — because it is still alive. Still alive today.

On Killers and Toponymy. Streets Named After Murderers Link to heading

Svetlana Pritula:
Igor, would you agree to live on a street named after Sofya Perovskaya or Kibalchish in the U.S.?

Well, I take it this is a reaction to my rather harsh statements about Voikovskaya metro station. In general, living on a street named after murderers would, of course, be unpleasant. But again — you know, I’m afraid I’ll be criticized here too. Living on a street named after Kadyrov — now that would be revolting. Just revolting. Because, well, that’s really… it’s extremely disgusting.

Living on, say, Kibalchish Street, in the U.S.? Yes, of course, he was involved in preparing the assassination of 1881. But the figure of Kibalchish — well, you know, the figure of Kadyrov Sr. is repulsive to me. And even though I don’t like murderers in general — the figure of Perovskaya is not repulsive to me. You see the difference? She’s not repulsive. She was a person who was a product of her time. That’s how I see it.

It’s just that I have a good understanding of that spiritual context — not just as a journalist, not just as someone who’s read about it. My ancestors, the Zhigunovs, were members of Narodnaya Volya. Granted, they were part of the faction that rejected terrorism. But letters have been preserved, the atmosphere has been preserved — the atmosphere of protest against autocracy. And autocracy was a vile regime.

That atmosphere of protest against autocracy — it was humanly understandable. You know, today, many supporters of our views, dear Svetlana, very much want to kill Putin. I’m not equating Putin with the Russian emperor killed by the Narodovoltsy. But if you immerse yourself in the atmosphere of that time, you can understand — autocracy was seen as something loathsome.

Let me remind you that this was a time when Russian autocracy tried to act as Europe’s gendarme, crushed the Polish uprising, and committed many other crimes. You could understand the people who wanted to kill the rulers who embodied that autocracy. It was understandable.

Kadyrov — I don’t want to understand. But Kibalchish — I can. Again, I want to stress — there is a dividing line here. I wouldn’t like to live on a street named after Sofya Perovskaya or Kibalchish, but I do see a difference between Kadyrov Street and Kibalchish Street.

On German Ugryumov Link to heading

So, Vladimir:
A few years ago, I read something on Facebook that struck me so deeply I wrote it down: “We had to blow up the buildings to get him into the Kremlin. How much blood will have to be spilled to get him out?” It was attributed to German Ugryumov, FSB vice admiral. Is that true? Was there even such a thing as an FSB vice admiral?

German Ugryumov? Just to clarify — he died, if I’m not mistaken, in 2001. As for the rank — I’m not 100% sure, but I believe he had already received the rank of admiral shortly before his death. He wasn’t an “FSB admiral.” He received the rank of admiral because he originally served in the navy — the military navy — and that’s the rank he earned as a naval officer. He rose through the ranks that way. He wasn’t an “FSB admiral,” just an admiral — first a rear admiral, then a vice admiral, and I believe eventually a full admiral.

He was one of the organizers — again, according to investigations — of the apartment bombings. One of the FSB criminals behind those attacks. As for that quote you mentioned — I have no knowledge of such a statement by Ugryumov. I don’t know when he supposedly said that, because, again, he died in 2001. I don’t know when he would’ve had the opportunity to say something like that. And I’m 100% sure he would never have said it publicly.

Where that quote came from, I have no idea. He was involved in internal security. He wasn’t a spy — he headed the department for the protection of the constitutional order. These are the people who jail dissidents, who carry out murders of dissidents. For someone like him to say something like that in public? I find that very hard to believe. He was a close associate of Patrushev, of Putin, and so on. So I really doubt he would have said something like that publicly in a way that could have been documented or attributed. I’m very skeptical.

On French Troops in Ukraine Link to heading

So, Ivanova:
Why is the involvement of North Korean troops on Russia’s side perceived by everyone as a given, while the deployment of French troops on Ukraine’s side is considered the start of a world war?

You know, I think this is actually quite simple. First of all, I’m not sure that the mere presence of French troops on Ukrainian territory would automatically mean world war. It’s a step toward world war, yes — but the issue isn’t one of legality. Of course, Ukraine has every right to invite any foreign troops onto its territory. That’s its sovereign right.

But they simply won’t come — because they’ll be killed. And by the way, North Korean troops also are not currently fighting in Ukraine itself. As far as I understand, they haven’t crossed that particular line either. I’ll need to double-check that today with Serhiy Maratovych, but to my knowledge, they’re operating only within Russia’s Kursk region. So this is a delicate matter.

And again, this isn’t about international law — it’s about the practical reality. There’s a gap between what should be and what is. As soon as French, British, or German troops step foot in Ukraine, they will immediately become targets. The issue isn’t legal or moral justification — it’s simply the fact that they’ll be killed. That’s all.

So yes, the involvement of North Korean forces on Russia’s side is, without a doubt, an escalation of the war — and that’s recognized by everyone. There’s no contradiction here.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

As I mentioned earlier, dear friends, unfortunately I wasn’t able to write down all of your questions today — I simply didn’t have time to get to all of them. So I will definitely answer the remaining questions tomorrow. With that, I’ll wrap up today’s conversation. And a reminder: at 8:00 PM we’ll be speaking with Serhiy Maratovych Hrabskiy. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives. Have a good day! All the best, goodbye.

Source: https://youtu.be/d617LRk73F0