The SBU continues to strike at Russia's prestige

“Everything that must explode will certainly be blown up,” said Medvedev. “Agreed,” replied Maliuk. Orban said that Ukrainians are criminals and that he has a conscience.

Main topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 4. It’s 07:42 in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

Undermining of the Kerch Bridge Support Link to heading

“Everything that must explode will be blown up,” said Medvedev. “Agreed,” replied Malek. In fact, this was an indirect dialogue between two government figures from Russia and Ukraine. And, generally speaking, it somewhat defined the events of yesterday in response to Medvedev’s words. This was probably the only response from the Russian leadership to Operation Pautina, because Putin did not say anything about it. Peskov said something rather incoherent. But Medvedev stated that everything that must explode will definitely be blown up. The response from the SBU was very, very convincing. So, yesterday, the Security Service of Ukraine announced the undermining of the underwater part of one of the Kerch Bridge supports. It was said that this happened in the morning. The underwater supports were heavily damaged at the seabed level. This was the result of detonating 1,100 kilograms of explosives. The bridge is now practically in an emergency condition. Traffic on the bridge was restored, then stopped again. In short, the bridge is unwell.

Here is what the head of the SBU, Vasyl Malek, said about this. So, a quote: “God loves a trinity, and the SBU always finishes what it started and never repeats itself. We previously struck the Crimean Bridge twice, in 2022 and 2023, so today we continued this tradition already underwater. There is no place for any illegal Russian object on the territory of our state. Therefore, the Crimean Bridge is an absolutely legitimate target, especially considering that the enemy used it as a logistical artery to supply its troops. Crimea is Ukraine, and any manifestations of occupation will receive our tough response,” said Malek.

In fact, yesterday, Yevheniy Fedorov and I talked about what the undermining of the Crimean Bridge means. And you know, I think that ultimately what happened once again convincingly shows that, in general, Russia can be defeated. Yes, undoubtedly, the Crimean Bridge has not yet been destroyed, but traffic on it has been significantly hampered. And ultimately, it’s the same situation as with Pautina. That is, of course, Russia still has aircraft and can still carry out air raids on Ukrainian cities, which actually happened again tonight. But it’s clear that this is a movement. And today one part of Russia’s Aerospace Forces is destroyed, tomorrow another. They don’t recover. So the movement is going in the right direction. And it seems to me that besides its significance for the situation in the war, it primarily affects the general state of affairs. In general, the attitude towards Russia—seeing it as some kind of invincible force that must be negotiated with because otherwise it’s impossible—this is starting to change. It turns out that Russia can be defeated, its Aerospace Forces can be destroyed, the Crimean Bridge can be destroyed, and ultimately, through such actions, Russia could end up being defeated. In other words, Russia may not have the resources to continue the war. And most importantly, this can be done not only through sanctions, but also through military actions, including such actions by the Security Service of Ukraine.

Continuation of the terror against Ukrainian civilians Link to heading

Russia is acting according to its own plan. In fact, nothing seems to have changed, because the main actions remain the terror against the civilian population. Last night, on June 4th, there were Shahed drone strikes on Kharkiv, Shahed drones with missiles, and a series of explosions thundered in Odesa. And besides all that, there was an attempt to seize as much Ukrainian territory as possible. By the way, speaking of seizing new territories, that didn’t really work out. But the terror? The terror is still working. There were strikes on the center of Sumy. Three people died, civilians, of course—no military personnel. The military is not targeted; they hit civilians. Sixteen people were injured. Such are the “feats” of the Russian occupiers.

Frankly Nazi actions by Orban Link to heading

A few words about the capture of Trojan horses. Here, I would like to separately talk about what Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban really represents, because his statements are becoming increasingly Nazi, openly Nazi. I will allow myself to quote a few fragments of his recent speech. So, he is now openly declaring that he is determined to use all his power to prevent Ukraine from joining the European Union. Specifically. So what? I’ll just quote it because it really needs to be known. So, the quote: “Ukraine takes every euro, every agent, every zloty that we have spent so far on strengthening European families, European farmers, and European industry.” Well, you see, the EU spends huge sums to support Hungary, but that’s nothing. That is, Hungary doesn’t drain, you understand? doesn’t drain every euro from the EU, because Hungary is a European country. But apparently, Orban has this new geography. So, Hungary is a European country, so it should be in the EU and can siphon euros from the EU. But Ukraine? No. Ukraine is not a European country, so it should not. It should not drain. Well, it goes further. Orban said that in ten years, he would not be able to answer to his conscience, to his grandchildren, and to his country if he didn’t do everything now to protect Hungary and the European Union from Brussels’ dream of Ukraine joining. And the last and probably the most important thing is Orban on his conscience. Some kind of elusive, nonexistent entity suddenly appears in him. And finally, what seems to me to be the final point in Orban’s political portrait: he stated that 80—this is a quote—80% of scammers are Ukrainians. They are sophisticated, smart criminals, Ukraine is a dangerous country, and therefore Ukrainians should not be accepted into the EU. Because then it would be harder to counter Ukrainian scammers. Well, can you explain to me? If this isn’t Nazism, then what is Nazism? So now he is conducting an all-Hungarian survey. At the same time, the question of whether or not to accept Ukraine into the EU is accompanied by such a statement. Well, it’s normal. That is, it’s kind of classic manipulative sociology. In fact, this is a survey whose purpose is to prove that Ukraine should not be accepted. Well. In fact, as they say, there’s a black sheep in every family.

Announcement of a conversation about Poland Link to heading

So, here’s the agenda for today. I want to immediately announce what I think will be a very interesting conversation. This is with Polish expert Piotr Kaca, whom we will meet at 16:00—16:00. We will talk about what happened in Poland. And I still see a huge difference between the new president, who has now become the President of Poland, and this frankly pro-Russian Nazi Viktor Orban. So, today at 20:00—Piotr Kuleba.

Answers to questions Link to heading

Dear friends, since I was unable to answer your questions yesterday, today we will have a very long segment dedicated to answers. There are more than 50 questions and comments that I want to address today. So I hope we have everything prepared, including the codes to help you navigate more easily. Well, be patient, let’s talk. So, here are my answers to your questions.

Attitude towards Viktor Shenderovich Link to heading

First, questions from the chat. DRON Vito Corleone asks: What is your attitude towards Viktor Shenderovich? Do you know him personally as a person, a journalist, etc.?

Well, of course, I know Viktor Anatolyevich, and we’ve known each other for quite a while. We have a good relationship. I have repeatedly expressed some critical thoughts about certain statements made by Viktor Shenderovich, but still, yes. And Shenderovich has sometimes responded very sharply to me. So those were—well, it was all about the content. So I have to say that, despite this sometimes sharp exchange of opinions, we have a good relationship. I believe that Viktor Shenderovich was one of the first to speak out harshly and publicly against Putin’s regime, and he did it very effectively. The famous Puppets, the famous Kroshka Tucker—that was probably the first such slap in the face, the first real slap that the Russian media delivered to Putin back when the media were still relatively independent. And it’s no coincidence that the first thing Putin did was to start destroying NTV. In fact, on the seventh—on May 7th, 2000, Putin’s inauguration took place. And already right after the holidays, the special services immediately began their attack on NTV. So this was Putin’s first political action. Many believe that it was precisely Viktor Shenderovich’s work that played a decisive role in prompting Putin to start destroying NTV. So, as for the disagreements—yes, I think Shenderovich is undoubtedly a talented writer, a talented journalist, and a master of words. So, yes, we have some disagreements.

Questions about Operation Pautina Link to heading

And? Questions about Pautina.

Do you believe that there was corruption during the operation?

Well, of course. Of course. I can hardly imagine how it could happen without—well, without, so to speak, some minor—well, apparently minor—instances of it. Still, the budget of the Security Service of Ukraine is limited, I think. So large bribes were unlikely to be given to the truck drivers. They were likely used without their knowledge, obviously. Obviously, they were given some money to be in the right place at the right time. Well, you could consider that. In this case, the SBU was using Russian corruption—the readiness of many Russians to do certain things for money. Of course, yes.

The second question from Donetsk residents:

Why, in your opinion, was the operation purely Ukrainian, or was there help from allies?

You know, that’s a question—well, let’s put some dots on the i’s. For me, it’s absolutely obvious—close to 100% probability—that the Ukrainian military and political leadership did not inform Western allies about this special operation. Probably 100%, because the risk of a leak was extremely high. So it’s clear that nobody told anyone anything. But was the help of allies used? It could have been. Here’s how. I don’t know for sure, and the experts I spoke to also can’t give a precise answer about how exactly the logistics were ensured. Well, meaning—well, in short, how these drones were controlled, if it was with built-in artificial intelligence, that’s one thing. But if it was still controlled by satellite, then it’s clear which satellites—American satellites. So it’s quite possible that this communication channel between the Ukrainian intelligence services and the United States was used to carry out the targeting. This could very well have been done in a working order, without notification of the objectives. So, in other words, the Ukrainian special services, the SBU, could quite possibly have used American intelligence resources, American satellites, to carry out this operation—maybe even without notifying them of the specific goals. Well, that’s the hypothesis.

About the creators of the tank games Link to heading

A question from Good Good MUS! Comment on the announcement of the company List as an extremist organization. For the first time, I support this decision of the Russian fascist authorities, because these are bad people openly supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Dear colleague, I believe that you are speaking untruths. This company List did nothing of the sort. Let’s clarify. This is important. You see, such misinformation simply damages the moral reputation of people, and I don’t think that’s right. Let’s dot the i’s. Tagansky—what happened? The Tagansky District Court of Moscow—this has just happened—recognized the founder of the company Wargaming. That’s Viktor Kisly, and the owner of the game. But we’re talking about tanks—the tank game. So, I don’t quite understand what—well, it’s more or less clear what we’re talking about: these tank battles and so on. So, this kind of gaming. They were recognized as participants in an extremist organization according to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The claims against Wargaming included transferring funds through a Hong Kong offshore account to support the Ukrainian army. And there were a number of publications with headlines like “The Most Military Game: Tanks Against Russia’s Special Operation.” And so, Wargaming launched a charitable project with Ukrainian content in games to raise funds for ambulances and so on. So, you were mistaken, dear comrade. Because from the very beginning, in April 2022, Wargaming—the company led by Viktor Kisly—officially announced the closure of its business in Russia and Belarus. And in October 2023, this company launched a charity campaign in which the proceeds from the sale of in-game packs were directed to humanitarian aid to Ukraine. So, it’s exactly the opposite. And in this case, the Russian prosecutor’s office and security services targeted this company. So this announcement of the company as extremist actually testifies to the fact that it was a company, and the people leading it, who supported Ukraine. So, you were completely mistaken here.

Does the European Parliament understand that there is no Russian opposition and no real representatives? Link to heading

So, a large number of questions from the chat from Nadya. Do you think the European Parliament understands that these are, in fact, impostors? I’m talking about Navalny, Yashin, and so on. After all, no one chose them as leaders, not to mention the absence of any real opposition, or on what grounds they are even speaking there.

But the question is about the speeches by Yulia Navalnaya, Ilya Yashin, and Vladimir Kara-Murza in the European Parliament. You know, well, in principle, of course, I have nothing against these people speaking in the European Parliament. It’s just that they really represent mainly themselves. And to call them opposition leaders is to make two mistakes at once. First, to recognize some kind of opposition. And second, it’s not very clear why they are leaders. This shows that European politicians really don’t understand very well who is who in Russia or what is going on in Russia. Well, there’s just this—well, let’s say, especially with the Americans, of course, Europeans are a little bit more perceptive. But the Americans have this kind of simplified position. They usually don’t want to multiply entities. They pick someone as an interlocutor. That is, they pick someone as the opposition, as the right person, and that person should be the one. That’s usually how it happens. I remember well how for a very long time they refused to see beyond Gorbachev when there was the confrontation between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. They made a bet on Gorbachev. Yeltsin for a long time was perceived as a rebel, an unclear figure, and so on. Gorbachev was Gorbachev. He had to be supported, had to be worked with. Then, when Gorbachev was gone—well, in a political sense—the bet was made on certain so-called reformist circles. In particular, they worked with Chubais with great enthusiasm. For a very long time, they worked with Chubais, for a very long time they supported him, even though Chubais had long since stopped being a reformer. Chubais had long since declared that the Russian army was being reborn in Chechnya, the liberal empire, and so on. But still—Chubais. So for a very long time, they just couldn’t give up on backing one person, and so on. In fact, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many analytical centers either disappeared or had their funding cut back, because in the eyes of the West, Russia no longer represented any serious threat. And this had a very strong effect on their understanding of what is really happening in Russia.

On Muratov’s proposal to exchange political prisoners Link to heading

A question from Tatyana Dmitrievna: I’m writing from Mordor. First of all, congratulations to all of us—an excellent performance in Operation Pautina. And here’s the question: Recently, one of the “good Russians,” Dmitry Muratov, after the last prisoner exchange, appealed to the Ukrainian authorities to exchange the lovers of the Russian world, collaborators imprisoned in Ukraine, for Russian political prisoners. He made a similar request to the Russian authorities. That is, a citizen of an aggressor country appeals to blood-soaked Ukraine to help in freeing Russians. He spent half an hour talking about the torture that they allegedly suffer in prison. While in Russia there are huge numbers of Ukrainian civilian prisoners kidnapped from occupied territories, there are huge numbers of stolen Ukrainian children now being raised in Russian children’s concentration camps. And he calls on Ukraine to take care of Russian political figures and addresses not Europe, which would be more logical, but the state that has been enduring monstrous suffering for the fourth year from our fascist country. Half an hour describing how a girl was tortured in pre-trial detention for allegedly trying to blow something up, playing on this fact. But if our political figures are only tormented by the conditions of detention, which is certainly criminal, but they are not tortured physically, not starved, not having their eyes gouged out like Irina Roshchina. And not all Russian political prisoners are treated badly. Just look at Yashin’s pretty well-fed face when he was flown to Berlin. Or that woman—I don’t remember her name, seems to be Chernysheva—whose complaints about conditions consisted only of porridge being wrong. He finished, apparently, with Muratov’s pompous words: ‘while they’re still alive.’ Naturally, Shenderovich and Bykov and others immediately responded with admiration, calling this an unprecedented act of courage. But to me, this is unprecedented insolence and extreme cynicism. Another disgrace and shame. Since you are my moral tuning fork, I would like to hear your opinion on this.

Dear Tatyana Dmitrievna! Well, I risk—so to speak, I risk losing my status as a moral tuning fork—but I don’t fully share the harshness with which you pounced on Dmitry Muratov. I can immediately say that I have had quite a complicated relationship with Dmitry Muratov. It has always been generally collegial. But there were also episodes that were not very pleasant. In particular, Dmitry Muratov, for some reason, when I had to leave because of a criminal case from Russia in 2008, for some reason published an absolutely false, slanderous text by one of the employees of the Russian Union of Journalists on his newspaper’s website. He then called me after posting it and said, “Igor, I couldn’t refuse; it was Pavel Gutiontov who wrote it.” And this was after I had fled from imminent imprisonment and death in jail. And on the pages of Novaya Gazeta, there was this absolutely false, vile, slanderous text by Gutiontov. Muratov called me and said, “Igor, if you want, we’ll publish your response.” Well, it was one of those rare times when I answered with profanity. I said I was not ready to respond to slander with slander. Please handle it yourself. So, yes, it was a very difficult situation. But nevertheless, let’s put the dots on the i’s. Dmitry Muratov is someone who for many years held together the most prominent anti-Putin newspaper—Novaya Gazeta. And this is proven, you know, by the editorial cemetery that Novaya Gazeta has, which testifies that Novaya Gazeta was probably the fiercest enemy of Putinism after the destruction of NTV. Eight journalists of Novaya Gazeta were killed for their work—for their journalistic activities. I won’t list them all—it’s Anna Politkovskaya, Yury Shchekochikhin, and so on. So, indeed, Muratov miraculously kept this newspaper afloat. There were even assassination attempts, terrorist attacks against Novaya Gazeta. So all that was real.

As for the text of this particular appeal—let me address some of your points, dear Tatyana Dmitrievna, because I have a different view. Why address Ukraine and not Europe? Forgive me, can you explain what sense it would make to address Europe regarding prisoner exchanges? Does Europe hold Ukrainian or Russian prisoners? No, of course not. So that’s a strange reproach in itself. And your outright hostility towards people who were in Russian prisons—for example, Lilia Chernysheva—I don’t really understand why you would call her “some woman.” She is actually a worthy person who suffered for opposition activities. What’s the issue with her? Why such disdain? And in general, being in prison is no picnic. I don’t know what the issue with the porridge was, but to me, your tone here seems at least unfair. These people were imprisoned. Yes, they were exchanged, and they’re now free, but speaking so dismissively about them is not right.

As for Yashin, Kara-Murza, and Navalny, I have spoken about their post-prison positions. Yes, I have criticisms of their stance after their release. But calling them leaders of the Russian opposition is strange because it’s not true. Still, being dismissive of their real imprisonment is not justified. There were no guarantees that they would be released. None.

So on this point, I don’t share your harsh tone. Regarding Viktor Shenderovich, I can roughly imagine his language, but I doubt that he called Muratov’s appeal an act of “unprecedented courage.” Maybe I’m wrong, but I doubt it. Overall, I don’t see anything terrible in Muratov’s appeal. I don’t see cynicism or “unprecedented insolence” there either.

To be honest, I’m not particularly enthusiastic about this appeal either because I don’t think it will produce any results. But Muratov apparently believes that his Nobel Peace Prize status gives weight to his appeal. I don’t think so. I don’t think it will be understood in Ukraine. And I don’t think it will matter to the Russian leadership either.

So my criticism is from a different angle. I would criticize the effectiveness and feasibility of Muratov’s appeal. In that regard, I’m ready to join the criticism. But not with the anger you expressed, dear Tatyana Dmitrievna.

About simultaneous voting on Telegram Link to heading

A question from Lara. A question and suggestion: Could you possibly not sum up the voting results on the same day, but the next day during the next 7-40 episode? Then I could duplicate the question here in Telegram. You would have an interesting opportunity to compare both votes. Chat participants, especially those without YouTube, could feel more involved in the process, voting for one point or another, while maintaining some intrigue and uncertainty.

Dear Lara, first of all, I want to sincerely thank you for constantly posting the audio versions. Here, I just see how our team is expanding and expanding, thanks to these wonderful contributions that help in Telegram—it’s absolutely amazing. There are amazing people like Viktoria and Uncle Yura who help a lot. And you, too. But I just want to say—I’d like to suggest that we get in touch and think about how to do this. It can definitely be done simultaneously. I think it would be the right thing to do if we conduct polls simultaneously there and here, and then compare them. But this just requires some sort of technology solution, not something fundamentally different.

Do bad people sleep well? Link to heading

So, a question from YouTube. Here are a few questions about worldview. Irina Rudnitskaya asks: Regarding the happiness of fascist scum. It seems to me that a person, after all, has some built-in mechanism that tells them they did something wrong, that they acted badly. So they can’t be happy. Do you agree with this?

Dear Irina! No, I don’t agree. You know, overloading the concept of happiness with some additional restrictions is a mistake, you see? Happiness is a feeling—a feeling of joy, a feeling of life satisfaction, an emotion. And the presence of these joyful emotions and so on is not at all linked to political views. Can a fascist be happy? Of course they can. Whether they deserve it is another question. But that’s an overload. That’s an overload of the concept. So, as for this built-in mechanism, you know, there are lots of built-in mechanisms, including blocking ones. There are all sorts of blocking mechanisms that prevent a person from admitting that they are acting badly. That’s—well, so, again, I may be tiresome in mentioning the British historian Colin Good, who has this idea of the corruption of consciousness, when a person changes the picture of the world. Because in this picture of the world, if you look at it objectively, they are a scoundrel, they are a criminal, a scoundrel, a killer, and so on. But since no one wants to destroy that self-concept—if a person, looking in the mirror, sees a scoundrel in that mirror, they change the mirror, they change the picture of the world. And in that changed mirror, they see a perfectly nice person who absolutely deserves to be happy. That’s all. It’s just that if a person objectively sees the world and knows they are a scoundrel, then the concept collapses. It’s very hard to live with that awareness. So people adapt, people change, change the picture of the world. And in that picture of the world, they’re perfectly fine and can be happy. So it’s very simple. A fascist can be happy, no matter how much we may dislike it.

Can crime be eradicated through education? Link to heading

A question from a subscriber named Flame of Victory: Jacque Fresco believed that if all people were raised humanely from birth, there would be no criminals. That criminals are a product of their environment. As an example, he cited a tribe where the level of respect depended on the number of scalps taken. Do you think crime can be completely eradicated this way?

Of course not. Moreover, Jacque Fresco himself—by the way, the stress on his name is probably wrong; it’s Fresco—often actually refuted this thesis in his own reflections. In fact, I haven’t come across this particular statement from him that if everyone were raised humanely from birth, there would be no criminals. He often had this famous discussion about a tribe living on an island, surviving by fishing. When the catch is plentiful, everyone is kind and shares fish freely. But when there’s a shortage, wars, fights, and even stabbings break out. This actually proves that the environment determines behavior—it doesn’t educate. If there’s no fish, people start killing. That’s it. So I think—well, I may not know this precisely—but I think if he made such a statement, it’s incorrect. Crime cannot be eradicated through humane upbringing alone. Who will be doing the educating if the conditions themselves are harsh? If the social, economic, and political foundations of crime are there, no amount of humane upbringing will change that.

Separating the concept of “soul” from the concept of “God” Link to heading

Vladimir. A question: Do you have a soul? A question about God.

Well, dear Vladimir, when I say “in our souls,” yes, I think I have a soul, but only it’s not the soul that corresponds to religious concepts. It’s not some kind of substance that lives on after death and continues its own activities. The soul is the inner world, the sum of inner experiences, the sum of the inner world. That’s what it is, yes? Every person has a soul—it’s the sum of feelings, thoughts, emotions, and so on. It’s a subjective perception of reality. It exists in everyone, the soul is there. But for me, it’s not connected to religion, to God, and so on.

Can we assess Jesus as a philosopher? Link to heading

Anton Kravchuk. Well, all right, Sergey, what do you think, can Jesus be considered a philosopher?

I think not. First of all, I believe that Jesus Christ did exist, and he was not a philosopher, but rather a religious preacher—one of many, perhaps one of the most prominent Jewish religious preachers.

Infinity of space and the higher mind Link to heading

Nail Vakhitov: I understand your criticism of the higher mind. Then a question about the infinity of space and time. Do you not like the term higher mind? Maybe higher power? And to my question about the error of colonizing planets, the existing beings who call themselves humans have brought and continue to bring so much harm.

Well, regarding the error, that’s again—if you believe that someone placed people here. I don’t think that’s the case. So, as for the infinity of space and time, I don’t really understand how that’s connected to the higher mind. It’s not that I don’t like the term higher mind—call it whatever you want. I just believe that there’s no evidence for the existence of this substance—there’s simply no evidence. So feel free to call it whatever you like.

As for the error of populating the planet with beings who call themselves humans, well, I don’t know—if you believe that your existence is a mistake, I don’t think so. I like it. I like that we exist, I like that people exist, I like that you exist, dear Nail Vakhitov! We can communicate with each other and, for example, disagree with one another. And that’s a good thing.

Request for a poll about belief in God Link to heading

A question from a subscriber who calls themselves OU: Please conduct a poll. It would be interesting to know: do you believe in God?

Well, no, I doubt it. Oh, excuse me, for God’s sake. It’s from the author—it’s Olga from Sumy. She writes: I myself became an agnostic after a long time spent in the church environment. My father was a fanatic, so I turned away from it.

Dear Olga! Well, I don’t know, of course—it’s not hard to do a poll. By the way, you know, I’ll probably wait for the reaction to your question, and perhaps, yes, let’s do it. Why not? We’re talking about a poll to roughly figure out the proportion of believers and non-believers. We still have to carefully word the question, because it’s probably not so straightforward to ask, “Do you believe in God?” Then we’d get all sorts of comments like, “What is God? I don’t believe in a religious God, but I believe in a higher mind,” and so on. Well, let’s think about it. Maybe it’s worth it—I agree, since there’s so much ongoing debate about it. It’s genuinely interesting.

People often criticize me for paying too much attention to minor topics. Well, you know, I could just answer questions only about the main events—like what’s going on in Ukraine. But here, our audience has become quite like-minded. So, the question? Perhaps, yes, perhaps. Dear Olga, you’ve convinced me. I think we should conduct this poll—again, including the questions of ancient knowledge and the higher mind.

About lost skills Link to heading

Rain noise. I want to clarify what I meant when I talked about humanity degrading to zero. For example, an ordinary sarcophagus made from a solid piece of stone with perfectly straight interior corners. Today, this is impossible to reproduce because our method of cutting stone uses disk saws, which can’t create a straight inner corner. Same with polygonal masonry—it doesn’t fit with our logic of construction. We only make identical bricks. And hauling a five-ton block to a height that even an empty person would hesitate to climb is not an easy task. Take Baalbek, for instance—its three-ton blocks, as I understand it, are somehow set on smaller stones. Not to mention the Sumerian epic, whose history begins on another planet.

Dear rain noise, what I want to tell you is that indeed, humanity, people have lost some skills and abilities that ancient people had. You know, let’s put it this way. Let’s take the Neanderthals of the Mousterian era, which is the middle Paleolithic in Europe. Their main source of food was mammoths and rhinoceroses. Can you imagine a mammoth or a woolly rhinoceros? That’s a huge animal. And they hunted them with stones and spears. Could a modern European—these Neanderthals lived in Europe, after all—could a modern European hunt a woolly rhinoceros or a mammoth with spears made in those conditions, with a bone or stone tip, for example? Those were the tools Neanderthals used. Well, I don’t know. It seems to me that’s also a kind of skill that’s been lost. Does this mean we’ve degraded compared to Neanderthals in terms of the Mousterian culture? I think, yes, it would probably be hard for us to do that today. The average modern European would struggle to make fire with friction. It’s known that some people try, but it’s difficult. Yet this was an everyday thing. They could make fire just like that. Surviving in the conditions of the middle or even late Paleolithic would be tough for us. We’ve lost some qualities—yes, without a doubt.

The same goes for the pyramids. Of course, something has been lost. But still, to say that we have degraded to zero, that the people of the Paleolithic or even our ancestors were more advanced? Well, they ate each other from time to time, let’s not forget. So to think that we have degraded compared to Neanderthals or even the Germanic tribes—it’s a mistake.

Andrey Sklyarov and ufologists Link to heading

Margarita: You touched a little on Egypt; in my opinion, it’s a very interesting topic. Have you ever encountered the theory of Andrey Sklyarov, unfortunately, no longer with us? He studied the history of the construction of the Egyptian pyramids and also the history of the stone statues on Easter Island. According to his theory, the pyramids could not have been built by human hands alone because the stones for the pyramids were cut so precisely that not even a knife could fit in the gap. Really incredible. I remember a Soviet history textbook and a picture of slaves dragging huge stones for the pyramids. What do you think about this, and have you heard of this scientist? A very, very original hypothesis he proposed.

Dear Margarita, I want to immediately read the next question from Natalia Porta, who asks more or less the same thing. And I’ll answer them both together. So, Natalia Porta is basically asking the same thing about Andrey Sklyarov.

Am I familiar with his theory about the origin of humans, about the evidence of a highly developed ancient civilization? She writes: I really liked it—very logical, without unnecessary speculation. Technically well-founded—the theory that aliens visited Earth. Sklyarov said that he personally encountered flying objects twice. It couldn’t have been human or natural phenomena.

Dear colleagues! Of course, I’m familiar with the work of Andrey Yurievich Sklyarov and the work of many other ufologists. What you’re talking about—this is ufology, obviously pseudoscience. Dear friends, I myself, as a young man, read I. Kazantsev and many others, and Shklovsky also had similar texts—especially Kazantsev, about ufology, about all these flying saucers, and about the idea that the objects of ancient civilizations could not have been built by people—that it had to be aliens. There is a special commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences that deals with exposing pseudosciences and ufology in particular. This is pseudoscience. The idea of alien civilizations visiting Earth is considered a typical pseudoscience, just like astrology, alchemy, and various types of folk history. In fact, ufologists often overlap with pseudohistory. And I want to stress that among the most prominent examples of this—aside from Sklyarov—Kazanstev was especially typical. Sklyarov is somewhat less well-known. But Kazantsev, for example, is a classic ufologist.

There is no documentary evidence—none at all—of aliens visiting Earth, either in the past or today. There’s a huge amount of verification and proof. All attempts by ufologists to prove the existence of alien civilizations that visited us in the past or today turn out to be erroneous, false, and so on. Take the Tunguska meteorite, for example—how many stories were told about it being a spaceship? None of it is confirmed. So yes, it’s romantic, it stirs the imagination—I remember it was very interesting to read about it, too.

Is there any sense in hosting Alexander Stefanov on the show? Link to heading

So, regarding certain individuals, Is there a chance to see Alexander Stefanov on your channel? His views differ greatly, even radically, from yours. But I remember you said a year ago that he creates the impression of someone you can talk to. And besides, his main audience is young Russians who see themselves as intellectuals. Throughout history, such people have been the driving force of revolutions. Perhaps it makes sense to try to convey your position to them.

You know, well, again, Alexander Stefanov calls himself a socialist, a democrat, a social democrat. He is undoubtedly against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he’s against Putin. But at the same time, he still considers Crimea to be Russian. He is against unconditionally returning Crimea to Ukraine, against paying reparations to Ukraine. So, you see, it’s a classic case where a person in this war still takes the pro-Russian side. He positions himself as a Russian patriot, he is against Russia suffering defeat, although he’s also against Putin. So, it’s a classic situation: in the confrontation and the war between Russia and Ukraine, he takes Russia’s side—against Putin, but for Russia.

Now, should we invite him? For what purpose? I return to the goals and criteria for inviting a guest. Inviting him as an expert—definitely not. Inviting him as someone to synchronize views with—no, obviously not. These are diametrically opposed views on a whole range of issues. Just to stage a debate or discussion? Who knows, I don’t know. I’m not ready to say yes right now. It’s not because I’m afraid of debates—I’m always up for them. It’s just a question of whether it’s really necessary. I don’t know. Let’s think about it. I remember he debated someone once, and I didn’t get the feeling that any new knowledge emerged from those discussions. It seemed like—well, I don’t know. In general, let’s think about it, maybe listen again to what he’s saying these days. But probably no, rather than yes.

Yuri Nagibin Link to heading

A question from Olga: What can you tell us about Yuri Nagibin?

What an interesting character. You know, he was undoubtedly an incredibly talented writer, but also a journalist and screenwriter—a very prolific author of a huge number of articles. But you know, it’s a classic case where he held quite a comfortable, cozy place in the Soviet system. He wrote a lot—there’s this whole journalist’s track of his work that was part of his fit into the Soviet system.

At the same time, his diary is a stunning, incredible work. And his political position was always impeccable. There was this tension between his role as a journalist, where he did well within the system, and his own personal political stance. His letter defending the dissidents Sinyavsky and Daniel—that was, if I’m not mistaken, in 1966—was a real act. I could be off on the year, but it was certainly an important event. His letter “42” was already in 1993. His political position was always the right one—he always stood on the right side of history.

Yet in the Soviet years, he still found ways to fit into the system. But even so, just look at that letter defending Sinyavsky and Daniel—it was an act of real courage at the time. So he was an incredibly talented person. Overall, what can I say? Nagibin is an important part of Soviet and Russian literature, journalism, and so on.

Pavel Florensky Link to heading

A question from the sponsor of our channel, for which we’re very grateful. His name is Oleg Pavlenko. What is your view of Father Pavel Florensky as a philosopher? His grandson, also named Pavel, whom I’ve known for 100 years, took to popularizing his grandfather’s legacy after the Perestroika and has often recommended reading the works of Pavel Alexandrovich—understand or not understand, something still isn’t understood. I decided to start from the beginning, and the first thing I came across was his articles.

Dear Oleg! Well, frankly, for me, there were always problems when I taught philosophy courses at universities. I always had problems with this whole Russian religious philosophy, and especially, I was always deeply repelled by Florensky, because indeed, he was a fierce, rabid, zoological antisemite. Regarding the Beilis case—he published anonymous articles, he was truly convinced that Jews use the blood of Christian infants. He really believed that. To say that a rational, intelligent, and good person could write and say such things—well, that’s just impossible.

Moreover, his views evolved from a sort of Christian anti-modernism—something fairly widespread—to a completely racial, Nazi antisemitism. His views differed little from Hitler’s. He believed that even the slightest drop of Jewish blood in a person was enough to bring out typically Jewish physical and spiritual traits in generations to come. So, in fact, Florensky was a harbinger of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935—a harbinger of the Holocaust.

So I think this is one of the darkest, darkest pages of Russian philosophy. Moreover, he didn’t care at all about the actual guilt or innocence of Beilis; for him, the conviction that Jews used the blood of Christian infants was a fundamental tenet of his worldview. As for his political views, he believed that the best form of government was a dictatorship. What else can I say?

Therefore, any reverence—yes, Florensky was executed by the Soviet authorities, but not everyone who was executed by the Soviet authorities was a worthy person. For example, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was also executed, as were Yezhov and Yagoda. Florensky was executed. And that’s about the level at which I see Father Pavel Florensky.

Dmitry Demushkin Link to heading

So, a question from Vera. Recently on another channel, after a video with Dmitry Demushkin, you said that he’s for the war and for Russia’s victory. This is the first time I’ve heard this. Can you explain your position logically? Of course, Demushkin in Russia can’t shout “Glory to Ukraine!” But I haven’t heard him say “Glory to Russia” either.

Well, honestly, I don’t know what exactly you’re referring to in my performance. Because to claim that Demushkin is for the war and for Russia’s victory—honestly, I doubt I could have said that. The question is in what context? Demushkin has always been known for rapidly changing his views—from outright Nazism (he did indeed espouse explicitly Nazi and racist views) to a softer kind of nationalism. That was around the mid-2010s, like 2015 or so.

More recently—if we look at his current position (though I don’t follow Demushkin’s statements very closely, as I’m not very interested in him)—more recently, his position has been unequivocally against Russia’s invasion in 2022. That’s a fact. So to say that he’s for the war—I definitely couldn’t have said that. That’s very unlikely. I know that he was against the invasion in 2022.

So I think you probably misinterpreted my words—misquoted and misunderstood them. That he’s still a Russian nationalist and Russian patriot is a fact. Possibly what you heard was not that he’s for the war or for victory, but rather that he cannot be for Russia’s defeat. That’s probably it—possibly. But again, that would need to be clarified. So I think you probably misinterpreted and misquoted what I said.

Why Illyarionov Cannot Be Forgiven for His Past Mistakes Link to heading

Olga, So why then? Igor, why then do you not apply the principle “people change” to Illyarionov? I’m not asking this in defense of Illyarionov, but simply from a purely logical standpoint. Osichkin changed his position on Crimea and the Maidan, and Illyarionov changed his position on Trump. Don’t you allow for the possibility that Illyarionov changed for the better?

Dear Olga, you see, these are very different people, and this principle “people change,” this assertion that people change, it’s not universal, not universal. And comparing Andrei Nikolaevich Illyarionov to Vadim Valeryevich Osichkin is absolutely not—it’s such a different comparison. Let me explain the difference as it applies to the idea that people change. The thing is, Osichkin is, above all, a political activist. It’s unlikely he can be viewed as an expert on political, economic, ideological, or international issues. That’s something completely different. Osichkin— for him, views are not the most important thing. For him, the main thing is his activities with the UN. He really did a lot to expose, so to speak, this entrenched system of the Russian GULAG. He’s a man of action.

But Illyarionov is an expert. He’s a man of words, a man of thought. And so, you see, to imagine that—Osichkin, yes, yesterday he supported the invasion of Crimea, today he doesn’t support it. He’s a man of action, a political activist. His views aren’t the main thing. But for Illyarionov—it’s different. He thinks, he’s a theoretician, a thinker. And so to imagine that Illyarionov, who for many years supported Trump and, yes, now no longer supports him—does that mean he’s changed? No. In reality, people like that may change their attitudes towards a politician, but they don’t change in their essence, you see?

Osichkin—he, let’s say, he’s—he’s somewhat—you know, he’s rather ingenuous. That is, if you take him as a person, he’s rather ingenuous. To call Andrei Nikolaevich Illyarionov ingenuous—my tongue just doesn’t turn for that. So Osichkin may very well be sincerely mistaken. Andrei Nikolaevich Illyarionov cannot be sincerely mistaken. He’s smart, sufficiently deliberate, and quite cunning. And when he lies, he knows that he’s lying. That’s the problem. So, when it comes to the changeability of people—it’s not a universal principle.

Why Latynina Has Gone Off Track Link to heading

A question from Stana — that’s what the person calls themselves. What happened to Latynina when the war began? She used to have intelligent thoughts and sound analysis, though even then her theory of electoral democracy raised questions. But now it’s hard to pinpoint exactly when she started going off track, and regarding Ukraine in particular. In her view, everyone else is to blame, and the right of the strong becomes a justification, with Arestovich almost in the role of co-host. It’s very strange that such an undeniably intelligent person doesn’t express the slightest doubt in such controversial judgments.

You know, I think the foundations of Latynina’s current stance were always there. Her worldview in her publications always included the right of the strong. She was always ready—she always admired strength. In particular, her defense, her categorical denial that the FSB blew up the apartment buildings in the fall of 1999—she had these admiring articles about Kadyrov, and later they changed, but still, that admiration was there. In other words, she really loves strength, she really loves the strong, and she’s always had an imperial mindset. She’s always had a certain contempt and scorn for human rights activists, viewing them as losers, as some sort of nobodies, and so on. That’s always been there, and that’s the basis of her current stance. Yes, Latynina—without a doubt. Now there’s a certain intensification of it. There’s an intensification going on right now. But the foundations were always there.

Are We Promoting Imperialists by Talking About Them Link to heading

Alexander — Alexander is a sponsor of our channel, for which we’re very grateful. Igor, why do you waste time on Latynina, if it’s all been written about her already? Here’s another one who won’t come back from the campaign any earlier. So many have fallen into that abyss. That’s it. There’s no such letter in that word. With the shepherd, it’s a little different. He’s torn between his Russian identity and the tragedy of his native city — mine too. That’s something that can be cured. He’d do well to spend a few weeks in Kyiv, he might come to his senses.

Dear Alexander! I agree that these are very different people, undoubtedly. But I spend time on Latynina and on Pastukhov because I think it’s important—important to form an institution of reputation. That’s important. That’s why I spend time, say, on Solovyov and Kiselyov, and with Suska. Because, well, it’s important—important to talk about what’s happening in that camp. Latynina is now in that camp too. She’s also a sort of special case. Latynina—Arestovich is there, I don’t know. Shariy, another one, so to speak, a character who hasn’t been fully investigated. And it’s important to talk about what they claim, that they have a large audience. Listen, Latynina still has a huge audience. If for us—if for you, dear Alexander, there’s no such letter in that word, for a much larger audience— I don’t remember exactly off the top of my head, but she has a huge audience. A million? I think not, not on YouTube, but she has a much larger audience than we do. That’s why I still think it’s relevant to explain who Latynina is. And it’s the same with the shepherd. I think it’s important. Although, of course, there’s a huge difference between them.

Empathy and Maniacs Link to heading

Is that so? Two questions from Yulia in this program. This program touched on the topic of dividing empathy between Ukraine and Palestine. But if you take the division of empathy deeper. The Bitsevsky maniac Pichushkin loved his dog very much, even visited its grave. The maniac from the Russian Orthodox Church, who killed five children in his apartment in one evening, adored his dog and fed it expensive dry food. So, if empathy is on such extreme poles, can it even be considered empathy? As a rule, with such paradoxes, the solution to the problem lies not inside but outside. Most likely, empathy is not a property of the brain, but something else, like an extreme form of cruelty. That’s the first question.

I’ll answer that right away. You know, contradiction is generally inherent to human nature. Sadistic bandits, for example, can simultaneously be very loving fathers and husbands. Or so on. There are many such examples. So, here, well, contradiction, yes, it exists. The question, you know, is a question of the radius of empathy. That is, empathy may only extend to those close to us. For some, empathy works within a very narrow range—only to those close to them. A dog is close, so empathy extends to it. Family, daughter, wife, close ones—empathy extends to them. Beyond that, there’s just not enough. It just doesn’t reach. Everything else is, well, it’s a kind of primitive trait: everything inside the cave is ours, everything outside the cave is them, the enemy. Empathy is limited to the space of the cave. Everything inside is our own. Everything outside is the enemy. There’s no empathy for them; they’re not human. That’s roughly how it works. So, in this I don’t see anything new, nothing at all. And on that basis, to say that empathy is not rooted in the brain—no, there’s no geo-location for empathy. The brain—of that I’m convinced. So, as for the examples you mentioned, that a dog is loved but people are not—again, the dog is close, it’s inside the cave. Everything else is outside.

Is Russia Part of Europe Link to heading

So, the second question. You said that Russia is undoubtedly a peripheral part of European civilization. But my late aunt, writes Yulia, a history teacher, said that Russia is Asiopa — in the worst sense of the word. I believe my aunt was right, not you. In a queue, they’ll call you “woman,” which is typical for an Eastern bazaar. When registering for a pension, they’ll definitely remind you that it’s “for your old age,” that it’s for the “years of survival.” That’s unacceptable for Europe. The attitude in Russian workplaces of “I’m the boss, you’re the fool” is exactly like the relationship between a padishah and his slave, the attitude towards animals in Russia — well, I’ll stay silent on that. So where do you see Europe? Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky, Mandelstam? For such a huge territory, it’s just a law of nature. Russia’s mentality is 80% Asian. Don’t you agree?

No, dear Yulia, I don’t agree. Let me explain my position. Well, regarding “Asia,” that’s nothing more than a journalistic cliché. I use it too, but, you know, let’s be clear. We’re trying to speak in a language that’s at least close to scientific. Or are we just throwing out journalistic slogans? If we’re serious and without that kind of journalistic fervor, let’s dot the i’s. The idea that Europe is all good and Asia is all bad is, in my view, very mistaken. Tell me, please, who was Hitler? Was he Chinese or was he a European? Orban—who is he? A Mongol? Or Marx, whose ideas, once they entered Russia, became the foundation for creating that communist dictatorship. So Marx — is he a Mongol?

Let’s once again run through geography. What is Asia? Japan is Asia. Is Japan very bad? Taiwan is Asia. Singapore is Asia. South Korea is Asia. You see, this whole opposition of good Europe and bad Asia is a deeply flawed stereotype. Europe is diverse. Asia is also diverse. Now, let’s talk about what civilization Russia belongs to — what is a civilization anyway? What is its foundation? First of all, it’s religion. Second, language. Third, culture.

So, tell me, is Christianity a European or an Asian religion? The answer is obvious — it’s rhetorical. The foundation of Russia as a part of European civilization is, first and foremost, Eastern Christianity. Yes, in Russia it’s degenerated into a totalitarian sect, but nevertheless, at the heart of Russian civilization — Russia as part of European civilization — is Christianity. A European religion, not an Asian one. Next, the Russian language is undoubtedly part of one of the European language groups. Undoubtedly. Culturally, it’s also obvious. All of Russian culture is, to a large extent, borrowed from European culture. Science came to Russia from Europe. Literature came to Russia from Europe, and so on. So this is all part of European culture, yes? Peripheral, yes. Catching up. Well, now Russia is trying to turn away from Europe. Where is it turning to? Which Asia? Which Asia? China, maybe? But there’s nothing Chinese in it at all. Yes, in the future, if there’s a breakup, maybe some part of Russia will be part of China. That’s another story. But right now, undoubtedly, Russia is part of European civilization.

And the fact that the Germans fell out for fourteen years — did they become Asians during that time? When they had the Reich? Does that make them Asians? No, it’s Europe — it’s also a separate chapter in Europe’s history. The same with Russia — it’s a separate chapter in Europe’s history, yes? Peripheral. Orban — we just talked about him. Hungary — did it stop being Europe? Did he become Chinese all of a sudden? No. So that’s a mistaken viewpoint. Let’s not, you know, artificially separate everything good into one camp, everything bad into another. Everything is mixed together — in Europe, in Asia. So, yes, let’s not deny that kinship. You know, very often, there’s an attempt — especially among Ukrainian subscribers — to deny it, which is understandable given the justified hatred of Russia. But the idea that Ukrainians are Slavs, while Russians are Mongols or Ugro-Finns — no, Russians aren’t Ugro-Finns, nor are they Mongols. They’re Slavs. And, yes, the Mongol invasion left a deep mark on Russia — but it also swept over Kyiv in just the same way. So let’s not, you know? This is another mistake, another attempt. Let’s not invent some racial basis for the monstrous history that’s happening in Russia now and happened in the past too. There are plenty of political and socio-cultural reasons for that. And Russia, of course, undoubtedly, is part of European civilization. You know, as was said about Ivan the Streltsy: “I’m a child of nature — maybe a bad one, but a child nonetheless.” And it’s the same here. Baba Yaga — yes, Russia is the bad part of European civilization.

Did Operation “Pautina” Disrupt the Balance of World Powers Link to heading

Pan Stepan! The question about Operation “Pautina.” There are many consequences that extend beyond Ukraine. As a Norwegian citizen, I was particularly pleased to see the excellent work of the Ukrainians on the Polenya airfield. Yes, indeed, that was impressive. I’m interested in whether the actual threat from Russia to NATO countries has now decreased, even if the loss of strategic aviation was only about 10%. After all, this disrupts the parity that once existed between Russia’s nuclear forces and the West. And conversely, has the threat to Russia from China now increased?

Dear Pan Stepan! First of all, I don’t think the threat to Russia from China has increased. China can’t really be called a threat. China is calmly, slowly, methodically digesting Russia—digesting it. It’s like a form of external digestion, like spiders do. Calmly, without fuss. The likelihood that China’s armed forces will attack Russia—I think it’s zero. Why? And more importantly—why? Why would a spider attack a fly that it’s already calmly digesting? It already has an excellent appetite, excellent digestion—there’s no point. So, I don’t really understand under what circumstances China would attack Russia. There’s just no point, I simply don’t understand.

As for whether the threat to Europe has changed—you know, I’m not sure that any significant change has occurred. Arithmetically, yes, the threat has decreased. But in reality, in my view, the threat doesn’t come from the number of nuclear delivery vehicles—it comes from the state of mind of the Kremlin’s occupant. So the threat isn’t really about how many aircraft they have—whether a few hundred or fewer. That doesn’t determine the threat. The threat depends primarily on the state of mind. So, I think nothing has really changed there. I would say the opposite—Europeans’ and Americans’ attitudes towards Russia have changed. At least, they should change. Because when they see that Russia can be beaten, it’s a completely different scenario.

A Russia that’s losing its nuclear triad is a different Russia—it’s not the Russia that needs to be feared, that you constantly have to worry about pressing the red button. I think this is a different situation. The perception of Russia’s threat has changed, but the threat itself has probably not changed. But the perception, yes—I hope it has changed.

Who Will the FSB Take It Out On Link to heading

A question from Denis. What should we fear now? The FSB’s revenge will be brutal. They will definitely punish Russians. Who do you think they will take it out on?

Dear Denis! In reality, the answers from Putin are always, always the same—they’re always marked by their absurdity. We all remember perfectly well that the response to Beslan was the cancellation of gubernatorial elections. Remember the horror the Chechens must have felt—this was during the Chechen war—when they found out that in the Kursk region, governors would now be appointed instead of elected, right? The same with the Dubrovka theater siege—after the monstrous failure of the Russian special services, the director of NTV was fired. Right? So what will it be this time? I don’t know—maybe they’ll investigate the creators of the cartoon “Masha and the Bear” for some kind of… you know, the little girl in that show remotely controlled the bear—an attempt to undermine traditional values, yes?

Well, in general, I don’t know—I’m even afraid to joke, because these jokes could suddenly turn into reality. The reaction will undoubtedly be inappropriate—it’s always that way with Putin. There’s no other possibility.

Is It Possible Not to Comment on Ukraine’s Domestic Politics Link to heading

A question from Andreas. Igor Aleksandrovich, you emphasize your independence as an analyst, saying that you’re not beholden to the state or to sponsors, only to your audience.

Well, by the way, I do, of course, rely on financial support—financially dependent, but that financial dependence has never translated into changing my position. I don’t change my position based on what a particular subscriber says. I always say thank you—I’m sincerely grateful—but I don’t change my stance.

At the same time, writes Andris, it seems that you consciously avoid even moderate criticism of Ukraine, despite its obvious mistakes and internal problems, which even its allies acknowledge. You often speak of honesty as a principle. But doesn’t such one-sidedness become a form of self-censorship? Not out of fear, but out of an ideological choice or concern about losing audience loyalty? Isn’t real honesty the willingness to call things by their names, even if it’s uncomfortable for “your own”? If truth is multifaceted. But on air, you only choose the facets that are acceptable. Doesn’t that in itself become a form of “positioning”?

Well, dear Andris, I don’t want to play word games about “analyst” and “positioning.” I want to point out right away some factual errors in your argument. I have never been afraid of losing audience loyalty—never. Quite often, in my statements, in my texts, in my streams, I’ve gone against the grain of the majority of my audience’s mood and positions. So, everything I say and do is never done to please the audience. I do, of course, value the relationship with the audience—I work for you—but this idea that I’m pandering to the audience is not true for me.

So, I often see how people react—including some who at one time were sponsors of our channel but later became disappointed and began expressing openly hostile views about what I say and do. Well, that’s life. You can’t force anyone to like you. So, you’re mistaken here—there’s no feeling of fear or concern about losing the audience’s favor.

As for my position—I believe there are already enough critics of Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy. It’s a topic many people have made their own—many, you could say, make a living from it. That’s not my topic. I have consciously chosen this position. I’m not sure that a citizen of the aggressor country has a moral right to criticize the victim of aggression. That’s my position, and for now, it hasn’t changed. I don’t see any reason to change it at this point.

Dislike of Russia Link to heading

So, I’m trying to read the name the person calls themselves… Satire. Bykov. Well, let me first apologize—dear colleagues, please subscribe if you want me to call you correctly. So the question is about my supposed dislike for Russia. Igor, you’re a smart man—well, generally a good person. But I’m really curious: why have you disliked Russia all your life? I’m also against what Putin is doing to Ukraine. But Putin isn’t Russia. Yet Russia has much that’s good and bad, like any other country—like in Europe, in America. In Russia there are many smart, talented people; strong science, culture, and education—currently in crisis, but still. Not every country can boast of that. I have a feeling that if you had grown up in another country, even Ukraine, you probably wouldn’t have become such a prominent expert. I don’t see Ukrainian journalists who match your level and Feigin’s level either—he’s brilliant too, but he also seems to hate the country he grew up in. So why? Was it really so bad?

Dear colleague, first of all—let’s put the dots over the i’s. I don’t hate the country I grew up in. I have many warm memories of things in the Soviet Union, and far from everything—I’m not inclined to paint everything black. And I also can’t paint everything black about post-Soviet Russia. I don’t hate Russia. That’s a mistake.

I’m ready to argue with you on one point: that Putin is not Russia. You know, one can, of course, say that Hitler wasn’t the Third Reich or Germany—but for the whole world, Hitler was Germany. You see, Germany—that was Hitler. And for the people in Ukraine, and not only in Ukraine, for them, Putin is Russia. You see, in Russia the personnel, the regime—that is Russia. What difference does it make? What difference did it make for the six million Jews who were exterminated during the Holocaust, what difference that apart from Hitler, there were tens of millions of people in Germany—some smart, some talented, some sensitive, some gentle, and so on. For them, Germany was Hitler.

And for the residents of Odesa, who were bombed last night, Russia is Putin, you understand? And for them, there’s no difference that there are many very intelligent, deeply sensitive people in Russia. Right now, Russia speaks with Putin’s voice. That’s it—full stop. So when you say that I don’t love Russia, you’re mistaken. You know, I don’t really apply the feeling of love to a country—or even more so, to a state. I can’t say that I love or don’t love Russia. Love is a feeling I reserve for living beings—people, animals. A country can stir some warm feelings, but that’s not the same as love. Love is something else. But that’s a minor point.

The main point is different. The main thing is that I don’t agree with you that “Russia is not Putin.” Yes, for you and me, maybe. But for the people Russia is killing now, Russia is Putin. Unfortunately, that’s how it is.

As for who I would have been if I’d been born and raised in another country—well, that’s such a thought experiment, it requires completely different conditions and assumptions. It’s a very strong hypothesis, one that could be discussed separately, but probably not much point in doing so.

So, in this sense—for Ukrainians, Russia is Putin, and Russia is Putin, it’s Motorola, it’s Givi. It’s all those ghouls who are killing Ukrainians. That there are also many decent people in Russia—you see, Russia turned to the whole world with Putin’s backside. That’s it.

Does Russia Send Conscripts to War Link to heading

So. A question from Sokol. Kukushkin Sokol Pushkin. I watched a video about the death of conscript soldiers. A grieving father said that his son was the first and only conscript soldier to die in this war. That’s hard to believe. Apparently, the man isn’t thinking very logically. Based on your information today, what’s the situation with sending conscripts to the combat zone? Or are they still only forced to sign contracts under torture?

Dear colleague, here—well, there are numbers, say, from the BBC, which keeps a name-by-name list of deceased Russian soldiers, and they’ve recorded—if memory serves—150. The last thing I read was that they’re basing this on facts and some kind of evidence. The number is 159 dead conscripts—based on exact names, surnames, and patronymics of those who died. In reality, the figure is much higher. But 159 is what’s confirmed.

So of course, the father is mistaken. But that’s specifically about conscripts. And how many conscripts were conscripts yesterday but signed a contract today? That number grows exponentially. So, of course, this is an error—conscripts do fight, conscripts do die, conscripts do get captured. So conscripts are indeed one of the resources of cannon fodder.

On the Term “Vatnyye Liberals” Link to heading

So, Max disagrees with the definition of “vatnyye liberals.” As for “vatnyye liberals,” we need to work on the term — it’s something soft, shapeless, that’s about lumpens. But these gentlemen have firm convictions with sharp edges. They’re ideological imperialists. However much liberal makeup they put on, they’re imperialists. Are these exaggerations? Or not? “Liberal imperialists” doesn’t work either. “Imperial liberasts” — well, okay, but too long.

Dear Max, as a rule, I agree with your position. But the term “liberasts” is a fascist term. It’s a term that Putinists use to smear liberals. So I’d throw it out of our vocabulary.

So, one question, writes Max. Why talk about them at all? Do they say anything smart? No? Anything useful either? They’re just dancing familiar dances for their fan zone. That’s understandable. Everyone wants to eat; let them dance — just don’t baptize the children. I wouldn’t give them publicity without need.

Dear Max! First of all, people often accuse me of “promoting” Solovyov, Latynina, and others. That’s an absolutely false view, a mistaken view. Because, you see, our channel right now has 302,000 subscribers. They have audiences in the millions. How can I be “promoting” them? It’s not promotion. When I talk about Putin, I’m not promoting him, because, excuse me, what is there to promote? The whole world already knows.

The same goes for Solovyov, Latynina, Pastukhov, and so on, and with Venediktov. I can’t “promote” them, because their audience is immeasurably larger than mine. So what are we doing? We’re creating an institution of reputation. Because, still, who is who needs to be known. And what’s happening in the enemy camp needs to be known. So, to some extent, I perform the role of a scout — since many of our colleagues, many people in our audience, are squeamish, and I am not. For me, it’s work. So I think it’s useful work. I still think that “Mediafrenia,” “Trumpofrenia,” and the “traitors” section are all useful work.

On the term “cotton liberals” Link to heading

So, Max does not agree with the definition of “cotton liberals.” As for cotton liberals, we need to work on the term — it’s something soft, formless, about lumpens. But these gentlemen have firm convictions with sharp edges. They are ideological imperialists. No matter how much liberal makeup they put on, they’re imperialists. Excessive or not? “Liber-imperialists” — that doesn’t work either. “Imperial-liberasts” — that’s good, but it’s too long.

Dear Max, I usually agree with your position. But the term “liberasts” — that’s a fascist term. That’s a term that Putinists use to brand liberals. So I would drop it from our vocabulary.

So, one question, — writes Max. — Why talk about them? Are they saying anything smart? No? Anything useful, also no. They’re just dancing familiar dances for their fan zone. It’s clear. Everyone wants to eat — let them dance, just don’t baptize the kids. I wouldn’t promote them without need.

Dear Max! First of all, I’m often accused of promoting Solovyov, promoting Latynina, promoting someone else — that’s a completely false premise, an erroneous premise. Because, you see, our channel today has 302,000 subscribers, and they have million-strong audiences. And how can I promote them? It’s not promotion. When I say something about Putin, I’m not promoting him, because, excuse me, what’s there to promote? The whole world knows him already.

It’s the same with Solovyov, the same with Latynina, with Pastukhov, and so on, with Venediktov. So to promote them — I can’t promote them, because their audience is immeasurably larger than mine. So what are we doing? We’re creating an institution of reputation. Because we still need to know who is who. And we need to know what’s going on in the enemy camp. So to some extent, I perform a reconnaissance function, because many of our colleagues, many people in our audience, they find it distasteful, but I don’t. For me, it’s work. So I think it’s useful work. I still believe that “Mediafrenia,” that “Trumpofrenia,” that the “traitors” section — it’s all useful work.

On personal guilt and collective responsibility Link to heading

Yesterday, this is how the author of the question identified himself. I’d like to ask a question about collective responsibility. I’ve been listening to you every day since the beginning of the war. You claim that all Russians bear collective responsibility for the war, specifically defining this responsibility by their citizenship. A citizen means collective responsibility. The question is: Is collective responsibility possible without personal responsibility?

Let me start by saying that there is no personal responsibility for citizenship itself. No one chooses their citizenship at birth, and it’s also true that in the early years of life a person is not responsible for anything — he can’t even hold his own head up. Parents have to support them. I’m afraid of building a straw man out of your position. So I’d like to clarify: is there an exception in your concept of the collective responsibility of Russian citizens? If there is, what is the criterion? My position is that without personal responsibility, there can be no other kind. True collective responsibility can be this: I myself could not have prevented the war, but if I had done something that would have had consequences, if we had all done something, that’s collective responsibility. As you understand, everything begins with personal responsibility. If I’m one year old or in a coma, it’s strange to condemn my inaction. So you can only judge starting from personal responsibility, not some status defined by circumstances beyond your control.

Dear colleague, well, let’s be clear about what collective guilt is and what collective responsibility is. Collective guilt does not exist. Guilt is only personal. That’s it: guilt is only personal. The idea of collective guilt, basically, really leads to fascism and Bolshevism. So, guilt is only personal, individual. A person is only guilty for what he himself did. These are actions or inactions that led to tragic consequences. Guilt, personal responsibility, can be collective. And it manifests in two main forms.

First, it’s the fact that, so to speak, Russians by definition bear collective responsibility regardless of whether they want it or not. They all do, when, so to speak, Ukrainian drones, Ukrainian missiles fly into Russian territory and, in some cases, innocent people die. They bear that. You see, when the Allies bombed Dresden, the bombs fell on the heads of all Germans, including anti-fascists. And so, whether you want it or not, in any case you bear responsibility. When Germany after World War II paid reparations, the economic responsibility was borne by all Germans, without exception, including those who were guilty and those who were not. Collective responsibility arises regardless of personal guilt. That’s the first point.

The second is the concept of conscience. If you understand what nationality is, what a nation is — a nation is, after all, an imagined community. When you mentally identify and associate yourself. When a person says, “I am Jewish,” for example, he identifies with all the people of Jewish nationality who lived for millennia before him, who live now around the world. The same goes for Russians, the same for Ukrainians, the same for Germans. When a person says, “I am Russian,” he identifies himself with the millions of Russians who live in Russia and beyond, who lived centuries before. And if that’s the case, then, so to speak, if you identify with this vast people, then this feeling of guilt for what the representatives of this people do — it is organic. If you have a conscience, you should feel ashamed of what representatives of your people do.

Otherwise, it turns out: pride in some successes — yes, please. But shame for some crimes? No, that’s not us, you see? That seems to me like great hypocrisy. I’ll stress again: collective responsibility manifests itself in two forms. First, it manifests in the consequences that inevitably come regardless of whether you’re guilty or not. Second, it’s this sense of belonging to a certain people. If you have a conscience, it will certainly, certainly awaken, and it will make you feel ashamed of what the representatives of this people do. And not just a separate shame for the crimes of, say, Chikatilo, for example — no, but for what is happening with the tacit consent of the vast majority of Russians. That, without a doubt, should stir some feelings. But again, that’s a question for your conscience. If you have it, you feel shame. And if you don’t, if you think, “That’s not us, that’s not me,” well, then that’s a question for your inner structure. Once again, the key here is to distinguish guilt from responsibility. Guilt is always individual, but responsibility can be collective.

On support for Putin among those who moved to the EU Link to heading

Valeriya Kalugina. My sister has been living in Bulgaria for about 35 years. She hates her government and adores Putin. She tries to convince me that I’m living very well under Putin. It’s very funny — when I start talking about the opposite, she suggests I pray and calm down. Of course, she’s in favor of what’s happening. We grew up together. She’s my cousin, but she’s like a sister to me. But it turns out that we’re now very, very different. Please explain how it is that people living abroad, in developed and not-so-developed EU countries, who moved long ago or not so long ago — and not only in EU countries but around the world — love Russia, support the current government, come out with posters and so on, like the Immortal Regiment. I just want to say, why do you live here? Go back to your Russia. But I forgot to mention: Russian television is banned in Bulgaria. Yet they set up special retransmitters at their own expense, just to watch and listen to it, to be “educated,” or whatever.

You know, dear Valeriya, this is a problem of immigration. It’s an issue I’ve encountered many times, and not only, well, let’s say… in my conversations with emigrants — nowadays I live quite a closed life, generally not interacting much with representatives of the Russian diaspora in Lithuania. But when I lived in the Czech Republic — I had two years of emigration there — and when I visited the United States of America… this famous Brighton Beach effect.

What is emigration? Emigration is quite a heavy trial. It’s almost always a form of downshifting, almost always. It’s always a loss of status. An immigrant is someone who faces challenges. And there’s often a language barrier. Especially if the immigrant is in, say, Sweden, or — well, in Lithuania, learning Lithuanian for someone without language ability is several years of hard work. Or learning Finnish, or Swedish, or Norwegian — all tough tasks. But the issue isn’t even that.

The point is that if you’re a doctor, your diploma doesn’t count. If you’re an engineer — well, if you’re in IT, it’s a bit easier. But for most it’s downshifting. You arrive in a country with the status of a doctor or engineer or someone else of fairly high standing — and here, you have to do completely different work. Or go through a tough process to restore your status. So it’s almost always downshifting. It’s a hard ordeal.

That’s why there’s a tendency to feel resentment. Again, it’s a sign of someone not particularly bright. Basically, you’ve been accepted, given shelter, you’re a guest. But people tend to blame their surroundings — anyone but themselves — for their problems. That’s a typical reaction. I saw the same in the United States, people who had lived there for decades but didn’t really know or speak English. Just because — well, because of laziness.

So, emigration is always intense work. If you want to live successfully enough in the country that took you in, you have to work harder than you did in Russia. Not everyone can do that. That’s where the reaction comes from: an unwillingness to see that it’s actually better here. This gets blocked off. It’s a particular manifestation of a kind of corruption of the mind: people start blaming the country they’re in for their problems, instead of looking for the root in themselves.

That’s where the nostalgia comes from, and the desire to watch Russian television. The love for Putin — and the unwillingness to go back to the country he rules. It’s a sort of mental block. It’s here, but at the same time it’s not.

On the reasons for Nawrocki’s victory in Poland Link to heading

So. You are asked: What do you think about Nawrocki’s victory in Poland? He was smoking some homeless tobacco on the air, but that fact didn’t affect the will of the people. Is Ukraine facing a major crisis because of the victory of this right-wing politician?

You know, I think that what he was smoking doesn’t really matter. There was a lot more dirt on him. But that didn’t have an effect. What worked was nationalism, what worked was Trumpism. That’s in line with the choice of a significant part of the Polish people. Let’s put it this way. I won’t go into detail on this question right now, although I actually answered it yesterday. I suggest we wait until 4:00 PM, when we’ll have the Polish expert Piotr Kultura, and I hope that will be a more authoritative opinion.

Why Putin’s operation cannot be compared to Pearl Harbor Link to heading

So, on this topic. So why is Russia doomed to lag behind in military progress in Ukraine? Everyone is making drones, from state enterprises to private garages. The drones are different, not very standardized, made from sticks and stones, but they fly and deliver their deadly cargo where they’re needed. There are a lot of them. Meanwhile, in Russia, a special unit is created with all the powers, a monopoly on funding, kickback sharing, bribes, and overpriced procurement. The main purpose of this unit’s activity is personal profit by all possible means. And at the output — some number of drones, funded by whatever scraps of financing are left. Perfectly documented, certified, and sold to the troops for money raised by soldiers and volunteers. Regarding Pearl Harbor, the analogy is not about who attacked whom. I don’t even really understand why this is emphasized. Yes, the aggressor was Japan attacking the USA, and in the case of Russian airfields, it was the other way around. It was a response to the aggressor. It doesn’t take much intelligence to understand that correctly. That’s not where the analogy lies. The analogy is in the destruction that Pearl Harbor’s aviation suffered and the reasons for that destruction. In that respect, Pearl Harbor is a very precise illustration. Careless Americans, thinking that the airfield was far away and couldn’t be reached, were caught off guard. The result of the attack was the destruction of all aviation at that airfield. Didn’t the same thing happen to the Russian airfields? The distant airfields were not guarded, had no protection. Doubts in this regard are quite appropriate. That’s the first comparison. What came to my mind when I heard the news: burning wreckage of Pearl Harbor and burning pieces of fuselage in Irkutsk. And Japan didn’t even cross my mind.

Dear colleague, for me it’s clear why. Why do Putin supporters compare it to Pearl Harbor? Because Pearl Harbor for Japan ended in the capitulation at Hiroshima. That’s the point of this comparison to Pearl Harbor. It’s an attempt to say: well, Japan attacked America and as a result got the capitulation and Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think that’s the wrong analogy. I think the right analogy is Tsushima, which ended in the defeat of the Russian Empire. That’s the right analogy. Pearl Harbor is the wrong analogy because it leads to the idea that Ukraine must end in complete, final capitulation — and a Ukrainian Hiroshima. I don’t think that. I think what’s happening is Tsushima, which ended in the defeat of the Russian Empire.

Another comment from Max: Defended Pearl Harbor. It seems to me a very apt comparison — a synonym for a sudden, crushing attack, and so on.

Well, again, I’ve already answered this question. From my point of view, the comparison to Pearl Harbor is unfortunate in that it draws a line from, so to speak, the Japanese attack on American airfields and how it ended. It’s a bad analogy, it’s limping. It’s the wrong one.

About the nationalist Link to heading

Alright? Alexander. Okay, now, just a second. So we got a little off track. So, Alexander — the stress is on the first A. And the skepticism of my colleagues towards him is justified. He’s not just a Muslim and a Tatar nationalist, but also very much a pro-Palestinian pan-Islamist with all the consequences. But his attitude towards women is typical for representatives of the most peaceful religions. I would also recommend paying attention. His struggle for independence, of course, elicits solidarity and support, but mostly it’s one of those cases where, yes, we’re allies in one cause, but otherwise let our trenches be far apart. Dear Alexander! Once again, I haven’t studied, so to speak, the views of Arsen Savva.

Thank you for pointing out the correct stress. So, I haven’t studied Gaisin’s attitudes towards Jews, Israel, and so on. I don’t know anything about that. When I appeared on his channel, by the way, it was mainly because I was invited by another interlocutor. There were two of them, but I knew that this person supported the independence of Tatarstan in that capacity. But still, when I go to journalists as a guest, my requirements for the host are much lower. Because he’s the one asking questions, and I’m much less picky about which journalists I visit than I am about the experts I invite to our shared space. So that’s why. But again, I haven’t looked seriously enough into this person’s views. If your point of view is confirmed, well, I’ll be more attentive about accepting invitations in the future.

Vershbow. I support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. At the same time, I sympathize with the peaceful Palestinians suffering in Gaza. There’s no contradiction in that. Hamas is a terrorist organization. Israel has the right to self-defense, but that does not justify the deaths of thousands of civilians, including children, or strikes on humanitarian missions. Clearly, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a direct aggression of one country against another. There it’s clear who the attacker is and who the victim is. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it’s not like that. It’s a long history of violence, occupation, blockade, and retaliatory attacks. There’s no black-and-white picture here, and you can’t disprove that. Israel still seems sympathetic to me, as a secular, democratic state, especially compared to the authoritarian or openly fanatical regimes in the region. But a civilized democracy also means responsibility, and criticism of the Israeli government’s actions does not mean denying Israel’s right to exist, or denying compassion for Palestinians, condemning terror, and at the same time supporting Ukraine unambiguously. It’s silly to talk about some kind of dissonance here — it’s an attempt to remain human, to see tragedy not only in politics, but in people’s fates. I don’t understand why Igor Alexandrovich didn’t express any note of doubt about the possibility of such dissonance here. I’d like to hear a more explicit position on the dissonance, not a discussion of A. Yasin or someone else’s personality.

Well, first of all, I don’t agree — I just don’t agree with the idea that there’s no black-and-white picture in the case of Hamas’s aggression against Israel. It’s just as black-and-white. You can talk as much as you want about how complicated it is, how intertwined it is, how it’s a long history of violence, occupation, blockade, and so on. But when you — it seems to me that your position is very sly. You say that you don’t deny Israel’s right to self-defense. Explain — just explain — how exactly Israel is supposed to stop the constant terror attacks, the constant threat, the constant rocket attacks. I mean, there was just another rocket attack in Tel Aviv, another terror attack, and so on. Almost every day.

Who can guarantee there won’t be another October 7, when people just came out of Gaza and killed a huge number of Israelis who had done nothing to them? Who can guarantee that and how? Just explain, please. Tell me how Israel should act and how it can avoid the deaths of civilians in Gaza, who are being used as cover by Hamas. How is that done? Please explain — teach me.

So, the fact that I’m no fan of Netanyahu’s government is well known, for which I’ve gotten plenty of criticism, outrage, and accusations from many Israelis. But again, I stress: criticism of Israel is perfectly valid. For example, I’ve always criticized Netanyahu’s government for its excessive love — excessive friendly relations with Putin. That’s always been disgusting to me. I understand the desire not to quarrel with Putin, because otherwise he can do a lot of harm. But it seems to me that in this demonstrative loyalty to Putin, he goes too far. But that’s a different matter.

As for the idea that this isn’t black and white — no, it absolutely is. From the very first minute of its creation, Israel faced military attacks from Arab states. And for all seven decades of its existence, Israel has faced constant, ongoing aggression. So this is about self-defense.

Are there questions about how far necessary defense goes? Yes, that’s a topic for discussion — but a discussion of specifics. Do you understand? To claim that this is just a war fought in white gloves — I absolutely believe that in any war, including in Ukraine, some retaliatory strikes on Russian territory inevitably lead to civilian deaths. But does that mean we’re going to say it’s not black and white? Nonsense, of course.

So I don’t see a big difference here between the war that terrorists wage against Israel and the war that Russia wages against Ukraine. Of course, there are differences — but in scale, not in essence.

Terms “унизительный” and “уничижительный” Link to heading

Konstantin Egorov I want to clarify something. Russian is my native language, just like it is for you, and I’ve been speaking it for 70 years. I remember very well from school the difference between “унизительный” (humiliating) and “уничижительный” (self-deprecating). “Уничижительный” is when a person belittles themselves. “Унизительный” is when it’s directed at another person. Or in modern Russian, with many new innovations, has this difference been abolished?

No, no, it hasn’t been abolished. If I understand correctly, dear Konstantin, you noticed a misuse in something I said. I just don’t recall having confused those terms. But overall, I completely agree with you. Yes, “унизительный” is when it’s directed at someone else, “уничижительный” is, so to speak, when it’s about oneself. I agree.

Answers to unimportant questions Link to heading

Alex Gai. How much time did you spend on the provocations of absolutely unimportant questions? Don’t you run out of energy for such broadcasts? You did announce the elections in Poland. From the outside, it’s pretty clear how bad people are trying to confuse you.

Dear Alex! Well, I did announce today at 4:00 PM — Piotr, please — there will be an expert on Poland. Of all the people I know, he seems the best informed, in my opinion. As for answering questions, you know, I do try to answer all questions — except for those that are, to me, absolutely clear as provocations, where the person needs to prove that they’re not just trying to provoke. But initially, I have a presumption of loyalty towards any person asking a question.

Does Russia have the right to demand elections in Ukraine Link to heading

So, Lyudmila Moskalenko, Does Russia, on the level of legality, have the right to demand elections in Ukraine? I understand that there is some kind of international law that allows other countries to intervene in the internal affairs of a country.

Yes, dear Lyudmila, there is such a law — it’s about the protection of human rights in another country. That’s normal. And there’s the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which establishes basic rights. So, intervention — or rather, the protection of human rights in another country — is not considered interference in the internal affairs of that country, because human rights are not, under international law, currently an internal matter of a country. But clearly, that’s not what’s going on here. It’s obvious that an attempt by a country where there is a dictatorship, where the president has been sitting on his throne for 25 years, an absolute dictator — for that country, which is also an aggressor, to dictate to Ukraine when to hold elections is, of course, completely absurd. So in this case, it’s like, you know, a cannibal demanding that everyone else be vegetarian — it’s absurd.

What question should the Ukrainian delegation include in negotiations Link to heading

Denys Lyubarev. What do you think is the question the Ukrainian group should include in negotiations? And then demand that the Russian group recognize the legitimacy of strikes on bombers. I believe we must not allow the destruction of terror weapons to simply be brushed aside from the discussion, and so on.

So. You know, I think that, well, if these negotiations are not a movement towards peace, then, as I see it, they should raise the demands that are key. That is, demands like freeing all illegally occupied territories, including Crimea. You see, if we were talking about negotiations that required a compromise, that would be one thing. But since we’re dealing with an imitation of negotiations, Ukraine should use the opportunity to put forward the demands it considers important: liberation.

So, if Russia demands that Russian troops leave the territories that Russia has written into its Constitution, then in response, Ukraine should demand the liberation of all occupied territories, including those unlawfully incorporated into Russia’s Constitution. That should be the principle. But again, this is a question of imitation — all these negotiations, as I said yesterday, are a theater performance for one spectator. So we have to keep that in mind too.

But I would include, for example, such a point as the liberation of all illegally seized territories — that is, Crimea and, so to speak, the four regions that Russia has for some reason included in its Constitution. And changing the Russian Constitution, in which five regions of Ukraine are unlawfully included.

In this war, fewer civilians are dying Link to heading

I. Harrison. I’ve repeatedly heard from various analysts that the percentage of civilian casualties compared to military ones in this war is much lower than in other recent wars, where many more civilians died than combatants. Why such a difference?

Well, first of all, let’s clarify: what wars are you referring to? Regarding the actual ratio of civilian to military casualties in Ukraine — it’s not what’s typically seen in wars, where civilians usually die in much higher numbers. There are several reasons for this.

First, this war is taking place exclusively on Ukrainian territory. Normally, wars are bilateral — and you need to consider what wars you’re comparing to. For example, the Iran-Iraq war, where the war was fought on both Iranian and Iraqi territory, and there really were large numbers of civilian casualties. Or, say, the Korean War, where all the warring countries were affected. Here, the war is only on Ukrainian territory, so civilians dying are only Ukrainians — just a handful of Russian civilians have died in this war. Meanwhile, military casualties are counted on both sides, but civilian casualties are only on the Ukrainian side. That’s one factor.

The second factor — and here I’m stepping into somewhat speculative territory — but still, there’s a fairly effective evacuation system, which helps to reduce the number of civilian casualties. So there’s a lower risk for civilians here.

Those are the main factors that seem to explain it. But again, we need to be clear about what we’re comparing it to.

Are negotiations covering up the war Link to heading

Another question from Max. I’ve often heard that negotiations are a cover for aggression — that Putin, under the cover of negotiations, keeps killing. But I just don’t understand who this cover is aimed at. Who, looking at negotiations, stops seeing the war? Trump? He doesn’t need cover — he only sees what he wants to see. He wants to see, to hate the war — his own media won’t let him, and negotiations don’t dull his reaction. Quite the opposite — before, he could shell at will, but now, after the calls to Putin, shelling during negotiations makes him look like an idiot — the cover doesn’t work on him. So who does it work on? Western leaders? They understand everything. Western media — they see the war. China understands everything. And the Global South doesn’t care. The Russian population doesn’t see the war, cover or no cover. And the Ukrainian population both sees and lives in a state of war — it doesn’t work on them. Maybe on Putin himself — “I’m in my little house, nothing’s happening” — I’m not sure. It turns out it’s a cover that doesn’t cover anything. It’s entirely possible this is a typical straw man and I misunderstood the meaning of the word “cover.”

Dear Max! You know, I think you’re mistaken here. For Trump, it is a cover, because he says he can’t impose sanctions now because there are negotiations. And more than that, yes, indeed — these negotiations serve as a cover, because while they’re ongoing, Trump has — again, I’m not trying to look deep into Trump’s soul, I’m talking about his position. And his position is this: there are negotiations, so I can’t impose sanctions. There are negotiations, so we mustn’t anger Putin. That’s the position. And it really does frame the negotiations as a cover. That’s just a fact.

On inviting Leviev Link to heading

So, a few sentences from Muratov: Invite Ruslan Leviev.

We’ve already invited him, I think. I don’t see any problem. Yes, he’s an interesting expert. Rustam agrees. Yes, no objections.

Personal questions Link to heading

So, a few personal questions. Sherlock Holmes asks: Excuse me for a very personal question. You seem like a balanced and reasonable person. Tell me, how do you manage it? Maybe it could help me too.

You know, dear colleague, the fact that I’m not hysterical, not wringing my hands — it’s just that I treat everything as an object of study, you see? Of course, emotionally, I feel very strongly about Solovyov and Putin and so on. But I treat it as an object of study. That’s why. And as for being balanced — you know, I think many of my close friends would disagree with you. But in public appearances — why make a fuss?

Andrey: Do you allow for the possibility that under some scenario you might return to Russia?

I don’t see any such scenario. I think not. I don’t think I’ll return to Russia.

Reality as a hologram Link to heading

A few questions from a subscriber named Pyotr. First question: I understand you’re tired of questions about the Almighty, a supreme mind. But the topic is really interesting. Thinking about it with you is incredibly valuable. Thanks to you, I’ve realized that I’m also an agnostic. Also, I’m not really into esotericism, because there the truth is always “somewhere nearby.” Now, the question: have you heard about the holographic principle, alternative physics principles, and are they close to you? In my opinion, it’s fascinating. But like the universal mind, it’s neither proven nor disproven so far.

Well, of course I’ve heard of it. The problem is that, naturally, like anyone who — let’s say — calls themselves a “philosophy buff,” I’ve always been interested in what’s called the philosophical problems of natural science and the geometric principles of physics. Without a doubt, this is one of the most interesting frontiers of knowledge.

What it’s about — as I understand it — is that information about the space-time within a certain region, for example inside a black hole, or even in the universe as a whole, can be recorded on its boundary. It’s an important worldview principle that offers real food for thought. It’s like a hologram — meaning everything that happens inside the region, inside the black hole, can be recorded or described using information that is somehow stored on its surface.

By the way, as far as I know, there has been scientific proof that the universe is not a hologram. So in that sense, I think the issue has been settled. But overall, it’s a fascinating, interesting area of modern physics.

Where is the strength? Link to heading

So. The second question from Pyotr. At the end of his interviews, Yuri Dud always asks his guests the same question: “Where is the strength?” I think it’s a non-trivial question. How would you answer it?

Well, you know, it’s a somewhat rhetorical question. But if we do answer it — you know, it’s actually a bit silly to answer it at length, because it’s a rhetorical question, a somewhat artificially constructed question inspired by, let’s say, the film Brother and Brother 2. So, if I were to answer it — if we’re playing this game, because it’s a game — I’d say that strength is in the mind. That’s probably how I’d put it. At the same time, I understand that this is a game — answering such a question is really just a playful exercise.

On an age limit for political activity Link to heading

The third question from Pyotr. Politicians often stay in politics until they die. A probably naive question: why can’t they, like everyone else, be sent to retirement, for example at 65, so that there wouldn’t be such nonsense as with Trump, Putin, Gaddafi, etc.?

You know, the question is: who decides? Who should pass such a law? Well, I don’t know. If we did that, we’d also be dismissing many modern politicians along with them. And, for example, you have someone like Nawrocki coming to power — he’s a relatively young man. Is he better? Better than some of his older opponents? So that’s a question.

But again, the main question is: who would pass this law? What is it — the United Nations is supposed to make such a decision? Of course not. So I’d say that this is a somewhat utopian idea about how these questions should be resolved.

Did science come out of religion Link to heading

Next, the fourth question from Pyotr. If I remember correctly, science — including philosophy — came out of religion. Was that more in spite of it or thanks to it? How could such an evolution happen? Correct me if I’m wrong in my reasoning.

Well, you know, dear Pyotr, you’re not entirely right here. So: first of all, strictly speaking, the sciences, if we’re talking specifically about the sciences, did not come out of religion — they came out of philosophy. And that’s exactly the process that can be traced literally point by point.

In the beginning, the sciences — in the modern sense of the word — were inside philosophy. So, in Aristotle’s system, for example, physics was part of philosophy, as was the science of society, logic, mathematics, and so on. Biology — it was all within philosophy. The same with Pythagoras, the same with others. These were philosophers who, within their philosophy, developed what we now call the sciences. A bright example: the first scientist of the modern type is Thales. He was a philosopher who, within his philosophy, made discoveries in mathematics, astronomy, physics, and so on.

So the sciences ultimately emerged within philosophy.

As for the origin of all forms of social consciousness, in primitive society there was indeed a kind of critical monolith in which all forms of social consciousness were united — including that sense of wholeness that distinguished the first stage of the emergence of social consciousness. This was a sort of “primordial stew” — a synthetic form in which magic, religion, worldview in general, traditions, tribal customs, taboo systems, and so on were all merged together. It was a reaction to the need for survival, for maintaining the integrity of the social organism.

Initially, there was a blending of everything: anthropology of nature, totem-religion, human physiology — this was magic. It was all fused together, absolutely undifferentiated. Later, from this synthetic lump, religion began to separate out as a distinct institution with its own doctrines and practices. Then things like morality began to separate out as independent from religion. And finally, philosophy itself became separate.

So ultimately, the sciences did not emerge from religion, but rather formed within philosophy. That’s why I think that the earliest stage of thinking was characterized by undifferentiation. And then from that emerged separate forms of social consciousness. That’s how it seems to me, at least.

Final word Link to heading

So, it seems like that’s everything I’ve seen. I’ve answered all the questions. Well, dear friends, thank you for your patience. Once again, we ended up with a very long stream. That’s largely because yesterday I couldn’t answer the questions, but today, I think I’ve managed to clear all the debts. I’ll remind you once again that today at 4:00 PM we have the Polish expert Piotr Katsa, who will help us understand more fully what the new Polish president represents and what to expect from him. Glory to Ukraine! Take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives! I’m saying goodbye to you until 4:00 PM. All the best.

Source: https://youtu.be/i6T-JctLxEA