The Tsargrad Institute is holding the “Forum of the Future.” Under the leadership of Dugin and Malofeev, prominent futurists such as Archpriest Andrey Tkachev, Ekaterina Andreeva, Pyotr Tolstoy, Sergey Mironov, and others are gathering.
Main Theme Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 9th. In Kyiv, it is currently 07:41, and we continue our morning reflection on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Divergence in Frontline Information Link to heading
Well, first of all, on the front line. There is a very sharp divergence between the information from the Russian General Staff, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Russians are constantly announcing an offensive into the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region. However, no satellite observations, satellite images, geolocations, or confirmations of this exist. In fact, referring to a report from the American Institute for the Study of War, Ukrainian media are reporting that this announcement by the Russian Ministry of Defense—that the armed forces of the Russian occupying army have advanced, reached the border of the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions, and are engaged in battles already advancing deep into the Dnipropetrovsk region—has no basis. That is to say, in reality here, well, we can consider it another case of the Russian Ministry of Defense lying. What is actually happening is that offensive efforts continue in the southwestern part of the Donetsk region, not the start of a large-scale operation to seize operationally significant territory in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
Third Day of Burning at Oil Depot in Engels Link to heading
And another significant event happening specifically in the war is that in Engels, which is in the Saratov region, the oil depot—called the Kristall complex—has been burning for the third day in a row. It was attacked by Ukrainian drones on the night of June 6th. This oil depot supplies fuel to the Engels-2 military airfield, the very airfield from which heavy bombers take off to bomb Ukrainian cities. So this can be considered good news—without fuel, the bombers can’t fly, and some Ukrainian civilians will survive another night. That night, Russian drones and cruise missiles attacked a number of Ukrainian cities. Kyiv, Odesa, Rivne, and so on were attacked. So, in fact, everything remains the same: Ukraine hits military targets, while Russia responds by striking civilian neighborhoods.
Joint Production in Ukraine Link to heading
And another significant development, or at least a trend that’s emerging—we have already talked about the serious agreements between the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine regarding the establishment of joint production of long-range missiles. These are events we have discussed several times in various broadcasts. But now it has become known that the French automotive group Renault will be producing drones in Ukraine. This was reported by the French press, citing French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu. So, as far as I understand, this is still just an intention, but at least it’s an intention confirmed by both Renault and the French defense minister. In other words, Ukrainians will work at these plants, which will operate either in Ukraine or nearby. And the main product of this production will be drones, which will primarily be intended for Ukraine but will also be supplied to the French army for defense tasks in France. So, essentially, this is another form of joint production. Ukraine is becoming more and more integrated into the system of creating European security and increasingly becoming an indispensable part of this system. I think this is the most positive aspect: this transformation and shift in Ukraine’s role from a petitioner who constantly asks and demands, albeit on perfectly legal grounds, to just a consumer of money and weapons, and increasingly, Ukraine is becoming an organic part of the European security system—joint production, joint factories, exchange of experience, and so on. In general, I believe this is precisely the only possible guarantee of Ukraine’s security: the integration of Ukraine into this system of international security.
Forum of the Future 2050 Link to heading
Well, in Russia there is a very amusing phenomenon that I want to talk about today. It’s starting today. It’s called the Forum of the Future 2050, organized by the Tsargrad Institute. The Tsargrad Institute is one of the most reactionary institutions in Russia, founded by the Orthodox billionaire Malofeev. And its director is one of the most well-known Russian fascists, Dugin. So that’s the company organizing this forum of the future. I’ll say a few words about the program—it’s worth it. It’s truly some sort of spectacle, a kind of witches’ sabbath of all the darkest reactionary forces in Russia. And the most amusing thing is that the Russian government is directly involved in this sabbath. Not just some marginal figures like Dugin and Malofeev—well, I’ll say a few words about the participants in just a couple of minutes. But first, the content.
So here are 10 points, which I’ll read out. The main discussion topics. This is all posted on the website of the Tsargrad Institute. So here we go: first, the struggle for souls and minds—the ideology of modern sovereign Russia. Second, a new concert of great powers. Third, warriors of the future. Fourth, Russian cosmos—the race to Mars. Stunning. There are also some amusing rhymes to this theme. Next, Special Operation Demographics: how to ensure a birth rate increase? A new strategy for migration policy. Russia as the ark of salvation. Technological development: robotics instead of mass migration. Spatial development: from megacities to single-story Russia. Digital sovereignty. Artificial intelligence in service to Russia. Patriotic education: the image of the hero of our time. All of this under the aegis of Dugin and Malofeev. In other words, it’s classic Orthodox fascism, a real reactionary show.
A few words about the speakers. First on the list is Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So this isn’t some marginal gathering—this is all under the auspices of the Russian state. Then the star of this sabbath is none other than Elon Musk’s father, who, as I understand it, has been in Russia for three days already, giving interviews left and right, talking about how his son fell out with Trump, why, and how each of them is right in their own way, and so on. In short, that’s the highlight of this sabbath. How did they lure Errol Musk to this? Well, Musk himself seems to be a very questionable character, judging by his son’s statements. Nevertheless, why he came to Russia—who knows? Yesterday, Mark Feygin speculated that he came solely for the money. Maybe, it’s hard to say, but in any case, that’s the cherry on top of this show.
And of course, the star, the great futurist who will talk about the future—our regular guest from Mediafrenia, Archpriest Andrey Tkachev. And a well-known character, perhaps the most flamboyant—of course, Malofeev himself. The thoroughly discredited Russian agent Dmitry Simes, who had to flee America to Russia, made infamous by his shameful performance with Jeffrey Sachs. And, naturally, the brilliant scientist, renowned for her visionary outlook, news anchor Ekaterina Andreeva. And, of course, Pyotr Tolstoy and Sergey Mironov, known as “Sergey the Paratrooper.” So, you see, the future will be discussed by Archpriest Tkachev, Ekaterina Andreeva, Sergey Mironov, and so on. In reality, it’s truly the shadows—the shadows of a long-forgotten past. And these are the people who will be speaking about the future. In essence, if you want a comprehensive statement about the current state of Russia, this forum is it: an attempt to peer into the future with dead eyes that are fixed solely on the past. I think it’s one of the most telling signs of Russia’s prospects.
On Street Talks on the Channel Link to heading
Well, we’re continuing to think about the future of our channel. And in particular, one of the ideas I’m exploring is to refresh the content a bit, update the format, and come up with something new that would diversify and create some fresh material for our programs. One of the ideas that came up was to compile opinions from people on the streets of different countries. Although our audience isn’t huge—302,000 subscribers, with varying viewership—it still includes practically all the major and significant countries for us. This means not only Russia and, of course, Ukraine, but also the United States, Germany, Israel, France, and the Baltic states. So it’s possible to do some comparative analysis. The idea is to do street talks, that is, interviews on the streets of different countries, which, of course, won’t claim to be representative, but will still serve as illustrations. I think street talks are useful if you don’t try to draw big conclusions or extrapolate them as actual public opinion in those countries. As simple illustrations, I think it’s interesting. It’s a perfectly legitimate journalistic method. So, if this idea gets some support from any of you, we’ll start editing this material and including it either in the morning show at 7:40 or, if it becomes substantial enough with a good number of countries represented, we might even make it into a separate program.
That’s the idea I wanted to share with you, dear friends. We held a poll on our YouTube channel’s community tab and on our Telegram channel. The question was: how do you feel about the idea of organizing street talks—street interviews on current issues in different countries—by the subscribers of our channel? I want to say right away that in Russia, we will not do this kind of street talk for safety reasons. Even if some of you in Russia want to do it, I want to say immediately that we will not publish materials from Russia for one simple reason: I absolutely do not want to put any of you in danger. We have a very negative experience: journalist Krieger is currently serving time for organizing street interviews. At one time, when I was offered to use Krieger’s street talks, I refused. I said I didn’t want to put him in danger, and I understand that he himself is fearless, but I believe it’s wrong to use this kind of material. So except for Russia, I think we can do these interviews in all the other countries.
So, what were the results? On our YouTube channel’s community tab, 951 people participated. 11% said they are positive and ready to take part themselves. That’s a lot! If it’s even somewhat close to reality, I think the survey will be fairly representative. 61% are positive but can’t take part themselves. 14% said they’re not interested, and another 14% said they didn’t know how to answer. On the Telegram channel, 474 people took part. 15% are ready to participate themselves—also a high number. 63% are positive about the idea but can’t take part. 11% said it’s not interesting, and 11% didn’t know how to answer. So that’s the result. Maybe even starting tomorrow we’ll publish a detailed guide on where to send materials, how to collect them, and so on. Maybe we’ll even start our first survey tomorrow. So, thank you to everyone who participated in the poll and to those who are ready to do this themselves. I think it will be an interesting experience, and we’ll continue to improve our channel’s work—hopefully with your help.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Moving on to the answers. Yes, before I get to your questions, I want to mention that today is Monday, and as usual at 20:00, we’ll have Sergey Grabskiy. I think there are a lot of questions for him about what’s happening at the front, because it seems that over the past week, there’s been a buildup of questions about what’s really going on and whether there’s any movement in the Dnipropetrovsk region. Although I’m still inclined to trust the satellite imagery, which suggests that the Russian occupiers are still far from posing a threat to that region. Now, let’s move on to the answers to your questions.
Is the Economic Situation in Russia Deteriorating? Link to heading
Questions from the chat. A question from Sasha: Igor Alexandrovich, why do you think Russia’s economic situation is deteriorating? There’s a line from a song that says, “You can’t throw out words from a song.” As long as resources are being bought in huge quantities, as long as there are very smart people in the Central Bank and the Ministry of Economy, as long as the population has huge amounts of money in bank deposits and everyone is happy, economically Russia can’t be strangled. I visit the capitals and regions, and everything’s working and bustling. There’s a huge shortage of workers. Marketplaces have reached even the farthest outskirts and can barely keep up with orders. Don’t you feel this?
I’m always amused by the confidence of people who assume I don’t feel it. Well, of course, anyone not in Russia wouldn’t feel it. It’s as if I don’t have contacts or can’t know what’s happening in Russia. It’s like when people say, “You live in Moscow, so you don’t know what’s happening in Russia,” but someone living in Voronezh, of course, knows what’s happening in Yakutia, in Kazan, and in St. Petersburg. So, there’s plenty of information.
Now, about why I think Russia’s economic situation is worsening. First of all, capitals and big cities are one thing, while the outskirts are completely different. That’s one point. The most important point is that there are indicators. As of now, oil sales to China have decreased by 14%. That’s a lot—minus 14% is minus that amount of money in the budget. Then, the price of oil that Russia sells to India and China is about $20 per barrel lower than what’s budgeted. That’s a significant drop. And finally, there’s a known and fairly substantial reduction in payments for contracts. For example, payments that were 2.5 million in some region are now down to 2 million. So, there’s a steady decrease, meaning there’s clearly not enough money.
So, let’s put some points on the i’s. I’m not claiming that Russia’s economy is in tatters, or that it’s completely falling apart—none of that. But the fact that Russia’s economic situation is deteriorating is a historical fact. Just don’t attribute to me things I’ve never said. I’ve never said that Russia could end the war because of sanctions or economic problems—no, that’s not true. I’ve never said the Russian economy is in tatters—that’s also not true. But the fact that the economy is getting worse—that is a fact.
Where to Buy the Book “A Study of the Jewish People” Link to heading
From Elena: Where can I buy your book “A Study of the Jewish People”? Is there an electronic or audio version?
No, there’s an electronic version. I’ll try not to forget. One of my friends—well, of course, I can’t provide a printed version because it was left in Russia, and there’s no way to bring over the remaining copies. Regarding the electronic version, one of my Facebook friends, a wonderful colleague from Moldova, made a copy, and I think we’ll organize it—well, most likely we’ll post it on the YouTube channel or in Telegram so anyone interested can have a look. The book is quite interesting. It’s a large-scale study of the Jewish people in Russia. It’s the result of a sociological study. I can say right away—it’s not fiction or opinion writing.
On the Reasons for the Takeover of Lesta Link to heading
A question from Good Good, Mukhа! I apologize for not responding right away to the answer to my question from June 4, 25. I just mixed up the unification and Kisel, who was declared extremist, with the company Lesta Games—the company Lesta. My mistake. Lesta Games, I consider extremist, for example, because of a message from June 3 on the Tanks section of this company’s website in the Games News section under the headline “Open Letter.”
Dear colleague, no one disputes that—it was simply that your accusation was misdirected. As for the company Lesta itself, like the overwhelming majority of companies, it demonstrates loyalty to the current authorities in order to keep working in Russia. That’s all. But the state attack on them wasn’t because of that—it was simply a good business, a popular business, a successful business, and the business was seized. I sympathize. I personally sympathize—no. But at the same time, it shows that doing business in Russia today is impossible. Or, more precisely, it’s very dangerous. God forbid you become successful. That’s the point. No sympathy for them, of course.
Probable Scenarios for Ending the War Link to heading
Sokol Kukushkin: Questions about scenarios for ending the war. Wars, as we know, end in different ways. According to Illarionov, the only solution to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is the defeat of the aggressor. So if I understand correctly, even the death of the dictator is not considered a factor by Andrei Nikolaevich. Although we remember how Naryshkin’s wet pants spoke more clearly than he did himself about how this war is needed only by one person. What scenarios for ending the bloodshed do you consider today? And what, in your opinion, is the likelihood of each of them?
Let’s try to lay everything out clearly. First of all, the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as it was phrased in the question, and the end of the bloodshed are actually different things. The end of the bloodshed doesn’t necessarily mean the conflict is resolved—it could continue in a different form. As usual, when you cite someone’s opinion, I always take it with a grain of salt because it’s your interpretation, with all due respect. But I’ll answer you, not Illarionov.
From my perspective, the death of the dictator would effectively mean the end of the bloodshed. Your reference to Naryshkin’s wet pants is quite convincing: as soon as the dictator is gone, the war will stop. I’m absolutely convinced of this. The problem is not that “Putin isn’t fighting—Russia is fighting.” Russia is fighting and is responsible, of course, and there are many war criminals besides Putin. But Putin is undoubtedly the inspirer of this war, and he is the guarantee that it will not stop. As soon as Putin is gone, the war will stop—I’m completely sure of this. For any other leader, as long as Russia remains in its current form, stopping the war would be possible, unlike with Putin. For Putin, it’s impossible; for anyone else, it will be possible, and it will be a good exit—an attempt to shift blame to Putin and to get out of the dead end he drove the country into.
So I believe the death of the dictator would indeed be the end of the bloodshed. Now, regarding scenarios— Let’s first consider the scenario of victory for the Russian Reich. I consider the probability of this scenario to be zero. Just zero—because Ukraine has no choice but to keep fighting, while Russia does. In fact, President Zelensky linked Ukraine’s defeat to the war dragging on for years and the West not helping. I think the scenario in which the West does not help is a fantasy. We see that the West is helping, maybe not as much as we’d like, but it’s helping nonetheless. So the scenario of a Putin Reich victory I consider to be zero probability.
The second scenario is the complete defeat of the aggressor. I would love to see that, and I think it’s certainly possible, but I assess its probability as less than 50%. Why? Because a complete defeat of the aggressor, given Russia’s huge military, economic, and manpower potential, is unlikely. What seems more—well, somewhat more likely—is a partial defeat of the aggressor and the internal collapse of the regime. This scenario, I think, is the most likely—at least over 50%.
Where to Get Instructions on Surrendering Link to heading
Denis from Lyubertsy: How best to make a flyer with instructions on how to surrender if there’s a procedure for doing so? Who do you think could create the best flyer with these instructions—find the best words, etc.? You know, yes. And Denis wants to ask Grabski if there’s a procedure for surrendering.
I don’t think it’s necessary to ask Grabski about the procedure for surrendering. It’s very well known and established. There’s a Ukrainian project called “I Want to Live,” and it has detailed instructions on how to surrender if you’re alone—step by step, from removing your magazine to slinging your weapon over your left shoulder, muzzle down, and so on—what to say, what to do. It’s all detailed and step by step, including if you’re surrendering as a group. So in reality, this “I Want to Live” project covers everything thoroughly, and there are flyers like that already. So, it’s a well-established topic.
Can the Russian Federation Be Called “Russia”? Link to heading
So, a question from a subscriber who goes by “user”: Why does everyone keep saying “Russia” all the time? There’s no such country—there’s the Russian Federation. Maybe if we called everything correctly, everything would be resolved? That would be the best way to name things properly.
But the thing is, dear colleague, you’re mistaken. In Russia’s Constitution—regardless of how one might feel about this document—it states in Article 1: “The Russian Federation—Russia.” And in the second part of that article, it says the names “Russian Federation” and “Russia” are equivalent. So, there’s no confusion here. Russia exists—at least for now.
Can an Antisemite Be Friends with a Jew? Link to heading
So, a question from Evgeny: How can social antisemitism and friendship with Jews coexist in one person? I personally knew friends of Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn. His closest friend was Emil Alexandrovich Mazen, an honored teacher of the RSFSR, a Jew by nationality. I also had the chance to work with Vladimir Abramovich, a fellow student of Solzhenitsyn’s in the physics and math department and at RSUH. Samvel Vladimirovich once let me read one of Solzhenitsyn’s letters, in which he inquired warmly about Vladimir Ilyich’s life and family. A very warm letter. Could you please explain how antisemitism and friendship with Jews can coexist in one person?
Dear Evgeny! Well, you know, there’s a saying: every antisemite has a Jewish friend. So, this isn’t surprising at all. There’s a difference between views and personal relationships. Sometimes, Jews themselves don’t feel squeamish about interacting with an antisemite. So, one thing is a person’s worldview, and another is their personal relationships. In this case, what surprises me is not how antisemitism and friendship with Jews coexist in a person, but why Jews tolerate having antisemites around them.
Where, Who, and How Will There Be Punishment? Link to heading
Here’s the question—Boris Fridman from the USA, apparently in response to my statement that guilt is always individual. So, Boris’s question: Agreed. But where and who will be punished and how?
Well, punishment happens through the courts. That’s what I mean. It’s another question whether it will actually happen, but at least if there is guilt, punishment should be through a court. That’s how it works. And responsibility can be different—it can be moral or it can be physical, like when bombs fall on everyone’s heads, both the innocent and the guilty. That’s collective responsibility. But guilt itself is only individual.
Leonid Radzikhovsky Link to heading
A question from a user named “verbovka”: Leonid Radzikhovsky—on your broadcasts I’ve heard memories of him several times, but I haven’t found a dedicated segment about him. From what I understand, there were even some public disputes with him. If you get a chance, could you tell us about your perception of him and the main points of disagreement? I’ve long appreciated Leonid Alexandrovich Radzikhovsky’s sharp mind and literary style, though in him one might also find imperial leanings and phobias, but now he’s completely stopped his public activity.
Dear colleague! I was actually acquainted with Radzikhovsky since 1990, and at that time we collaborated. I was the editor-in-chief and publisher of a newspaper called “Mister People,” and Leonid Radzikhovsky regularly wrote for it—sometimes as many as three articles per issue. That was a time when our political and value views completely aligned. It was a time of fiery democratic journalism. The only thing that was a bit concerning was Radzikhovsky’s absolute and selfless love of money. In journalistic and publishing circles, he was known for the unpleasant habit of selling the same article to two or more outlets, which caused some publishers to refuse to work with him. At the time, I took it as a quirky little trait, and it didn’t interfere with our collaboration.
What happened when Putin came to power? Radzikhovsky underwent a very serious transformation—he felt a sense of complete hopelessness. What he represented became a modern version of the old idea that “only power can protect you from the fury of the people.” Radzikhovsky’s idea became that the opposition was worse than Putin. How did this transformation happen? It happened pretty quickly. Putin came to power, and it became clear it was for the long term. It became clear that protesting against Yeltsin and writing opposition pamphlets was easy and pleasant, but Putin was a different kind of power. And Radzikhovsky broke.
I had many disagreements with him. I remember in the early 2000s, when Putin hadn’t yet managed to crush everything alive in Russia, there was still some journalistic life and debate. In “The Daily Journal,” an online publication, we debated. One particular discussion was about Radzikhovsky saying that the hope for Russia was the Russian Orthodox Church. I wrote a big article comparing the Russian Orthodox Church to a cannonball, and Radzikhovsky responded that it wasn’t a cannonball, it was a straw. So that kicked off a lively debate—cannonball, straw, and so on. My position is well known to you: I consider the Russian Orthodox Church to be a totalitarian sect that is a curse on Russia. Radzikhovsky, on the other hand, thought it might be salvation, which I found very odd and unconvincing. But that was just one of many debates we had back then in this sort of publicistic life.
Then, over time, there was no point debating with Radzikhovsky anymore because he became a regular columnist for Rossiyskaya Gazeta, essentially joining the ranks of Putin’s regime’s service staff. After that, it wasn’t interesting anymore. And by that time, he’d stopped engaging.
Dina Rubina’s Work Link to heading
Svetlana Ovchinnikova: What is your attitude toward the work of Dina Rubina? If you like it, which work do you like most? The question was inspired by debates around Israel.
I don’t know. I like the essay “The White Dove of Cordoba” the most—its style and the voice of Leonardo. But really, I try to distance myself from literary criticism. I’m not trying to be a Vissarion Belinsky—that’s not my thing, and I don’t want to do it. But since you’re asking, that’s my short answer.
Why Was Navalnaya Able to Do It, but the Author Was Not? Link to heading
A question from a user named “Nedvizhimost” (Real Estate): Why was Yulia Navalnaya able to organize satellite broadcasting into Russia, while Igor Yakovenko, Garry Kasparov, Igor Eidman, and other reasonable people were not, and instead are huddled in their YouTube channels and Nalcik? Yes. And further, the author writes: You’ve all long noticed that FBK is largely about money, but not to this extent.
You know, questions like this are similar to asking why 77 million Americans voted for Trump while others didn’t even make it to the finals. I’m aware of what happened—I didn’t even bother noting it as news because I think it’s not particularly significant. Yulia Navalnaya and her team, apparently with the support of the French organization Reporters Without Borders, seem to have started or plan to start satellite broadcasting. And frankly, they have absolutely nothing to say. Because, from what I gather, this channel plans to talk about corruption—meaning they’re essentially helping Putin keep as much money as possible in the budget to kill Ukrainians. That’s how it works, theoretically: fighting corruption in Russia means leaving more money in Putin’s budget to kill more Ukrainians. That’s apparently what they’re talking about.
Why? I’ve tried to explain my position on this several times. The point is, Western elites don’t really understand who’s who in Russia. They just react to familiar names. There was Navalny—very famous, very bright, the top opposition leader, very well-known. So, there was Navalny, now there’s Navalnaya, and they don’t understand that charisma, political influence, and potential don’t get transferred by marriage or sex. They just don’t get that. They perceive it like that—what can I do about it?
I don’t think it’s going to do any good. I doubt anyone in Russia will actually watch that channel. If it’s going to be about corruption, we’ll see. But honestly, I don’t see any real potential there. And regarding your comment, dear colleague, that we’re stuck on YouTube—remember, Trump first came to power relying on Twitter. He didn’t have any big media support (except for Fox News), but with Twitter alone, he won. So I wouldn’t underestimate today’s video hosting platforms and social networks. Political victories through social media are well known—it’s not just one or two examples. So, I’m perfectly fine with YouTube. Another question is how to develop it—that’s a separate story. We’re trying to work on it.
Is Ukraine Escalating the Situation? Link to heading
Second question from the same author, regarding Pastukhov. The author calls him a “cotton liberal”—a term I, in fact, introduced: Pastukhov stated that now, after the attacks on planes and bridges, Russia has a free hand and will also start carrying out terrorist attacks. In my opinion, this is an absolutely inadequate assessment. As if Russia was holding back before. Actually, it was only held back by fear of Western countermeasures, which is why it still hasn’t used them. But terrorism—let’s not kid ourselves—Russia is carrying out sabotage all over the world and in the countries it’s at war with.
Well, that’s not really a question—I see it as more of a comment. And I pretty much agree.
Elvira Bary Link to heading
So, and the third suggestion is to invite the American writer of Russian origin Elvira Bary: She runs an educational channel for English-speaking viewers and talks about Russia and Russians in a balanced way.
Well, maybe—I’m not familiar with this channel or with this writer. But I’ve made a note of it. Let’s see, maybe.
On the Statement That “All the Cities of Germany Are Not Worth the Life of One British Soldier” Link to heading
A question from Alexey: What do you think of the statement: “All the cities of Germany are not worth the life of one British soldier?”
This is probably about the British marshal who organized those bombing raids on German cities during World War II. It was at the beginning of the mass bombings of Germany. You know, the idea is understandable: all the cities of Germany are not worth the life of one British soldier. When I first encountered this statement from that British marshal, it reminded me—oddly enough—of a quote from Dostoevsky’s “The Brothers Karamazov” where he writes that the whole harmony of the world is not worth the tear of a single child. It’s that kind of metaphor, which, yes, has a right to exist. During war, every general’s duty is to protect the lives of their soldiers—so in that sense, the statement is valid.
But there’s another layer. It’s not as if, at that moment, there was an immediate threat to British soldiers’ lives from those German cities. The marshal’s position was actually that his goal was to kill German workers and their families—not military targets—to break the moral spirit of the enemy population, especially industrial workers. So while the statement that all German cities aren’t worth one British soldier’s life can be seen as a general’s perspective, in reality, the aim was something else entirely: to destroy the morale of the German population.
Here’s where an unexpected question arises for me: did Marshal Harris actually achieve that goal? I have my doubts. The goal of breaking the spirit was legitimate, but did he succeed? Germans kept fighting even after the unconditional surrender had been signed—at least until it was clear the war was over. The Germans were ready to fight until the last days of the war. So it seems that the morale was not actually broken, and Harris didn’t achieve his stated goal. That’s what makes me question the justification of his actions.
As far as I know, this remains a controversial issue even today. In Germany, Harris is mostly seen in a negative light; in Britain, his figure is still debated. So while the slogan “the end justifies the means” can sometimes work in war, in this case, the question is: was the goal achieved? Hundreds of thousands of Germans were killed—essentially for nothing, because the stated goal of breaking morale was not reached. German workers didn’t stop working in their factories, German soldiers didn’t stop fighting. So, what was the point? That’s the lingering question. No wonder Harris’s figure and his actions remain so contentious and open to debate.
The Term “Second Front” in World War II Link to heading
Ruslan, I see your question is: Please explain why you said “second front.” There were no fronts before this.
Dear Ruslan, well, of course there were other fronts. The term “second front” is typically applied to the Allied landing in Normandy. This comes from Soviet historiography. You see, we try, on the one hand, to move away from the terminology of Soviet historiography—because, for example, one of the biggest clichés is calling it the “Great Patriotic War” instead of World War II, which was an attempt to erase the period when the Soviet Union collaborated with Hitler, and the period of the division of Poland, when Britain was fighting alone against Hitler, and so on. That’s how the historical picture was distorted.
As for the “second front,” yes—in Western historiography, this term doesn’t exist, because in Soviet historiography the Eastern Front was called the “first front.” Soviet historiography doesn’t really acknowledge the Italian campaign of 1943, nor the African campaign, nor the American war with Japan—those are seen as irrelevant. The “first front” was the Eastern Front, and that’s it. And yes, if we’re talking about the war against Hitler, the absolute majority of German divisions were destroyed on the Eastern Front.
Nevertheless, I agree that the term is imprecise, but it’s widely accepted. The point is that we’re trying to move away from the language and approaches of Soviet historiography, but in Russian-speaking contexts, the term “second front” is very clear—most people immediately understand that it’s the Normandy landing. It’s important to be understood, and when you say “second front” in Russian, it’s crystal clear to most people and there’s no confusion. So you’re right, Ruslan, that numbering the fronts is, in a sense, arbitrary, and if you’re summing up all the fronts, you might end up with the fourth, fifth, or even sixth front.
Weakness and Shortcomings of Liberalism Link to heading
Question from Ilya What do you see as the weakness and shortcomings of liberalism? I agree with you that the stereotype associating liberals with cowardice is very strange. So I want to rephrase the question as it should be. And do we need to dispel this association of supposed weakness of liberalism in the public mind? Because I personally strongly dislike this association, not to mention that such a comparison is fundamentally unfair. And what do you see, if one can call it that, as the weaknesses and shortcomings of liberalism.
You know, dear Ilya, if we take the concept of liberalism as a political, value-based system, as a set of views, I don’t see any flaws in it. That is, if we take the idea itself. The idea of freedom, the idea of the supremacy of human rights, the idea of the rule of law, again, human freedom, the idea of the separation of powers, and so on. I don’t see any flaws here. So, what are the shortcomings? Here I would divide it into two things. First, the shortcomings. The shortcomings are not related to the idea of liberalism itself, but to the shortcomings of specific politicians. And this is usually how it is presented. That is, a person is called a liberal, and then his personal shortcomings, so to speak, are presented as the shortcomings of liberalism. For example, let’s say someone is called a liberal. I don’t know, like Pastukhov or someone like Koch or someone else. And they say, well, this is a liberal, and he’s bad. And then his shortcomings are presented as the shortcomings of liberalism. That’s the first point. Now, regarding what seems to be a shortcoming. Liberalism, since it is based on the separation of powers, on humane treatment of people—freedom. Freedom and the rule of law are not ways to solve problems quickly. That is, to follow, to follow liberalism sometimes turns out to be difficult and slow. You know, as someone who worked for quite a long time in the subway as a locksmith, I recall an analogy. When you assemble some kind of metal structure or disassemble it, you tighten the Baltic bolts with a wrench. It’s much easier to just pound the bolt in with a sledgehammer. It’s much easier, in an instant, two strikes, and that’s it. Everything is fast and simple. But the construction ends up being very unreliable, the thread gets stripped, and as a result, everything collapses at some point. So, in this case, the shortcomings of liberalism, which people point out—well, how is this so? There’s a problem, and you start coordinating with parliament, more debates, and all that, while it would be much easier to just pound it in, so to speak. A sledgehammer is easier but unreliable. As a result, it turns out badly. So, the shortcomings of liberalism are often either connected to the specific shortcomings of the people who call themselves liberals, or it’s what Churchill said about democracy—he said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others. Well, it’s something like that.
Did the author plan to leave Russia? Link to heading
Nadya, in a movie. You have said many times that you left when you learned that you were facing arrest. But if for some reason you were not threatened with arrest, would you have stayed in Russia? I understand that if you stay, you’ll either be imprisoned or broken and forced to write or speak in interviews following the Kremlin’s playbook. What do you think?
I didn’t plan to leave Russia. Well, again, ending up in prison seemed wrong to me. So, it’s not that I intended to leave Russia, but now I think, in general, there won’t be anywhere to return to.
Books about Religiousness Link to heading
Alright, two questions from Antonina. What books about the origin of religious feelings would you recommend? I think religiousness is a byproduct of our consciousness. That is, all people are naturally religious, and it takes some effort to get rid of this so-called faith. And even then, it’s impossible to completely get rid of it. Even atheists get angry and curse at their car if it doesn’t start in the morning.
Dear Antonina! It seems like I’ve stopped engaging in discussions about religion. But since you’re asking, let’s see. I’ll recommend the following authors on the origin of religious feelings. First, the classics: Émile Durkheim, Claude Lévi-Strauss—I think they’re very interesting. I’m not saying you’ll fully agree with them, but I think these are fascinating texts. James Frazer is undoubtedly interesting. And there’s Edward Tylor—these are the classics I’m mentioning now. As for modern authors, I can’t recall anyone at the moment. You see, not having my library at hand affects me. But this set of classic authors—Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss, Tylor, and Frazer—is probably enough. I think they’re very foundational authors who will give you a good sense of things.
I’m not sure about what you said, that every person is naturally religious. Here it’s probably something else—since I let myself get drawn into this discussion again, you see? It’s easier to be religious. Not only religious as in a believer—a Christian, a Muslim, a Jew—but even this faith in a cosmic mind simplifies everything a lot. Because this faith, whether in a cosmic mind or in religious faith, is like sweeping trash under the bed. You sort of explain everything: where did everything come from? It’s God or it’s the cosmic mind—done. But what is the cosmic mind? Where did it come from, what does it look like, how is it structured, what’s its inner nature? No, we don’t know, can’t know. Trash. Trash swept under the wardrobe, and it seems the room is clean. But the trash is still there, still exists. You’re still breathing in that trash. So, you’re not getting real answers to questions—you’re just simulating answers to questions, you see? So this explanation—“cosmic mind” or “God”—it’s an explanation that explains nothing. You sweep the trash under the wardrobe and then what? Nothing. It’s an imitation of trying to explain something. That’s how I see it. But it really does simplify things—like a lazy housewife or househusband, instead of actually cleaning the whole apartment, just sweeping the trash under the wardrobe, under the bed, and so on. It simplifies things, but doesn’t solve the problem.
Was Criticism of Biden Appropriate? Link to heading
And a second question from Antonina. About the appropriateness of criticizing Biden. In the circles of so-called Russian opposition figures, criticizing Biden was considered good form. Mr. Kasparov still can’t seem to calm down. And criticism is very useful if you want to change the situation. But the alternative to Biden, the only alternative, was always Trump. Well, that’s what we got. That’s how they criticized Biden.
Dear Antonina! First, I don’t agree with you that the only alternative to Biden was Trump. There were, for example, other alternatives that were, in my opinion, quite appealing. So, that’s the first point where I don’t fully agree with you. And second, criticism isn’t always about replacement—it can also be about influence. Criticism isn’t necessarily aimed at replacing Biden with someone else, but also at improving Biden. Again, I’m not saying that something we posted on our YouTube channel changed Biden. But even Kasparov, who writes and publishes in leading American media outlets, that’s a real influence. So, criticism can have different goals. And we must criticize. Otherwise, what do we have left? Uncritical, choir-like singing in unison.
Why does the discussion on faith continue? Link to heading
Valeria Putina, Why do you continue the discussion on faith?
Well, I don’t continue it. It’s just that some interesting questions come up. I try not to arrange for constant discussions. You see, the problem with a repeated discussion is that it becomes a never-ending series—one word after another, and then it just goes in circles. I remember the debates we had on the pages of the Daily Journal, and there was a principle, a rule: so that the discussion wouldn’t turn into an endless series, someone would publish a text, then there would be criticism of that text by another author, and the criticized author would have the right to reply. That’s it—it would stop there, because otherwise… Well, I think there were exceptions, but mostly that’s how it was. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis—criticism, reply, reply to criticism. Done. It has to stop there, because otherwise it’s a never-ending series for me.
Of course, my own rules are much less strict. Here there may be several objections, but at some point it has to end, because otherwise the whole channel turns into a discussion of a single topic. That’s a kind of distortion of the channel that I try not to allow.
On Promoting Philosophical Concepts Link to heading
Alright, Mikhail Koshkin. It seems to me that the humanitarian gap that arose because of the USSR’s 70-year exclusion from the global development flow still persists. This lag is one of the main reasons for today’s monstrous degradation. So, couldn’t you, in the interest of public enlightenment, dedicate at least 10–15 minutes once a week in your morning broadcast to highlighting or promoting various useful concepts from philosophy, sociology, political science, psychology?
You know, well, when there’s a relevant topic, yes, probably, it’s possible to do that, but it’s important for me not to turn our conversations into something like lectures. Well, some practical things—yes, definitely, I’ll comment on them in that way.
How to pronounce “Ukraine” Link to heading
Ruslan Ramazanov On the “A” or the “I”?
In the word “Ukraine,” in Ukrainian, the stress is on the third syllable, on the “i” in Ukrainian. On the third syllable. (Only in Russian)
On the proposal to bet on war Link to heading
Question from Yulia. Or rather, not a question, but a whole proposal from Yulia. So, I’ll read it. Yulia writes to me: You have repeatedly said that the war has disrupted your plans. Because of it, you switched to an uncomfortable format, you’re not writing articles, you’re promising on YouTube. You’ve noticed that your area of activity has expanded because of this. I have a proposal—we, your subscribers, will create a common fund, and you will place bets on political forecasts. We’ll take short-term events in democratic countries since there’s no falsification there. There are many options: parliamentary elections, passing of laws, and much more. Precedents show that one can turn $200 into one and a half times more. This way, we can better help Ukraine. We won’t risk large sums since you can also be wrong, but a maximum bet of $250, and regularly. Over the weekend, I looked up the information. There are reliable international bookmakers. Let’s try it.
Dear Yulia, I’m not going to participate in this, and I’ll explain why. First of all, I’m against this kind of money accumulation. You see, for me… Well, I collect money for drones, I collect money for helping the Freedom of Russia Legion—these are two different accounts. And I don’t accumulate this money somewhere with me; I just provide the account that the guys on the front lines give me. Right now, I don’t want to be a cashier, because that’s a separate job, a separate responsibility. Not because I’m afraid of responsibility—I just understand that if you take on these functions, you have to do them. So, it’s just a separate job, a separate activity. And I don’t want to do it. You see, to develop the channel, there are tools, there are extra contributions, there are subscribers, there’s a region. That’s enough. Coming up with things like raising money for some separate initiative—no, I don’t want to do it. Thank you, dear Yulia, thank you for your care and your activity. But this format is not very acceptable for me.
Accusations against the author and Shenderovich over the train crash Link to heading
Question from AI A train crashed into a collapsed bridge. There’s no evidence of an explosion. Conclusions are being drawn because of the timing, coinciding with the review of the weapons by the presenter. And then it started—from Shenderovich to the Yakovenko audience, from Trump to Russian liberals. Everyone wants to say that the Ukrainians blew up this passenger train, so Trump can stop helping Ukraine, so the opposition crowd can feel more Russian. Like, look, the Ukrainians are just as bad. Shenderovich, by the way, has even bigger accusations. He’s a public figure, authoritative. One shouldn’t insult that. And in a comment by a layperson—let’s rejoice at the deaths of the passengers. Ukraine, in years of war, has never once targeted a civilian object on purpose. That’s what should be the focus. So, willingly or not, he played into Putin’s hands.
I just don’t understand why you’re dragging me into this. I never claimed that this was a deliberate sabotage of the train. That’s… I don’t know where you got the idea. What happened there is a separate conversation, a separate investigation. Some say the bridge simply wore out and collapsed. So, in fact, you’re barking up the wrong tree here, you see? And this idea that some people are gloating over what happened—you shouldn’t confuse things. First of all, don’t lump me together with Shenderovich, and second, don’t lump Shenderovich together with Latynina. Latynina, yes, she’s always looking for some speck in the eye of Ukrainians—she does that, yes. That’s Latynina, that’s Arestovych. But here, don’t just add everyone together in one breath, you see?
Comment about Shenderovich Link to heading
So? Alexander Korolyuk. SHANDEROVICH—by the way, you’re deliberately twisting his last name. He’s never once spoken publicly about the death of even a single Ukrainian child—he’ll get banned, I’m sure. There’s a whole lot of exclamation marks.
You know, Alexander, no one is banning you. Your comment… your post is still there. Well, the fact that you’re lying is obvious. That you’re attributing to Shenderovich some kind of extreme inhumanity, claiming he’s never spoken about the death of a Ukrainian child—this is a lie. Why you’re doing this, I don’t know. Maybe you’re trying to compensate for something—it’s hard to say. No one is banning you. Please, show your true colors as much as you want—your post is still there. Please, keep showing yourself.
Was Navalny a nationalist? Link to heading
Nadezhda Belova I don’t agree about Navalny. He was never a nationalist. That’s not true. He said that nationalists are also Russian people, and that’s why he took part in their marches. I didn’t expect from you that you could say this about a man who paid for his mistakes with his life. It’s easy to sit and pontificate about who’s who and what should be done. So do it, rather than judge—lest you be judged. I’m sorry, I believed in you.
You know, Nadezhda Belova, Navalny himself called himself a Russian nationalist. You’re just not aware of this. You only know one thing—that Navalny was killed for his beliefs. That’s true. But the fact that he called himself a Russian nationalist is also a fact. And he, unlike you, didn’t consider it something bad, you see? Navalny’s views are well known. This man was undoubtedly in the spotlight, and the fact that he created a nationalist movement—“The People” together with Zakhar Prilepin—well, you can’t just erase that from history. He stated—this is his own statement, a quote—that nationalism should become the backbone of Russia’s political system. This statement of Navalny’s also won’t disappear. The fact that in August 2008 he supported Russia’s aggression in Georgia and called the Russian occupiers “good fellows” is also a historical fact. The fact that he called Georgians “rodents” is also a historical fact, by the way. He later apologized for that. So, in fact, his views changed. By the way, he changed his views, and he apologized to the Georgians in 2008. But the fact that at that time he expressed such views is a historical fact. And there’s no need to talk nonsense about how that never happened—it did. That’s all fact.
So once again—this phrase, “judge not, lest you be judged,” well, I’m not judging him, but we have the right to make judgments about him. That’s the difference. To judge someone and to make judgments about someone are different things. Only a court can judge someone, but each of us has the right to form judgments about someone else—you about me, and I about Navalny.
Was Sakharov’s wife Jewish? Link to heading
Alright, Rita? Sakharov’s wife was Armenian. She took the name Bonner from her husband, who is not Jewish.
Dear Rita, you’re mistaken. Sakharov’s wife was Yelena Georgievna Bonner. She was genealogically Jewish—her mother, Ruth Grigorievna Bonner, was Jewish. Therefore, Yelena Georgievna Bonner herself was Jewish, since genealogically Jews are determined by the maternal line. So even though her father was Armenian, she is considered Jewish through her mother.
About Slavic languages Link to heading
Alright, Tatyana from Donetsk region. Well, here’s a remark about the Russian language, that it was artificially crafted from Church Slavonic, and that’s why it’s most similar to Ukrainian and Bulgarian. In Belarusian, it’s basically a calque, actually approved by the Latin Slavs. But the monarchs in the Russian Empire didn’t want the people to know their languages. So only toponyms like Moscow, Syzran, Volga, Ural, and so on remain. In general, everything that’s not colored in Leninist or Komsomol terms is not Slavic.
Well, I’ve already talked about the names. Take half of the states in the United States of America—these are Native American names. This doesn’t mean that the population of the U.S. is Native American.
Objection to Kulpa’s reasoning Link to heading
So, regarding Mr. Kulpa’s reasoning—it doesn’t hold up to criticism, or even to logic at all. This isn’t a Polish view of history but rather pseudo-history. I don’t see any significance in Bandera for the history of Ukraine—let me clarify right away, it’s not his fault, there just isn’t any significance there. He himself didn’t participate in any actions. That’s enough to not classify him among any great deeds. Now, on to Kulpa’s arguments. Bandera didn’t have a Ukrainian passport. He was a Polish citizen. Poles have the right to judge his actions. Second, Bandera was a terrorist, so he shouldn’t be a Hero of Ukraine. Well, let’s look for analogies. Polish national heroes: Ignacy Hryniewiecki, subject of the Russian Empire, member of Narodnaya Volya, participated in a terrorist attack, killed Alexander II. Józef Piłsudski, subject of the Russian Empire, member of the Revolutionary Faction, participated in a terrorist attack, organized a robbery, including an attack on the homeless in 1908, and so on. So, this is a list of people who, from the perspective of the author of this objection, are considered terrorists.
You know, I would also prefer that, on the pages of our channel, if we could actually have a serious discussion among Polish and Ukrainian historians, then let it be a discussion among historians. Maybe it would make sense to organize such a thing? I don’t want to rush into it, I don’t want to make it a priority. But maybe it would really be worth having a calm, non-political, non-hysterical, non-hateful discussion specifically among historians?
Kellogg didn’t use the word “escalation” Link to heading
Alright, an objection from Max about the interview. Kellogg—after watching the interview again, he didn’t use the word “escalation” in English even once, but he did use the phrase “raising the level of risks.” Right?
Well, basically, yes, I agree with you. Yes, you’re right. But still, it seems to me that here, both with Trump and with the whole idea of raising the level of risks, right? So what should be done? Well, dear Max, I’d like to ask you: what, in your opinion, should Ukraine do to avoid raising the level of risks? Just sit still? Because every shot fired by a Ukrainian soldier, from the UN’s perspective, raises the level of risks. So you haven’t eliminated the problem, you’ve just renamed it. But renaming the problem doesn’t make it go away. “Raising the level of risks,” “escalation,” “raising the level of risks”—it’s all the same. Both have a negative connotation. But raising the level of risks isn’t good, right? So what should Ukraine do to avoid raising the level of risks? Apparently, surrender. That’s what it looks like. Because from this logic’s point of view, every single shot in return raises the level of risks. So, I don’t see how, by restoring linguistic accuracy, you’ve solved the problem. The problem remains.
Is censorship a boon for creativity? Link to heading
A question from Mira of Noon. Wow! I have great respect for your moral, ethical qualities, Igor Alexandrovich. I value them highly. I fully share them. But let’s not make a cult out of comrade Yakovenko and his infallibility. He, like any person, can make mistakes.
Oh, how right you are! You have no idea how often I make mistakes. And then, essentially, this reminds me a bit of that famous remark by Panikovsky: “I respect Ostap Ibragimovich very much, but what a miserable man he is.” And then Mira of Noon raises an objection. It was precisely thanks to censorship in the Soviet Union that we became the happy owners of spiritual books, masterpieces, films, wonderful performances, and breakthrough technologies in the USSR. Moreover, censorship exists in every country: the censorship of the Politburo, the censorship of money from the bloodsucking capitalists, the censorship of the level of education of society, and the censorship of religions.
Well, first of all, about the idea that it was precisely thanks to censorship—I just… every time I hear something like this, I don’t know if the person writing it actually lived in the Soviet Union. And if they did, whether they had any connection to journalism, to how information was actually disseminated. You see, if we’re talking about my field, we couldn’t get access to a single book, not a single book by contemporary sociologists, contemporary philosophers, because everything was either labeled “for scientific libraries only,” kept in the special storage sections of libraries that required special access. Ordinary people couldn’t read any of it. The amount of literature that was unavailable, the amount of films… So really, to say that it was thanks to censorship that we got anything is just nonsense. We got things in spite of censorship. It was always a battle. When I worked in the Soviet press, every time I had to push through my articles—it was a fight. I remember my first sociology article, or rather, I was invited to write an article for a sociology collection. Back then, sociology was only just breaking through at the Moscow Worker publishing house. The editor-in-chief of that publishing house began mangling my article so badly that I just had to refuse.
So, it’s, of course, laughable to claim that thanks to censorship we got something. No, it was in spite of it. And about the claim that there’s censorship in every country—well, in normal countries, there’s no pre-publication censorship. There’s simply no such system. There’s nothing like Glavlit anywhere in any normal country—there physically doesn’t exist anything like it. So you’re just… just not informed.
Concluding remarks Link to heading
Alright? Dear friends, this concludes our conversation for today. I remind you once again that at 20:00 we have a meeting with Sergey Borisovich Grabski. I think it will be, as always, interesting—especially since today, Sergey Maratovich’s main focus is what’s happening at the front. On that note, I conclude our talk for today. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov! By the way, he has another court hearing coming up soon. We’ll be watching—he will undoubtedly use every court session to express his views on the current order in Russia. Freedom to Alexander Skobov! To all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian prisoners of war. See you at 20:00!
Source: https://youtu.be/jMkXtYb__dc