Trump has approved sanctions against Russia. The war may be entering a new phase. The Azerbaijan–Russia conflict has sharply escalated.
News Link to heading
Good evening, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 30th. It’s currently 7:41 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.
A Record Number of Missiles and Drones Launched at Ukraine Link to heading
A record number of missiles and drones were launched by the occupiers at Ukraine overnight. 537 — that’s a record. There are casualties, and many have been injured. On the night of June 29, Ukrainian pilot Maksym Ustymenko tragically died while piloting an F-16. He managed to steer the aircraft away from a populated area but still sustained damage. The plane began to lose altitude, and the pilot was killed. This is the third F-16 provided by Western partners that has been lost by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As of now, the situation at the front looks as follows. We will be discussing this in detail today with Serhiy Ivanovych Hrabskiy, but preliminarily, as a hypothesis: Western experts believe that in the future, Russia may be able to produce up to 1,000 drones and missiles per day. This is, unfortunately, what one would call bad news.
Russia’s Summer Offensive Has Stalled Link to heading
The good news is that, apparently, Russia’s so-called summer offensive has, in general, stalled. It seems that Russia has no real potential for significant advancement. Essentially, the front has stabilized. And the center of gravity in the war is shifting toward these strikes on Ukrainian cities. This is the kind of warfare that was seen for a time on the front between Nazi Germany and Great Britain, when the Nazis carried out massive missile and bombing attacks on London. This is how the Germans fought in World War II when they attacked London, and this is how the Allies fought when they attacked Dresden and other cities. So this is that type of war, where little happens on the battlefield, and the main war is waged in this manner.
To illustrate this type of war, I want us to watch two videos. The first video is of a Kyiv metro station from last night. Let’s take a look at what happened. This is the Varshavska metro station of the Kyiv Metro. And this is essentially the way of life that many Kyiv residents lead. The same kind of situation exists in Kharkiv, where people practically live in the metro. So this is a result of the kind of warfare that now seems to be dominant.
The second video reflects what is happening in Russia. At the same time, Putin organized a celebration for graduates in St. Petersburg — the Scarlet Sails event. Let’s watch this video as well. It seems to paint a rather… well, vivid picture. It includes some elements from the People’s Council on the Sochi elections. There’s also always been an association — those ripple effects are the Katyusha rocket launches. This symbolizes that this graduation celebration is actually happening to the sound of Katyusha rockets. That’s how it’s presented — and that’s what’s really happening in Russia today. A total effort to portray the current war as a continuation of World War II, along with indoctrination. People are being poisoned with this war rhetoric.
And yet, one of the brightest celebrations in a young person’s life — the Scarlet Sails graduation event — has always been such a joyful occasion. It used to be associated with things like Grin’s Scarlet Sails, and so on. But now — it’s Katyusha, it’s war. And the very person organizing this — Putin — is the one who has forced Ukrainian children and civilians to live in basements and in metro stations. That, in essence, is the scenario Putin would like the war to follow.
The Secondary Sanctions Bill Is Advancing Link to heading
We’ll see how this unfolds, because other processes are also underway, and in particular, there’s one encouraging development: Donald Trump has given the green light to sanctions against Russia. That is, Trump has supported the advancement of a new sanctions bill, one of whose authors is Lindsey Graham. Graham reported that during a golf game, Trump said it was time to push the bill forward. Essentially, senators and congressmen are handing Trump a tool they believe could force Putin to negotiate over Ukraine.
I have strong doubts that this will be that tool, but at the very least, the bill could deal a blow to the Russian economy. The mechanism of the bill is known: if a country continues buying goods from Russia and does not assist Ukraine, its exports to the U.S. will be subject to 500% tariffs. The primary targets of this bill are, of course, India and China, since they are the two countries buying the most Russian energy resources and thereby supporting Russia’s war effort.
Eighty-four out of 100 senators have supported this bill. The vote on its adoption is still ahead, and as I understand, it will take place after the July recess — starting from around July 7. I wouldn’t start celebrating or burying the Russian economy just yet, for many reasons. Aside from not knowing how China and India will respond, Trump doesn’t have the best track record with sanctions. Most importantly, it’s known that members of Trump’s team are in talks with Lindsey Graham about amendments to the bill. According to U.S. media, these amendments could effectively neuter the legislation.
As always, the decision rests with Trump, who is known for starting a sentence and not finishing it. So there is hope, of course, but it’s quite shaky — as is everything related to the 47th President of the United States.
Escalation of Relations Between Russia and Azerbaijan Link to heading
What else is significant? From the latest news: around Russia’s perimeter, along its borders, more and more conflicts are emerging. Arguably, the most intense conflict, the most serious escalation, has occurred in recent days between Russia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has canceled all events related to Russia—all official visits, all joint cultural events planned in Azerbaijan by Russian state and private institutions.
The reason, according to Azerbaijan’s official statement, is the targeted actions by Russian law enforcement against Azerbaijanis based on ethnicity in Yekaterinburg. What does that mean? The Azerbaijani delegation refused to participate in the session of the interparliamentary cooperation commission between the Russian and Azerbaijani parliaments—for the same reason. This story is widely known. I won’t go into too much detail, but let me remind you that the first significant crack appeared after a Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijani aircraft over Grozny in December of last year. Azerbaijan is still waiting for some clear and articulate official response from Russia, from the Kremlin. It’s clear that the plane was shot down by accident. But the actions taken against the Azerbaijani community in Yekaterinburg can hardly be called accidental.
The reason or pretext was the brutal arrest of seven individuals. Actually, 50 people were detained, seven were arrested, two of the detainees were killed, and the rest were severely beaten and injured. Two people dead—what kind of arrest operation leads to two fatalities? The alleged reason for this action was a murder committed in 2001. It’s now 2025—this crime happened 24 years ago. And this is the response? Suddenly they “woke up” to it? I don’t know. I’ve read both the Azerbaijani press and other journalists’ opinions. All this talk about it being a Kremlin directive—I find that unconvincing. Most likely, this is a local initiative. Perhaps some overzealous local officials decided to demonstrate that relations with Azerbaijan have soured, and now they’re trying to make life unbearable for all Azerbaijanis.
We remember how some Moscow officials—idiots—organized persecutions of Georgians during the August 2008 conflict. They started firing Georgians, persecuting, arresting them, and so on. This is, once again, what Stalin used to call “excesses at the local level.” Nonetheless, what happened—happened. I don’t think the Kremlin will be able to mend this rift that has opened up between Russia and Azerbaijan. The reason is simple: the Kremlin is becoming less and less necessary—and in fact, increasingly obstructive—to Azerbaijan. Because the current alliance with… well, I’d say it’s more than an alliance. Erdoğan’s position is “one nation, two states,” and this clearly opens up completely new opportunities for Azerbaijan.
This includes the chance to create a major oil and gas hub and push Russia out of the energy market. And clearly, no alliances with Russia are needed for that. So this rift may actually be beneficial for official Baku. And it’s also clear that for Erdoğan and Turkey, this is a good reason to seriously begin displacing Russia from Crimea—and not only from the South Caucasus, but possibly from the North Caucasus as well. We’re also seeing some attempts to normalize relations with Armenia. And then only Ivanishvili remains—that issue is temporarily unresolved, but only temporarily.
So overall, I believe that this relatively spontaneous event—yes, accidental, but still—has resulted in a serious rift between Russia and Azerbaijan. And it’s unlikely that this will be patched up anytime soon.
Street Talk from Cologne Link to heading
So. And before moving on to your questions, I want to say that we’ve received another stream. So, a subscriber to our channel, Anatoly Stepanenko—Stepan, rather—sent us a video from Cologne, where he asked a local resident named Mikhail a question. Anatoly included a cover letter in which he said he didn’t entirely agree with what was said, but that’s exactly what we’re looking for. We’re collecting different opinions. So, let’s watch the stream that Anatoly Stepanenko sent. The question was: “What do you think, Mikhail, will the war between Ukraine and Russia end this year or not? What’s your opinion?”
My opinion is that both Ukraine and Russia should end the war. Because I believe it’s important for the global economy to finally begin to develop normally. And for that, the war between Ukraine and Russia needs to stop. Regarding this topic of war, I would like to see more diplomacy. Diplomacy in such a form that it allows for a reasonable agreement where neither side—neither Russia nor Ukraine—loses. Overall, I’m not for weapons and not for war. I just believe we need to find a diplomatic solution as soon as possible that will satisfy both sides. So that all the parties can finally find peace. Then the sanctions that were introduced could also be lifted. And in this way, the economy in Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union can function normally again. I fully support that.
Well then, thank you. Thank you, Anatoly. But I want to say right away that I think we’ll go ahead and pause this project for now, because we were, of course, hoping for a larger number of diverse opinions—that was the point of the project—but for now, we’re putting this street-talk gathering initiative on hold until better times. Of course, every opinion is valuable, and it’s important to get a glimpse into different regions this way. We previously had views from residents of the United States, and now here’s Cologne. But still, I think we’re pausing this for now. We’ll try to reconfigure the system and make sure we get real streams with a broader range of perspectives. That’s the whole point of these contributions. And of course, a higher level of responsiveness is needed here.
So, before moving on to your questions—yes, none of this diminishes our gratitude to subscriber Anatoly Stepanov, who sent us this material.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
As usual, tonight—Monday at 8:00 PM—we’ll have a conversation with Serhiy Hrabskiy. During this discussion, we’ll talk about the very topic I mentioned earlier: how realistic it is for this new phase of the war to actually take shape. So, 8:00 PM—just a reminder. Now, let’s move on to answering your questions.
What Is Internal Migration and How to Use It Link to heading
A question from Eldar: Thank you for how you commented on the origin of Russian profanity. At 37, I thought I already knew everything from Mikhail Zadornov and my own observations. But I learned even more from you. Now, my question: please explain what internal migration is and how to use it wisely and intelligently?
Internal migration is the movement of people from one region to another within the same country, driven by various factors. Examples of internal migration—especially in the context of Russia or the Soviet Union—include industrialization and the relocation of people from rural areas to cities. There are also extremely negative examples of internal migration, such as so-called population replacement. In the Soviet Union, this involved artificially replacing local populations—for example, relocating people from remote regions of Russia to Ukraine. This is another form of internal migration.
Another example is the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East. More broadly, the growth of major cities is largely the result of internal migration rather than natural population growth. As for using it wisely, as you put it, this should start with building infrastructure—then moving on to creating industrial facilities. But in Russia, as is often the case, it tends to happen in reverse. So, I don’t know—maybe Eldar had something else in mind with his question, but I answered it as I understood it.
Reasons for Hazing in the Army Link to heading
A question from Ilya: Thank you for the mini-lecture on the origins of Russian profanity. Regarding hazing in the army, I’ve heard two theories: first, that it began in the 1960s due to a shortage of regular conscripts, leading to the enlistment of criminal elements into the armed forces. Around the same time, the length of service was reduced from three to two years. Second, that the history of hazing (non-regulation behavior) goes back to the Russian Empire or even earlier, when hierarchical family structures—where elders had automatic authority over younger members—transferred into military relationships. Also, Nevzorov suggested a way to eradicate this plague in the Russian army, or at least take the first step. After the high-profile case of conscript Snowden, who shot eight fellow soldiers, Nevzorov proposed giving the guy an award. This was, of course, a bold metaphor in Nevzorov’s style. But what are some real examples of effective efforts to combat hazing in the army?
I won’t comment on Nevzorov’s idea due to its complete absurdity. Yes, it can be considered a metaphor. Now, let’s get something straight: hazing is a fairly specific and clear phenomenon. It should be distinguished from other issues in the army, such as regional cliques, regular barracks bullying, and crimes committed within the military. Hazing is directly related to differences in the status of servicemen based on their length of service.
I believe we can identify both local and systemic causes. Locally, there has indeed been a criminal infiltration into the military over many years. Prison norms and customs adapt easily in the military, because the army and prison share similar features—groups of men confined together. So when prison rules enter the army, they take root very quickly.
On a broader level, there is the general culture of dominance in Russian society, reflected in the well-known phrase: “You’re the boss, I’m an idiot; I’m the boss, you’re an idiot.” This vertical structure permeates all of Russian society and forms the foundation of what’s called “non-regulation relations.” There is also a lack of effective legal institutions, and a temptation to exploit free labor—which becomes a tool of control for commanders. Hazing is a form of manipulation and coercion.
Moreover, today’s conscripts are seen as a resource for cannon fodder, and hazing becomes a means of total control over conscripts who are treated as disposable. Hazing goes through cycles—sometimes more intense, sometimes less—but overall, it has not been eradicated in Russia.
Examples of effective anti-hazing measures? Well, I’m not sure. I’ve spoken to quite a few people. It’s known that in Israel, where nearly everyone serves, hazing is practically non-existent. There are many reasons for this. First, Israel is a country in a constant state of war, and the military is a source of national pride. Also, Israel is a fairly strict state with a tough judicial and police system. That’s why non-regulation behavior like hazing is harshly punished there.
So, what has to happen to eliminate hazing? The society itself has to change. You can’t reform just one part of the system—like the army—without changing the society and the state as a whole. It’s like trying to fight corruption without changing the system that breeds it.
The Phenomenon of Jews and Armenians Link to heading
So, here’s how it is. Tell us about the phenomenon of the two peoples — Jews and Armenians. These two ethnic groups, despite being relatively small in number compared to many others, are extremely active in many countries of Greco-Roman civilization. Jews, to put it simply, are active; Armenians also find a place in those same countries, in those same countries, in those same countries. And it continues. I think that such vigor is connected to the fact that these ethnic groups have a tragic past. Persecuted and exterminated for centuries, forced to live in diasporas. Certain survival traits have developed in their genes. What do you think, is that true or not? Are Russians simpler in this regard? Russians have never bothered themselves with backbreaking labor. They have always taken up arms and moved across the vast expanses of Eurasia. So, what do you think of this line of reasoning?
Well, the only thing is — you shouldn’t have brought genes into this. Once again, there’s some sort of obsession with dragging genetics into everything. Why does it matter so much to you? But the fact that the histories of these two peoples — Jews and Armenians — undoubtedly share some similarities is true. They are both diasporic peoples. However, their histories are different. Different, first and foremost, because Armenians, although undoubtedly a diasporic people like the Jews, nevertheless had their own state for a significant part of their history. In both cases, the exceptionally high level of national consciousness and extremely low level of assimilation — the dissolution into other peoples — was primarily ensured by religion. In one case, Judaism; in the other, the Armenian Church. These were the barriers that prevented the dissolution of these two relatively small peoples into others. And in both cases, we indeed see a disproportionately high contribution to culture and science compared to their numbers. And today? Today their fates differ. The Jews have created a powerful state in Israel, with a strong army and are quite successful in resisting external aggression. The situation with Armenia is much more complex. Also, the ratio between the diaspora and the population living in the homeland differs. That is, the number of Jews living in Israel today exceeds the number living in the diaspora. It used to be about half and half. But now the total number of Jews in Israel slightly exceeds the diaspora. The situation is completely different with Armenians. A huge, huge diaspora — several times larger than the population of Armenia itself. As for the truly significant contribution to science and culture — it’s clear. It’s clear what that’s connected to. It’s truly the difficult, difficult experience of surviving in a hostile environment that forces people, so to speak, to make efforts beyond those made by citizens of the countries where both Armenians and Jews lived as diasporas. This has been studied quite thoroughly. And here, I think, everything is fairly clear. In addition, Jews also have a traditional, so to speak, special attitude toward education. Jews were the first people in the history of humanity to establish universal education. So in general, this question has been studied quite well.
Corruption, Opposition, and National Idea in Ukraine Link to heading
Lamps. Lamps. IVANOVA Alena Kurbanova — Kurbanova was on Yevgeny Kiselyov’s channel today, writes Lampa Ivanova. When asked what three main problems she sees in Ukraine today, Alena responded: First, corruption; second, the government’s inability to reach an agreement with the opposition; and third, the absence of a national idea. I thought that Ukraine had no issues with the last point. Maybe I’m missing something? I’d like to hear your opinion on this matter.
Wow. My apologies, really. Actually, this is YouTube. YouTube is not a pseudonym, but the author of the question. It’s Galina. I apologize for not noticing the signature. Dear Galina, as is usually the case in such situations, since I myself haven’t watched this stream with Kiselyov — whether it was BBC or a recording, I don’t know — and with Alena Kurbanova, in this case I’m not commenting on Alena Kurbanova herself, because I haven’t seen what she said. I’m commenting on what you’ve relayed.
So, corruption — yes, of course, that’s an obvious problem, everyone knows that. Second — the inability to reach an agreement with the opposition. I don’t understand what the problem is here. No government can reach an agreement with the opposition. Why should they? What’s there to agree on? That the opposition should disappear, that it should stop opposing the government? I don’t see this as a problem, frankly. I don’t see a particular issue here.
And finally, the absence of a national idea. I also don’t understand what the issue is. The absence of a national idea — but Ukraine undoubtedly has one: it’s the final liberation from the claims of the Russian Empire. The national idea, in my opinion, is absolutely clear. Over the past couple of decades, it seems to me, Ukraine’s national idea has quite clearly been the rejection of the Russian Empire’s ambitions — ambitions of domination, of absorption — and during wartime, this national idea has become so crystallized that it couldn’t be more clear. So I don’t think this is a real problem. What other national idea could there be beyond what life itself suggests?
Why Is Orbán Acting This Way Toward Ukraine Link to heading
So, cake from Nancy. Please tell me, why is Orbán behaving this way toward Ukraine?
It seems to me this is a fairly obvious question. The point is, this is a specific reaction from the Hungarian government and its prime minister to what’s currently happening with Ukraine. This is Orbán’s general stance. He is trying to balance between the Kremlin and Brussels. That is, Orbán is trying to maintain a position between EU subsidies and Russian energy resources. It’s an attempt at being a kind of smooth operator who feeds from both sides, so to speak. I think it’s all quite clear. He’s trying, while being in the EU and NATO and enjoying the benefits of membership in both, to simultaneously maintain relations with Russia.
And this explains why he is useful to Russia. Russia needs him to constantly torpedo anything related to supporting Ukraine. It’s all perfectly logical and clear. By using the structural features and charter provisions of the EU and NATO — where decisions must be made by consensus — Orbán has chosen this particular tactic. A frankly, frankly Nazi-like stance toward Ukraine.
And considering that the EU charter doesn’t really allow for expulsion, this creates a very convenient position. In other words, to please Russia, he demonstrates an extremely negative attitude toward Ukraine. In doing so, he ensures the Kremlin’s loyalty, the possibility of making profitable deals with it — and possibly even receiving some personal benefits. And the EU? Well, where can it go? It can’t expel him. It still provides some benefits. So this is a very convenient position indeed.
U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Birthright Citizenship Link to heading
So, Alex Ivanov, Please comment on the latest U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the revocation of citizenship by birth. A direct violation of the U.S. Constitution without actually amending it. Also the decision to suspend the powers of the courts. Rulings in favor of prioritizing an empty bucket — meaning Trump. That his orders can’t be overturned by the courts. What is even happening? Where is the rule of law, the Constitution? Is it just a piece of paper now? The Founding Fathers and their perfect model — was it all just cheap nonsense?
And so on. Alex Ivanov is outraged about the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision. What can I say about this? It’s an important issue, and I can immediately say that on Saturday we’ve invited Igor Naumovich Aizenberg. I sincerely believe that, among those I know, he is probably the most knowledgeable expert on America — a person who deeply understands everything going on inside the United States, all the mechanisms and behind-the-scenes workings. So we’ll discuss it with him in detail.
But based on what I know and the materials I have at this point, here’s the conclusion I’ve come to. Dear Alex, you’re absolutely right — all your emotions are justified. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision — I’ll use different words than you — I’d say it’s a highly, highly partisan decision. It was made strictly along party lines. The six justices appointed by Republicans voted in favor of what is, in fact, an unconstitutional ruling. A partisan ruling. The three Democratic appointees voted in defense of the U.S. Constitution.
But I have to say — this is one of those cases where, in my opinion, a battle has been lost, but not the war. On Saturday, I’ll compare my view with that of Igor Naumovich Aizenberg. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the powers of judges. Trump’s executive order on citizenship — or rather, on the ability to revoke birthright citizenship — is now taking effect. This will affect people’s lives. The Supreme Court has issued a ruling that limits judges’ ability to suspend presidential executive orders. Essentially, the Constitution is being changed — not formally, but in practice. Presidential orders now outweigh judicial decisions. This seriously disrupts the U.S. system of government.
It all started with Trump signing an order that revokes the right to citizenship for most children born in the U.S. to foreign nationals — a right guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. For over 100 years, this amendment has been interpreted as guaranteeing that a child born on U.S. soil is entitled to citizenship. That worked for a century. And now? Now it doesn’t. Trump’s interpretation of the Constitution was challenged, and judges had blocked it. But the Supreme Court has overturned that, saying Trump’s orders prevail.
What’s happened is that among the justices who voted for this interpretation of the Constitution, three were appointed personally by Trump. This strictly partisan and ideological split is very telling. It’s clearly, without a doubt — at least to me — an attempt to override the U.S. Constitution. This is the battle I’ve spoken of before — when a dictator of a fascist type heads a democratic country. That confrontation is unfolding before our eyes. And for now, yes, some of the Constitution is being bent.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the senior Democratic appointee, wrote that this Supreme Court ruling should be seen as nothing less than an open invitation for the government to bypass constitutional norms. This really is a battle — a major American battle between democracy and a fascist-style dictator. And besides this case, there are several other decisions that can now be interpreted in Trump’s favor. Naturally, Trump is celebrating.
I won’t read out the rest of the commentary — it’s fairly self-evident. Ultimately, I believe that the U.S. Constitution will prevail over Trump — but only through the efforts of civil society, and of Congress, which is, I think, slowly beginning to wake up. But people’s lives are being upended. Those born in the U.S. who have every right to citizenship are being stripped of it.
So what else is there to say? That’s the current situation. I’m looking at the comments about this — yes, there are several more Trump executive orders that were previously overturned in court. Now they’re being reinstated — the Supreme Court is siding with Trump, strictly along ideological lines. The six justices appointed by Republicans support Trump, while the three appointed by Democrats support striking down his unlawful orders. That’s how things stand. The resistance front within the Supreme Court has been breached. The remaining line of resistance is now with the states. Let’s see how it all unfolds.
Differences between “truth” and “verity” Link to heading
So, Sokol? KUKUSHKIN’s question: Dovlatov once said, “The road from truth to verity is difficult.” For some people, these are synonyms. And a thinker like that, of course, cannot understand the meaning of the phrase. For example, I can say that the Earth is flat. If I believe it, then for me that is the truth. And even if such claims were recently broadcast on Russian TV, they apparently believe in it. And we believe them, of course. Truth is subjective, one-sided, incomplete, and biased. Verity is capable of surviving centuries — if not eternal, then it should be eternal, like the Universe itself. But ’truth’ is always used as a judgment of events.
And so on. That is, this is quite a long reflection. The point? Sokol Proshkin’s question is: can we say that verity is an axiom? Truth? A theorem.
Dear colleague, well, I don’t think that’s correct. Verity is not necessarily an axiom. Verity can also be a theorem. In short, truth is subjective. Verity is objective. Verity is a concept from the world of science, from the world of law. It’s a concept — a correspondence with reality — that doesn’t necessarily have to be proven. It can be an axiom, it can be a theorem. So, among other things, to say that verity is eternal is also incorrect. Because the comprehension of verity is also a process. It can… What was considered verity, for example — that is, the understanding of verity — can deepen. And indeed, it’s a process with a certain dynamic.
As for truth, it’s more of an everyday concept. That is, it really has a subjective nature. And in that sense, we can simply say that ‘verity’ and ’truth’ are two concepts belonging to different semantic domains. Verity is science, jurisprudence; truth is an everyday concept, the opinion of individual people. Therefore, we can say that the expression “everyone has their own truth” indeed reflects real differences. To say “everyone has their own verity” — well, that is probably incorrect. Because verity is still one. At least, at the current historical moment and the current state of science that we have right now. Verity is still objective — it has a certain objective nature. Truth? It’s subjective.
Why the author relies on experts Link to heading
A question from Yulia. So, on Friday I asked why we couldn’t just set the Kerch Bridge on fire instead of blowing it up. I was sarcastically told that I must be a great drone expert. I’m not an expert, but why do we need experts for everything? Don’t you think that in their closed-off expert wastelands their vision gets totally blurred? Take, for example, how simple the solution to the Gaza Strip problem seems.
Really simple. Or you’re an extraordinary person, seriously. How simple is the solution to the Gaza problem?
So, Saudi Arabia and the UAE rent the area, invest money, build a tourist paradise involving the local population, earn profits themselves, provide jobs for the locals. But I’ll surely be told — who are you, an expert or what? At every turn we keep deferring to experts. What’s the point? Who will build the future system of international security — today’s experts? Congratulations in advance. Bravo!
Well, dear Yulia, I’m not saying you’re not an expert. Maybe you are, but I am not. You see, when you ask me to reason about something I clearly don’t know — well, I’m not ready for that. I mean, personally. I’m speaking about myself. There’s a clear disproportion here, a clear asymmetry in our communication. I don’t fully know who you are. Obviously, yes. I don’t know. I don’t know your education, your background. But who I am — that’s well known. Anyone who wants to can check my Wikipedia article. They can. Sure, there are some inaccuracies in it, but I generally try not to write my own bio — that’s the last thing I’d want to do. But overall, it’s fairly accurate. And from that you can understand what I know and what I don’t.
When it comes to military affairs, I clearly don’t know anything. About bridge construction — same thing. So I can’t possibly claim to be an expert in that. That’s why I think when it comes to such kinds of engineering and military-technical matters, we really do need experts. Just like, by the way, with solving the Gaza Strip problem. Why hasn’t your version been implemented? Well, probably because neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE are able to solve the problems associated with the Gaza Strip — namely, that Hamas is in control there. A terrorist armed group. And no investor is going to put money into that. That’s a very simple reason why your wonderful plan hasn’t been realized.
Novikov and Sheitelman on Plyushchev’s show Link to heading
So, Alena Akerman: How do you explain the beyond-reason hatred and blindly unfair criticism of the President of Ukraine by lawyer or prosecutor Novikov? Is it due to belonging to the Poroshenko sect and not understanding the harm he does to the country he lives in and even helped defend, by creating division?
Well, that’s unnecessary, dear Alena. Novikov defended Ukraine, not divided it. As far as I know, he genuinely defended it. And ultimately, such statements only benefit the enemy. I assume things aren’t going well. Are you sure Ukraine will survive? I’m sure Ukraine will survive too. And whether things are going well or badly — time will tell.
So, I can say that since the question came up on Friday, and at that time I hadn’t yet seen Novikov’s appearance on Plyushchev’s show, I watched it over the weekend. I watched both Novikov and Sheitelman — I believe they appeared on the show a day apart. I watched both.
Now, there are some absolutely obvious things. The one point where Novikov is truly right is that sanctions against one’s own citizens are nonsense. But here’s the huge issue. Mixing roles always creates vulnerability. That is, Novikov, Poroshenko’s lawyer — as far as I understand — is being paid to defend Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko legally. And at the same time, he’s taken on the role of a sort of public prosecutor of Zelensky. Well, that’s wrong. There’s clearly a conflict of interest here.
Either you’re a lawyer defending Petro Oleksiyovych Poroshenko, or you’re acting as a prosecutor accusing Zelensky. Theoretically, of course, one can say he has a right to his position. But frankly, a lot of nonsense was said about Zelensky — I won’t list it. There was clearly a strong bias on many issues.
In particular, it’s unclear what he’s trying to achieve. Obviously, the occupiers’ interests lie in removing Zelensky. That’s clear. Putin’s constant statements that Zelensky is illegitimate, his repeated attacks, claims that people can talk to anyone — but not Zelensky because he’s illegitimate — all aim at the same thing: destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, holding elections in the middle of a war.
Now, I won’t even get into how technically impossible that is — though it is indeed technically impossible to organize elections. Among emigrants too — that’s several million people who also have the right to vote. Organizing elections in occupied territories, on the front lines — all of this is incredibly difficult and would require immense effort. And yes, it really could blow up the country — which is exactly what the enemy wants.
But the most important thing is something else. The most important point is that Ukrainians themselves don’t want this. All polls show that Ukrainians are against holding elections now. So I don’t understand the need for this.
And in this case, I think Novikov may even be acting against the interests of the person he’s defending — against Poroshenko’s interests. Because this all undermines him. Novikov, it seems, is a very good lawyer, a good advocate. But with his political actions — extreme politicization — he’s seriously undermining his own authority as a lawyer.
That’s why I think in this case — I don’t know, maybe he has a very strong legal position, at least regarding opposing the sanctions against a citizen of his own country — but why he turned the whole story into a political issue, I really don’t understand.
Statement by Navalnaya on Crimea Link to heading
So, Ryzhikova. Please comment on Yulia Navalnaya’s latest statement regarding de facto Russian Crimea.
Well, this statement, in my opinion, is quite scandalous. Although, to be fair, all of Yulia Navalnaya’s statements regarding Ukraine are of that nature. She said the following: the Crimean Peninsula belongs to Ukraine, but currently it de facto belongs to Russia. She could have stopped there, but then she added that this becomes a complicated issue because 1,000,000 people now have Russian passports. And after a possible—well, in short, it’s complicated because 1,000,000 people have Russian passports. Now, you see, to say that this is why it’s a complicated issue—there’s no basis for that, in my opinion. Crimea is Ukrainian, period. The entire world recognizes it as Ukrainian. Therefore, from a legal standpoint, there are no issues here. The problem lies in the possibility of liberating Crimea by military means. That’s where the real problem is. Right. As for the 1,000,000 passports, they are completely irrelevant. Absolutely irrelevant. Because the fact that 1,000,000 passports were issued during the occupation holds no legal validity, since this is forced passportization, which falls under the definition of a war crime. So the issue is resolved quite simply. If and when Crimea is liberated by military or diplomatic means, then all citizens residing in Crimea—regardless of what passports they hold, Russian, Ukrainian—if they committed crimes, they will be held accountable. If they didn’t commit crimes, and they were Ukrainian citizens, they stay where they are, regardless of whether their passport is Russian, Ukrainian, or anything else. If we’re talking about people—and I answered a question about internal migration—if we’re talking about people who were resettled or came to Crimea as part of population replacement, meaning they arrived from, say, the Kursk region, Oryol, Bryansk, Siberia, maybe Chechnya, and began living in apartments abandoned by Ukrainians fleeing the occupation, then these people must carefully pack their things and return to their historical homeland. Period. It’s a simple matter. There’s no complexity here. Yes, this is a process that might require some time and effort. You’ll need to investigate each individual case. So, if you’re a Ukrainian who received a Russian passport under forced passportization—no problem, no complaints. You stay where you are. If you committed a crime against Ukraine, you’re prosecuted according to the law. If you’re a Russian citizen who arrived under this so-called internal migration—or more accurately, under population replacement—and occupied an apartment left behind by a Ukrainian, regardless of whether they were a Crimean Tatar, Ukrainian, or Russian, it doesn’t matter. You had no right to do so. That’s it. You go back to your homeland, provided you didn’t commit a crime. So yes, it’s labor-intensive. But we must distinguish between something being difficult and something being a problem. Right? There is no problem here. It’s labor-intensive, labor-intensive. But as they say: the eyes are afraid, but the hands do the work.
Adam Kadyrov Link to heading
So, Korney Prokhorov In your opinion, what’s behind the renewed focus on Kadyrov and the Kadyrovtsy? What’s all this fuss around the wedding of Adam Kadyrov, the heir? Kadyrov has adult sons older than Adam. Why are they staying out of the spotlight? Especially since, as journalists report, Adam himself—apparently the son of Kadyrov’s second or third wife—is once again being made untouchable by the Kadyrovtsy. Although this seems to be a game between Putin and Kadyrov.
You know, frankly, I don’t see a reason to use the verb “being made” again. This has been going on continuously; nothing has changed. As for Adam Kadyrov—again, since there’s a personal dictatorship in Chechnya, any whim of Kadyrov is carried out. In this case, Kadyrov’s whim is that this underage character is effectively becoming the second most powerful person in Chechnya. He’s the Secretary of the Security Council, the curator of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and essentially the overseer of Chechnya’s armed forces. That’s it. In essence—well, his “achievements” are well-known. His main “achievement” is that he beat Nikita Zhuravel, who was in prison. That is, the person was in pre-trial detention, and this character beat him up—for which he received the title of Hero of the Chechen Republic and was appointed head of the Security Council and curator of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. That’s all there is to it. Kadyrov made his choice. He’s elevating this scoundrel and betting on him. Why him specifically? Why is he making this particular underage scoundrel effectively his second-in-command? I have no idea. Maybe it’s his way of signaling that he’s not yet ready to name a successor. As far as I know, he’s 17 now, and there’s still a long way to go until he’s 30 or 35. So this could be a way to avoid becoming a lame duck by appointing one of his older sons as heir now. That’s one of the hypotheses that comes to mind. Naming someone as successor who could realistically replace Ramzan Kadyrov is dangerous. But appointing a 17-year-old scoundrel as the obvious successor is safe. Because, formally, you still have to wait—how long is it? Essentially, a long time. So maybe this is some kind of guarantee for the stability of his rule. Maybe that’s it?
The author considers himself an analyst Link to heading
Three questions from a subscriber who calls themselves MTS. Do you consider yourself an analyst or a propagandist?
Well, again, you see, what I consider myself is one thing, and what the audience considers me is another. I consider myself an analyst.
Can a democratic state exist without propaganda Link to heading
So, can a democratic state exist without a well-functioning propaganda machine?
So, internally—for domestic purposes—there should be no propaganda. State propaganda might be acceptable if it’s about promoting a healthy lifestyle, or perhaps, I don’t know, promoting something else—animal welfare, for example, or humanism. But there should be no state propaganda aimed inward. As for outward propaganda—say, like the United States, which built propaganda machines but banned those propaganda resources from broadcasting within the U.S.—that was the principle. But your question is about a democratic state, and that means what it does for its own audience. There should be no propaganda targeting its own population. In other words, the state should not use propaganda within its own country. That is a fundamental principle—at least for a democratic state. That’s also why there should be no state-owned media. As for external propaganda, that depends on the state’s foreign policy concept. If a country plans to pursue a rather assertive foreign policy—not necessarily in a negative sense, but aiming to expand its influence abroad—then of course it needs some tools for external propaganda. If not, then not. Ukraine is a clear example: for a long time, many years—up until today, essentially—it has been inward-looking. It wasn’t interested in expanding its influence; no money was spent on that, no foreign broadcasting was created. I’ve talked about this many times with Mr. Podolyak. Why this still isn’t being done is unclear. Every time, Mr. Podolyak told me they were thinking about it. But that’s already another issue, because right now Ukraine really needs to boost its influence abroad. But it has no tools. So that’s the story: internal propaganda is bad, external propaganda depends on the foreign policy concept.
About the book The Assault on Reason by Al Gore Link to heading
And the third question from the same author Your opinion on Al Gore’s book The Assault on Reason
Well, you know, it’s a kind of journalism that, in my view, works quite well as a warning. It outlines various methods of manipulation used by the U.S. government—specifically, for example, under the Bush administration. And I think it serves as a useful warning, especially in light of what’s happening now with Trump. So, if Gore’s The Assault on Reason was a warning, then what’s happening now is the worst realization of the worst-case scenarios described in that warning. So, as people often say in such cases—it’s a very timely book.
What the author knows in Lithuanian Link to heading
So, a question from Andreas. I understand that you leave your place of residence here in Lithuania much less often than you’d like. But still, during your time living in Lithuania, have you picked up any words or expressions in Lithuanian?
Well, greetings—for saying hello, wishing good morning or good evening, or good day. Yes, that I know. But so far, I haven’t started studying Lithuanian. I just don’t have the time.
Why the episodes with Piontkovsky are shorter Link to heading
So? Maksim Lebedev Episodes with guests usually last about an hour. Why is the episode with Piontkovsky half as long?
That’s our mutual agreement. Andrey Andreyevich requested that the episodes be kept within 40 minutes. No problem.
A question about moderators Link to heading
So, an unidentified user asks An unexpected question. What do you constantly think about this issue? The administrators—permanent moderators of YouTube chats of liberal media: Sapsan, Fyodor Orlenko, Rasul Ashkenazi, and so on. Regular viewers who act at their own discretion. Don’t you think their dominance is more like Putin’s camarilla from the Leningrad KGB office that remains in power and never leaves?
Dear colleague, I don’t know anything about this. You’ve listed a few people here—I’ve never met any of them in my life, I’m simply not aware.
Will Mediafrenia continue to be released Link to heading
So, Yevgeny Krasilnikov Will the program Mediafrenia continue to be released in the future?
Well, just yesterday, the latest episode—number 142—was released. It will continue.
About the film Grizzly Man Link to heading
So, Kosta Katsuba, I hope you’re familiar with the documentary film by Werner Herzog. As I understand it, it’s about a man—a grizzly man—a young man who lived as a hermit in Alaska for many years, where bears are most numerous. I’d like your opinion on this sad film—or rather, not about the film, but about the main character, this guy Timothy, who somehow reached the point where he felt uncomfortable among people and in society due to the circumstances of his personal life. And so he sought a path to death. Perhaps the idea of suicide lies on the surface.
Well, and so on. So, what can I say? The film is a good film. A film—well, like much of what this director does—is complex. Here, you can talk about the film as one thing, and separately about the fate of this guy who died in such a tragic way. There’s also the theme of getting off drugs—that’s present as well. Overall, yes, like any good work of art, this film—though technically a documentary—is truly a piece of cinematic art. It’s not banal. There’s no clear-cut meaning. On the one hand, it’s a kind of defense, but on the other, it’s a defense of the individual. The film raises complex, difficult questions—such as how compatible human and animal coexistence really is on this planet. But overall, yes, I liked the film. It raises questions and makes you think.
About reciprocal invitations to the channel Link to heading
And Chuvashov—you probably know him? Eisenberg, editor-in-chief of Israel’s Best Radio. Have you invited him to your channel?
You know, he’s invited me to his channel several times. As for this kind of exchange—you know, going on each other’s channels—it’s an interesting idea. He’s an interesting person. Maybe he should be invited. But I’m not really into that format of, “Today I go on your channel, tomorrow you come on mine.” I remember one very funny episode from when we were covering the protest rallies in 2012. These “cosmonauts” started pushing us out. Literally—ranks of riot police advancing like a Macedonian phalanx. They gradually cut off the journalists, and we all bunched together in this little spot. And I suddenly noticed that the only people left there were journalists. And our task—my task, specifically—was to interview protesters. But it turned out there was no one around but other journalists. And I noticed this totally irrational process where journalists started interviewing each other. That stuck with me. So even though we do interview each other, taking it to the point of absurdity doesn’t seem quite right. As for Eisenberg—we need to think through what we’d talk about, take another look. He’s very good as an interviewer. But whether he’s good as an expert—we need to assess that. Probably yes. Probably worth inviting.
Maksim Kulakhmetov Link to heading
So, Historian Maksim Kulakhmetov promised to be a regular guest on our channel—when will we see him?
I think we will. No problem. Maksim is a very friendly person and always happy to engage. If a topic comes up that’s close to his field, we’ll definitely invite him. I believe he’s a welcome guest on our channel.
Larysa Voloshyna Link to heading
So, Tatyana Degtyaryova. Today I listened to Larysa Voloshyna—how interestingly and vividly she explained Zelensky’s jacket, the bombs on Iran, Trump’s pivot. Don’t you think it’s been a while since Larysa last appeared on your channel?
I think so, yes. The thing is, for me, every guest, every expert is first and foremost about what kind of added value they bring. I think Larysa Voloshyna will be back on our channel.
On the world’s readiness for globalization Link to heading
Mikhail Khramtsov. Khramtsov My bad. It seemed to me that that bastard John Jones has tried twice already to formulate his question, but you respond not to it, but sort of alongside it. Perhaps it’s because it’s hard to express a clear thought in a short question. Though his questions aren’t short at all—they’re practically half a page. You talked about that today. A quote from a Hegel letter: if it’s brief, it’s often not specific. I think the bastard Jones has a sound idea: civilization is moving toward civic nations and their unification into a single whole. National nations were important in their time, but having fulfilled the task of minor unification, they are gradually becoming archaic. That doesn’t mean national identity should be discarded—far from it. It should remain in the cultural sphere of each people as part of humanity’s multicultural foundation. But it must exit politics, as it often causes division rather than unity. In place of national values in politics, universal human values—common to all—should come. And they are the foundation for uniting the world’s peoples who see themselves as civilized.
Well, so to speak—first of all, the text of that bastard John Jones is now starting to take on the air of some kind of sacred teaching. We’re even getting interpreters of it, right? So I’m not going to rely on what John Jones said—I’ll focus on what you said, dear Mikhail Khramtsov. And I think, essentially, what you’re talking about is what ought to be. You say: national values in politics should be replaced by universal values, common to all. “Should.” But will they? See, essentially, what you’re saying—let’s clarify—is: national values should be replaced by universal values common to all. What is that? That’s basically a restatement of Fukuyama’s thesis in The End of History: that all of humanity accepts a set of universal values, common to everyone. That’s the “end of history.” But in the debate between Fukuyama and Huntington—who said no, there are different civilizations and conflict between them—so far, Huntington seems to be winning. What shared values do Iran and Israel have, for example? None. What shared values do Russia and Ukraine—or Russia and Europe—have? What shared values do Trump and his opponents have? It just doesn’t work. What shared values do China and Taiwan have? Not really any. So, with some nuances and caveats, Huntington seems to be right. That’s my response to the normative point you raised. Yes, I agree with you. But in the realm of what is, it’s not working out too well.
Commentary on the differences between Russian and Ukrainian folklore Link to heading
So? Andrey? Igor Aleksandrovich, I’m not a folklorist, but I had a period of actively studying folklore—mostly Ukrainian, but a bit of Russian as well, including children’s folklore and what’s called “Aramaic,” though in Russian that probably means obscene, especially in the Soviet period. The distinction is pretty clear. Very roughly, Ukrainian expressions focus on the butt, while Russian ones are all about the d**. And if they had all come from the same Turkic source, such a difference probably wouldn’t exist. It would be interesting to look into Belarusian, Polish, or Slovak folklore too. Maybe I’ll get around to it someday.*
Well, what can I say? You know, I’ve never studied Ukrainian obscene lexicon, so I fully trust your observation and tend to agree—you’re probably right. But what does this prove? It proves one very simple thing: that Ukrainians and Russians are different peoples. That’s it. You’ve convincingly brought yet another 100,000th argument in support of the idea that Ukrainians and Russians are distinct nations. As for the origin of Russian obscenities—I was only talking about Russian swearing, not Ukrainian. I don’t know anything about Ukrainian swearing; I haven’t studied it. But as for Russian obscenity, this is no longer a matter of debate—it was already proven back in the 18th century that it comes from a single source, and it’s neither Turkic nor Mongolian. That’s been proven. Because, excuse me, we have birchbark letters and inscriptions with swear words carved into stones dating back to the 11th century. So what Turkic origin are we talking about? Who else? Martians? No. Russian obscenity has a distinctly native origin—authentic, with no foreign borrowing. As for Ukrainian vocabulary—yes, you’re right. But these are different peoples. That’s all there is to it.
Novikov didn’t always criticize Zelensky so harshly Link to heading
So, regarding that—another question from Andrey about Sheitelman. NOVIKOV This is a remote debate. You have to look at how drastically Novikov has changed in the past couple of months. Yes, his criticism of Zelensky used to be at the level of Portnikov’s, but now something seems to have snapped.
Well, I haven’t studied Novikov’s rhetoric. So here, I’ll just leave your wording without comment.
Novikov and Sheitelman weren’t on the same episode Link to heading
Elena Bobkova Dear Igor, just a small clarification. There was no debate between Novikov and Sheitelman—there were questions from Plyushchev to Novikov during the morning broadcast. Then there was Plyushchev’s question to Sheitelman about Novikov’s statement.
Well yes, that’s obvious. You see, the discussion did take place, but it was indirect—there was criticism of Zelensky from Novikov and a comment from Plyushchev. So yes, the discussion happened, just not in person.
On the seriousness of the charges against Netanyahu Link to heading
So? Leybin Mark, Igor, you’re absolutely unaware of the trials against Netanyahu—all four cases are made up and just ridiculous. A fancy doll was given to his son, cigarettes were gifted, and so on.
Well, go ahead and laugh. In one of the cases, the gifts amounted to $250,000. I understand that some might find that funny. But no, these are serious cases. Nothing there is made up. So—yes, it’s true that there’s a war, and naturally, all these cases are being put on hold during wartime. But there’s nothing ridiculous about them. These are serious matters.
The untenability of usury as the basis of antisemitism Link to heading
So, a question about antisemitism from Norka. I once came across a little book about the fate of the Jewish people. I’m not part of that people, but the everyday antisemitism I observed was incomprehensible to me. I read it and began to think. The only valid historical reason for antisemitism seems to be the religiously sanctioned practice of usury toward other nations—lending at interest, often extortionate, while lending to fellow Jews interest-free. Makes sense?
I don’t think so. I wonder what members of the Jewish community themselves think about this? You know, there’s so much nonsense out there. Dear colleagues—and I mean no offense—but you wrote: lending at interest to other nations, and lending interest-free to fellow Jews. Do you have even one example of this? Today, this is all institutionalized—there are banks that issue loans. Can you point to even one case where a bank run by an ethnic Jew gives loans to non-Jews at predatory rates, and lends to Jews interest-free? Do you have even one such fact? There are countless court cases where Jews sue other Jews over financial matters. Have you never heard of this? The great legal battle in London between Abramovich and Berezovsky—doesn’t that ring a bell? Enough with this nonsense already. Shall we bring up the blood libel next? What kind of rubbish is this?
On ending discussions about Ukrainian-Jewish issues Link to heading
Power, basically. Jews were persecuted by all nations, but according to your version, they somehow only remember the Ukrainian ones.
Look, once again—I’m not going to keep reading this nonsense. I have no intention of turning this channel into a battleground between Jews and Ukrainians. No one has ever said that Jews remember only the Ukrainian persecutions. That’s complete nonsense. Where is this stupidity being pulled from? That’s it. I’m firmly putting an end to anything related to so-called Jewish-Ukrainian issues. I won’t even read it out anymore.
Has Europe Awakened Link to heading
So, Margarita, I listened to a long stream at the Free Russia Forum with Garry Kasparov, and it made me feel really sad. I consider Garry Kimovich one of the most brilliant analysts in the world. After all, it’s no coincidence he was so successful in chess. According to him, the war can only end by force, that is, with an encircling victory. Or through the regime being overthrown from within, which is less likely. Probably, that’s not news. But in Garry Kimovich’s opinion, Europe is absolutely unprepared to repel an enemy offensive. If the war takes a turn for the worse, Putin’s troops will go further. That’s what’s really sad. Because throughout this war, Europe has basically just watched as Ukraine bleeds, offering help but doing almost nothing to improve its own security. In one of your streams, you tried to explain why Europe is so passive, pointing out that Ukraine wasn’t that strong either—for example, back in 2014, when the first serious moves against the country began from Russia. So how long do we have to wait for Europe to fully wake up—until there’s a full-scale attack?
Well, look, for several decades Europe was under the umbrella of the United States, and it felt quite comfortable. Now that umbrella has caught a cold. I don’t know what else needs to happen, because yes, it doesn’t happen right away—military factories don’t just spring up overnight. Europe is currently setting a goal of 5%. Well, except for Spain, of course. But 5% of GDP being directed to defense is more than what’s currently allocated for defense in the United States. So Europe, overall, you could say, has awakened. But from the moment of waking up to the creation of a powerful defense system, time still has to pass.
On Europe’s Unreadiness to Fight Russia, Just as Ukraine Was Unprepared to Fight for Crimea in 2014 Link to heading
Question from Tesla Dear Igor Ivanovich! But people are telling you that Ukraine didn’t refuse, it simply couldn’t fully resist in Crimea in 2014. The annexation was completely unexpected. The army wasn’t ready, nor were the politicians who came after Yanukovych—no one was prepared. Yet you keep stubbornly insisting that Ukraine didn’t want to fight for Crimea?
Listen, where did you get that from? That’s interesting—I’m hearing this nonsense for the second time now. There’s a simple term: unprepared. When I said that Ukraine in 2014 was unprepared to defend Crimea, I was answering the question—why? Why didn’t Europe come to Ukraine’s aid in the war? I explained: because Europe is unprepared. Do you hear the difference in the words? Europe is unprepared to fight Russia. And Ukraine in 2014 was unprepared to fight Russia for Crimea. That’s all. There is a difference between “didn’t want to” and “wasn’t ready.” That’s it. So there’s no need to force your way through an open door.
On the Flaws of the EU Charter Link to heading
So, a question from Volker What’s with these ridiculous charters of all those EU pharaohs? Unanimous voting. Okay, sure, it’s clear that for decisions concerning security and well-being, full agreement among all countries is required. But say a troublemaker shows up in the group, and he doesn’t agree with all your progressive decisions. And no matter what, you won’t get anywhere—he’s against it and that’s that. Even though everyone understands what needs to be done. And if it’s not done, everyone will suffer. But he’s against it—he doesn’t care who suffers. And to this day, there’s no mechanism to bring a bully like that to reason.
And so on. Well, listen, there is a problem. Indeed, when the EU was being created, no one anticipated this. There was actually a pretty strict filter when the EU was founded. We know how strict—the kind of filter that still prevents Ukraine from joining. Georgia tried, didn’t work. Moldova is currently waiting its turn. So yes, it’s a serious filter. But once you’re in, there’s no option to kick a country out of the EU. It was designed to be a community of countries that are, so to speak, invested. The benefits of being in the EU are so great that it was assumed no one would want to destroy it from within. But they didn’t account for a change in power, where a country already in the EU might end up led by someone like Orbán or even Fico. They’re trying to work around it, trying to exert influence. I wouldn’t dramatize the situation too much. In reality, there hasn’t yet been a case where European countries couldn’t overcome such resistance. Are Fico and Orbán a problem? Yes, in the end they have to be bought off, settled with somehow—problems are resolved that way. And yes, you know, you’re saying the Union is done for. Why write things like that? Why? So, dear colleague, I understand your frustration, but writing things like “the Union is done for”? What does that mean? That it no longer exists? That the EU has fallen apart? That these two dozen-plus countries are no longer members? Or that the EU has lost its appeal? No, none of that has happened—nothing has fallen apart. Yes, the situation with Hungary and Slovakia is unpleasant, but it’s not a catastrophe.
On Trump’s Assistance to Israel Link to heading
So, Mikael Ivlīn I agree with Igor Alexandrovich on many things, but not all. Our attack on Iran would have been impossible if Harris had been in the White House, and just as impossible under Biden. Biden held us back, didn’t allow us to be supplied with bunker-busting bombs and other powerful weapons. Trump is a great president. He gave us all the necessary weapons, supported us politically—even militarily. He will make America a great power again.
Dear Mikael, and how exactly did Biden give Israel bunker-busting bombs? Trump gave you nothing. In fact, Trump was the one who held Israel back. Trump didn’t allow Iran to be destroyed. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—Trump didn’t let you finish him off. So it’s exactly the opposite. As for what would have happened if Harris, for example, or Biden had been in the White House, I think Israel carried out that strike on Iran on its own, and there were no problems. Israel did it independently, without any U.S. assistance. The United States actually did the opposite. Trump himself said, “I saved Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.” That’s his own statement: “I saved him.” And in my view, I wouldn’t call it a crime, but at the very least, it was a very bad move. Because Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is truly a figure incompatible with the security of Israel—and not just Israel. So the fact that Trump saved him doesn’t do him credit and, to say the least, doesn’t make him a great president—just like everything else he does.
On the 7-40 Format Link to heading
So, Igor has become… A commentator on questions, asking questions—I listen to your answers, and not just for myself. I’ve come to the conclusion that the format of “question today, answer tomorrow” often leads to misunderstandings on both sides. Sometimes you don’t quite grasp the speaker’s point, but they don’t have the chance to immediately clarify it—with an audience as smart as yours. To effectively stay in sync, at least brief online dialogues or real-time discussions are needed, though of course that’s difficult. Otherwise, either you or your interlocutors end up offended. All week long it’s clarifications, apologies, and so on. The only other way to avoid this, which I will now choose, is to ask very short, unambiguous questions and expect equally concise answers.
Dear colleague! Well, everyone chooses their own style of communication. I’m offering this one. You’re suggesting short, concise questions. Yes, sometimes it does seem strange to me when someone writes a two-page question. I don’t know—maybe I shouldn’t read the whole thing, but that somehow feels disrespectful to me. I hold to the principle of showing the utmost respect to each of you. And that’s why, if I sometimes still have to shorten things—shorten them when reading the questions—I feel a bit awkward. But yes, the call to ask more concise questions is certainly relevant.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So that’s it for today, dear friends. Let me remind you that at 8:00 PM tonight, as usual, we’ll have Sergey Maratovich Hrabskiy. I think it’ll be interesting to ask him about the main topic of our stream—has the war really entered a new phase? Although to me, that seems obvious. But let’s see what the expert has to say. With that, I’ll wrap up our conversation. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian POWs. See you at 8:00 PM!
Source: https://youtu.be/-VMPAr0nPJQ