Another phone chirping session between Trump and Putin, fairy tales about peace, ceasefires, and other details of the cover-up operation.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 20. It’s 7:41 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Results of the Trump-Putin Call Link to heading
Immediately after Trump’s phone conversation with Putin, the latter gave the order to torment Ukraine. Well, not quite as instantly as after the phony talks in Istanbul, when the night of May 18 saw a record-breaking deadly drone attack on Ukraine, but still a pretty massive one. Since last evening — right after the Trump-Putin phone call — and throughout the night, Russian occupiers attacked Ukrainian territory with 112 strike drones. However, Ukrainian air defenses shot down 41 drones, and another 35 were suppressed using electronic warfare. Still, the Kharkiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Cherkasy, and Kirovohrad regions suffered. Infrastructure was damaged — in short, Putin summed up the call with Trump by launching another attack on Ukrainian cities. That, I believe, is the real brief summary of their high-level phone call. A concise Putin-style conclusion.
Putin seems to have confirmed for himself that the president of the most powerful country in the world not only poses no threat to him, not only isn’t an obstacle to the Kremlin ghoul’s plans to destroy Ukraine and kill all who consider themselves Ukrainian, but that this president, with a sort of Musk-like masochism, continues to humiliate himself by offering the ghoul economic cooperation, fabulous riches, and prosperity. That, in essence, was Trump’s side of the conversation. A textbook case of a masochist — Trump — and a sadist — Putin — finding each other. Sometimes that happens. It’s a solid, enduring bond that can last a long time.
Trump coaxed another phone call out of Putin. Anything just to hear the beloved voice. Sadist Putin picked up the call, but hasn’t agreed to a meeting yet, continuing to torment his admirer. Touching details of this little chirp-fest were shared by Putin’s aide Ushakov. According to him, neither party wanted to hang up first. The call lasted more than two hours. I don’t know which part of the conversation sounded like that song — “I turned around to see if you turned around to see if I turned around” — but it was something in that key. A prolonged courtship phase. During the call, they addressed each other by first names. The dialogue began with Trump congratulating Putin on the birth of his 11th grandchild, Alexander. Well, the grandchild is named Savva Trump, actually.
Furthermore, Putin and Trump reportedly agreed — in very confidential tones, as Ushakov put it — to stay in touch as needed. Ushakov also said that Trump summed up their agreements with a tender phrase: “Vladimir, you can pick up the phone anytime, and I’ll gladly answer and talk to you.” But as we know, pleasure comes at a price. And the price won’t be paid by Trump. It will be paid by Ukraine — with the blood of its citizens and destroyed homes.
Dear friends, I don’t know about you, but I’m getting pretty sick of the pornographic details of the communication between these two fascist ghouls. Of course, when they went public, they fixed their faces, wiped off the greasy grins, bit into a couple of lemons, and tried to briefly and dryly report on their call. Both said they were satisfied with the two-hour chat. They complimented each other generously. Trump spoke very highly of the tone and spirit of the conversation. Putin, in turn, thanked his admirer for helping resume direct talks with Kyiv.
Putin claimed he’s ready to move toward a peace agreement with Ukraine — something he’s been “working on” since February 24, 2022, as we’ve all seen. Trump confirmed this, saying he sees that too — and last night’s attack was yet another confirmation. He promised Russia vast trade opportunities after the war. Ukraine would also get something — not as vast, but, well, proportionate. Sorry, but size matters to people like Trump.
There was definitely a difference in the details. Trump claimed that talks between Moscow and Kyiv on a ceasefire are starting right now — directly, without intermediaries. I don’t quite understand, though, since Trump previously said this process began in Istanbul. And based on the outcome of those phony negotiations, a ceasefire doesn’t seem to be on the horizon. Ukraine demanded one, but Russia insisted on addressing the “root cause” first. We’ll come back to that.
Putin said he’s ready to work with Ukraine on a memorandum for a future peace agreement. But the most important point — and I repeat, the most important point in all of Putin’s statements — is this: “The main thing for us is to eliminate the root causes of this crisis.” Once again, the root cause. And it’s clear that the root cause refers to the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The same old positions — denazification, demilitarization. In other words, dismantle the army, legally recognize Russia’s claim to five Ukrainian regions, and declare that no foreign military — except Russian, of course — will ever set foot on Ukrainian soil. It’s all quite clear.
So, essentially, this is what Medinsky also said after the previous fake negotiations. Nothing has changed. This position is completely unacceptable to Kyiv, so no ceasefire is visible on the horizon. And most importantly, I tend to believe Ushakov when he said that Putin and Trump did not discuss any time frame for a future ceasefire. Judging by Trump’s very warm and kind remarks, Putin managed to convince him that he’s interested in ending the war — but postponed the idea of an immediate ceasefire indefinitely.
So let’s sum up. There will be no peace — because Putin doesn’t want it. There will be no 30-day ceasefire — because Putin doesn’t want it. There will be no direct meeting between Putin and Zelensky — because Putin doesn’t want it. And there probably won’t be a Trump-Putin meeting in the near future either. But that’s less certain — that’s an intimate matter. It depends on how long Putin can keep stringing along his suitor. So far, Putin isn’t ready. Too early. The suitor isn’t ripe yet.
And as for Trump — what about Trump? Where is Trump? And what does he have to do with this? Was he even real? Or was he some kind of hologram, some kind of artificial intelligence? Based on what he says, it’s hard to tell. This is a question that, more and more, should probably be asked by American voters. But, of course, that’s their sovereign concern.
One more thing. It’s clear that once the stream of aid from Biden dries up — best wishes for his recovery — this famous “Biden dropper,” which everyone mocked, has proven to be quite substantial in practice. Obviously, once this so-called “targeted aid” from Biden runs out — which will happen sooner or later — according to some estimates by summer, others by September — things will change. By the way, I also want to apologize to you, dear friends, for the canceled program yesterday with Sergey Ivanovich Grabsky. We’re working it out with Sergey Ivanovich now — we owe him an apology. It was entirely our fault. There was a misunderstanding. Everyone thought we had sent the announcement — but he never received it. So, that was our slip-up. But we’re now arranging a new date to make it up.
Anyway, Biden’s targeted aid — which is currently allowing Ukraine to hold off Russia’s attacks — will likely end soon. And then it’s clear: Trump will give Ukraine nothing. Well, maybe he’ll sell something — though even that’s uncertain. What exactly, in what quantities, what kind of weapons — those questions are becoming increasingly important. That’s why people are now trying to butter up Trump. Praise him. Applaud even his most foolish remarks. That’s what you have to do. He’s the most powerful man on the planet. Never mind that he’s a fool. It happens.
So now, to avoid a repeat of the Oval Office disaster, even Zelensky is praising Trump no matter what he does. European leaders are joining in. That’s the kind of misfortune American voters have brought upon the world. So Ukraine must now rely, first and foremost, on itself. And on Europe. We will continue to monitor whether those hopes are justified. Ukraine will, without a doubt, ultimately prevail — there’s no question about that. The only question is: at what cost? And that is the most important question of all.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, I want to say that following Sunday’s elections in Romania and Poland, today we’ll have a conversation with Oazu Nantoi, a member of the Moldovan parliament. I think it will be interesting. It’s important because when we talk about Ukraine needing to place some of its hopes in Europe, we need to understand what that Europe will look like. How many Trojan horses will it have? That’s why the election results in Romania and Poland are extremely significant. And we’ll have a professional commentary from one of the most competent politicians and analysts. I consider Mr. Nantoi not only a Moldovan politician, but someone capable of analyzing at the European level. So don’t miss Nantoi at 20:30. Now I’ll move on to your questions. There are quite a lot of them, so I’ll try to briefly comment on each one.
Offsetting Between Ukraine and Russia Is Impossible Link to heading
Oleg Pavlenko — Oleg is a sponsor of our channel, for which we are very grateful — writes the following: You likely misspoke when you called potential offsets in Russia-Ukraine reparations fair but technically impossible. What kind of fairness is that, if Russia is the sole initiator of the war, the aggressor? If a Ukrainian missile lands in the Russian Diamond Fund — excuse me — Russia, as the aggressor, cannot claim any compensation. Am I wrong here? Though the Diamond Fund might be a bad example, since Putin’s cronies have already looted about 90% of it.
Dear Oleg! Let’s put some dots over the i’s. This is a serious question, and I will spend a bit of time on it. So look, first of all, I haven’t read the original source — the Memorial document referred to in a previous question — I didn’t read it then, so I was commenting second-hand. The topic concerns some abstract notion of justice, which, frankly, has never existed, does not exist, and never will exist on this earth. Let’s start with a few axioms and try to evaluate what I said and what you, dear Oleg, are saying.
Reparations are paid by the defeated. That’s obvious. There is no absolutely objective court in the world weighing on cosmic scales who did what right or wrong in this war. Russia is the aggressor, solely the aggressor, and all responsibility lies with Russia as a whole and with Putin in particular — this is an axiom.
But tell me, please: in World War II, who was the aggressor and who paid reparations? Was there any offset of reparations between the USSR and the Third Reich? Obviously not. Next question: Were there any war crimes or violations of the laws of war by the Soviet Union? Or by the Allies? Of course, there were. Did any of the Allies or Stalin’s USSR pay reparations to Germany for those? Was the USSR prosecuted for its crimes during the Nuremberg Trials? Of course not. Because the victors judge the defeated. Because the defeated pay reparations.
So let’s clarify this further. Do war crimes happen — crimes committed by Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers toward prisoners of war or by striking targets on Russian territory? Of course they do. War never happens without crimes from both sides. Yes, rhetorically, I fully support Ukraine. So I never highlight or dwell on potential war crimes committed by the Ukrainian side. But of course, they happen. Wars aren’t fought with white gloves.
Are these crimes adequately evaluated by Ukrainian command and judiciary? Of course not all of them. That’s obvious — I feel awkward even pointing it out. Will there be any kind of mutual offset? Of course not.
So I will try to find that Memorial report and return to it. I suspect this is all theoretical. If, as mentioned in the previous question, Memorial really wrote something about mutual offsets, then it’s total nonsense. It’s a kind of thinking that looks at the situation from somewhere like Saturn or Jupiter — somewhere very far away, where they can pretend to be neutral. But of course, it’s complete nonsense. A kind of attempt at arithmetic fairness. Some abstract idea of mutual offsets. Absolute nonsense.
Again, I don’t want to say anything bad about Memorial — I’ll need to read the report. As for the Diamond Fund, I think Oleg is absolutely right. Russia certainly cannot demand any compensation. Though, again, from Jupiter one could ask, “Well, what did the Diamond Fund ever do to you?” But the point remains: reparations are paid by the defeated. Only by the defeated. And there will be no mutual offset, of course.
The myth that Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine Link to heading
Svetlana. Please explain why Khrushchev gave Crimea to Ukraine. Gymnasiums have been operating in Sweden for about 20 years, and all this time both students and colleagues keep asking this question. Especially so in recent years. Thank you and Glory to Ukraine!
Glory to the heroes! Dear Svetlana! As for this — I don’t know, it seems to me I’ve already covered this topic, so I’ll be very brief. Khrushchev did not give anything to anyone — not to Ukraine, not Crimea, none of it. The matter happened in a completely different way. On January 25, 1954, under the chairmanship of Georgy Malenkov, not Khrushchev, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee took place. A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the transfer of the Crimean Oblast from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR was approved. Then came the decree from February 19, and the corresponding accompanying laws from April 26 were signed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Kliment Voroshilov. So the signatures on these documents were made not by Khrushchev but first by Malenkov, then Voroshilov. The stories that Khrushchev did this because he was ethnically Ukrainian — Khrushchev was Russian, Russian, and not Ukrainian. So that’s all nonsense. It’s all lies spread by Russian propaganda.
As for Khrushchev’s political weight — yes, he later became, so to speak, a notable voluntarist, trying to create some illusion of personal power in that regime. But, of course, Khrushchev didn’t give any kind of gift. In January and April of 1954, there was truly a collective leadership. Khrushchev had no personal authority, so he couldn’t have made such a “gift” to Ukraine. That’s complete nonsense.
But that’s the short version. One could say a lot about how it really was, under what circumstances, why, and who transferred what to whom. It was an entirely legal action within the Soviet Union. So now, what Russian propaganda is trying to portray as some kind of voluntaristic act by Khrushchev is about as much of a lie as the claim that Ukraine was created by Lenin — or Stalin. Same category. So explain this at least to your colleagues and students — at least what I just said.
Can a religious state develop? Link to heading
Viktor Krikunov, You recently stated that a state in which religion is woven into the fabric of the government cannot progress. That’s not a direct quote. But what about Israel?
Dear Viktor, so to speak, I can’t respond in detail right now, but I do remember the topic around which I said something like that while explaining my position. First of all, the discussion wasn’t about the structure of the state, but about religiosity. That is, the question was whether a country in which the majority of people are religious can progress. I immediately said that’s not true, because, for example, in the United States of America, religion is treated with great reverence. Just look at the most popular bill in Russia — the 100-dollar note — and see what’s written on it. Look at how practically all U.S. presidents emphasized their religiosity, their attitude toward God, and so on. And yet, that country is without a doubt a leader in science and technology.
As for Israel, yes, it is indeed a country where Judaism holds a special place. But still — still — despite that, it’s a paradoxical story. Israel is, without question, a secular country. What I meant was countries where there is democracy, and I specifically meant theocracies. If it’s a theocracy, then indeed progress suffers. But Israel is not a theocracy, even though it’s a Jewish state where Judaism plays a special role. Nevertheless, Israel is undoubtedly a secular state. Secular? Yes. There is a struggle to turn Israel into a theocracy, but there’s no real hope for that. In Israel, there’s no hope for that. They know how to defend themselves — a certain segment in which they operate, so to speak, engage in their democratic pursuits.
But Israel is undoubtedly a secular country, and that does not contradict what I said. Israel is unquestionably a very progressive country with rapidly developing science and technology. And the guarantee of this is precisely Israel’s secular nature. Despite everything, Israel is a unique entity on planet Earth. So, yes. But the fact that it is a secular state is a historical fact.
Dmitry Muratov Link to heading
Marat Muratov, what is your opinion of Dmitry Muratov and his friendship with Venediktov?
Well, I still do my work, you see? Muratov — on the one hand, he’s undoubtedly someone who, throughout all this time, tried to exist — all the way up to the start of the war. And in fact, after it began, he tried in some way to exist in Russia under the Putin regime, clearly in opposition to it, with the editorial cemetery that existed — or rather, still exists — in Novaya Gazeta. That’s an extraordinary story. You can interpret it in different ways, but at the very least, on the editorial walls of Novaya Gazeta hung portraits of eight people from the newsroom who were killed while performing their journalistic duties.
So Muratov, unlike Venediktov, was — and still is, really — someone who, in his editorial policy, generally acted without regard for the regime. That was real. And it’s clear that Novaya Gazeta, in the form it once had, no longer exists. But without a doubt, it was a completely different media phenomenon compared to Echo and Venediktov. But Muratov — he also, well…
VENEDIKTOV was the ringleader of that liberal circle. Echo was always the gathering point for that group, and it still is, despite the fact that Echo no longer exists — it’s more symbolic now. And Muratov was, in a way, part of that liberal circle too, still is, due to certain traits of his personality, especially his loyalty in friendships.
MURATOV is like one of those musketeers, for whom friendship is more important than truth. That often happens with such people — new-type musketeers. That’s why Muratov really does maintain good relationships with people who are, quite often, not very respectable. It’s just a musketeer thing — where friends are more important than the truth. That happens. That’s the kind of person Muratov is.
I’m not a close friend of Muratov’s. We’ve always had a good relationship, as far as I know. I wouldn’t say I self-censor when it comes to Muratov — no. If something happens that I don’t like, I say so openly.
It just so happens that, among the people who currently represent some kind of media interest, I don’t really have any friends, so I don’t have the “friendship filter,” so to speak. I’ve answered this kind of question before. Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Shestakov — he was probably the only politically significant person I could truly call a friend. That’s just how it turned out — I don’t have those limitations.
And as for Muratov — I still draw a very clear line between him and Venediktov, despite his friendly ties with the latter.
Can a professor invite a female student to the movies? Link to heading
A question from a user — well, that’s how the person identifies. They write the following: A question for you as someone with significant teaching experience. Igor Aleksandrovich, if a young professor invites a female student to the cinema, can that be seen as unethical or something else — say, in a negative light?
Well, dear colleague, let’s just break this situation down, regardless of any written or unwritten rules. I know that in a number of, say, American universities, such an action is considered incompatible with teaching. But let’s just analyze this from the standpoint of common sense.
Tell me, in your view, what is the nature of the relationship between a professor — any teacher — and a student? How would you describe it? It’s a relationship of dependency. Each of us, even if we’ve never been a teacher, has been a student and knows well what that dynamic is like. A teacher holds certain power over the student — they can pass or fail them, give them a low grade or a high one. That’s obvious.
When a teacher evaluates a student — well, exams are a little different because an assistant is often required — but we all understand that the professor or instructor leading the course has full dominance in that dynamic. Even if there’s an assistant present, the teacher’s word is final, and no reasonable assistant is going to argue with the professor or even just the course instructor during the exam process. So the power teachers hold over students is considerable. And it’s especially so in certain environments — I won’t get into that now, it’s obvious.
So when a teacher invites a female student to the movies, it’s clearly — I mean, let’s be honest — he’s not just inviting “a student.” If we look at a typical case, he’s inviting a female student. Or, if other orientations are in play, then a male student. Either way, it’s not part of the educational process — it’s flirting. It’s an attempt to shift the relationship into a different sphere.
Does the dependency factor come into play here? Of course it does — absolutely. So in my opinion, these things are unacceptable.
Now, is it possible for genuine feelings to exist? Let’s dot the i’s: yes, female students quite often fall in love with teachers or professors. That’s also a normal phenomenon. But should — or can — a teacher respond and act on that? Of course not. Absolutely not.
Sure, the Romeo and Juliet story is theoretically possible in a university setting. But if that’s the case, then something has to be done. You either wait or find another way to handle it. But still, such romantic relationships between teachers and students are incompatible with norms — because it’s always an abuse of professional authority. Always.
So I don’t want to come off as a prude or something. I know cases of true and pure love between professors and students — some even ended in marriage. That happens quite a lot. But in such cases, you need to do something — wait, or otherwise make sure the relationship is removed from the academic power dynamic. That can be handled in different ways.
But I’ve often seen teachers abuse their role — and their power, let’s be honest — over students to shift things into another kind of relationship. Frankly, when I saw that, I caused a scandal. Always. There were two such cases. One was in Chita, where I was teaching, and the other was at MGIMO, where I had to take an old goat aside and explain what I would do to him.
That sort of thing always provokes genuine outrage in me. All that “Let’s stay after class,” or “I’ll give you the exam at my place,” and so on — it’s filth. Nothing else.
Has Maksim Katz Sold Out? Link to heading
A question from a user. A question about Maksim Katz. During the Russian elections, one of the regional opinion leaders appeared on Aleksandr Kushner’s channel. He said that someone approached him with a proposal in exchange for certain benefits. They asked him to urge his supporters to go vote — it didn’t matter who they voted for, the main goal was turnout. So why, in the case of Katz, who has a much more powerful platform, do we assume it’s a story about a coach in a pool with no water, or naivety, or a mistaken understanding of the electoral situation? Maybe it’s much more mundane, and we are ignoring or overlooking his possible calculation and pragmatism.
You know, dear colleague, I always start from the presumption of innocence. Yes, I’ve heard a lot too — including from the Anti-Corruption Foundation, which is at odds with Carlson — all sorts of accusations of corruption and so on. But I haven’t seen any payment records. That’s it, period. So accusing someone of corruption when you don’t know for sure and have no evidence, I think, is improper. My criticism of Katz lies on a completely different plane. The fact that he calls people to vote — for example, in the Moscow City Duma elections. I mean, an intelligent person — and he’s undoubtedly intelligent — cannot fail to understand the utter pointlessness of this endeavor. And if he doesn’t understand, then maybe he’s not so intelligent after all. That’s it. But as for corruption — well, at least in this regard, I definitely can’t accuse Katz, simply because I don’t know, and I think making baseless accusations is, in general, not a very good thing. Not very proper.
A Suggestion to Diversify Experts from Moldova Link to heading
Leonid. Would it be possible to diversify the guests from Moldova? There are equally competent experts in Moldovan domestic politics regarding Romania. For example, Anatol Țîgănoc is also a pro-European development supporter and sympathetic to Ukraine.
Thank you. We’ll take note of it. I’ll ask our colleagues to look into the matter. But for now, Nantoi completely suits me. That doesn’t mean I’m rejecting your suggestion, dear Leonid. Thank you for it.
Will Any Polish Government Be Against Russia? Link to heading
A question from Vera. Political scientist Mr. Kulpa could comment well on the elections in Poland. Could you invite him to your channel? One more question. Knowing the past relations between Poland and Russia, it seems to me that any government in Poland will be opposed to Russia anyway. And that’s also good for Ukraine.
Well, regarding Kulpa — I’ve taken note, so to speak. As for the idea that any Polish government would be opposed to Russia, I don’t agree. There are pro-Russian politicians in Poland, including some who participated in these elections. So, well, Poland is a separate topic. I don’t want to make any big statements right now, because the situation there is very, very concerning. I don’t know about pro-Russian sentiments, but nationalist and anti-Ukrainian sentiments do exist, and there are anti-European ones as well. That’s why the situation there is very, very troubling. And I agree with those who think that right now, ahead of the second round of voting, Poland is at a crossroads.
What Is Putin’s Luck? Link to heading
Antonina In the late ’90s, when I was studying at the Faculty of Petrochemical Synthesis, all our professors used to tell us that we were entering an era of expensive oil. So the rise in oil prices under Putin didn’t come as a surprise to me. What does luck have to do with it? Same with Trump’s victory — it was predictable. The U.S. has many intelligent people, but also a lot of lowlifes, for whom a jerk as president is better than a smart and educated woman. Being a lowlife is a state of mind, not tied to socio-demographic traits. Unlike in 2016, when almost all experts thought Americans were better than they actually are, in 2024 no one had such illusions, and Trump’s victory was considered quite likely. So I firmly reject the concept of Putin’s luck. Trump got much luckier, though he’s also a sham, if you look closely.
Dear Antonina! I don’t see any contradiction between your position and mine. What I’m asserting is simple. The predictable rise in oil prices that your professors forecasted — that has nothing to do with it. Look, what is luck? Luck is undeserved success. Luck is when you win, but it’s not due to your own merit. Tell me, did your professors at the Faculty of Petrochemical Synthesis ever say that the rise in oil prices would be caused by the actions of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin? I’m sure they didn’t. So the fact that rising oil prices helped Putin’s economic policy is obvious. That’s the truth, right? What’s next? Trump came to power after the 2004 election — not Kamala Harris. That helped Putin — as we just discussed today. Of course it helped. Was that Putin’s doing? If so, then only minimally. I think Russia did influence the U.S. elections, but it wasn’t decisive. To sum up once again: luck is success that comes undeservedly, due to surrounding circumstances and not the person’s own actions. Again, the oil price spike wasn’t Putin’s doing. Did it help him? Yes. The sudden, severalfold increase helped him. Trump’s rise to power — that helped Putin too. Would it have been harder with Harris? Absolutely. Was Putin’s role decisive in Trump’s rise? No. That’s it. Luck is luck. That’s what luck is — undeserved success.
There’s a Victim and an Aggressor — Why Do So Many People Deny This? Link to heading
Mikhail Khramtsov. Nemtsov. I’m far from philosophy. Still, I think that sometimes, for clarity of perspective, it’s necessary in certain aspects of life not to complicate things, but to deliberately simplify them and reason in binary terms — at least to avoid sliding into the foggy uncertainty of various ideas, where the devil, as they say, hides. For example, good and evil. To me, it’s obvious that Russia invaded another country’s territory — an independent Ukraine — destroying its cities and committing blatantly obvious evil. I’m surprised that this isn’t obvious to everyone. Are they on the side of evil? Or do they believe this is good? Or do they think these actions are beyond good and evil? I mean, what’s the point of such geopolitics, where people’s lives and resources can be sacrificed? After all, the state exists for the person — not the other way around.
And so on. I mean — I mean, well, honestly, dear Mikhail, I don’t quite understand what exactly the question is. I agree with you, and more than that — this is my consistent position. War — especially war — simplifies everything into black and white. I constantly say that for any person, especially any public person who speaks out in public, there’s one simple question: whose side are you on? There can’t be any middle ground here. No nuance. You’re either on Russia’s side or on Ukraine’s. Do you want Ukraine to win? Do you want Russia to lose? If yes, then we’re on the same side, so to speak. If not, then, well — yes, there are further nuances, but overall you’re on the other side. So in general, I agree. Good and evil — especially during war — take off their masks. And here, things are quite obvious. I agree with you. That doesn’t mean everything should be simplified — no. You know, simplification can sometimes be helpful, sometimes harmful. It all depends on the specific situation. You know? Beautiful silky hair on someone’s head is lovely — but in your soup, it’s awful. So simplification is good in some places, bad in others. That’s also a pretty simple idea, I think. There’s no real confusion here.
Can Science Grasp All Mysteries? Link to heading
A question from Ilya, which, as he says himself, is partly scholastic. Do you think science can grasp all the mysteries and laws of the universe, or is that fundamentally impossible?
Well, this is one of the fundamental questions of that part of philosophy called theology — whether the world is knowable. Again, for Kant, it’s not fully knowable. There’s always an unknowable part for Kant. I wouldn’t dare argue with a great thinker, but I believe the world is knowable. I believe that the world can be known. The thing is, every time we reach the boundary of what’s knowable, the picture — the picture of the universe — changes. In fact, science always finds new ways to get around those barriers. So I still proceed from the idea that the world is knowable. But to answer this question with a simple yes or no — from the standpoint of plain rational logic — is impossible. Because, well, there are simply no arguments. It’s a matter of belief, if you will. It’s a matter of belief. I, let’s say, believe in the knowability of the world. So that’s my answer. Yes, this is one of those cases where it’s a matter of belief. I don’t think there’s a rational explanation for it — just as there’s no rational explanation for the idea that the world isn’t knowable.
A Proposal to Rename the Russian Language to “Russka Mova” Link to heading
Viktor Poperechny Do you comment on listeners’ suggestions and questions? Here’s a suggestion: to distinguish between the concept of “Russian language” and “Russka mova.” I found out that in schools in Western Ukraine under Polish rule, they used to study “Russka mova” — which was clearly what they called Ukrainian. Why not now, during these fierce information battles, introduce the concept of “Russka mova” to refer to the Russian language still widely used in Ukraine? This would undermine the Kremlin’s narrative about Russian-speaking cities that supposedly need to be “liberated” for the sake of borders. It would be in Ukraine’s interest to draw a line between the Russian language of Russia and “Russka mova” as a dialect or variety. It’s not a HIMARS or an F-16, but at least it’s some kind of response. Right now, we’re speaking “Russka mova,” but all the narratives are coming from the Kremlin in Russian. What do you think?
Dear Viktor, I don’t think you can talk drones into stopping, talk tanks into turning back, or talk shells out of firing. I don’t really connect with the idea of solving problems through renaming things. First of all, I think this is more of a trick — and a rather naive one at that. We’re speaking Russian, and though fewer and fewer do so, many people in Ukraine also still speak Russian. Trying to rebrand the language spoken in Ukraine — the same language Putin speaks — seems to me not only naive and forced, but also completely ineffective. I don’t think even a single centimeter of Ukrainian land could be liberated — or defended from occupation — through such renaming. So, to put it briefly, I’m not sympathetic to this approach.
Is There a Successor to Putin? Link to heading
Simon. SIMON, anyone, Sorry for any syntax errors. I haven’t written in Russian for about 25 years. My question about a successor was about Russia. Putin was Yeltsin’s successor. In Russia, everyone is waiting for some kind of successor to Putin.
Dear colleague, there will be no successor to Putin. I’ve answered this question several times already, and I’ll gladly do so again. The very existence of a designated successor would make Putin a lame duck. Because as soon as a successor appears — especially if Putin officially names one — the court entourage immediately starts to split: some still run to Putin, while others start running to the successor, thereby weakening him. It creates the beginnings of dual power. That’s why Putin — who, though not particularly bright in some areas, is very attuned to matters of power — understands this perfectly. Especially the kind of indivisible, unified, monolithic Russian power that has existed since the times of the Moscow principality. So, no — there has not been and will not be any successor to Putin. That brief zigzag with Medvedev was a unique event. Putin simply found someone so impotent that four years in the presidential chair didn’t make him a politician. A uniquely pathetic figure — truly rare. And even that scenario is impossible in today’s context. There is and will be no successor to Putin.
Andrey Malgin Link to heading
So the question — this person calls himself Vasya, I think. What is your opinion of Andrey Malgin?
With interest and respect. I don’t know. Nothing more to add.
Whose Side Is Latynina On? Link to heading
A question from Vadim The broadcast with Latynina is fairly recent. I turned it off when she said that aggressive propaganda only benefits and is needed by the losing side. This was aimed at Ukraine. You don’t take things at face value? I know — conditionally. Here’s someone like Yulia Leonidovna, with a background that was, if not in the same trench, then in the neighboring one. And now she’s crawling — belly to the ground — into the opposite trenches. What is this? Has she forgotten what Solovyov, Skabeeva, Simonyan and the rest are? I’d like to hear your opinion.
Dear Vadim, what’s happened with Yulia Leonidovna Latynina is, well, let’s say — if we’re seriously talking about why she’s crawling, you’ve quite accurately and vividly described what’s happening with her. She really has — well, it seems to me she’s already crawled into those opposite trenches. She’s not exactly in the same trench with Solovyov and Kabaeva — no, she’s somewhere nearby. They — she and Arestovych — have set up their own little dugout, almost a cozy family one, from which they mostly fire at Ukraine. Yes, their main target is Ukraine, specifically Zelensky, though they occasionally engage in some friendly fire toward Russia — but rarely. Why has this happened? I don’t know. Again, I don’t consider corruption or recruitment as explanations. But I do think there’s some kind of psychological dependency going on. Arestovych is a rather peculiar figure. And it seems to me that his role in dragging Latynina from the right side of history to the wrong one has been quite fateful — he misled a naive girl. Just kidding. But that’s how I see it.
Nothing Good Will Happen in Russia Within Its Current Borders Link to heading
Tadeusz Kosciuszko. Windows of opportunity come and go. There’s no doubt that eventually another such window will land on Russia. Do you agree? In general, assuming Russia remains within its current borders, then despite these passing windows, its chances of becoming a decent, normal place are directly proportional to the quality of the human material inhabiting it. Which, in essence, means they approach zero. New “spiritual bonds” and regimes are being bred actively. If you disagree, please explain why.
Why do I disagree? I don’t see a contradiction here, because I believe that Russia — in any case… You see, when you talk about the “quality of human material,” I think that’s putting the cart before the horse. Why is there ongoing degradation of the population? Because, overall, the sociocultural processes in Russia have developed over centuries in exactly this way. So if we take the quality of human material as the root cause, then we’re slipping — again — into terminology about genetic defectives, slaves, etc., which is basically racism. I believe what comes first are the sociocultural foundations — they’re what shape the so-called human material. The degradation happening in Russia’s population is the result of those sociocultural conditions into which a person is born. A person isn’t born a genetic slave — they’re born a normal, or at least not inherently broken, child. Then they’re thrown into certain circumstances. I’m absolutely convinced that it doesn’t matter what someone’s genetics are — be they ethnically Ukrainian, Jewish, German, American, French — if you throw them into Stalinist USSR, they grow up a Stalinist, or someone who fears everything. So human material is shaped by sociocultural conditions — that’s what I believe. Moreover, I’ll emphasize again: in my view, there is absolutely no possibility of any democratic — or, in your words, “decent” — transformation of Russia as long as it remains in its current geopolitical configuration, with Ukraine on one side and China on the other. This is not because every large country must become a totalitarian regime — no. But in Russia’s case, these geographic and cultural conditions combine with its specific traditions to make either the preservation of empire (which inevitably gravitates toward some version of fascism) or collapse inevitable. At this point, collapse is quite realistic — and it’s the only path by which Northern Eurasia could cease being a threat to the world and become at least a space that, even if not decent or normal, no longer poses a danger to its neighbors.
Is Geopolitics a Pseudoscience? Link to heading
A question from someone who calls themselves MTS Is geopolitics a pseudoscience or not?
No, I don’t think it’s a pseudoscience. It becomes a pseudoscience when certain people turn it into one — that is, in certain dimensions or specific interpretations, it can become pseudoscientific.
There Are No Centrifugal Forces in Russia — So How Would It Collapse? Link to heading
Igor Stal. You’ve repeatedly claimed that after losing the war, Russia will inevitably collapse. I understand that it’s premature to discuss the postwar future now. But still — what exactly did you mean by collapse? The separation of regions? Among expert opinions, I most often hear that there are no centrifugal forces or significant separatist sentiments in Russia. Why would regions, especially poor ones, want to secede — besides Chechnya? I don’t see any preconditions. Please justify your position, if you can.
Well, before justifying anything, let me ask a counter-question. It’s rhetorical, of course. But tell me — were there separatist tendencies in the Soviet Union? Among the union republics? I can say with certainty that if they existed, they were in a nascent, underground state. There were no real separatist movements in the Central Asian republics. Sure, there was competition for status and resources — no doubt — but no widespread call for secession. In Uzbekistan, in Azerbaijan, even in Ukraine, no one in the political leadership or mainstream was demanding to leave the USSR. It just wasn’t happening. The only real exception was the Baltic States — yes, there were such sentiments there. But even those were harshly suppressed and, I’d say, rather effectively. And the Baltics were always a special case — they joined the USSR later and violently, with bloodshed, deportations, and repression. But again — that was the exception. In general, there were no strong separatist trends. And yet the USSR collapsed almost instantly — all it took was a slight wobble of the Soviet regime. All it took was defanging Article 6 of the Constitution — not even removing it, just gutting it — and boom. The whole Union unraveled.
Now, in today’s Russia? There are centrifugal forces — they’re just being crushed. And once that coercive “binding agent” disappears, things will fall apart. I’ve explained many times — not just Chechnya. Remember the 1992 referendum in Tatarstan? The overwhelming majority of Tatarstan’s residents — including ethnic Russians — voted for effective independence from the Russian Federation. There was a whole “parade of sovereignties” — remember the creation of the Ural Republic, with its own currency? Practically every region, even the poorest ones, had laws that took precedence over federal ones. As soon as the power grip weakens, disintegration begins — and the main beneficiaries will be local elites.
As for “they’re too poor to secede” — well, it depends how you count. Of course they’re poor — when everything is taken by the center and redistributed at its whim, everyone ends up poor. We heard all the same screaming when the Baltics left: “Where are you going? You’ll starve! No one will buy your sprats or your electronics!” And look at them now — doing just fine. The myth that Russia “feeds everyone” is the same Soviet fairytale. When they gained independence, they left with what they had — and some built democracies, others autocracies. That’s a matter of the people’s and the elites’ choices. So yes — the preconditions are very much there.
Could the war in Ukraine last for decades? Link to heading
Question from Yulia. I listened to an interview with Yevgeny Kiselyov yesterday. He is convinced that the war with Ukraine will last for decades, with ongoing negotiations and so on, resembling the situation in Israel and its surroundings—bombings, mediators, talks. According to Kiselyov, this will continue until the imperial mindset is eradicated. And that could take decades. Is such a scenario realistic?
Respected one, but again, you know, I don’t want to take the stance of “haven’t read or listened, but I disapprove.” Overall, I agree, such a scenario is possible. The only thing that bothers me about this interpretation—again, I don’t want to direct this at Yevgeny Kiselyov specifically—is the idea of somehow eradicating the imperial mindset. That’s what troubles me. If Yevgeny Alekseyevich really had that idea, then it seems to me not very well-founded. Because who? Who is going to eradicate it? The imperial mindset? From my point of view, the imperial mindset will disappear as soon as the empire disappears, collapses. Then yes. Again, if it really collapses, not just gives up some regions, like Chechnya breaking away, then the imperial mindset will not disappear. Just as it didn’t disappear when the Soviet Union collapsed. This whole imperial syndrome concentrated in the Russian Federation, although earlier it was undoubtedly spread out in different proportions across practically all the republics. So I think that if there is truly a full collapse, then the imperial mindset will disappear. In that situation, if some large core remains, it could gather again, though in a smaller form, over a smaller territory. But it cannot be eradicated by itself. That, so to speak, is impossible.
Are Lithuanians flirting with their Soviet past? Link to heading
Alexander, Your answer to the question about Dozhd brought this to mind. Why do you think Lithuanians, at least before the war, weren’t afraid to flirt with their Soviet past? I used to get Lithuanian channels on satellite dishes for a while. Well, Lietuvos Rytas less so. Less, more domestic ones. But they regularly aired Russian TV series. Some dubbed, some with subtitles. Probably not anymore. But you probably don’t have Lithuanian TV to check. And if you do, then no time. My personal observations are about 10 years old. But Lithuania was already in the EU back then, not in the CIS. There was a shop sign “Shapoklyak.” Every Soviet child would recognize the profile of the old woman with the rat. In a store called “Doctor’s Sausage” was a portrait of an honored criminal. Only instead of USSR it said “quality in Lithuanian.” But if you go outside and look under your feet, I think you’d still see “PINKUS of the Lithuanian SSR” on manhole covers. Of course, these aren’t monuments on Kača Kosu or Kosu, but the environment does shape perception, don’t you think?
Dear Alexander! Well, I’ve been living in Lithuania for four years now. I don’t see—well, as far as I can tell, to some extent, obviously I don’t go out much, don’t interact that much, but still, I do interact. And I don’t see any flirting with the Soviet past. As for the manhole covers—well, you know, waging war on manhole covers is kind of pathological. I’m not in a position to judge Lithuanian television, simply because I don’t watch it. As you correctly said, I don’t have a TV. And, well, I hope you can see the kind of schedule I work under. I do appear on Lithuanian TV, but as a guest, and they accommodate me by speaking Russian. But overall, I don’t see this flirting. Yes, they probably did show Soviet films—sure, that likely happened. But I don’t see it as flirting. So overall, I don’t have the impression you’re describing. Lithuania is very decisively breaking away from its Soviet past. Lithuania has a very strict attitude toward any attempts at engagement with Russia. For example—just one fact I know, because I interact with a number of people in Lithuania—if someone has a residence permit, meaning they’re firmly settled in Lithuania, and they travel to Russia without a valid reason, they can be stripped of that permit and simply deported. That’s the level of the attitude toward Russia and any Soviet symbols. So I don’t see any flirting here.
Why does the civilized West support Gaza? Link to heading
Friend of a chekist. Why does the civilized West support Gaza? Do they like how these Gazans slaughter sheep in the streets of London? When and where did the system break down?
You know? The Leviathan. This Leviathan of the Western intelligentsia has deep roots. First of all, it’s a long-standing story—when the Soviet Union, undoubtedly one of the main participants in the anti-Hitler coalition, received massive, massive support specifically from the Western intelligentsia in its confrontation with fascism. We remember all those visits by Western writers in the 1930s, during the show trials, when they supported these trials, were absolutely blind to the truth. They said Stalin was great, that he was doing everything right. This was tied to the idea that, when choosing between Stalin and Hitler, people chose Stalin because they saw him as the alternative to Hitler—not knowing or not wanting to know that Stalin and Hitler were allies. This fact is often overlooked—consciously, unconsciously, or simply because people weren’t informed. But sympathy for the Soviet Union was widespread. That’s why McCarthyism didn’t just appear out of nowhere. For all its distortions, it didn’t arise in a vacuum. The communist threat in the United States was real, and so were the sympathies. Leftist sympathies were very widespread. And this remains to this day. These are traditions—traditions of leftist, left-liberal, or simply openly left-wing intellectuals. So it didn’t appear from nothing. And that’s why this support—what does leftism mean, what are the left? It’s the support of the weak. It’s the attempt to always support the victim. From their point of view, the residents of Gaza, the Palestinians, are victims. They’re the weak. The weak are being bullied. They must be helped, protected. So this grows out of normal leftist views, where helping the weak and humanism are legitimate—but then it morphs into the Chomsky effect. Noam Chomsky, who is an absolutely brilliant linguist, became an absolute idiot in politics. That’s the effect—a desire to protect the weak ultimately leads to Stockholm syndrome and to defending or justifying terrorists. That’s how it works.
Closing remarks Link to heading
So, dear friends, I have to wrap it up here. There are still questions and comments, but I’ll probably leave those for tomorrow. That’s the end of our morning Stalin for today. Thank you for your patience. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander Skobov! Darya Kozyreva. To all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives. A reminder once again: today at 20:30 we’ll have a conversation with Moldovan MP Oazu Nantoi. I think it will be very interesting. We’ll talk primarily about Romania, of course. And also about Poland. Because I believe Mr. Nantoi is quite competent in European analysis overall. See you at 20:30.
Source: https://youtu.be/otmP2XiG7tI