Trump found out that Biden and Zelensky are to blame for the war in Ukraine—well, Putin is also to blame. In Ukraine, they decided to hold a May 9 meeting with the heads of state of the anti-Putin coalition as a counterbalance to Moscow’s victory-frenzy.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 15, and I’m in Kyiv. It’s now 07:43:43, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Rhyme with the Titanic Link to heading
Let’s start with a historical rhyme. On this day, April 15, 1912, what is considered the greatest, most tragic catastrophe of the 20th century occurred. In the Atlantic Ocean, the Titanic sank after colliding with an iceberg, killing about fifteen hundred people. And why? Well, I’m not going to repeat clichés or say that the Titanic is a symbol of human civilization. But in fact, there were six ice warnings, and the radio operators were very busy—they didn’t relay those warnings to the watch crew, since they were preoccupied with sending private telegrams, which they considered more important than the fate, the fate, the fate of the passengers. And yet, it really does suggest a symbol of human civilization, because our civilization receives not six, but thousands of ice warnings, and yet the radio operators are too busy—preoccupied with some private matters—and so civilization stubbornly heads toward a new shore every time. And now it’s already like it’s seeking this. And we see today that all kinds of icebergs have emerged throughout the 20th century, and now it’s a different century, but the trend toward the self-destruction of human civilization continues.
In North Korea, it’s the Day of the Sun Link to heading
And today is also a very joyful holiday. April 15 is the Day of the Sun. This state holiday in North Korea is celebrated on April 15 in honor of the birthday of Kim Il Sung, the founder and head of the North Korean state. In fact, Kim Il Sung himself holds the title of “Sun of the Nation” in North Korea. And on this day, April 15, government institutions, business offices, banks, and retail shops are closed. In short, it’s a celebration, a real celebration. North Koreans celebrate the Day of the Sun. I’m not sure whether, say, in Russia or the United States, the cult of personality around a leader will ever reach such heights—but there’s certainly a trend in that direction.
Trump Unveiled a Monument to Himself Link to heading
And now to current events. Well, not exactly today’s event, but very recently, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, unveiled a monument to himself at his golf club. He was gifted a bronze statue called the Monument of Defiance. It was erected in the most prominent spot. This bronze statue was gifted to him by businessman Antonio Constantinou, a former congressional candidate from New York. I have to say, I don’t know how it will be used—whether flowers will be laid at the statue, or some form of worship will develop, or maybe a line will form of world leaders eager to kiss something on Donald Trump, trying to make deals with him. Maybe he’ll allow them to kiss not his actual rear, but the rear of the statue. Anyway, I don’t know—some rituals will probably emerge. But it should be noted that Anthony Constantinou is not the first to decide to gift Trump an image of himself. In fact, he’s far from the first. On March 22, U.S. Special Envoy Steven Witkoff presented Trump with a portrait from Putin—a painting said to be by a leading Russian artist. There seems to be some mystery about who the artist is. We won’t point fingers, especially since it’s Nikas Safronov.
There was also a very touching message, claiming that Putin told Trump how deeply he worried about him when there was an attempt on his life—that Putin went to church, met with a priest, and prayed for Trump, because they had a mysterious friendship. So, anyway, the Day of the Sun is being celebrated today in North Korea. I’m not sure what kind of celebrations are planned for Trump’s birthday. Apparently, he’s planning a military parade. So, each nation gets the ruler it deserves and arranges all kinds of festivities in honor of its leaders. It should be said that the practice of erecting monuments during one’s lifetime did not originate in the United States. Nothing new here, really—because in the Soviet Union, as we know, a twice Hero of the Soviet Union would be honored with a bronze bust in his hometown. So in that sense—yes. But it must be noted that a thrice Hero of the Soviet Union had his bronze bust installed at the Palace of the Soviets in Moscow. So the United States is clearly following the Soviet Union’s path. Trump can really be considered a three-time hero. During the short time of his second coming, he performed at least three feats: he collapsed the global economy, global trade, and brought the reputation of the United States below rock bottom—and made China the West’s new hope. And a fourth feat, not yet complete, is that he has divided, or is in the process of dividing, Western European civilization into two parts—into the civilizations of the New and the Old Worlds. So what now? That makes him a four-time hero. And this outstanding man just made an important and fateful statement during his recent meeting with the President of El Salvador. On his body…
Trump’s Discoveries Link to heading
And Trump shared his discovery. It turns out that Biden and Zelensky are primarily to blame for the war in Ukraine. Well, and Putin is also to blame. Although the order varies—in different parts of his statement, he alternates between putting Biden and Zelensky first, and sometimes highlights Putin. So, three people are to blame. I quote: “The war should never have been allowed. Biden could have stopped it, and Zelensky could have stopped it. And Putin should never have started it. Everyone is guilty. A million people have died because of three men.”
Now, of course, we won’t go into the fact that there aren’t a million dead in this war—thank God—but obviously the war won’t end today. Still, as of now, there is no million. Trump lies every time he opens his mouth—that’s well known. But still, the main point here is that everything is supposedly because of these three individuals. Trump, of course, doesn’t explain how exactly Zelensky could have stopped the war. Or how Biden could have stopped it. Well, maybe he could have. But now, at this very moment, we can see how Trump himself is trying to stop it. So far, it seems he hasn’t succeeded at all. Again, the usual claims that this is “Biden’s war,” that if the election hadn’t been “rigged,” there would be no war. That President Zelensky is a fraud, that Joe Biden handled things terribly, and so on.
I’ve already spoken about the utterly bizarre reaction to the strike on Sumy. Was it a mistake? Whose mistake? Apparently, it was a mistake by whoever elected Putin at the time, or perhaps the one who elected Trump. Hard to say. And then, during his meeting with the President of El Salvador, Trump was asked about Zelensky’s request to buy ten Patriot air defense systems. He responded that Zelensky always wants to buy missiles, and then added: “Listen, when you start a war, you should know that you can win the war, right? You can’t start a war against someone twenty times stronger and then hope people will give you missiles.”
A stunning statement. It feels like Zelensky started the war. So, what was Ukraine—and Zelensky personally—supposed to do when Putin attacked? It really seems like Trump is living in some isolated space, cut off from the signals of the outside world. So, perhaps I won’t quote him any further. A lot more nonsense was said during the Q&A session. All of this happened during the meeting with the President of El Salvador, followed by a press interaction. Journalists tried to figure out what Trump thinks about what’s going on. And this is what he thinks. Three people are to blame—Biden, Zelensky, and, well… Putin, who probably shouldn’t have started the war either. But of course, Biden and Zelensky are mainly to blame.
A Counterbalance to Victory Day Mania on May 9 Link to heading
So, one of the significant developments that happened yesterday is that Ukraine has announced a decision. The political leadership of Ukraine has decided to hold a meeting on May 9 with the heads of state of the anti-Putin coalition. This is clearly an attempt to create a counterbalance to Moscow’s May 9 Victory Day celebrations and military parade. The invited guests include leaders of the European Union and those participating in this coalition—the coalition of the willing, so to speak. The goal is clearly to create a counterbalance to the May 9 spectacle and to demonstrate unity and resolve in the face of the largest act of aggression in Europe.
Basically—though I won’t list everyone invited—virtually all European leaders who are part of this coalition of the willing have been asked to attend. At the same time, the EU’s top diplomat, Ms. Kaja Kallas, has already warned EU leaders against participating in Moscow’s May 9 events. It will be interesting, of course, to observe who attends Putin’s May 9 festivities. It’s fairly clear that North Korean troops will take part in the parade. Also expected at the celebrations are the leaders of Slovakia, China, India, Brazil, Serbia, and possibly Hungary. So, overall, if we set aside the Chinese leader—who will most likely attend and whose country was indeed a member of the anti-Hitler coalition—the rest, like North Korea, which, as is known, was part of the Japanese Empire during World War II and thus an ally of Hitler, present an interesting picture. Slovakia fought on Hitler’s side, Hungary also fought on Hitler’s side. So on May 9, the gathering in Moscow will mostly consist of representatives of countries that fought on Hitler’s side.
Which, frankly, matches today’s alignment—sorry. So if the leaders of countries that were members of the anti-Hitler coalition during World War II come to Kyiv on May 9, we’ll end up with a rather ironic picture: on Victory Day in Moscow, many of the leaders present will be from countries that fought for Hitler, while in Kyiv, the leaders will be from countries that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition. That will reflect today’s reality. That, essentially, is what the current global landscape looks like.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
And now I’ll move on to answering your questions.
On Berdyaev Link to heading
A question from Yevgeny:
Could you please share your opinion on Nikolai Berdyaev’s views on the meaning and essence of the Russian soul from today’s perspective?
You know, dear Yevgeny, I have a rather critical attitude toward Russian religious philosophy in general, but that doesn’t mean… When I was reading—and I only recently stopped teaching philosophy lectures—and when it came to Russian religious philosophy, which is certainly part of the course, I would always give a disclaimer right away that my critical stance should in no way affect the knowledge being presented. So yes, my view on this is quite critical.
As for the current relevance of Berdyaev’s views—well, I don’t know, you can judge for yourself. His reflections on the Russian soul as feminine, as waiting for an external source, as struggling with form and self-discipline, as tending toward extremes—all of this he links to the vast open spaces of Russia, and so on. He certainly attributes a high level of political significance to the Russian soul. Today, yes, there’s a clear temptation to take Berdyaev’s ideas as a springboard to develop certain ideas—of submission, of servitude. His sociological concept of the Russian soul’s femininity and passivity is very widespread right now.
I’m not a big supporter of drawing conclusions from such metaphysical qualities of the Russian soul as postulated by Berdyaev. I believe there are specific historical reasons for the peculiarities of the Russian mentality. So, in short, Berdyaev’s ideas don’t really resonate with me. Although I understand why many people are drawn to them and rely on them. That’s how it is. Again, I’m not the best conversation partner for Berdyaev, because I don’t really connect with what he writes.
That said, he was undeniably a talented person, a strong literary figure—I think he was very strong in that sense. But I don’t see a scientific approach there. I’m more of a supporter of the scientific core of philosophy. Of course, philosophy isn’t purely science—it is, but also more than that. Still, I tend to favor a science-centered approach to philosophy. Again, that doesn’t mean it’s the only valid approach.
On Teaching. “Thinking Together” Link to heading
Ivan Goncharuk:
A question for you—right in a row. A question for you as a teacher. Is it true that when you give knowledge, you get back even more in return?
Well, it depends. It depends on what kind of teacher you are and what state you’re in at the time. I can say that, of course—this is why I say the motto of our channel is “let’s think together”—because when you truly start thinking together with your listeners, with your students, that’s when you get something in return. Because it becomes a kind of dialogue. Even if you’re speaking in monologue form, there’s still a dialogue happening—with authors, with the books you’ve read, with the material you’re engaging with. So you’re always building something in the form of a dialogue, a new form—and that’s when the enrichment happens.
But I think that in the practice of the vast majority of teachers—including my own—there have been times when there’s degradation, burnout, when especially in my case—since I only briefly worked as a full-time teacher, and mostly it was something supplementary—so there were times when I wasn’t well-prepared, when I reused old lecture notes and just started droning on. And when that happens, there’s no way you’re getting anything back. But when you really put in the effort, when you start thinking together with your students—then, of course, there is a return. A huge one. Because collectively, the audience is always—always—smarter than the teacher.
Again, we’re talking about collective knowledge in various fields, about collective intellectual potential. Practically always, the audience is smarter than the teacher. That’s why such a dialogue is enriching. But it’s crucial that this dialogue actually takes place. It’s important not to look down on the people you’re lecturing to. Because the teacher-student relationship always has an element of authority. The teacher, the professor, has power. They can pass or fail someone, give or deny credit. That shouldn’t distort things—but it often does, quite seriously. Because when I’m telling someone something, it means I know something—and you don’t. I’m smarter. That’s a big mistake, a real temptation. A serious mistake. Because I know for certain that among the people listening and watching me right now, there are many who are smarter than I am, who know more than I do. And acknowledging that fact should be one of the axioms, one of the cornerstones of any real dialogue. And then, yes—you truly get back even more in return.
On the Mistakes of U.S. Democrats Link to heading
So, Viktor:
What do you think—did the Democrats in the U.S. make significant mistakes in domestic policy during President Biden’s term? If so, what specifically? Should they now conduct a critical analysis and develop a forward-looking program for the upcoming midterm and presidential elections? Or is it enough for them not to make any concrete policy adjustments and simply wait for voters to react to Trump’s current policies? I understand you don’t live in America, but I’m still interested in your opinion.
Yes, indeed—not only do I not live in America, but I also don’t consider myself a specialist in U.S. domestic policy. I don’t want to spout clichés. You know, here’s what I think we’ll do. Obviously, there’s a set of standard points—like the fact that Biden’s policies were to a large extent forced to follow the lead of the so-called progressive wing. I mean the far-left wing. That is, without a doubt, a mistake. But how much the internal dynamics of the Democratic Party actually allow for course correction and breaking free from dependence on the progressive wing—I don’t know.
So, you know, this might be a topic for a separate conversation. I’m not sure how much of our audience would be interested in it, but it could definitely be its own discussion. And probably one of the few people who could really lead that conversation is Igor Naumovich Aizenberg. He was recently on our channel. I think he’s one of those people who really understands U.S. domestic politics comprehensively. Among the guests we’ve had, I don’t think anyone equals him in terms of knowledge of U.S. internal affairs. I think we’ll have that conversation with him. That would be far more useful than my rather generic reflections.
Yury Vlasov Link to heading
So, Tamara Pumpyansky:
What’s your opinion of Yury Vlasov? He seemed like a strong figure and a consistent democrat in the early 1990s, but later, after losing the Duma race, he aligned himself with the Stalinists. Maybe I’m wrong—please correct me.
Dear Tamara! I have nothing to object to—because I had the chance to get to know Yury Vlasov. Indeed, we were deputies in the first convocation of the State Duma, and that’s when I met him. Before that, there had been an initiative from one of our colleagues in the Republican Party to invite him to join the party as one of the leaders, because he was undoubtedly a prominent, charismatic figure—a celebrated, outstanding athlete, a man deeply impressive in his physical strength.
We met and talked for several hours. I must say—I don’t really want to speak harshly now, because he was certainly a very bright, very appealing person in many ways. But my impression was that he suffered from a fairly serious persecution complex. His worldview, I think, was heavily shaped by his difficult life path—he had endured a lot, both physically and emotionally. As for what you called his “Stalinism,” it stemmed from his conviction that the only way to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis—between communism, or more precisely, the Chekists on one side—he was actually quite close in his views to our mutual colleague Yury Felshtinsky—he believed that the Soviet Union was ruled by the KGB. His ideas about the KGB’s omnipotence, its constant surveillance, including of him personally, were the foundation of the distortion I observed when we talked.
He believed that the only way to pass between the Scylla of the Chekist regime and the Charybdis of fascism was through spiritual Orthodoxy. That is, his religiosity—as far as I could tell; I don’t know how personally religious he was—but he believed that spiritual Orthodoxy was the panacea. And patriotism was central—patriotism as the foundation. This is what led him to drift toward the most obscurantist political structures, where he ultimately vanished from the political scene. Because if he had remained committed to the democratic principles he upheld during his time as a People’s Deputy of the Soviet Union, I think his political star would have been much more stable.
But because he veered into this pseudo-patriotic sector, he disappeared as a political figure—much to my regret. He undoubtedly had potential, a sharp mind despite all the rough edges. A very vivid and, in his own way, attractive person.
About Ramiz Yunus and Yevgeny Savostyanov Link to heading
Here’s the thing. Two questions from Gloomy Donkey:
First question. Ramiz Yunus. Yevgeny Savostyanov. Same kind of Trumpists. I’m not quoting many of their wild Trumpist statements—it’s pointless for obvious reasons. Like other well-known Russian-speaking Trumpists, you seem extremely lenient toward them, and I don’t recall a single critical comment from you about them. Are all Trumpists equal, or are some more equal than others? Correct me if I’m wrong. Well, congratulations.
You know, Gloomy Donkey, I want to tell you—there are plenty of Trumpists in the world. Right now, I’m preparing the next episode of “Trumpophrenia,” and it’s quite possible that the people you mentioned will be included. At the very least, I’m expanding the list, the circle of people we’re analyzing as featured “heroes” of Trumpophrenia. So nothing’s over, and I assure you—I don’t have any kind of selectiveness at all. So I don’t accept your accusation.
On the Reinforcement of a Servile Mentality Link to heading
Second question: Could centuries-long negative selection within a single nation lead to genetic changes in people’s characteristics—or further intensify existing psychophysiological traits, specifically a servile mentality?
You know, once again this question implies the existence of some kind of “slavery gene.” In one of my previous memos, when responding to a question about whether empathy is innate or acquired, I cited research by British scientists who empirically established that empathy, as a human trait, is about 10% hereditary and 90% acquired. But most importantly, the methodology of this research—which, as far as I understand, was conducted by a joint team of American and British scientists—had its limitations. For instance, they weren’t able to identify specific genes responsible for empathy. They couldn’t pinpoint the carriers of these traits. So I already had significant questions about the methodology, but I still felt it was worth mentioning in response to that earlier question.
Now, speaking to your question—there is no such thing as a “slavery gene.” At least, no one has ever succeeded in identifying one. So I believe this so-called centuries-long negative selection could lead to physical changes—for example, physical traits like height or appearance could be affected. If, say, there were a situation where taller people were systematically disadvantaged, over time this could fix certain hereditary traits and the population might shrink in height. That’s because physical characteristics clearly do have a hereditary component.
But when it comes to things like a servile mentality—this is definitely acquired. Definitely acquired.
On Viktor Tsoi and Pasha Teknik Link to heading
A question from a subscriber who calls themselves “user”:
Here’s a bit of context. I believe that Teknik—Pasha Teknik, the rapper—and Russian youth are a very important topic. You’re absolutely right that an involuntary social experiment has been conducted, leading to the current state of today’s youth. And you pointed out that there’s a big difference between what was happening around Tsoi back in the day. But Tsoi also had drugs and a protest against life, etc. So here’s the question: could you more specifically and thoroughly explain the fundamental difference between Tsoi and Teknik in terms of how they relate to youth? Surely, there must still be other kinds of youth today—for example, among students of top universities. What’s the mood there, how is it expressed?
You know, dear colleague, first of all, I’ve been out of Russia for three years now, so I can’t responsibly speak to the current situation among student youth. That makes it hard for me to assess. But as for a deeper analysis of the Pasha Teknik phenomenon—today’s Tuesday, so this Thursday at 11:00, yes? Yes, at 11:00 we’ll be having a conversation with Artemy Troitsky. And I won’t hide the fact that I specifically invited him in light of how relevant this issue is. Because a phenomenon like Pasha Teknik really does require serious reflection. It’s not even that Pasha Teknik himself is such a monumental figure deserving of long discussion—but what happened around his death, the almost cult-like attitude toward him—definitely calls for a real conversation.
So I think that’s something I’ll dig into more deeply with Artemy Lvovich, since I don’t really consider myself a specialist in music, especially not youth music.
Now, as for the difference between Tsoi and Pasha Teknik—I think it’s pretty clear. Tsoi was unmistakably a carrier of protest sentiment—specifically protest against authority. Pasha Teknik, on the other hand, never expressed any protest against authority; politically speaking, he had no clear positions. There were some Nazi-style remarks here and there, but considering his persona and tone, I think they could be read as parody—he mocked everything, including his own life.
But the most important difference is, of course, the attitude toward drugs. Yes, drugs were a weakness of Tsoi’s, that’s well known. But there’s a fundamental difference. Pasha Teknik was a symbol of drugs—a cult of drug use. His entire life and creative output were open, unapologetic promotion of drug addiction. In contrast, Tsoi, despite having been part of that environment himself, still created things like the film Igla, which is a very direct anti-drug film—and it was hugely popular at the time. So yes, the difference is massive.
And if we want to draw a general line between them, I’d say Tsoi was clearly a hero on the side of good. And Pasha Teknik—a hero on the side of evil. At least, that’s how I see it for now. Still, I’m looking forward to the conversation with Artemy Troitsky, because the topic is much broader—it’s really about youth musical culture, and youth subculture in general. That includes pop music, humor, and more. I hope we’ll cover all that.
On “Peace” in Chechnya and in Ukraine Link to heading
Rada Ivanchenko:
Do you think Russia is using the Chechnya scenario in its destruction of Ukraine? They also forced a truce there.
Dear Rada, I’m not sure what exactly you mean when you mention Chechnya and a truce. If you’re referring to the Khasavyurt Agreement of 1996, then I don’t think there’s any analogy to be made here. The Khasavyurt Agreement truly ended the First Chechen War, and it was an absolute good.
As for the current situation in Ukraine—there is nothing similar. So let me clearly state once again: in my view, there is no analogy here. The situations are fundamentally different. And again, if we’re talking about what could be considered a truce—if you do mean Khasavyurt, which is the first thing that comes to mind—then yes, Khasavyurt was a good thing. If something similar could be devised to end the war in Ukraine, I would wholeheartedly support it. But unfortunately, nothing of the sort is on the horizon.
On the Danger to Zelensky Through the Example of Władysław Sikorski Link to heading
A question from Semyon:
There was a Polish Prime Minister, Władysław Sikorski. He defended Poland’s independence and sovereignty within the 1939 borders and demanded punishment for Soviet crimes like the Katyn massacre. As a result, he was eliminated by British intelligence, possibly with Soviet involvement, in a staged plane crash in 1943—because he was interfering with the Allies’ dealings with the Red filth. In light of today’s alliances with today’s Russian filth, do you think Mr. Zelensky is in danger?
Dear Semyon, you know, I can’t agree with your version of the death of Władysław Sikorski. Sikorski was the Prime Minister of the Polish government-in-exile. As for his death, the main version is still that it was a plane crash caused by an accident. Though yes, there are serious theories suggesting it was an assassination.
I have to say, there’s one institution I personally trust in this matter. Of course, as you understand, I couldn’t conduct any independent investigation for obvious reasons. But the Polish Institute of National Remembrance continues to investigate the case. The theory of British involvement is not the primary one. The dominant version is still the Soviet trace—if it was a murder, then it was carried out by Soviet intelligence services. The British theory exists, but it’s not the main one—at least, based on what I’ve read and what the Polish institute has concluded so far.
As for your concern regarding the safety of President Zelensky—I do share that concern. But if your worry, dear Semyon, is aimed at suspecting the allies—that is, suggesting the Americans or the British might kill Zelensky—I don’t believe that. I think the threat to Zelensky does not come from Washington or London, but from Moscow. But again, that’s my personal opinion.
On Kellogg and Witkoff Link to heading
A subscriber named Beton-Stal-Drevesina asks:
Russia excluded General Cynologist Ukraine from the negotiation process. Are there any chances to exclude Stepan Tsvetkov? Witkoff A.
Well, dear colleague, I don’t think Ukraine has such a chance. Simply put, Steve Witkoff is part of the negotiation process not with Ukraine, but with the United States. The point is—you can only really influence who takes part in negotiations if the negotiations are happening with you. That is, if someone is involved in a negotiation process with Ukraine, then yes, Ukraine could potentially influence who sits at the table. Even then, it’s not guaranteed.
But as for Witkoff—he’s involved not in a negotiation with Ukraine, but with Russia. So I don’t see how Ukraine could influence that.
On Valery Panyushkin Link to heading
A question from Olich:
I happened to watch a Radio Liberty interview with writer and journalist Valery Panyushkin. What’s your opinion of him? I found him to be an interesting conversationalist. I learned a lot of new things—for example, that prisoners are mistreated on both sides. Could you ask Hrabski about this?
I’ll try to remember and ask Hrabski this question. As for my opinion of Panyushkin—I share your assessment. He’s indeed an interesting journalist, a notable human rights advocate, and a person with a clearly defined worldview. He’s definitely a striking figure in Russian journalism.
On Shelest Link to heading
Marina:
Two questions about Shelest. Is it true that he now lives in occupied Luhansk? As for the fact that you once gave him an interview—that’s not even the issue. It’s just Stalin casting pearls before… well, you know the rest.
I have no idea where Shelest is currently located. As for the fact that I once gave him an interview—yes, and I’ve already explained this: I don’t know whether Shelest himself went through some kind of transformation, but during those interviews, when he behaved like a journalist—asking questions and listening to the answers—I considered it reasonable to appear on his channel.
When he stopped doing that and began essentially pushing his own worldview, which radically differed from mine, I simply saw no point in continuing. Whatever Mr. Shelest wants to say on his channel, he can do so without me. So I just stopped going—and that’s it. Again, I’m not insisting that Shelest changed. I’m saying that the nature of our interaction changed—and it became absolutely unacceptable to me. That’s really all there is to it. Yes.
On Vladimir Kara-Murza Jr. Link to heading
The second question from Marina is about Vladimir Kara-Murza:
I’m really disappointed. I know that you and many others held him in high regard—largely because of his father. Though honestly, I’m not that familiar with Kara-Murza Sr.’s work. But I know how respected people feel about the younger one, especially for his work on the Magnitsky Act, his connection with McCain—he seemed like a model of anti-Putin resistance. But where did it all go wrong? Was he recruited? I don’t believe he was truly broken during prison. Was he just weak? It’s all very disheartening. I’d like to know your thoughts on his recent statement.
Well, we’re obviously talking about Vladimir Kara-Murza’s widely discussed comment—the one where he said that ethnic Russians find it harder to shoot at Ukrainians because they’re a kindred people, while others—non-Russians—don’t feel that way, so it’s easier for them. I’m paraphrasing, but that was the essence of it.
Let’s be clear: the statement is stupid and repugnant. Why he said it, or what he was thinking—I don’t know. I reject the idea that he was recruited. I reject the idea that he was intimidated or broken in prison. None of that happened. He just said something stupid. Plain and simple.
What he said contradicts everything we actually see. Yes, there are indeed a lot of non-Russians in the Russian army. And the reason is obvious—they’re drafted from the poorer national peripheries, like Tuva, where the standard of living is dramatically lower than in Moscow. So it’s much easier to buy cannon fodder in Tuva than in Moscow. That’s why the percentage of ethnic Russians may be lower than non-Russians in the occupation army—not because it’s “easier” for some to kill Ukrainians. That idea is nonsense.
And supporting Putin’s propaganda line that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people”—that’s absurd. Ukrainians and Russians have never been one people. Not for a single second in history. Yes, there were long periods of Russification, of oppression, of domination by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. But they have never been one people.
So again—Kara-Murza, a person I still have a certain sympathy for, said something deeply foolish. What else can I say? Why? Perhaps he’s still part of that liberal circle—one that leans toward the so-called “party of blood ties.” People who haven’t fully taken Ukraine’s side. Not just in the sense of supporting Ukraine—because at this point, if you don’t sympathize with Ukraine, you’re simply a fascist, period. And Kara-Murza is definitely not a fascist. But I’d say he lacks clarity.
There was a time—back in the day—when the litmus test question was: “Whose is Crimea?” Today, that question has become less relevant, because most decent people have a clear answer. Now the real question is: “Do you want Russia to lose?” That’s the new litmus test. And I think this is where many people falter. Because if a person doesn’t want Russia to lose, then they haven’t made up their mind in this war. In my view, that puts them partially in the “party of blood ties.”
That’s the position of people like Shlosberg, Yavlinsky, and yes, Ksenia Sobchak. That whole crowd. And with this statement, Vladimir Kara-Murza Jr. has shown that he, too, may be leaning toward that party. It’s sad. It’s unfortunate. What else can I say?
On the Deaths of General Secretaries and Swan Lake Link to heading
Anna:
People often mention Swan Lake these days, supposedly in connection with the deaths of Soviet general secretaries. But I clearly remember that the ballet was only shown during the GKChP, when they didn’t know what else to broadcast. When the general secretaries died—there were no such issues.
Yes, yes, of course. During that famous “gun carriage relay” period—when Brezhnev, then Andropov, then Chernenko died in quick succession—no, there was no Swan Lake broadcast, no such issue. So you’re absolutely right.
Did Strikes on Germany Accelerate Victory in WWII? Link to heading
Arkady Mikhailov:
Did the bombing of German cities accelerate the Allied victory in World War II, or were they pointless?
The debate on this topic is ongoing, and there’s no definitive conclusion. But I believe that the air strikes on German cities did indeed accelerate the coalition’s victory—because these were major cities with significant industry, including military and defense production.
Most of the controversy revolves around Dresden, which was a key transportation hub. Even there, there was military relevance. At least in my view, I side with those who believe the bombings had military significance. In other words, there was strategic justification. That means the strikes on German cities undoubtedly helped speed up the Allied victory.
On the Strikes on Sumy and the Godlessness of Russian Military Forces Link to heading
A subscriber named “Ukraine Kharkiv” writes:
I know you’re an atheist, but still—maybe you’ll read my question. The strikes on Sumy targeted civilians, including Orthodox believers coming home from church. Do Russian military personnel involved in these strikes pray to God afterward? Who are these people? How do they live, what do they feel—what’s in their soul? Or are they not even human?
You know, I take this question very seriously. Even though I’m not a believer, in this case I’m less interested in whether they pray to God. What matters more is the question you asked: what’s in their soul? That’s a profound question, and I’d like to respond—not with a knee-jerk answer, but indirectly. The way Hannah Arendt did in her piercing, vital book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. She didn’t judge without knowledge—she studied the subject in depth. She examined how evil functions from within, how it feels inside. And she portrayed this extremely well. But Eichmann isn’t the same as these missile launchers—he’s a different kind of person. Still, the banality of evil she describes was laid bare through careful analysis.
And I’d want to approach it the same way—by getting to know the object of study. I don’t want to speak in generalities, to say “yes, they’re all monsters” or “they’re born brutes.” I don’t know them. And I’d like to. I hope that someday I’ll have that chance—if I live long enough. Holocaust survivors lived to see their chief executioner Eichmann face justice. I believe that research like Arendt’s should also be done in relation to Russian war criminals.
It’s easy now to spout clichés—that they’re non-humans, beasts, and so on. That’s easy, but I won’t do it. So I’ll simply say: I don’t know. I want to meet them. I want to hear them. I want to see how they act in their families, what they talk about, what kind of toasts they give after carrying out such strikes. All of that matters. Just like Arendt’s Banality of Evil mattered.
The author of the question goes on, under a pseudonym:
Do you think the Russian people are capable of repentance like the Germans—or does that contradict their mentality? To them, does admitting wrongdoing feel like weakness? How much are they capable of self-reflection?
Dear colleague, the comparison with the Germans is not exactly apt. Because, let’s be honest, the Germans came to repentance only after several decades—and after undergoing forced denazification. The Germans didn’t come to repentance on their own—they were defeated, occupied, their statehood was dismantled for decades, and the country was divided into occupation zones. Germans went through forced detox from the drug of fascism—immobilized, fractured, forced into recovery. And then repentance came. Think of it like addiction rehab—this is a very serious process. Japan went through something similar.
But who will do that to Russia? Who will take on that external role of forcing repentance? Repentance won’t arise on its own—no nation has ever repented on its own after decades of totalitarianism. You won’t find a single example.
As for your question about whether a nation can possess “reflection”—nations don’t reflect. Populations don’t self-reflect. What they have are institutions of reflection: literature, philosophy, and so on. In Russia, these institutions are very weak.
But to return to the core of your question—about the capacity for repentance—you mention the Germans, and I think that’s a poor comparison. Had Germany not been crushed, not occupied, had it not lost its sovereignty, repentance would not have happened. And even today, there’s still resistance to it. The rise of the AfD, with its underlying backlash against repentance, shows that full recovery hasn’t truly taken place.
So I believe that if history plays out as it often does, and Russia, like other empires, ceases to exist—if it breaks apart—then maybe, just maybe, that will spark certain processes. Perhaps then, on the ruins of the Russian empire, something might begin. But comparing it to Germany? That’s not very useful.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So, dear friends, we’ll wrap up our morning stream here. See you on our channel. Thank you for your patience—it ran a bit long today, but there were a lot of questions, and it seemed to me they were all quite relevant. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian POWs! All the best to you—have a good day.
Source: https://youtu.be/eWe4ufulkwI