Trump listens to Whitcoff, not Rubio, and forbids the West from criticizing Putin. Russian journalists were imprisoned for their honesty and professionalism. The Russian army is almost entirely dependent on supplies from North Korea.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 16th, and I’m in Kyiv. It’s currently 7:42, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
New Demands from Russia Link to heading
First, the news. Victory—well, not a victory, but negotiations. Negotiations are still quite far off. Naryshkin has put forward yet another—well, it’s understandable, he’s the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, that’s his official title. Sergey Naryshkin has issued another ultimatum regarding a peaceful settlement. He said that a peaceful resolution for Ukraine includes the following demands: first and foremost, Ukraine must have non-nuclear status, be demilitarized, repeal discriminatory laws—I’m not sure what exactly he means by that, but clearly, he has something in mind—and recognize Russia’s new borders. This speaks to Russia’s position in these negotiations. Frankly, I don’t believe Naryshkin is freelancing here. Remember how this remarkable man stood in wet pants in front of Putin, trying to guess what exactly the leader wanted from him? So, the level of autonomy Naryshkin has is fairly clear.
And on the other side of the ocean, Whitcoff, who just recently met with Putin in St. Petersburg, told Fox News that this was already his third meeting with him—that’s true—and that the meeting lasted about five hours. At that time, Ushakov and Kirill Dmitriev were also in the room with Putin. And in the end, according to Whitcoff, they reached a consensus. This unified opinion—shared by Whitcoff, Putin, and his advisers—is that in order to have lasting peace, the peace agreement must concern five territories, meaning the four regions plus Crimea. Additionally, as Whitcoff claims, there must be far more substantial security guarantees. Most importantly, in my opinion, what Victor Whitcoff said is that he believes there’s a chance to change the relationship between Russia and the U.S. through very attractive commercial opportunities. Partnership creates stability.
Well, I must say, when it comes to Whitcoff, I don’t think anyone has any doubts. He’s basically a fixer, like Dmitriev. And his key word is “deal.” It’s clear they’re talking within the framework of making a deal. The United States of America still remains a democratic country. And this democracy, this pluralism, even permeates the administration of the 47th President of the United States. There are different viewpoints, which are noticeable in the media. For example, The Wall Street Journal published a piece noting that there are differing views within Trump’s circle regarding Russia policy. And it’s more or less clear that Trump is aligned with Whitcoff rather than with people like Secretary of State Marco Rubio or Special Representative for Ukraine Keith Kellogg.
I don’t really understand why there’s a special representative for Ukraine when the special representative for the Middle East is the one constantly traveling to Russia, meeting with Putin—meeting with Putin! It’s not the Ukraine envoy who’s settling Ukraine-related issues, but the Middle East envoy. Well, in the end, that’s their sovereign American business. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Keith Kellogg are advocating for a tougher stance toward the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Whitcoff insists there should be no hardening of position because it would hinder negotiations. And according to The Wall Street Journal, Trump leans more toward Whitcoff’s position. So essentially, I think no further commentary is needed—everything is more or less clear.
In 22 Days of Truce, Russia Killed 2.5 Times More Ukrainians Than Before It Link to heading
So. I would put it this way: Russia’s real position is expressed in the fact that—Russia’s position on negotiations, right?—is reflected not only in statements from Putin, Medvedev, or the recent remarks by the head of foreign intelligence, but also in its actions. Over the 22 days of the so-called energy truce—which, as we know, has already been declared and is ongoing—Russia has killed almost 2.5 times more Ukrainians than during the same period before the announcement of this energy truce, that is, since March 25. That’s the point when the truce was declared, up to April 15. Russian occupiers carried out eight massive attacks on Ukrainian cities, resulting in the deaths of 72 people, including 11 children. So this is, well, this is the language Putin speaks. Is anything unclear to anyone? Well, okay then.
The U.S. Forbids Condemning Putin Link to heading
The key event in these negotiations, from my point of view, was the effective breakdown—or rather, the prohibition by the United States—for Western countries, specifically the G7, to condemn Putin. This was clearly expressed when the United States refused to sign the G7 statement condemning the strike on Sumy. That is, the Trump administration informed its G7 allies that it would not sign the statement condemning the Russian strike on Sumy because, quote, they are “working to preserve space for peaceful negotiations.” So, in other words, Putin must not be condemned because Trump is working to preserve space. Thus, the natural Western reaction—condemning the strike on Sumy—is off limits because it interferes. Everything must be quiet, hushed—absolutely no words of condemnation toward Putin or Russia, because we’re making deals here, we’re preparing something important. Deals are needed, cooperation is needed. Don’t condemn Putin—let him keep killing, and we’ll keep negotiating.
North Korea Is the Key Supporter of This War Link to heading
In my view, very important information has come from an investigation by Reuters and the British research organization OCSI. This study shows that the Russian army is almost entirely dependent on supplies from North Korea. The methodology—well, it’s been used for quite some time—was based on estimating the number of shells and munitions North Korea supplies, calculated by counting containers. Containers are easy to assess since they are visible from satellites. According to satellite imagery, around 16,000 containers were shipped from North Korea. Based on analysts’ calculations, these containers held between 4 and 6 million artillery shells. Again, according to Western analysts, last year Russia was able to produce just over 2 million shells on its own. In the future, production may increase to 3 million. So, if we compare this with the investigators’ data, it turns out North Korea is providing Russia with about twice as many shells as it produces itself.
Ukrainian military intelligence estimates are a bit more modest—they believe North Korea supplies about 50% of all shells Russia uses in the war. Internal technical reports from the Ministry of Defense, which journalists accessed, indicate that in some Russian army units, around 100% of the shells are made in North Korea. And beyond the shells, there are also North Korean ballistic missiles, which Russia is using to strike Ukrainian cities. What does all this mean? It means the following: all the talk about the need for economic pressure on Russia to stop the war—what really enables Russia to continue the war? What are the key resources, the depletion of which could force Putin to end it?
The first is the availability of cannon fodder. The second is the depletion of ammunition, primarily the resources to keep striking Ukraine. As for cannon fodder, I’ve said many times before that Russia’s human resources are virtually inexhaustible. Practically inexhaustible. There’s the purchase of manpower, the second draft that instantly turns into mobilization magic—today you’re a conscript, tomorrow you’re signing a contract. Resisting contract signing is incredibly hard for an 18-year-old under immense pressure in the barracks—most simply can’t. Then there’s the instant conversion of any Russian into a convict or suspect, followed by a simple offer: either prison or the front. And finally, there’s North Korea—four virtually endless sources of cannon fodder replenishment. Combined, this gives Putin the ability to cover human losses indefinitely—at least throughout the foreseeable future of 2025, 2026, and 2027.
And regarding ammunition depletion, as the war’s primary resource, we see that Russia is producing its own shells, production is increasing, and most importantly, there’s North Korea, which produces nothing but weapons and is happily sharing them with Russia. The conclusion is obvious to me: economic pressure on Russia is absolutely necessary. But it is not the lever that can force Putin to stop the war. That is why I’ve gone into such detail about this Reuters and OCSI investigation, which I believe is extremely important.
Moscow Sentences 4 Journalists to 5.5 Years in Prison Link to heading
And finally, an event that took place yesterday and is personally very important to me: yesterday, the Nagatinsky District Court of Moscow sentenced four journalists to 5.5 years in prison. These are Antonina Favorskaya, Sergey Karelin, Konstantin Ryabov, and Artyom Kriger. They were convicted for allegedly participating in the activities of an extremist organization. The so-called extremist organization is the Anti-Corruption Foundation. I believe this trial stands out, even against the backdrop of numerous other criminal cases, because it is a pure example of journalists being convicted for their professional activity.
Practically speaking—well, you see, even if, say, these journalists had collaborated with Navalny’s media team, it still wouldn’t be a crime. But the issue—or rather, the fact—is that nearly none of these journalists did. One of them had worked with Popular Politics, but the others worked with different media outlets. So even under Russia’s draconian laws, these people were unlawfully convicted. And they were undoubtedly sentenced for professional honesty and journalistic integrity. As a fellow journalist, I feel obliged to say a few words about each of them. These are the best journalists in Russia today. Antonina Favorskaya—two of them worked with the Vision team, which I am honored and proud to collaborate with. In that sense, we are doubly colleagues.
So, let me introduce these people. This is a huge challenge and problem that exists in Russia—can independent professional journalists still work in the country? Well, this trial of four courageous journalists shows that they can, but unfortunately, only for a short time.
Antonina Favorskaya is a human rights activist who spent a long time volunteering to help Ukrainian refugees. She then joined Division and worked with them until recently. She specialized in continuing work with Ukrainian refugees and covering trials of Ilya Yashin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Oleg Orlov, Berkovich, and Svetlana Petrik. She attended all court sessions related to Alexei Navalny’s lawsuits and ultimately filmed the last video of Navalny on February 15, 2024. She is a person of absolute courage and impeccable journalistic professionalism. I’ve seen her reports—they are truly high-level work.
Konstantin Ryabov collaborated with Reuters and Deutsche Welle, also producing reports primarily on court proceedings—a form of human rights journalism.
Sergey Karelin worked with Associated Press and Deutsche Welle as well. He’s a professional cameraman, truly one of the benchmarks in his field. As far as I know, he once worked at NTV, but recently has been working with Western media outlets.
And finally, Artyom Kriger, the youngest of the four. I’ve had the honor of personally knowing him and working with him. He’s a 100 Million journalist who started his career early. I’m not shy to call it a career—even at 24, he had one. He mainly worked on street interviews in Russia, which is extremely dangerous. At one time, when we at the editorial office discussed including Artyom Kriger’s street interviews in our weekly show with Mikhail Valentinovich Savva, I said no—I’d rather abstain because I didn’t want to put Artyom Kriger at risk. He was working in Moscow, filming street interviews—and as we know, someone was recently sentenced to five years just for giving the “wrong” answer in one of those.
And now a journalist who filmed those interviews is sentenced to 5.5 years. It seems fearlessness runs in the Kriger family. Not long ago, Mikhail Kriger was sentenced—he’s a well-known figure to anyone who’s been part of Moscow street protests since the 2000s. Anyone who attended a protest saw Mikhail Kriger—always there, coat flapping in the wind, unafraid, ready to confront pro-Kremlin provocateurs. A man utterly fearless. And Artyom Kriger is much the same.
So my full support goes out to these four brave journalists—just as with Alexander Skobov. There’s a clear analogy here, a kinship of fate. They refused to leave and continued doing professional journalism. Of course, one could say they should’ve fled, but they chose another path—the path of Alexander Valeryevich Skobov, the path of those eight brave souls who stood on Red Square in 1968 and gave up their freedom to resist a fascist regime.
What more can I say? I sincerely hope they don’t serve out the full term—just as Alexander Valeryevich didn’t—and that they live to see the collapse of the fascist regime. I believe their courage and professionalism are bringing that collapse closer than anyone else.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to your questions, I want to say that we have a very interesting conversation coming up today. At 7:00 PM, we’ll have Yuri Evgenievich Fedorov joining us—he’s well-known. In fact, when we call him a military expert, I think today I’ll try to highlight some of Yuri Evgenievich’s other professional sides, because he’s a sociologist, a truly broad-profile analyst. So, well, we’ll talk—no spoilers—but I believe the conversation with Yuri Georgievich will be interesting not only because of his military expertise.
Now, moving on to your questions.
So, here are a few. There were two topics in the previous stream that sparked lively discussion. One was related to Viktor Tsoi, and the second to Vladimir Kara-Murza.
Did Viktor Tsoi Use Drugs Link to heading
Let me begin with a few questions about Viktor Tsoi. Three questions—Dmitry Taran:
Please tell me, where does the information come from that Viktor Tsoi used illegal substances? Nelli Taran: Did he use drugs? Where can I read about this? And finally, Max: First time I’m hearing that Tsoi had drug problems. I’ve never come across anything like that in any memoirs. This topic is not reflected in his work, and his personal life and physical condition suggest that this claim is likely based on unverified information.
Dear colleagues, I mentioned this as a fact—and I believe it’s a fairly obvious one. Namely, I was contrasting Viktor Tsoi with the recently deceased Pasha Technik. For Pasha Technik, drugs were his life; his entire artistic output was essentially an advertisement for drugs—heavy ones at that. He created in a state of altered consciousness.
When I said that Viktor Tsoi also used narcotic substances, I was emphasizing the contrast—because for Viktor Tsoi, drugs were not a creative tool. That is also well known.
Where do I get this from? There are several testimonies from people who knew Viktor Tsoi well and worked with him professionally. One of them is Andrei Tropillo, who was the producer of the band Kino. In fact, Tropillo even claimed that Tsoi died because he was under the influence of drugs while driving. An even more reliable source, in my opinion, is Artemy Troitsky, who stated that Tsoi did not use hard drugs like heroin. But—and I quote—this is what Artemy Troitsky said: “As for weed, I’d like to see even one person from that crowd who didn’t smoke it. If you smoke marijuana, it brings good vibes, relaxation.”
So, in my view, the topic is closed. Viktor Tsoi did not use hard drugs. Drugs were not a source of inspiration for him, as they were for Pasha Technik. He had no issues—here, I agree with Max, who says Tsoi had no drug problems.
It was simply the environment Tsoi was in—weed was like regular cigarettes. Some smoked Herzegovina Flor, some Belomorkanal, some Primu, and some weed. In that scene, it was normal. It wasn’t an issue.
That’s exactly why I brought it up—as a contrast. As for Viktor Tsoi’s stance, it was firmly anti-drug, especially against hard drugs. This is evident in perhaps the most famous film he acted in—The Needle. So, to be clear, no one is trying to tarnish Viktor Tsoi’s memory here. We’re just discussing facts. Yes, he was in a scene where smoking weed was accepted and normal. There’s no attempt to smear this outstanding musician.
By the way, tomorrow at 11:00 AM we’ll have Artemy Troitsky on. If it comes up, we can ask him to clarify. I think the people who knew Viktor Tsoi well, worked with him professionally, produced him—they know best.
On the Protest by Belarusian Activist Pauk at the Russian Embassy in Lithuania Link to heading
A question from Tamara Pumpiansky:
Did you see the situation surrounding the protest by Belarusian activist Andrei Pauk at the Russian embassy in Lithuania? Why do you think this happened in Lithuania? Is the Russian lobby strong there?
Dear Tamara, naturally, I didn’t witness it personally—I wasn’t at the Russian embassy in Vilnius at the time. But I’m, of course, aware of what happened. There was no large-scale protest against the Belarusian activist. As far as I know, Belarusian activist Andrei Pauk rode his bicycle to the Russian embassy in protest against the strike on Sumy and left the bike somewhere nearby. The bike was stolen—apparently by a pro-Russian activist. One individual, as far as I understand. After that, provocations were staged against the Belarusian activist.
To my knowledge—and I might be mistaken—but based on reports, including from the Lithuanian press, there was no mass action involved. So yes, this is a very unpleasant incident. From what I know, a police case has been opened regarding the theft of the bicycle. But this situation doesn’t provide grounds to say that the Russian lobby is strong in Lithuania. I don’t think it’s stronger in Lithuania than, for example, in Germany. I can say for sure that the Russian lobby in Lithuania is much weaker than in Latvia or Estonia, where there’s a larger Russian population. In Lithuania, Russians make up just over 5%.
Overall—I live in Lithuania myself—I don’t see any noticeable pro-Russian sentiment. Ukrainian flags are visible throughout Lithuania, and the Ukrainian diaspora feels completely free here. As for pro-Russian sentiment—if someone comes to Lithuania and openly displays it, they’re simply deported. So yes, the Russian lobby does exist, of course. But it doesn’t play any significant role in Lithuania’s life, in my opinion.
Of course, I could be wrong. Tamara, if you have a different perspective, I’d be very interested to hear it, and we can certainly discuss it publicly.
On the Author’s Position Regarding Religion Link to heading
A question from a subscriber who goes by “Plus Minus”:
Please formulate your position. You say you’re not a believer—what does that mean? You don’t believe in life after death? You don’t believe in the existence of a soul? What kind of position is that? How do you define it? I’m a believer, writes Plus Minus. I believe a person doesn’t cease to exist after the body dies. I know a person is not their earthly body—they use it, like a car, which falls apart if not maintained. I know I have a creator who pours life into me every moment. That’s my motivation in life. Maybe I’m wrong? Maybe I’m mistaken? I watch your stream and see that you’re falling apart because you consider yourself not the driver of the car but the car itself. That’s what your position is: you’re a non-believer. You’re too smart for me to explain this to, but I’ll try. Kirill—presumably Gundyaev—is a believer. Are you like Kirill?
Dear colleague, you see, that last attempt to explain something to me actually shows that you—pardon me—but you seem to have a bit of a logic issue. Because, you know, this is about the same as saying: “Hitler loved animals. So, what, you love animals too? Are you like Hitler?” Just because Gundyaev, in my opinion and observation, is an atheist, and I also don’t believe in a supernatural being, doesn’t make us the same. We disbelieve differently.
So yes, I really don’t believe in the existence of a supernatural being that created the entire universe and, as you wrote, “pours life into me every moment.” I don’t believe in that. I perceive the world somewhat differently. I do believe there is no life after death. That’s what I think.
People who believe life continues after death—yes, it helps them. It’s comforting. But I don’t need crutches, I don’t need support structures to continue living. I find strength in my work, in my loved ones, in love. I have other sources of life-affirmation.
You see, I’m not going to argue with you or judge you. We just have different positions. And there’s nothing wrong with that.
On Yuri Felshtinsky’s Theory Link to heading
So, Alexey Alekseev asks:
What do you think of Yuri Felshtinsky’s theory explaining Trump’s strange behavior? The idea is that for his third term, the U.S. would need to get involved in a future European-Russian war, which Trump would provoke after the fall of Ukraine. Sounds wild, but still…
Well, as always, I have great respect for Mr. Felshtinsky, and he’s always a welcome guest on our channel with you. But, as usual, I don’t agree with him. That’s how it goes. I think this is just another hypothesis that lacks evidence.
Trump is, after all, a man driven by deals, not wars. I don’t think Trump wants a war. He constantly says that no wars started under his leadership, so it’s unlikely he’d be interested in starting one to secure a third term. I do think he has hopes for a third term, but I suspect he’ll try to justify it through a state of emergency. That would be much easier for him—to declare a state of emergency and use that as a basis.
A major war—essentially a world war—isn’t the kind of environment where Trump would feel comfortable, in my view. So I think this idea is off base.
And then there’s this notion that it would happen after “the fall of Ukraine.” I don’t really understand what “fall of Ukraine” means. After more than three years, Russia hasn’t been able to capture even one regional capital in Ukraine. So where exactly is this “fall” supposed to come from?
So, all in all, I find this hypothesis unconvincing.
Suggestion to Invite Rashkin Link to heading
Fidel Macho:
Would you consider inviting Yuri Rashkin for a joint discussion?
I’ll keep it brief—no, I have no such desire.
On the Videos of Sergey Mironov Link to heading
Helga:
Recently, videos have surfaced of speeches by Boris Sergeyevich Mironov, and I felt a glimmer of hope that there are still some unbrainwashed individuals left. I’d be curious to know—are you personally acquainted with him, do you have any contact, and what kind of resources does he have that allow him to speak out so boldly and openly against the regime? Personally, I fear for his life.
Dear Helga, this is one of those cases where I… well, let’s take it step by step. Yes, of course I knew Mironov. When he was chairman of the Russian Committee for the Press—there was such an organization before and after—it later became the Ministry of the Press. Mironov was its chairman. I knew him then.
But the acquaintance brought no pleasure to either of us, for a very simple reason: Boris Sergeyevich is an anti-Semite. I wouldn’t call him a Nazi, but he is undoubtedly a nationalist and a 100% anti-Semite. He never hid it. For instance, in the 2000s, when Putin became president, Mironov accused him of imposing “Jewish fascism.” I don’t know what that means, but that’s what he claimed. He publicly said he was an anti-Semite. He said, “I don’t like Jews. I’m a Russian man. And what Russian man could love them after what they’ve done to Russia?”
This is not some subtle, coded anti-Semitism—like the kind associated with Solzhenitsyn, for example. This is anti-Semitism full throttle. He openly said he couldn’t stand Jews, couldn’t stand “various gays,” didn’t like this, didn’t like that… In short, dear Helga, I do agree that Sergey Mironov is now on the right side. He opposed the occupation of Crimea from the start, and that deserves respect—but that doesn’t make him someone I feel close to.
So yes, he may be in the right trench today, but I would personally try to stay as far away from that circle as possible. I want nothing to do with him—though yes, he currently appears to be on Ukraine’s side.
On the Phrase “NATO Soldiers Look Formidable” Link to heading
A question from K:
In a recent audience Q&A, someone said “NATO soldiers look formidable,” and you didn’t comment or respond. Personally, I found that line amusing—I’ve seen these so-called NATO tough guys in Germany, Poland, Lithuania. To me, honestly, they look like relaxed airsoft amateurs who would scatter at the sound of a firecracker. Their professionalism, combined with lack of real combat experience, makes me think even a single Russian alcoholic ex-con with a couple months in Donbas would be more useful in battle than a few of them. I honestly can’t imagine how they can fight when even in peacetime, without an enemy, they manage to drown themselves in a swamp. So yes, the NATO nameplate is imposing, the gear is shiny and modern—but there’s no one to fight. Basically, all amateurs. Where am I wrong?
Dear colleagues, I think you’re wrong about everything. As for the tragic death of several American soldiers in Lithuania—yes, it happened. But fatalities occur in any military exercises. That’s a given.
Now let’s look at just one incident. You say a Russian alcoholic is worth several NATO soldiers. Well, there was a direct clash not so long ago between Russian troops—not just alcoholics, but supposedly the best elite Russian fighters—and NATO soldiers, specifically Americans. That happened in Syria. The group involved was arguably Russia’s most capable force: the Wagner PMC.
Remember the story when they tried to confront U.S. soldiers? To this day, people are still trying to find the molecules Wagner troops were blown into in the Syrian sands. That’s the reality. So sure, maybe—though I’m not convinced—a Russian alcoholic with Donbas experience could win in a bar brawl against a few NATO troops. But you know, street-fighting skills aren’t much use in modern warfare.
Modern warfare is about technology—drones, aviation, precision weapons. And NATO soldiers know how to use all of that. Again, the only known direct engagement between elite Russian forces and Americans didn’t go quite the way you predicted. So I think you’re wrong.
As for experience—yes, perhaps NATO troops haven’t seen as much recent combat. But outside the Russia-Ukraine war, who has?
On Crimea Link to heading
Andrey MUS:
Do you think Crimea should have been given the right to hold a referendum on independence in 1991 or later? After all, since the USSR collapsed without following a formal procedure—illegally, one could say—autonomous republics should have had the right to self-determination.
First of all, I don’t quite understand why you say “illegally.” Of course, there were some rough edges—but I don’t see how that leads to the conclusions you draw. You know, as soon as I read your question, I noticed a response from Max underneath it, and I’d like to read it out as well:
“There was a referendum in Crimea,” Max writes. “A referendum on Ukrainian independence. Turnout: 67.5%. Of those, over 54% voted yes. In Sevastopol: turnout 63%, 57% voted for independence.” So a referendum was held.
Max continues: “The autonomous republics of the former USSR were home to peoples who didn’t have their own union republic—Kalmykia, Bashkiria, and so on. If we support the right of nations to self-determination, then yes, it would be fair to allow those peoples to exercise it. But what nation, lacking its own union republic, did the Crimean autonomy represent? The population of Crimea had been deported, the territory colonized. Among all the autonomous republics of the USSR, Crimea was an exception. If the question were about creating an independent Crimean Tatar state, then yes—that would be fair. But what you’re suggesting is not.”
And I completely agree with Max’s logic. I really don’t understand why, dear colleague Andrey, you single out Crimea specifically as the Ukrainian territory that required some special referendum. Why not Tatarstan? Why not Yakutia? Why only Crimea?
Again, Max’s objections are absolutely logical—because truly, if we’re talking about the right of nations to self-determination, then what nation does Crimea represent? The Crimean Tatars—well, that’s a separate matter entirely.
So overall, I find your idea highly unconvincing.
On the Bombing of Berlin: Did It Hasten Germany’s Defeat? Link to heading
Arkady Mikhailov:
Did the bombing of Berlin hasten the Allied victory or was it unnecessary?
I believe it did hasten the victory. Of course, I’d prefer a military expert to answer this definitively. But from my conversations with military experts, I’ve come to understand that the capture or assault of major cities—Berlin being a massive one—is impossible without preliminary bombardment aimed at breaking the will to resist. Otherwise, taking such a vast city becomes unfeasible. So yes, I believe the bombing of Berlin accelerated the Allied victory.
On Kara-Murza Link to heading
Now then, Justin:
You’re well acquainted with Kara-Murza. Can you contact him directly and personally criticize his behavior?
There are a few questions regarding Vladimir Kara-Murza’s recent statements. I’ll address them together.
On Anti-Colonial Motives Link to heading
So, Alexander—a sponsor of our channel—asks:
Maybe there’s no smoke without fire? Could it be that the actions of people from Russia’s national peripheries have not only economic but also anti-colonial motivations? Just as we, the laypeople of European Russia, don’t distinguish Buryats from Tuvans, Chechens from Dagestanis—they don’t distinguish Russians from Ukrainians. My wife is Russian—a Russian Ukrainian from Poltava. As they say: a face of Caucasian nationality—like the hero of Vizbor’s novella from half a century ago. They’d love nothing more than to tear Moscow to pieces, but they can’t get to Moscow. So instead, they lash out at a region that gave them nearly as many colonial officials as Russia itself. What’s your take?
Well, this once again ties into the remarks made by Vladimir Kara-Murza. I’ll allow myself, dear Alexander, to address this and related questions at the end, all together.
Does China Need a War in Europe? Link to heading
Almaza Sadykova:
In your stream with Hrabski, you didn’t ask perhaps the most crucial question: what does China think about Russia attacking the Baltic states? China doesn’t need a war in Europe. It needs someone to sell goods to and someone strong to ally with against Trump’s tariffs.
Dear colleague, yes, I admit—I didn’t ask that question. Hrabski, after all, is more of a military expert, and this is more of a political question, wouldn’t you agree?
From my perspective, in your reasoning you implicitly assume that China dictates Putin’s actions—that if China says something, Putin will or won’t do it. I don’t think so. Despite Russia’s massive dependence on China—which we fully understand—the relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping, at least based on what we can observe, is not one of superior and subordinate.
Yes, Russia is dependent on China, and it takes China into account, but it’s not a relationship based on orders. That’s why I continue to respectfully disagree with the endlessly esteemed Serhiy Maratovych Hrabski: I don’t believe Russia is capable of attacking any European country until the war in Ukraine reaches some form of resolution.
And whether or not China gives its approval—I don’t think that plays a decisive role here. Maybe a secondary one, yes. But not decisive. I don’t share the view that Putin is Xi Jinping’s errand boy. I just don’t see it that way.
On How Russia Strikes Civilian Targets Link to heading
A question from the USA—or rather, more of a reflection:
What’s in the hearts of those who fire missiles and bombs at civilian targets? What’s in the minds of those who plan the flight paths and input the target coordinates into cruise missile warheads? I completely agree with you that without studying the subject in depth, one can’t say for certain what kind of people they are, what their conscience, morality, or empathy is like. But what can be said with absolute certainty is that these people are not fools—because a fool couldn’t operate a modern fighter jet, a tactical missile system, or program chips. What is absolutely certain is that these people know exactly where they’re striking and that they are committing war crimes. That much is absolutely clear. And they can’t hide behind excuses like “we didn’t know where we were hitting, we were just following coordinates.”
Dear colleague, I agree with everything you wrote—except for one point. I’m not sure that, when they do this, they know they are committing war crimes. I think, in their frame of reference—and this is just a hypothesis—they don’t have such a concept. They believe, they’re convinced, that they’re doing the right thing, that they’re fighting an enemy.
Again, this calls for further study. Hannah Arendt conducted a very important philosophical and historical investigation—The Banality of Evil. She did an excellent job of explaining the inner world of the man who organized the Holocaust, Eichmann. I think a similar study is needed here. These missile operators killing people in Ukraine are likely not very much like Eichmann—their inner world is different. Understanding that inner world, I believe, is crucial.
Diagnosing it properly, researching it—this is important to understand what we’re dealing with. Because a misdiagnosis leads to the wrong actions.
On Kara-Murza Link to heading
So, regarding Kara-Murza. First of all, I received many questions and criticisms about my commentary. The situation is as follows: I want to start by apologizing—when I commented on Kara-Murza’s statements (sorry for the tautology), I relied on translated transcripts from several sources, which indeed distorted what he actually said. I apologize for that.
Now, I want to do the following: present the exact text that Kara-Murza himself shared in response to these criticisms, and then analyze it. Let’s take the time for this. Why do I think it’s important? Because Volodya Kara-Murza is perhaps the most prominent figure in the current Russian political emigration. He is someone received at the highest levels by Western leaders—in the U.S., France, Germany. And what he said—he said in the French Parliament. That’s why I think it’s important to clarify what was said and how we should respond to it.
Let’s hear Kara-Murza himself. Here is the full, verbatim transcript of his answer to a question from French Senator Claude Shure during the April 10 hearing. The question was why most Russian soldiers and most casualties in Ukraine are from national minorities. What is the current situation in those republics? Here is Kara-Murza’s translated answer:
“It’s absolutely true that many Russian military personnel in Ukraine are from these republics—from the Caucasus, from the East, from Siberia, etc. The reasons are mostly economic. As we discussed with the vice-chair, these are very poor regions—of course, much poorer than Moscow and St. Petersburg, but also much poorer than central Russian regions. The Russian Ministry of Defense offers people a lot of money to go to war. These people from remote, impoverished regions—who have no money, no prospects, nothing—agree to take that money and go fight.”
Then Kara-Murza continues:
“Just yesterday in Strasbourg, at a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I was speaking with a colleague who works a lot with POWs from both sides. She has spoken extensively with freed Ukrainian POWs from Russia and with Russian POWs still in Ukraine. She told me there’s another reason the Russian Defense Ministry recruits so many prisoners and members of these national minorities—because supposedly, it’s psychologically harder for Russians to kill Ukrainians, since ‘we are the same.’ We’re very close peoples, as everyone knows—almost the same language, same religion, centuries of shared history. But for someone from a different culture, it’s supposedly easier. That’s what my colleague told me yesterday. I had never thought of it before. For me, the reasons were mostly economic. But after she said that, I also started thinking about it.”
End quote.
Now let’s unpack this. First—yes, without question—Kara-Murza’s statement isn’t the cartoonishly “Putin-style” phrasing I relied on in the flawed translation I previously cited. Again, that translation was inaccurate and distorted the meaning. I expressed genuine disbelief that a serious person could say what was attributed to him—because he didn’t.
But there are still three major issues to consider.
First, this is serious—because Vladimir Kara-Murza is a significant figure. He’s closely connected with many influential U.S. congresspeople and senators. He’s received at the highest diplomatic levels. So the question arises: why would you publicly, from the floor of the French Parliament, broadcast a private conversation that cannot be verified? The woman Kara-Murza references—most commentators have identified her, but I won’t name her—has reportedly denied saying anything like that. And if that’s true, then this is a serious misstep. You simply don’t do that. Even in a regular discussion, referencing unverifiable private talks is risky. To do it publicly, globally—that’s just an error.
Second, pay attention—Kara-Murza didn’t use the precise phrase “one people,” which has a particular propaganda ring to it. But he said: “We are the same. We are very close peoples. Almost the same language, same religion.” So, “we are the same” is still there.
Third, and finally—this line: “I had never thought about it before. But after she told me that, I also started thinking about it.” This idea—that because “we are the same,” it’s harder for Russians to kill Ukrainians—is, in my opinion, a deeply foolish, fundamentally flawed, and dangerously misleading notion. That someone of Kara-Murza’s stature is now “thinking about it” indicates a troubling lack of intellectual clarity.
Let’s be honest—history is full of examples of people killing those very similar to themselves. During the Russian Civil War, Russians slaughtered each other with pleasure and brutality. The American War of Independence? Brits and Americans—same language, same religion—killing each other eagerly. Close nations often fight more viciously than distant ones.
So no—there is no historical evidence to support the claim that “similarity” or “sameness” prevents violence. And in today’s Ukraine, there’s zero evidence that Russians are hesitating to kill Ukrainians because they’re “close.” None.
So when a person says, “I hadn’t thought of that before, but now I will”—well, thinking is always good, yes. That’s what we’re here for. But what are you thinking about? If tomorrow someone tells you that Jews drink Christian baby blood—“I never thought of that, but now I will”? I’m exaggerating, of course—but only to highlight the absurdity.
To publicly transmit a thought like that to the whole world—it raises serious questions. And when it comes from someone as prominent and influential as Vladimir Kara-Murza, it’s not a trivial matter. That’s why this needs to be addressed.
I do regret that I initially relied on an incorrect translation. And yes—it’s clear: we need to learn languages. No question about that.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So, with that, I’ll wrap up our conversation for today. Once again, I want to remind you that at 7:00 PM we’ll be joined by Yuri Evgenyevich Fedorov—not just a military expert, but a truly versatile specialist in a wide range of areas. I hope today’s discussion will go beyond military analysis.
That concludes our talk for today. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian POWs. See you at 7:00 PM! Goodbye.
Source: https://youtu.be/YOVoTfTavS8