Trump is angry with Putin and is threatening Zelensky with serious trouble. Journalism and war: a highly “timely” article in the NYT and the awarding of an international prize to a TASS photographer.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is March 31, and I’m in Kyiv. Right now, just like in Moscow, it’s 7:40 AM. And we continue our morning reflections on what’s happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Russia Attacked a Ukrainian Hospital Link to heading
This Sunday, Russia committed yet another war crime. Ukraine was attacked by 111 Russian drones. The heaviest strike was on Kharkiv. Two people were killed, and 35 others, including five children, were injured. The strike hit a military hospital as well as nearby residential buildings. This is a true war crime — an attack on a medical facility. It doesn’t matter whether it’s military or not, it’s still the same. In any case, it is undoubtedly a war crime, and one of those we will definitely investigate on our channel — with documents, naming those responsible, and so on. This is the minimum contribution I believe we must make to the cause of holding Russia’s war criminals accountable.
Trump Threatened Putin with Secondary Tariffs Link to heading
Now, moving on to the main newsmaker on planet Earth, who has undoubtedly held that title for several months now — I would say — Donald Trump. Yesterday, the former President of the United States stated that he was very angry with Putin after the latter declared his intention to place Ukraine under external governance. This was said during his interview on CNBC, where he specifically mentioned that Putin was moving in the wrong direction. He also said that if Russia does not agree to a peace deal in Ukraine, the United States will impose secondary tariffs on all oil. A direct quote: “So if you’re buying oil from Russia, you won’t be able to do business with the United States.”
In addition, he set a deadline — one month. That is, if Russia does not agree to a ceasefire within a month, these severe sanctions will follow. Trump also explained that he is tough but fair. Moreover, he said he has a very clever heart — specifically, he stated that he has very good relations with Putin and that his anger will disappear quickly if Putin does what’s needed. He also mentioned that he will have a new phone call with Putin this week.
I checked, and as far as I can tell, Kremlin sources have not commented on Trump’s statements from yesterday. However, some of the Russian media, including the main state-run outlets, did cover it. Here, I’d like to point out the art of headline writing. Just imagine how the Russian media might interpret Trump’s direct quotes I’ve just read out. Well, it turns out, everything you just heard — direct quotes from Trump — got twisted through the funhouse mirror of Russian media.
Here’s how it appeared, for example, in RIA Novosti: “Trump said he does not want to impose secondary tariffs on Russia.” I quote: “I definitely wouldn’t want to impose secondary tariffs on Russia, but if they were imposed, it wouldn’t be very good for them.” So, this is, really, a perfect example of headline artistry — when everything gets turned inside out, and any statement can be spun to mean the opposite.
RIA Novosti also gleefully quoted Trump’s negative response to the question of whether his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin was at its lowest point.
Well, that’s the art of headlines for you.
Also, another piece of news came from Finnish President Alexander Stubb, who met with Trump the day before yesterday, played golf with him, and said that the ideal option would be to establish a complete ceasefire in Ukraine by April 20. This deadline, which Stubb also referred to, is explained by the fact that — first, it’s Easter, and second, April 20 marks three months since Trump’s inauguration. That’s basically the date.
I won’t go into the associations that April 20 brings for some — never mind that. In the end, if there is peace — if there is a ceasefire, which I personally don’t believe in, but still — if a miracle happens and there’s a lasting truce, then I think it doesn’t matter what date it’s tied to. So, yeah.
Victimization of Ukraine Link to heading
Once again, I want to emphasize — and I really hope I’m wrong — but so far, based on what we’re hearing and seeing from various sources, there’s absolutely no indication that any sort of ceasefire will be established by the 20th. There are various reasons for this. First of all, there’s a clear and deliberate victimization of Ukraine — an attempt to make Ukraine the guilty party in everything that’s happening. We’ll talk in more detail here about a number of publications in the American press.
And then there’s another issue — the indecent proposal. In fact, the deal, or rather what the original rare-earth metals deal has turned into, has now become, according to several sources, a truly obscene proposal made by Trump to Zelensky. Essentially, it’s a proposal to hand over Ukraine’s entire economy to the control of the United States — without any limits. All revenues from Ukraine’s resources, railways, ports, and trade would go directly into the hands of the United States. At least, that’s how it appears. At the same time, Trump stated that, in his view, Zelensky is trying to back away from the rare-earth deal between the US and Ukraine, and that if he does, he’ll have some problems — big, big problems. End of quote.
So that’s the situation. Now, since April 20 has been named — and Trump himself essentially gave Putin a month — that puts us somewhere in the final days of April. That means we’re entering a decisive moment when it will become clear what’s going to happen with this potential ceasefire. Putin clearly has no intention of stopping the war — he believes things are going well for him at the moment. It’s clear that what’s happening around Trump, this blatant and persistent attempt to victimize Ukraine and blame it for all sins — well, that’s part of the story too.
And regarding Trump’s tough talk, threatening everyone and sending people all over the place, I want to touch on a new trend — a dip into the world of high fashion, so to speak. Among world leaders today, it’s considered good form to tell Trump to go to hell. I can’t say for sure who started this tradition — that would require a dedicated study — but from what I recall, the first was actor Robert De Niro, who publicly told Trump to take a hike. Then Trump was sent off from the podium of the European Parliament by a Danish representative — I believe they told him to go to hell as well. There have been quite a few such messages directed at Trump.
Just yesterday, according to the Associated Press, Iranian President Mahmoud Masoud also sent Trump packing. The story goes that Trump sent a furious letter to Iran’s spiritual leader, giving him two months to strike a deal with the United States on the nuclear program, or else he threatened Iran with bombings like they’d never seen before. In response, the Iranian president proposed direct talks between Iran and the US. To this, the Iranian president replied that there would be no negotiations — and, essentially, told Trump where to go.
So this is the kind of tradition that’s emerged. The question is how ready Trump is to break this tradition with decisive action — because, really, the Yemeni Houthis have told him off, Hamas is ignoring him, and so on. So the real question is: is Trump ready to prove that his threats actually mean something? So far, it feels like he doesn’t care. All the talk about his reputation being on the line — well, Trump seems confident, and that confidence is rooted in something real. He doesn’t really have a reputation problem. It’s solid.
What’s happening in the US right now suggests that Trump’s support remains largely “Teflon-coated.” That is, his core electorate believes everything he does is good — regardless of the economic situation or what’s happening in the world. It’s a kind of cult, really. By the way, I think in the fourth episode of the “Trumpophrenia” program, we’ll talk about the psychology of Trump supporters. That’s also important.
But at least, for now, while there’s no clarity in terms of content, there is temporal clarity. This month is supposed to decide a lot. April truly should be a decisive month — one that will show which direction the situation in Ukraine will move next.
Syria Formed a Cabinet of Ministers Link to heading
Well, in the midst of all this chaos, there’s a bit of unexpectedly good news from Syria. A new cabinet of ministers has been appointed, and essentially, the leader of Syria — who came to power after Assad was overthrown — Ahmed Shura, has formed a new cabinet. It’s being called a temporary transitional cabinet. Though, “temporary” is relative — if I’m not mistaken, it’s actually for a five-year term. So it’s only “temporary” in name.
This new government consists of 23 people and will apparently be headed by Ahmed Shura himself. Why do I consider this good news? Because all the rumors that these are terrible Islamists and terrorists — and yes, many of them, including Shura himself, were affiliated with Al-Qaeda and have a very heavy political past — yet, despite that, the makeup of this government looks quite respectable, at least for a staunchly religious, Islamist regime.
What do I mean? The cabinet includes representatives of ethnic minorities — for example, an Alawite, Badr, was appointed Minister of Transport; a Druze, Omar al-Bashir, was made Minister of Agriculture; a Kurd became Minister of Education. And finally, a Christian woman — Kobaladze — was appointed Minister of Social Affairs and Labor. That’s a big deal. Including a woman in the cabinet, for a strictly Islamic government, is a positive sign.
A representative of the White Helmets was appointed Minister of Emergency Situations. So overall, I think this sends a good signal — that this Syrian government, at least based on its composition and the messages it’s sending by forming such a cabinet, shows that Syria might not be a source of external threat to the world. At the very least, there’s a chance. So I consider that good news.
Journalists Are Also Victimizing Ukraine Link to heading
And finally, a topic that is professionally important to me — journalism during wartime. This topic is closely linked to our main conversation, to what’s happening right now during this so-called truce — or lack thereof. Who’s to blame, and so on. A piece in The New York Times is currently being fiercely debated everywhere — it’s being discussed in every possible circle. The article details how the United States participated in the war in Ukraine. It’s titled The Secret History of the U.S. Involvement in the War in Ukraine. It’s quite a lengthy article based on about 300 sources.
I won’t retell the entire piece — I just want to point out the general trend, which is directly related to the victimization of Ukraine. The overall message is that Ukraine has been a very unreliable partner to the United States over the past three years. There are concrete examples — the Moskva cruiser, for instance. The Americans provided intelligence identifying the target — the cruiser Moskva — and, according to the article, they said, “Oh, that’s the Moskva.” The Ukrainians responded, “Oh! Thanks a lot. Bye.” And then they struck the ship. According to American sources quoted in the NYT, the U.S. was outraged that the Ukrainians hadn’t warned them about the impending attack. Since the Biden administration at the time did not intend to allow Ukrainians to strike such a major symbol of Russian power, this came as a big disappointment and source of anger for them. I won’t comment further on that.
Another episode detailed in the piece involves Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region. That also caused serious tension with the Americans, who saw it as a major breach of trust, as the article claims that Ukrainians once again kept the U.S. in the dark and violated agreements.
I won’t go on — there’s a lot of content in the same tone, suggesting that Ukraine acted without coordination, misled the U.S., and didn’t follow advice. I definitely want to cross-check this publication today with Serhii Borysovych Hrabskyi, because there’s a military side to this. I’ll touch on that a bit later.
But what happened in the meantime? All of Ukraine’s detractors gleefully jumped on this material. I won’t name names — I catch myself getting fixated on individuals — but I checked Telegram and YouTube channels: every single Ukraine critic is savoring this article. All those who say, “If only Zelensky had behaved differently, if they had listened to Arestovych or someone else, things could have been resolved peacefully…” These are the people who never pass the Ukrainian House without stopping to throw a jab. The article became a major tool for reinforcing the victimization of Ukraine — blaming it for all the disasters it’s currently facing.
Now, my own strictly amateur thoughts. A conversation with someone more informed is important to me, but still, I dare to voice my personal view. What’s happening now is, as everyone acknowledges, a new kind of war — a war with unprecedented use of drones, with no real rear lines. Ukrainians are in their fourth year of fighting this type of war. American generals, for their part, have never participated in anything remotely like it. Yes, they observe and analyze, but it’s like being a boxer by correspondence — great in theory, but never actually stepping into the ring. U.S. generals (at least the current ones) haven’t fought a war of this nature — not since WWII, which, of course, is drastically different from what’s happening now.
So here’s the first point of doubt — should Ukrainians really have to obey every piece of American advice? There are two specific ideas I want to share.
First: the Biden administration, as described in the NYT article, was characterized by limited military aid and constant restraint — prohibiting Ukraine from striking Russian territory, infrastructure, and energy facilities. So, on one hand, the Biden administration restricted support; on the other, it tied Ukraine’s hands. This kind of caution creates an impossible situation for a country fighting a far more powerful enemy. It’s unworkable to fight like that — with such strict limitations on maneuverability.
So, the question is: were Ukrainian political and military leaders right, in certain cases, to go against U.S. preferences? After all, the U.S. isn’t actually fighting — it advises. And advice is something you sometimes take, sometimes don’t. Of course, the Americans provide weapons and have the right to offer guidance. But can you really blame Ukraine for not always obeying — for example, for destroying Russia’s Black Sea Fleet flagship, the cruiser Moskva? Maybe the situation would be far worse now if Ukraine had always followed American instructions. It’s an open question.
Second: the matter of trust. Of course, you could say it’s outrageous that Americans weren’t notified about the Kursk operation or the Moskva strike. Especially since Ukraine uses U.S. intelligence. But here’s my question — is there a 100% guarantee that if Ukraine shares every plan with the U.S., there won’t be leaks? Just remember SignalGate. That specific incident might explain why Ukraine didn’t disclose every move. What if a leak led to mass casualties among Ukrainian soldiers?
And another reason: in cases where Ukrainians took actions not explicitly sanctioned by the U.S., perhaps they just wanted to avoid a direct veto — to avoid confrontation. So, for me, this article raises serious questions. I’ll be checking my take with Hrabskyi. But for now, what’s clear is that this article has become a powerful tool for the victimization of Ukraine. That’s beyond doubt.
International Award Given to a Propagandist Link to heading
The second episode — also from the realm of journalism and war reporting — is an obvious problem for me. The issue is that the World Press Photo competition, a major international contest, has awarded its top prize to a TASS photographer, Mikhail Tereshchenko. This is an annual photojournalism contest, and the top prize in the “Photo Series” category was awarded for his work covering protests in Georgia.
In response, Georgian photojournalists and documentary photographers issued a protest statement, saying that awarding a photographer who supports the Kremlin’s position is unacceptable. They emphasized that both this photographer and TASS played a central role in spreading false information during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war — and later, the same Tereshchenko supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, calling it an act of liberation.
Thus, by giving him the award, the international jury is legitimizing an agency known for spreading disinformation.
Let me be clear: I didn’t dig deep into the topic or review the photos themselves. I didn’t look into what exactly was awarded. I have no doubt that the photos are technically professional. I don’t think an international journalism award would be given for something amateurish. I’m sure the photography is strong.
But I have one question: would it be appropriate, in today’s world, to give a cinematography award to the works of Leni Riefenstahl? Yes — talented, yes — technically excellent, but created in the service of a Nazi regime.
And this is the same situation. So the question again arises: what is journalism? Is it just technique? Just a craft? Or is it also a form of public service? And if it is a public service — service to whom? That’s the real question about journalism.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Once again, before moving on to your questions, I want to remind you that today at 8:00 PM we’ll have a conversation with Serhii Hrabskyi, and among the many topics, I specifically want to compare notes with him regarding that New York Times publication. Now, let’s move on to your questions.
Why the Author Cares About the Ruble Exchange Rate Link to heading
So, a question from Farit Khafizov:
Igor Ivanovich, why do you care about the ruble exchange rate? You wouldn’t mention that Trump boosted it by 17 points for no reason. After all, you don’t get paid in rubles.
Dear colleague, of course I don’t get paid in rubles — that’s simply not an option for me. But, you know, I talk about things that may not directly affect me personally. Some events, though they don’t impact me directly, are still of public interest. I believe that Trump causing the dollar to fall is, in some way, a measure of his actions. I talk about things like the auto tariffs Trump imposed. They don’t affect me personally — I have no intention of ever buying a car. I never have, and I’m not planning to buy one now. But still, I understand that this is a matter of public importance.
I have no personal interests in Syria either, yet I understand that the fate of that country carries enormous international significance — including for the people who live there. So not everything we discuss has to concern me personally or directly.
On Inviting Illarionov to the Channel Link to heading
Viktor. So, Viktor is being very direct here — I’ll read this out. It’s not really a question, it’s a demand.
“It seems to me,” writes Viktor, “that you should reconsider your attitude toward Andrei Illarionov. If you prioritize the cause over personal feelings, then giving Illarionov a platform on our channel would certainly benefit our shared struggle against Putin and his sidekick Trump. Ukrainian journalists like Moseichuk and Nemyrya give him a platform and value his opinion. Please listen to his latest interview with them — it will surely be more useful than wasting time on Zhdanov and Katz. You yourself acknowledge Illarionov’s professionalism. I think he surpasses many of your guests in subject knowledge and depth of analysis. He explains his shift in attitude toward Trump with clear arguments and concrete examples from Trump’s first term. As you say, he’s now on the right side of history — obviously referring to Illarionov, not Trump. A fighter like him in the information war shouldn’t be left unused. Please consider whether you could set aside your personal dislike for the good of all your viewers. I’m sure his perspective would be interesting and helpful to many.”
Dear Viktor, a few words about Illarionov. Yes, I’ve noticed he’s changed his stance. But forgive me — this is a man who spent several years actively promoting Trump. I don’t deny his professionalism. The issue is that during that promotion, he constantly twisted facts. My problem is simply that I don’t trust him — on a human level. It’s not about personal animosity. I used to have a very positive relationship with Andrei Nikolaevich — mutual respect and warmth.
But it all started when I saw him regularly distorting facts and outright lying. You’d be reading or listening to his polished, fact-filled analysis — full of numbers, quotes, and citations — and suddenly, there’d be a glaring manipulation. It was like something out of a shady corner shop — 40 cigarettes? No, you owe 2.80. Just a small sleight of hand, but always to reach a convenient, predetermined conclusion.
When he was pushing for Trump, it happened all the time — all the black marks were thrown at Biden, who certainly deserves criticism, but not all of it. And all the white balls went into Trump’s pocket. It was blatant distortion. And even now, I don’t see him as a clean source of information. I still believe the source is tainted. Nothing has changed.
And beyond that, while he wasn’t solely responsible for bringing Trump to power, Illarionov did contribute. Shouldn’t there be some accountability? Nothing inherently wrong with supporting Trump over the years — except that Trump hasn’t changed. All this talk about him being different now is nonsense. He lied shamelessly throughout his first term and continues to do so. He was a fascist-type leader back then and remains one. He hasn’t changed.
Now the situation with Ukraine has shifted, and when Trumpists were forced to choose between Trump and Ukraine, some chose Trump and abandoned Ukraine. Illarionov, to his credit, chose Ukraine. Great — good for him. But that doesn’t mean we should now give him a platform. You can listen to him elsewhere — he won’t be on our channel.
As for Ukrainian journalists like Moseichuk and Nemyrya — I have great respect for them, especially Lyudmyla Nemyrya, whom I consider a highly professional journalist. But, you see, Arestovych also appears on her channel. So while I respect her work, she uses different criteria for choosing guests. I repeat — Arestovych appears on her platform. He won’t appear on mine.
Just because I respect Nemyrya doesn’t mean I respect all her guests. So, I don’t feel obliged to copy what Nemyrya, Moseichuk, or anyone else is doing. They’re good journalists — but they’re different. They have their own approach, their own channel.
I’m not saying don’t listen to Illarionov. Please do, by all means. But he won’t be featured on our channel.
Proposal for Ukraine to File an International Lawsuit Against the U.S. Link to heading
So, Igor FSB writes:
“Is the U.S. even a true ally or partner to Ukraine under Trump? Trump not only took away everything he could from Biden, but now he’s trying to strip us like a street hawker and sell us into slavery. If that’s the case, maybe it’s time for Ukraine to go to an international court and declare both the U.S. and Russia as unreliable, treaty-breaking states that disregard international law. They only follow jungle law — the law of force — and should be held accountable for Ukraine’s destruction and the violation of the Budapest Memorandum?”
Dear namesake! I think we are absolutely within our moral rights to criticize and debate the actions of the U.S. administration — Trump, Biden, and the rest. And we do that. But suggesting that Ukraine file an international lawsuit against both the U.S. and Russia — I’d say, as gently as possible, that this would be unwise.
First, the United States does not recognize the jurisdiction of any international court. Second, no international court would hold an entire administration liable. Whom would you even sue — the United States as a state? A specific administration? An individual? It would lead nowhere.
What it would absolutely do is provoke a sharp reaction from the United States — and from European partners as well. If someone in Ukraine were to seriously pursue such an action, the outcome would likely be sheer bewilderment and a withdrawal of support. In other words, it would genuinely harm Ukraine. Genuinely.
About Shura Burtin Link to heading
Moscow Migrant:
Who is Shura Burtin? I keep coming across his gloomy articles translated into English. Is he a genuinely independent journalist telling hard truths, or a propagandist in dissident clothing playing into the Kremlin’s hands? Where is the line between honest, tough reporting and amplifying Russian propaganda?
Thank you for the question. In fact, it’s a very relevant and timely one. It ties directly into our main discussion today about the role of journalism during war — particularly in light of the New York Times article. That piece didn’t lie; everything in it is technically true: Ukrainians often didn’t coordinate with the Americans, struck targets outside the “approved” list, launched offensives that weren’t sanctioned, and so on. All true. But the result is fuel for anti-Ukrainian sentiment — even though nothing in it is false. In my view, the NYT could have balanced that narrative by giving voice to serious Ukrainian analysts explaining the rationale behind those decisions.
Now, about Shura Burtin specifically. No — Shura Burtin is definitely not a Kremlin propagandist in dissident clothing. He’s a correspondent for a Swiss magazine. At one point, he was even awarded the Redkollegia prize — although, as it turns out, no award is an automatic seal of moral legitimacy. I’ve read at least two of his pieces. One was a widely discussed article, in my opinion poorly titled: “Many Ukrainians No Longer Want to Fight.” The other, more recent one — which I believe was published in a Swiss magazine and translated by Meduza — embedded him with Ukrainian soldiers during medical evacuation missions.
It’s basically deep trench reporting — and it’s written in a relentlessly bleak tone. War as mud, war as despair, war as a daily evil that permeates the entire text. The accompanying photographs are just as somber. It’s a very grim picture.
Do such publications have a right to exist? I believe yes. Ukrainian media circles have harshly criticized these pieces. But what’s the root of that criticism? Is it that Burtin is Russian — regardless of what passport he holds now — or would the reaction have been just as harsh if a Ukrainian journalist had written the same? I honestly don’t know.
This is a kind of journalism I personally wouldn’t pursue. In my view, this sort of grim-dark narrative may be justified, but it needs to be balanced by other forms of commentary. Burtin has made his choice — he writes about the war’s dark side.
To me, the whole Burtin debate recalls the post-WWII evolution of war literature: at first came the “general’s prose” — war as heroism, war as myth. Then came “lieutenant’s prose,” which included both heroism and the gritty realities. Then came the dark, gritty “soldier’s prose” — the so-called trench truth. In literary criticism, this was often seen as an ascent toward the real truth about war — away from propaganda.
But here’s where that analogy breaks down. The war literature of WWII was written after the war. It was reflection, not real-time influence. Burtin’s writing is happening during an ongoing war — so the moral climate is completely different.
Does Burtin really influence the Ukrainian audience? I don’t think so. I really don’t. But is he an agent of the Kremlin or someone playing into their hands? Absolutely not.
My take is this: let Burtin write what he writes — but alongside him, there should also be dozens of other writers showing a different side of the war. The quiet daily heroism without big words. The calm resolve that exists on the front lines. Let there be Burtin — and let there be others who write differently.
So no — I don’t see Burtin as a traitor or Kremlin mouthpiece. And yes, I may be a bit long-winded here, but this is an important topic to me.
One last thought: when grim reports come out from the Russian side — about dehydrated occupiers or how their drone war is failing — we often take satisfaction in those “ugly truths.” That’s information warfare too. So can you be objective in the middle of an information war? It’s hard — but possible. Hard, but possible.
Shura Burtin is not the hero of my story, but he is a necessary part of the narrative. He brings a truth that, whether we like it or not, also needs to be known.
Will Americans Take Up Arms, and Is Israel Violating International Law? Link to heading
Vladimir Rashkin has sent a very sharp rebuttal. He writes:
“Dear Alexander, what’s gotten into you lately? First, you claim Israel should return the Golan Heights — and what if Syria, after proving it’s non-aggressive today, changes tomorrow under new leadership? Israel will never give up the Golan. Then you say Americans are an armed people who will rise to defend democracy — based on what? When have Americans taken up arms since the Civil War? By the way, over 50% of American households don’t even own a gun.”
Dear Vladimir, you mentioned you’ve asked a question twice and haven’t received a reply. I don’t recall seeing it, but let me just say: when a question is disguised as a personal critique — “what’s gotten into you lately?” — it becomes harder to recognize as an actual question. Not because I’m touchy about criticism, but because it doesn’t read as a genuine inquiry. Just a suggestion — if you want a clear answer, try framing a clear question, rather than starting with a jab at the author.
That said, your criticism is perfectly within your rights, and as long as it’s not in obscene form — by all means. Criticism is allowed. Maybe not always useful, but certainly permissible.
Now, on substance:
About Americans and guns — you’re right, Americans haven’t taken up arms en masse since the Civil War. But that’s because they’ve never faced an attempt to radically change the nature of American society — until now. What Trump is doing is unprecedented. When I mention the Second Amendment, I don’t do so lightly. It exists precisely to guarantee the people’s right to resist tyranny. And yes, more than half of American households may not have guns — but millions still do.
In Russia, one of the sources of despair is the absolute impossibility of unarmed citizens standing up to heavily armed forces — the National Guard, FSO, FSB, police. The total disarmament of Russian society guarantees that popular resistance cannot lead to a change in power. If the Trumpist regime in the U.S. ever reaches that level, I wouldn’t rule out the Second Amendment being invoked — not as a theory, but in practice.
So yes, I think there’s a certain logic in what I said. We are living through an unprecedented moment in U.S. and world history — when a fascist-style leader has come to power in a democratic country.
Now to Syria and Israel:
Yes, the Golan Heights are populated by a mix of communities — some loyal to Israel, others who would prefer to return to Syria. I have no illusions that Israel will return the Golan anytime soon. But still — the situation in Syria is evolving. I believe those Israeli politicians who say it was easier to negotiate with Assad than with the current Syrian leadership are mistaken. Assad was a direct threat to Israel, not least because he allowed Iranian proxies to operate freely. Today, the region under new leadership seems less permeable to Iranian influence — that alone is a major step forward.
We don’t know how the new Syrian government will develop over the next five years. We don’t know how Turkish influence will affect Syria and its relationship with Israel. But if Syria begins to follow the path of normalization — not necessarily becoming a Western-style democracy (which no Middle Eastern country other than Israel is) — but something like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, then that’s a different situation.
So yes, there is a contradiction: Israel’s presence on the Golan Heights is fully justified from a national security standpoint — and at the same time, it’s a clear violation of international law. That contradiction needs to be acknowledged, not papered over.
Once again: Israel’s occupation of the Golan was logical from its perspective. But from an international legal standpoint, it is an annexation. That contradiction reflects a deeper issue — that international law exists, but there is no global enforcer. There’s no “international policeman” to protect a country’s legal right to self-defense when it is under daily attack or facing existential threats.
That’s the issue — law exists, but there’s no guarantee it can be enforced. So Israel violated international law because no one was there to uphold it on its behalf.
Now, as for Syria — maybe I’m being idealistic, maybe I’m placing too much hope in the new Syrian government. But so far, their actions suggest a potential path forward. And if this trend proves stable, then yes, we should consider how to bring the status of the Golan Heights back into line with international law.
That’s all I wanted to say.
Piontkovsky Supported Trump Link to heading
Dima, Dima asks the question:
How do you explain that Piontkovsky, whom you love so much, supported the antisocial Trump—how did Trump’s antisocial nature blind a man who has always seen an enemy in society’s aspirations? Question mark.
Dear Dima, Dima! I don’t know where you got the idea that, first of all, Piontkovsky supported Trump. I don’t remember that. Another thing is that Andrey Andreyevich, as a kind of combative political analyst—that’s what I call him, and I call him that to his face, so I find it acceptable to do so behind his back as well—acts based on expediency. And possibly at some moments he really did believe that the arrival—I don’t remember, I don’t follow every statement made by Andrey Andreyevich, although I do genuinely like him—but as for him actively supporting Trump, I don’t remember that.
Secondly, I absolutely don’t understand why you believe that Andrey Andreyevich sees or saw an enemy in the aspirations of society? I don’t remember that either. Andrey Andreyevich is a staunch supporter of the Western way of life, a supporter of Western civilization, of democracy, of liberalism. So, dear Dima, Dima, I really don’t understand where these accusations against Andrey Andreyevich are coming from.
Collaborating with Echo of Moscow Is Unacceptable Link to heading
One more critical remark from the gloomy little donkey.
Where is the logic, really, I don’t understand. Really, I don’t understand. We’re told—yes, by A.Y.—that Pliushchev and Shenderovich are bright representatives of the liberal crowd, while at the same time claiming they are decent, respectable people and professionals in their field. And yet, the same crowd is described as de facto part of the fascist regime, having contributed significantly to building the Putin regime, simulating opposition activity while actually draining protest energy into a whistle. As the deputy sender reminded us, this crowd also includes criminals and propagandists like Simonyan, the deranged Markov, and so on. And the leader of this VIP crowd is likely a presidential administration employee—I’m sure this will be confirmed soon after the regime changes. An indirect sign of this is his years-long work for the authorities, the falsification of electronic voting, bribes from Sobyanin, and constant pro-Putin standards. After this, one must ask: how can anyone be part of this so-called VIP crowd? How can a decent person with even a single brain cell cooperate with, let alone produce content for, this Echo-Nail outfit? One could still understand cooperation or participation in the 2011–2012 crowd. OK. Even 2014. But to actively cooperate after 2022? Absolutely not. Not distancing oneself from them after a million scandalous statements and actions from both the leader and his fledglings? Well, excuse me, you must either be a clinical idiot or a complete scoundrel. That’s why I personally consider Shenderovich and Pliushchev to be either one or the other. There is no third option.
Dear gloomy little donkey! You know, in order to somehow respond to you, I need to refer to two phenomena: on one hand, the theory of six degrees of separation, and on the other hand, the criminal underworld’s concepts. So, as for the six degrees of separation, well, it’s clear what that’s about. In today’s world, the distance between any two people on the planet—with several billion people living here—is about five interpersonal connections. I know Petya, Petya knows Smith, Smith knows Lucy, and so on. In the end, for example, between you, you gloomy little donkey, and Putin, there might be three people separating you, right? That’s the issue of transitive connections. Do you think that if Petya is friends with Vasya, and Vasya is friends with Kolya, and Kolya is a fascist, then Petya is also a fascist? That’s the kind of logic you’re using, you see?
Let me tell you this—I’m looking for my cheat sheet here—tomorrow at 11:00 I’m going on the “Special Opinion” program organized by Echo of St. Petersburg. As for Venediktov and his office—firstly, I don’t go to them, and secondly, they don’t invite me. But the St. Petersburg Echo invites me from time to time, and I go there occasionally. It’s also called “Special Opinion,” same as the main one, and I also go to Pliushchev. Now, from your point of view, just a question—no emotional charge here—am I, since I go to Pliushchev and to the St. Petersburg Echo, am I, in your words, a clinical idiot or a complete scoundrel? Just asking. Because I do go there, right? So, from your point of view, I must be either a clinical idiot or a complete scoundrel.
If we follow your logic further, basically each of us has some kind of contact with either Smekh, or Dozhd, or someone else. And to avoid these contacts, we would have to completely isolate ourselves from all interactions. That brings to mind the concept of “criminal code”—you know, there’s this idea in criminal circles of “tainted” association. That anyone who sits at the same table with someone who’s considered tainted, or touches them in any way, is also considered tainted and must join the caste of unfortunate people who represent the absolute bottom of the criminal world.
So, this kind of “moral purity” in quotes, which you propose, dear gloomy little donkey, is characteristic of criminal communities. It’s typical of them. This moral purity is also characteristic of the era of Stalinist repressions, where any contact with an enemy of the people—even a daughter or son of one—meant you too were an enemy of the people, and so on.
So, although I have a rather negative view of the liberal crowd as a phenomenon—a phenomenon I repeat was artificially created by Putin, who cleared out the information space and left only isolated spots like Echo of Moscow (Dozhd came later), and all the people with alternative views gathered there—should they be blamed for that? No, I’m not inclined to blame them. Yes, due to Venediktov’s policies, which were partially aimed at keeping the station from being shut down, there was a certain level of cooperation with the regime. From my point of view, that cooperation far exceeded what was necessary for safety—but that’s another discussion.
In any case, I think that Venediktov’s role is one thing, but the role of, say, Shenderovich, who simply came and said what he thought—not what he was told—is a completely different story. So, you see, I think this demand for absolute purity, for interacting only with perfectly distilled, righteous people—this is, in my opinion, a very flawed concept. Very flawed. I believe it’s unviable. It leads to isolation, and ultimately to ideological and political solitude, where you recognize only yourself and see emptiness around you. That’s what it comes to in the end.
Zelensky Should Have Left in 2022 Link to heading
Elvira from Germany:
And what if Zelensky had known what Ukraine would come to by 2025, surrounded by “friends” like Trump and enemies like Putin? Would he have left the country in March 2022? Maybe it would have been better to avoid such terrible losses and destruction? Everything happening to Ukraine from both friends and enemies is so awful and disgusting.
Dear Elvira! These are two different questions, wouldn’t you agree? I’m very skeptical about my ability to get into other people’s minds, especially in retrospect. But based on what we now know about Zelensky, I think that if he had been able to look into the future in 2022, he still definitely wouldn’t have left. He didn’t leave then, even when the leadership of the United States offered him the chance. So no, in any case, I don’t think he would have left.
But the other question is: could such terrible losses and destruction have been avoided? What options did Zelensky—or any leader of Ukraine—have to avoid such losses and destruction? Yes, Arestovych keeps saying that it was a mistake not to elect him president, that he would have avoided casualties and destruction, and Ukraine would already be the most developed country in the world. But that’s Arestovych—he’s like a modern-day Baron Münchhausen, you see?
In reality—what were the options? Don’t tell me fairy tales about the Istanbul agreements. We both understand, dear Elvira, that those are just fairy tales. Ukraine had no real way to avoid casualties and destruction. The only option was immediate surrender. Yes, that was an option, no doubt—just surrender. But even then, if we imagine living completely stripped of agency and sovereignty, having lost the right to make decisions independently, living inside a Russian-controlled Ukraine—even if we assume that’s a kind of “way out”—that option wasn’t realistically available to anyone.
Because even if someone—Zelensky himself—had given an order to the Armed Forces of Ukraine not to resist, to lay down their arms, that order would not have been followed. That’s the point. If someone thinks that life in slavery is better, I won’t argue—that’s a legitimate point of view. But again, it’s not a realistic one. Realistically speaking, Ukrainian society would never have accepted such a president. And if someone had given such an order to surrender—and that’s the only way to avoid such casualties and destruction—yes, absolutely, if President Zelensky had issued an order on February 24 to lay down arms and fully and unconditionally capitulate, perhaps this destruction wouldn’t have happened. That’s true. That was the only way. But the order wouldn’t have been followed. That’s all there is to it. Because Ukrainian society is a subject in its own right. It’s that simple.
Who Pays the Salaries at Dozhd TV? Link to heading
Elena Potemkina:
Please tell me, who pays the salaries at Dozhd TV?
Wow! Well, I don’t know—I’m not sure I want to conduct a special investigation into Dozhd’s funding sources, so I’ll just say what I know. The information might be incomplete or outdated. So, Dozhd TV has had—at least in the past—funding from the European Union. Since 2014, there has been a grant to promote European values. As far as I know, that funding hasn’t ended. At least, there’s information that they’ve had EU funding.
They’ve also received funding from the Boris Zimin foundation for supporting Russian media. I haven’t heard that this has stopped—at least some money was allocated. In general, Dozhd TV earns good revenue from advertising, since they have a large audience. Naturally, that means big revenues. They also have a paid subscription model. Plus, they receive donations. And they also sell merchandise with their own branding.
So, I’m not going to name Dozhd’s budget—although I’ve heard figures, I’m afraid they might be outdated. I’d rather not spread misinformation. They’re getting by—not living large like Russia Today, for example—but I think they’re doing quite decently.
Does the Author Influence Russia’s Domestic Policy? Link to heading
Andrei Borisov:
I have a personal question for you. Can you influence Russia’s domestic policy?
But the answer is obvious—no, of course not. No, of course not. Naturally, no political émigré—your humble servant belongs to that category—can influence Russia’s domestic policy. I might, to some extent, have a bit of influence—being a somewhat ambitious person, but one with a sense of humor and self-irony—I hope I have a small impact on the mindset of a few people in Russia. But on Russia’s domestic policy? Of course not. Absolutely 100% no. And none of our colleagues can either.
Can the FBK Structure Be Reused? Link to heading
A question from Pan Stepan:
Around the same time as the debates between Zhdanov and Katz, Volkov posted a tweet attacking Radio Liberty and essentially supporting its closure. I feel like we can safely write off the FBK leadership at this point. But have you considered how the FBK structure in Russia could be salvaged and ideally reused in the future—after all, they were the only real and large-scale opposition structures in the country? If not the formal organization, then at least the human resources? That’s my first question.
Dear Pan Stepan, I don’t think there’s any chance of that, because the FBK structure has its own hierarchy, its own network of contacts. I don’t think it’s possible. Especially since I don’t really see who would take on such a task. You’re absolutely right in your assessment of the significance of these structures. Indeed, Navalny managed to build a fairly extensive network of supporters, organized into Navalny’s regional headquarters and these FBK entities.
But these are people who were personally oriented around Navalny, and now, as far as I understand, they follow the current FBK leadership. In theory, some kind of operation to engage these people and attempt—well, I don’t really see who would take on that kind of task. There is not a single person or organization in Russia today that would want to or be capable of doing something like—let’s call things by their name—recruiting these structures. No one is going to do that. So I think, frankly, it’s a utopian idea.
The Unclear Benefit of Inviting Viewers to the Channel Link to heading
And a second question from Stepan:
Regarding the invitation—an unexpected invitation. The suggestion to invite listeners like me on air—you even mentioned me personally as an example. Very flattering, but I also don’t understand the format or the point, unless it’s just to bask in the glow of your fame.
Well, dear Pan Stepan, I appreciate your irony about basking in the glow of fame and all that. I don’t quite get it yet either. So for now, the proposal is still up in the air. I don’t yet understand how—though I’m sympathetic to the idea. In general, the idea of more active audience involvement in the channel’s work is very close to me. But I’m not quite sure how to make it happen.
About Maksim Katz Link to heading
Tatyana Nikitichna:
I don’t share your opinion about Katz. If you watched Maksim’s videos daily, I think you’d feel differently about him. As many people write, Maksim’s videos help one stay sane amidst the political events in the world and our country. If, as you claim, Katz is not a politician, then who is? Name at least a couple of names, please.
Well, dear Tatyana, right from the start—when I commented on those Katz–Zhdanov debates—I said that I regard Katz’s educational work quite highly. I don’t have the time and, frankly, not much desire to regularly watch his educational videos. But I have watched a couple, and I think it’s decent work, and so I rate it highly. It has nothing to do with politics. Every time Katz tries to engage in politics, he ends up doing nonsense. For example, his attempts to get people to participate in the recent September elections—well, that’s just absurd. He achieves no results. He just looks silly. And if one wanted to, one could even accuse him of working for the Kremlin. But I don’t do that, because I don’t believe he works for the Kremlin. Still, it looks silly. I mean, elections? What elections in Russia today? I’ve said it a hundred times—it’s like diving headfirst into an empty pool and trying to swim. There’s no water.
As for your suggestion to name a couple of politicians—I’m afraid I have to decline. Because there are no politicians in exile today. In today’s Russian emigration, there are no politicians. There are more or less likeable people. There are people who share their opinions, who give analytical or expert assessments. Some have more realistic views, some less. Some write higher-quality commentary, others lower-quality. But there are no politicians. That is, no people who significantly influence the situation in Russia, who have a real roadmap to come to power—none of that exists today in political exile, or even in Russian politics as a whole.
So there are no names. Katz is not a politician, I’m not a politician, Kasparov is not a politician, Khodorkovsky is not a politician. We’re all talking heads. That’s not politics.
Ukraine in Fact Never Had Nuclear Weapons Link to heading
Viktor R.:
To be fair, it’s worth asking—in whose operational control was the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal located, including that deployed in the republics? The responsibility for storage and security, of course, lay with the republics. But I doubt the republican leaders could have launched the missiles on their own, without Moscow’s approval, due to both administrative subordination and technical constraints. The infamous nuclear briefcase belonged to the General Secretary, the Minister of Defense, and I believe the Chief of the General Staff—all in Moscow. I think Andrei Piontkovsky is well informed on this. So, during the USSR, the nuclear weapons stationed in the republics functioned like those in Belarus today—they were there, but the republic’s leadership could not use them independently. Moreover, after the collapse of the USSR, the republics’ nuclear weapons remained under Russia’s operational control. And so on. So, the question of ownership of the nuclear weapons located in the republics before and after the USSR’s collapse is, at the very least, ambiguous and formally undefined. Is that accurate?
You know, dear Viktor, the thing is—everything you’ve said is true, with one exception. The fact is that not a single republic—including the RSFSR, today’s Russia, as you well know—had its own Ministry of Defense or its own General Staff. There were military districts located on their territory. For example, five military districts were stationed on Ukrainian territory. These had their own command, yes—but that command reported not to the republic’s leadership or the Ukrainian Communist Party or government, but naturally to Moscow, to the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.
Then, after the Soviet Union dissolved, what happened to the armed forces, including the nuclear weapons? The entire structure of the Ministry of Defense, including the nuclear arsenal, was subordinated to the so-called Unified Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States—the CIS Unified Armed Forces. This military structure was created (I don’t recall the exact date, but it was early 1992) and lasted through 1992–1993. The idea was that this would be a unified command—these unified armed forces of the CIS would eventually become a single military force, including border troops, and so on. This was one of the reasons Russia didn’t initially establish its own national borders.
At the head of this structure was Marshal Shaposhnikov—a well-known figure. The strategic forces, including the nuclear triad, were formally under his command. The RSFSR, I stress, was not initially granted control over these forces. When military reform began around February 1992, the strategic nuclear forces were not subordinated to the RSFSR—they were under the CIS Unified Armed Forces. I don’t remember the name of the exact commander responsible then, but he was not a Russian official—he was part of the CIS joint command structure. And the entire nuclear triad was under this system.
Now, there’s a catch: six of the 15 republics didn’t support this whole CIS unified military project. Three republics—Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia—refused to recognize it. And the three Baltic countries said outright they would have nothing to do with any such force—they would build their own national armies from scratch.
So yes, the headquarters and Marshal Shaposhnikov were based in Moscow. Moscow was simultaneously the capital of both Russia and the CIS military center. But from the start, conflicts began between the newly created Russian Ministry of Defense and the CIS Unified Armed Forces. This conflict eventually led to the dismantling of the CIS command structure in 1993—not the armed forces themselves, but the administrative body overseeing them.
That period also coincided with the Budapest Memorandum, and by that point, the entire nuclear triad had ended up in Russia. So no, it’s not true that Russia “inherently” inherited the arsenal—it didn’t happen organically. That’s incorrect.
I’ve already pointed out that the RSFSR was not initially any more empowered than the other republics. In fact, paradoxically, it had less political agency than many others—it didn’t even have its own Communist Party, for obvious reasons: the moment Russia asserted its own subjecthood, the USSR ceased to exist. A simple story.
So, I think your narrative, dear Viktor, is an attempt to explain that the nuclear arsenal somehow naturally ended up in Russia’s hands. But no—it wasn’t natural. It was a political decision. And in my view, it was a mistake.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So? That’s all, it seems. I don’t see any more questions. Dear colleagues, let me remind you once again that today at 20:00—now using a unified time zone for Ukraine, the Baltic countries, Israel, and Russia—we’ll have a conversation with Serhiy Ivanovych Hrabskiy. I think it will be an interesting discussion, including about that article in The New York Times.
Please take care of yourselves. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom for Alexander Skobov, all Russian political prisoners, and Ukrainian captives! See you at 20:00!
Source: https://youtu.be/VsC-EA_SMig