In Romania, liberal Dan decisively defeated Trumpist Simion, while in Poland, liberal Trzaskowski is slightly ahead of Trumpist Nawrocki. European leaders tried to explain something to Trump before his call with Putin.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 19, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Record Strike on Ukraine Link to heading
Well, the triumphant march of Trumpism across the world, across Europe in particular, has been somewhat halted. I think that’s very good news amid everything else. But first, I want to talk about what’s happening on the main front in Ukraine. A day after the talks in Istanbul, Russian forces launched a record number of drones at Ukraine. On the night of May 18, this was the largest drone attack on Ukrainian territory—273 drones were launched in a single night. Kyiv and its region were attacked by more than 150 drones. As a result, a 28-year-old woman and her entire family were killed. There were severe injuries as well—in short, Putin’s actions just radiate peace. So much for the negotiations. So much for any hopes of Putin’s peacefulness.
Liberal Candidate Wins in Romania Link to heading
Well, now I’m finally getting back to the good news. The vote count in Romania is coming to an end. Over 99%, almost 100% of the votes have been counted. And the liberal mayor of Bucharest, Dan, is confidently defeating his opponent, the leader of the nationalist party, George Simion. This is very good news because—let me try to briefly and concisely explain why—I believe this is very important, especially considering Romania’s strategic position. By the way, tomorrow we’re trying to invite Oazu Nantoi, a member of the Moldovan parliament who is very well-versed in European affairs, and of course, Romanian ones in particular. I hope he will give a more detailed commentary on the events. But for now, I want to say a few words while it’s still fresh.
This was a very clear confrontation between liberal Dan and nationalist Simion. Dan supports aid—this was a textbook, I would say, classic confrontation. Because Dan is a supporter of aid to Ukraine, and of deeper integration of Ukraine and Romania into the European Union. Simion, on the other hand, is a classic Trumpist, a proponent of an imperial direction in Romanian politics. Not only is he a Trumpist, but he also advocates for an imperial Romanian policy. He’s the bearer of the slogan “Make Romania Great Again.” His propaganda materials even featured a map of Romania that includes Moldova and southwestern territories of Ukraine—in short, Romania within its 1918 borders. This is exactly what nationalist George Simion openly calls for at the UN.
So, this is a fairly extreme position—one shared by Trump with his imperial ambitions to annex Canada and Greenland. And of course, by Putin. This is a very clear-cut, black-and-white division—where the liberal and supporter of Ukraine wins. Yes, that’s important. It’s also very telling that this time the diaspora played a huge role—particularly Moldovans, who actively campaigned for Dan. I think it’s very significant that this time diaspora members—people who don’t live in Romania but consider it their homeland and vote in its elections—participated actively. The diaspora makes up 14% of Romania’s total electorate.
Just a couple of words about why this is extremely important for Ukraine. Romania holds a strategically unique position in supporting Ukraine because, first, it provides the main alternative route for exporting Ukrainian grain. Second, the Romanian Navy participates in demining operations in the Black Sea. Additionally, three major NATO airbases and American missile defense systems stationed in Romania undoubtedly play a key role in protecting the airspace along Ukraine’s borders and in the Black Sea region. On top of that, Romania hosts the European F-16 pilot training center where Ukrainian military personnel are being trained. So the elections in Romania are of huge strategic importance. And the winner of these elections—now effectively the acting head of Romania, though still officially the mayor of Bucharest—has consistently stated that aid to Ukraine must continue.
As for Simion, he is against supplying weapons to Kyiv and constantly emphasizes that his foreign policy line will follow the course of Donald Trump’s administration. Moreover, he demands compensation from Ukraine for the aid already provided. These are fundamentally opposite positions. So I congratulate not only Romania, not only Moldova, but also Ukraine on the victory of this politician. This is good news.
Results of the First Round in Poland Link to heading
Well, let’s say my reaction to the results of the first round of elections in Poland is somewhat more reserved. Things are more complicated here, because a second round of the presidential election is clearly ahead. On one side is the candidate from the ruling Civic Platform party, Warsaw mayor Szawkowski, and on the other, the conservative director of the Institute of National Remembrance, Karol Nawrocki. This is based on exit polls, at least—I don’t have the actual results, just the exit polls. According to them, Szawkowski is in the lead with 30.8%, while Nawrocki has 29.1%.
I won’t go on at length about each side’s positions, but here, too, it’s quite a black-and-white situation. Nawrocki is an outright Trumpist. He was recently in the United States, had his photo taken with Trump, and Trump supposedly encouraged him with the words “You will win.” So Nawrocki is, without a doubt, a textbook Trumpist and an opponent of supporting Ukraine, and so on. Everything is pretty much the same story.
The only thing that can be said is that the results of the second round are highly unpredictable. I hope that tomorrow, if we manage to have a conversation with Anton, he’ll comment on the elections in Poland as well, because he’s very knowledgeable about European politics. But the situation there is much more complex, because the margin is tiny—less than 2%—and the political mood in Poland is quite right-leaning. Szawkowski, of course, doesn’t look very convincing in this context. For one thing, as the Poles themselves say—based on comments I’ve seen—they consider him too smart and too leftist. He’s even gotten the nickname “Manjour,” not because he knows French well, but as a way of poking fun at how detached he seems from the average Kowalski in rural Poland.
In short, rural Poland will, of course, vote against him. The question is how all this will ultimately translate into second-round results. I don’t know—the situation is more concerning there. But for now, at least in Romania, Trumpism has definitely lost—and that is encouraging.
Eurovision Trends Link to heading
Another event—or rather, several events—I’d like to touch on. First of all, strangely enough, and it is very strange for me, I want to say a few words about Eurovision. Dear friends, you know very well that I generally try to avoid making any public comments on literature, and especially on pop music. I don’t consider my aesthetic or artistic tastes to be any kind of standard, and I definitely have no desire to engage in literary or musical criticism. And even more so when it comes to pop music—modern pop is something I clearly do not understand. So I won’t be analyzing the artistic or musical aspects of Eurovision.
What does interest me, however—what I find very interesting—is the audience voting. And that is important. I think it’s a very serious and rather troubling indicator. Of course, let me immediately clarify that this is not a direct reflection of European opinion as a whole. There are major distortions here. After all, who votes? Those who watch Eurovision—a specific subset of the population that is not representative of society as a whole. The general population of Eurovision viewers does not match the general population of all Europeans. And then, among those viewers, only a portion actually vote—so there’s a second layer of distortion. That has to be taken into account.
Still, something is revealed here—a certain active segment of Europeans is expressing its opinion. And in that sense, one can get an indirect sense of which countries and peoples Europeans sympathize with—and to what extent. Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has consistently held top positions in audience voting. In 2022, Ukraine took first place in the viewers’ vote. In 2023, fourth place. In 2024, second. So there’s no clear downward trend. But in this year’s Eurovision—2025—Ukraine, according to viewers, placed only sixth. And that matters.
Now, overall rankings also include professional jury votes. Ukraine, if I’m not mistaken, finished ninth overall. But I couldn’t care less about the jury votes. What matters is the audience. So let me read out what I think is important—the top seven in the viewers’ vote:
First place went to Israel with 297 points—an overwhelming lead. This, by the way, is something to keep in mind when it comes to all the talk about pro-Palestinian sentiment in Europe. Well, as it turns out, that’s nonsense. All the talk about the pro-Palestinian mood in European universities, the protests, slogans, anti-Israel sentiment—it’s all exaggerated. Sure, it exists, but overall, the fact that Israel took first place, especially amid the escalation in Gaza, is significant. So—297 points for Israel is a big deal.
Second place went to Estonia with 258 points. Third was Sweden with 195. Fourth, Austria with 179—or 178. Fifth, Albania with 173. Sixth, Ukraine with 158. And seventh, Poland with 139.
I think this is very—excuse me—I think this is very telling. Again, audience voting is not a representative sample, that’s clear, but it reflects a very active segment of European citizens and viewers. That’s why I believe it’s an important indicator.
Trump Plans to Call Putin Link to heading
And one more piece of news I can’t ignore in today’s morning stream—it’s May 19, and Trump is planning to call Putin, and then Zelensky. Well, I think—excuse me—but I do believe that calling Putin is something he can manage. So I hope that conversation will indeed take place today. What’s also telling is that late last night, Trump was contacted and spoken to by the leaders of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Clearly, they understand the gravity of the situation—understand how significant this is—and knowing that Trump might do something erratic during his talk with Putin, they decided to steer him in the right direction. My apologies, but honestly, this really speaks volumes about their attitude toward Trump.
On one hand, European leaders clearly recognize that he is the most influential person on the planet. On the other, their approach to him is clearly that of someone with limited capacity—they’re essentially trying to act as his guardians. Well, we’ll see today. I don’t know how much of the conversation’s content will become public, but we’ll be watching. It’s important—undoubtedly significant. Especially given that, as I said, just last night there was the most massive drone raid by Russian occupation forces on Ukrainian cities. That’s Putin’s idea of seeking peace.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, I want to mention that today at 8:00 PM we’ll have our traditional Monday conversation with Sergey Borisovich Hrabski, and I think it will be an interesting discussion. There are a lot of questions for him. Now I’ll move on to answering your questions. Let me say right away—there are a lot of questions, just a huge number. So please be patient. Some are interesting, some not so much, but in any case, I’ll try to respond to all of them. So just a heads-up—today’s morning stream will likely be quite long. After we wrap up the stream, I hope there will be timestamps available. That should be helpful.
Katz urges supporters to take dangerous and pointless actions Link to heading
A question from the UN poncho. Well, kind of a strange question. And not a question, as the author himself presents it, either in defense or not in defense of Katz, reviewing his analysis a year after February 2022 and later. He spoke correctly and predicting things was at first interesting to listen to—sometimes it still is. But during the presidential election, he began urging people to vote for Nadezhdin, and he was clearly a technical candidate. Soon after, those who voted for him began to be persecuted. And after the election, Katz did not react in any way to the persecution of those voters.
Dear colleague! I have already repeatedly expressed my opinion about Katz. I mean, not about him as a person—no one is interested in that—but about his political position, you see? On the one hand, this is indeed irresponsibility, because calling people to do something and then, so to speak, not taking any responsibility for it—what happens next when people are persecuted? And then what? Meanwhile, you, who called for it, are living in complete safety—how do you feel about that? That’s not right. That’s exactly why I don’t call for any actions that pose a danger to people. Some people criticize me for this, say that I, so to speak, advocate inaction. No, dear friends, I just believe it is wrong, being personally safe—well, relatively at least—to call on people to do things that may lead to serious, serious problems for them. So let’s do it this way. If there are people who want to take risks, well, they do so on their own. But the most important thing is something else. The main point is that Katz still sees the situation as electoral. That is, the pool has long since dried up, it’s been dry for ages. The tiles are cracked. Yet the swim coach Katz is still calling for people to dive headfirst into the concrete floor—or tiles—and crawl along the bottom, pretending to swim. That’s exactly how it looks. He still perceives the situation as electoral, as if something can be changed through elections. Again, I think that’s not so much strange as it is just wrong.
Irina Verna Link to heading
Two questions from Sergey. Say a few words about Irina Verna. She left Kasparov.ru, unfortunately.
Well, I can only say one thing. I share your regret—she was interesting to read. I can’t say I was a regular reader or a fan, but reading her was interesting. It’s a shame she left.
Yevgeny Ikhlov Link to heading
And the second question here requires a more substantial, more detailed answer. It’s about your attitude toward Yevgeny Ikhlov.
Here I can say a bit more. First of all, we were, of course, personally acquainted. He was a unique figure, without a doubt, and I received the news of his passing with real sorrow. He died, as they say, in an informational trench—at his computer while writing another article. He was truly an incredibly educated person, despite not having a formal higher education. By the way, in his articles, he sometimes astonished with his detailed, encyclopedic knowledge of history. And in the field of religion too—he was a great expert on Jewish history. And of course, his analysis and forecasts were always very interesting. And beyond all that, he was a human rights activist. He went to court as a defender. So what can I say? He was a phenomenon, without a doubt. Really, it’s like—without him, the world feels incomplete.
Putin’s Cunning Link to heading
A question from Nora Can we say that Putin rules through ambiguity, using so-called demonic politeness, convoluted phrasing, verbosity, demagoguery, and delaying tactics? Unlike many leaders of democratic countries, who are mostly straightforward, this is a very cunning position, writes Mara. What can be opposed to such a stance without coming across as aggressive, rude, or uncooperative?
Dear Nora! I think there are two things that can be opposed to this—first, truth and clarity. Putin lies constantly; those lies must be exposed. And second, strength. Because confronting Putin only through rhetoric is a pointless exercise. Putin is absolutely not inclined to give any undue importance to diplomacy, rhetoric, and so on. He’s simply not interested in that. His main battlefield is force itself. So one must oppose him with strength, or else everything is futile.
Where Are the Consequences of the Ultimatum Link to heading
Is that so? Gerd Müller The question is, why are there consultation talks? Where did the ultimatum go?
Dear colleague, that question should be addressed to Donald Trump. He was the one who insisted on these negotiations, he was the one who shoved the ultimatum aside. So that’s a question for Trump. Unfortunately, the person with the greatest resources and influence in the world is taking such a position. That’s a problem. I’ve spoken about this many times already.
Why Didn’t Ukraine Respond in 2014 the Way It Did in 2022 Link to heading
So, here’s another question from Deutsche Poncho Since 2014, the first sanctions were imposed for Crimea, Donbas, and Luhansk. But Ukraine continued to communicate, make films, hold concerts. All relations finally ended in 2022. Why didn’t Ukraine cut off communication immediately back in 2014?
You know, very often we—and our Ukrainian colleagues, our Ukrainian viewers—tend to extrapolate today’s situation back to 2014 or even earlier. And that’s why people say, “Why do you say the war started in 2022? It started in 2014 or even before that.” A whole number of Ukrainian analysts argue that there was already an imperial, aggressive Russian policy toward Ukraine even during Yeltsin’s time. Yes, some individual idiots, some imperialists, like Luzhkov, the same Zatulin, they made extremely aggressive statements—Glazyev too—about Ukraine. But the attitude was completely different. Overall, the state policy was completely different.
Now, as for why Ukraine continued—well, not all of Ukraine, of course, but certain people in Ukraine continued to communicate. I just want to remind you, dear friends, of the results of the 2019 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. Five years after the occupation of Crimea, five years of war in Donbas, five years of the de facto occupation of a significant part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. And what was the result? The Opposition Platform – For Life, openly pro-Russian, overtly so, received over 13%. So even during this period—2014 to 2019—not to mention the situation in 2014 itself, there were pro-Russian sentiments in several regions of Ukraine. Quite a lot, in fact. They didn’t dominate, but they were there. And they were mostly beaten back, countered, as an openly pro-Russian provocation. But those sentiments did exist.
And so, yes, indeed, until February 24, 2022, there were pro-Russian sentiments in Ukraine. A vivid example—the 2019 elections, over 13% for an openly pro-Russian Opposition Platform – For Life. That’s why some people wanted or didn’t want to keep communicating, make films, hold concerts, etc. All that was cut off by February 24, 2022. After that—nothing. Of course, there are still people who are waiting for Russia to come. But there aren’t many of them. And besides, in wartime conditions, even those who are waiting for something tend not to voice their position openly—although that still happens too.
Suggestion to Invite a Non-Ukrainian Military Expert Link to heading
A question from Lana Is it possible to invite a non-Ukrainian military expert—Aguilera?
Of course, it’s possible. I don’t think there’s any problem with that. We will definitely be inviting a wide range of experts.
Why Don’t People Remember the Harris–Trump Debate Link to heading
Alexander, Why does no one remember the Harris–Trump debate, where Harris said Putin would eat Trump for breakfast? That’s exactly what happened. No need to read further. Not only did the bald one crap on the orange clown’s head…
Well, generally speaking—what do you mean no one remembers? That debate happened. It took place, and many people do remember it. And the fact that Harris quite rightly assessed Putin’s influence on Trump is a historical fact. Which didn’t prevent Trump from ultimately becoming president. Well, still, right? So, what’s said is one thing, but the fact that sympathies ended up largely on Trump’s side is also a historical fact.
Did Zelensky Make a Faux Pas in Etiquette Link to heading
Aleksei Alekseev Did you notice that no one told Zelensky that sitting down before elders is unacceptable in Muslim traditions? It’s a serious offense. And as we know, the East is a delicate matter. By the way, the Turks cut this episode from the official broadcast.
Dear colleague, first of all, I didn’t notice that. I mean, really—I just didn’t see it. Second, you know, this situation needs to be examined separately—how it all unfolded. You’re right to say that the East is a delicate matter, but the degree of adherence to Islamic traditions—again, the degree of adherence—while in an Islamic country is a separate issue, you see? In general, the level of observance of religious traditions in a given country is a separate matter. Take Israel, for example—on the Sabbath it’s not customary to work or do many other things. But still, here’s the thing: no one forbids you from working, no one forbids you from not following, so to speak, the restrictions and requirements of Judaism. No one forbids you to work—go ahead. But where’s the catch? If you enter neighborhoods populated by traditionalists, there could be problems. Again—it’s a matter of crossing boundaries. So we need to analyze this particular situation. I didn’t see that episode, so I can’t say. But let me stress again: observing Muslim traditions as a non-Muslim in a Muslim country is its own matter—without fanaticism, so to speak. There’s no need to pretend to be a devout Muslim. And who exactly should sit first—or what does it mean to sit before elders? That—again—is a separate matter. Who qualifies as an elder? Is it only about age? All of this requires a separate conversation. So I don’t know to what extent Zelensky may have violated Muslim traditions there.
Iosif Diskin Link to heading
Now, a question from a user—that’s how people sometimes identify themselves, without specifying a name. What do you think of Iosif Yevgenyevich Diskin? Doctor of Economics, professor.
You know, I think this is a classic case. There’s a term—“court Jew scholar,” meaning an intellectual servant, so to speak. Iosif Diskin was a classic example of an intellectual servant of the regime, because he was the academic supervisor and chair of the scientific-expert council of VTsIOM under Pyotr Fyodorovich—after the leadership change, when Levada left and Fyodorov took over. Diskin continued to serve Fyodorov. In addition, since 2008 he was a member of the Public Chamber of Russia. Well, that too is telling. So, he was part of this intellectual support staff. Personally, I find his work and statements of little interest. Though he is, without doubt, an educated person—that doesn’t change my opinion of him.
Does the War Continue Because It Benefits the U.S. and Europe? Link to heading
Aigul Dadaeva Why hasn’t the war between Russia and Ukraine ended? Everyone understands that Putin could stop it, but aside from him—why does it continue? There’s an opinion that the main reason is the U.S. and Europe’s interest in prolonging the war to deplete and weaken both countries, and then at the right, convenient moment, provide all the necessary weapons, change EU and NATO laws, end the war, and turn Ukraine into a buffer zone between Europe and Russia.
Dear Aigul, I don’t believe your version of events is accurate. It leans a bit toward conspiracy thinking—a sort of plot. I think things are simpler, somewhat different. On the one hand, look—Ukraine and the United States, excuse me, the U.S. and Europe are still supporting Ukraine, providing weapons and funds. The reason why the support is insufficient varies. Trump, for example, is a separate story. He’s someone who supports Putin and is generally not willing to support Ukraine at all—he only does so under strong pressure from Congress and public opinion in the U.S.
As for the Europeans—they do support Ukraine. And their main objective is just one thing: to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. That’s something voters don’t want. Europeans don’t want to go to war. And they are, in principle, inclined toward Ukraine serving as a buffer zone between Europe and Russia. You’re right about that. But your interpretation—that at some point EU and NATO laws will be changed—I don’t think so. I believe they are interested in Ukraine continuing to fight. In principle, they would prefer that Ukraine win this war. But they’re afraid it could escalate into a world war. That kind of concern exists.
And on the other hand, Europe today is hardly in a position to flood Ukraine with weapons—it simply doesn’t have that amount of weaponry. So I think your version has a somewhat conspiratorial tone.
Putin’s Luck or Personal Qualities Link to heading
Liliya, a little bit. You still need to think further. That is—who are you? This is about luck. There are two options: God or the devil. And in that case, it’s not just luck. Below are the conduits of will, and somewhere in there are the figures you’ve already mentioned. And Putin could have been analyzed since childhood. Who gave him this luck? Are you an atheist? Then analyze the chain of puppet masters—who are they? Conduits of good and evil? And continuing this question, Alenka asks: Putin’s luck goes by several names. The question is—why did so many people recommend him specifically?
An interesting question. I think Putin’s inconspicuous dullness didn’t raise any alarms. That’s why Sobchak gladly took him on as an assistant—because he didn’t see him as a competitor. And the Yeltsin family—they too thought he would be a loyal executor of their will. Well, that happens. Like little Zaches. The most convincing description of what Putin represents. I’d also like to remind you that Putin’s “luck” is tied not only to people, but also to policy—oil prices that skyrocketed. So it doesn’t all boil down to personality alone.
Why Does the Author Use Slang Link to heading
So, from the MOVIE studio center. Igor Aleksandrovich, but with your level of culture, why do you reduce politics to “he caved in” or “didn’t cave in”? What nonsense! I hope you haven’t adopted street slang. That kind of thing belongs in public bathhouses. Today it’s enough to say “they crossed a line.” Let’s move on.
I don’t fully understand the point of the criticism. Regarding street slang, I just want to say one thing: language reflects reality. And when the reality is that of street thugs, unfortunately, sometimes one has to find matching language. As Mr. Mirzoyev used to say—it’s “class language.” Language reflects reality. I don’t speak like that in everyday life, but when describing that kind of reality, sometimes one has to resort to language that fits.
Putin’s Luck as a Scientific Phenomenon Link to heading
A question from Liliya Why are the factors behind the fantastic luck of an illegitimate usurper of power in Russia—and the economy—not being considered or explained in European and American universities? Why did the Russian media remain silent about this even when it was still possible to cover it? Why is the left wing uninterested in economics, sociology, or even statistics? Why do scholars, experts, and political scientists like Pastukhov in London, Shulman in Berlin, Pipes in the U.S. constantly ignore the economic and sociological reality? How can such a phenomenon even be explained?
Well, dear Liliya, you’ve really gone all in on some well-known people who, in fact, do try to analyze things—they rely on sociology and on economics. So it’s not fair to say they completely ignore all of that. As for the phenomenon I mentioned, here’s the thing: almost no one discusses it in terms of “luck.” And here’s why: because “luck” is not a scientific term at all. Let me pause for just a minute to elaborate on that. Scientific terms—or terms from other disciplines—can indeed be introduced into academic discourse, but this takes some effort. “Luck” is a term from everyday language, and it inevitably raises a lot of questions when you start using it in analysis. What is luck—just good fortune? It’s a term from card games—does someone get lucky or not?
But, in principle, introducing new terms and concepts into scientific discourse is a possible thing. I remember well how I had very difficult relations with the sociology department when I taught at MGIMO. For a while, I had quite a few dissertation candidates who came to me asking to be their academic advisor. And very often we would formulate the topic and problem using terminology that was unusual for academic scholars. I clearly remember many debates within the sociology department where people would say, “There you go again, using terms that are completely unfamiliar to the sociological ear.”
I tried to explain that it’s actually a common practice to bring terms from other disciplines into a particular academic field. For example, many sociologists—including major ones like Pierre Bourdieu—used the concept of “field.” “Field” is a term from physics, not sociology. But he integrated it into sociological discourse—and it worked brilliantly. It turned out that with the help of this concept, many things could be analyzed and resolved. That’s one of many examples where a term from another scientific language—or even from everyday life—is introduced into the academic framework of a specific field.
The term “luck,” or “fart” in Russian, would require considerable effort to be accepted into scientific discourse. It naturally causes resistance because it’s not standard. It’s perceived as something alien. But it is possible. It’s possible.
Do other people’s opinions about a person matter? Link to heading
Uh-huh. So, quite a few of your questions relate to your attitude toward other people. My attitude toward people is formed based on their words and actions. I absolutely don’t care what others think about them. How important is the formation of opinions about a person to you? Do other people’s opinions of them matter?
Dear colleague, I do not agree with the position that I form an opinion solely based on words and actions. And what others think—who cares. First of all, I can say right away that in many cases we do not know a person well enough to judge them. And therefore, if there are people who are authoritative to us, whose reputation seems flawless to us, and they express an opinion about someone—if a person I respect expresses their opinion—then that matters to me. That is significant to me. Right. And in general, I call all this “synchronizing our watches.” And ultimately, it’s about thinking together. That is, the opinion of others is significantly important to me. Again, it all depends on whose opinion it is. Obviously, the opinion of people I don’t respect has little value for me. But when it comes to certain authorities, certain people I respect—why shouldn’t their opinion matter to me? It absolutely does. This is exactly the kind of “synchronizing of watches” we engage in with our experts.
On Actions Outside of Morality Link to heading
Friend of a security officer. Question about morality. One definition of morality states that it arose and evolved, among other things, to ensure the survival of a biological species. So let’s say that in a critical situation, a person has to resort to, for example, cannibalism without killing in order to survive. Would that be a moral or immoral act?
I think that would be an action outside the bounds of morality. Again, you’re describing some extreme, critical situation. And again, we’re talking, of course, about a scenario without killing. Right. But yes, in the case of famine, in the case of a man-made famine where people were in an extreme situation—yes, there were cases of cannibalism. I’m not ready to condemn them for that. That is, it’s not moral, it’s an act outside morality. And it doesn’t mean that people are returning to traditions of cannibalism. It’s an extreme situation. Just like in normal circumstances it’s unacceptable to kill others—during war, yes, it’s an extreme situation, and one has to kill the enemy. So, once again, I emphasize: this is an action outside of morality.
Then Who Will Eliminate Putin? Link to heading
Georgie. But then who should destroy evil if Ukraine doesn’t have such a scenario?
Well, as I understand it, this is a reaction to my statement that, at the moment, the elimination of Putin does not have any political will behind it, and is not really… Well, let’s dot the i’s right away. First of all, how do you know there is no such scenario? How do you know that Ukraine’s intelligence services or military-political leadership are not considering this option in principle? I don’t know that. I think that such a scenario is extremely unlikely. But I’m not sure it’s not being considered. I’m not sure that the intelligence services of the United States aren’t considering such a scenario either. The fact is, there is no political will for it—that’s a fact, for obvious reasons. And besides, destroying evil doesn’t necessarily mean the physical elimination of Putin. Defeating Putin’s army can be done in another way, but that would require a different kind of political will, focused in a different direction—not toward physically eliminating Putin specifically, but toward providing such an amount of weapons that it would undermine Russia’s military potential. That’s a different story. So, there can be different scenarios.
Putin Skillfully Uses His Abilities Link to heading
Alright, Lyubov Polishchuk, alright. I want to share my opinion: the trump cards of the deal have entered the world stage. Like some casino, and now it’s just luck. I think it’s not luck. It’s an ugly, necessary, advantageous man without limits, without honor or conscience, who is capable of making any deal, committing any atrocity, even murder, surrounding himself with accomplices—armed, moreover, with KGB skills and knowledge. That’s his trump card, which he’s used all his life. Luck has nothing to do with it. Trump took the bait—waving immense wealth and benefits before him. Isn’t it obvious that Trump is desperately waiting for Zelensky to slip up, so he can blame him for the war, hand Ukraine over to Putin, and in return get good deals, profits, and support? And I think he’s already received his personal payoff. Or was it just promised? What do you think about this?
I agree with much of what you’ve said. But the only thing is—how do you explain the fact that as soon as Putin came to power, as soon as he became president, oil prices soared? He had nothing to do with it; that’s obvious. His KGB skills had nothing to do with it. I’m not claiming… Again, I’m saying that luck is something that still includes a huge degree of randomness, irrationality, and so on. I’ll emphasize again: introducing the term and concept of “luck” into scientific discourse requires certain effort. And until that’s done—well, it still needs to be seriously developed. That is to say—well, how? A certain scientific framework is needed to study it. So, you’re right. Absolutely, you’re right. Putin did have certain personal qualities that helped him advance. These included his recruitment skills, cunning, and so on. He had all of that. But there are also definitely elements—elements of what we call luck. Not every stork landed like that, so to speak. I mean, there were plenty of KGB officers, but it was Putin who ended up at the forefront. So luck still plays a role. And the oil price spike can’t be explained by Putin’s personal qualities.
Wikipedia Has No Information About Shestakov’s Death Link to heading
User Sorry, I didn’t know that Shestakov had passed away. There’s nothing about it on Wikipedia. Please correct that, and tell us why he died in poverty. After all, he was in the Duma, and before that a rector, a candidate of philosophical sciences, a doctor of historical sciences. Was there really no source of income from academic or teaching work? Where were his friends, the people he helped? His children? And another question about Shestakov, from a different subscriber. Igor Ivanovich, Wikipedia says that Vyacheslav Nikolaevich Shestakov, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, is alive and 87 years old.
Dear colleagues! Well, you see, I was at the funeral. I emphasize once again that Vyacheslav Nikolaevich was my friend. Let’s just say, I am proud not only of having known him, but of the fact that we were comrades, friends, and that’s why I was at his funeral. So there’s no point in telling me he’s still alive. Vyacheslav Nikolaevich’s role is clearly underestimated. There are people whose role in history is grossly overestimated. His role is greatly underestimated, because he was the very person who, at the party conference in 1988, declared the creation of the democratic platform within the CPSU. And that played a very important role in the later fracture of the Communist Party. I would say that Vyacheslav Nikolaevich is truly a historical figure. Although very few know about this now. He played a significant role in the internal split of the CPSU. As for that time—I remember well how, in that situation, he sacrificed everything: his career, his livelihood, even his family’s wellbeing. I remember how, when we were taking this step together, we fully understood what it meant—expulsion from the party, dismissal, and essentially, falling into a void. Today it’s easy to look back and say, “1988—well, the Soviet Union was about to collapse anyway.” But back then no one knew that. At the time, it truly was stepping into the void. And when we talked about it, he even—partly joking, partly serious—said, “Igor Aleksandrovich, you’re pushing me toward Golgotha,” fully aware of the consequences.
As for the poverty—he died before receiving… that is, he didn’t receive a pension, he lost his income. It was a time when, yes, some freedom had appeared and people could make money, but it required a certain resourcefulness. And, you know, the principle “if you want to live, you have to hustle” was very relevant. Vyacheslav Nikolaevich wasn’t someone who knew how to hustle. The political weight, the sheer personal gravity of this man—I’d say his personal “mass”—was too great to squirm his way through. You see, a spinning elephant is a strange sight. Vyacheslav Nikolaevich was such an elephant—he couldn’t spin. I wouldn’t say it’s some great virtue, but it’s simply a fact. He didn’t know how to maneuver. He knew how to act—nobly, and powerfully. But maneuvering—he couldn’t do that. And for people like him, the new reality turned out to be fatal. So… that’s how it was. It’s all very, very sad.
Andrei Piontkovsky Link to heading
Yulia Prokofieva Could you tell us a little about Andrei Andreyevich Piontkovsky?
You know, we’re getting a series of biographical questions today. Andrei Andreyevich—first of all, he’s a brilliant mathematician. His work in mathematics—I’m not a mathematician myself, of course—but I tried to read it. And what I understood was very interesting. And beyond that, he’s an encyclopedist. But Andrei Andreyevich gave all that up, so to speak, on the altar of Ukraine’s victory. He’s a classic example of combative analysis. People often criticize him for allegedly making inaccurate predictions. A favorite argument of his opponents is that “he predicts things and they don’t come true.” But he doesn’t actually predict anything. You see the point? He doesn’t predict. He engages in combative analysis. What does that mean? He’s not saying what will happen. He’s saying what must be done. You see, he’s trying to influence things. He writes articles in the American press. He has a lot of texts on social media in English. Why? Because he’s trying to exert influence. He absolutely doesn’t care what people might say about him predicting this or that. He doesn’t predict—he says what must be done. He tries to shift the situation in a different direction. And when he expresses optimism, he believes that by promoting that optimism, he nudges the situation in a better direction.
I remember well our many discussions with him, back when we would meet at Kasparov’s home—almost every week. Garry Kimovich, Andrei Andreyevich, yours truly, and a few others. In those discussions, he would often say things that triggered my resistance, and I would argue with him. He constantly said, “What does a scientific forecast have to do with anything? I’m trying to say what needs to be done.” That’s the kind of person he is. That’s who he is—thankfully, still with us. A person who prefers action and influencing the situation, rather than just trying to comprehend it. That’s who Andrei Andreyevich is.
Has the Author Read Vikhareva’s Recent Posts Link to heading
Svetlana Ovchinnikova. Have you read Elvira Vikhareva’s Facebook posts—specifically the most recent ones?
Dear Svetlana! No, I haven’t read them, I don’t know. If you think it’s important, I’ll take a look. But, well, Elvira Vikhareva used to invite me to take part in her initiatives. I agreed, and then she stopped inviting me. I don’t know the reasons. Frankly, they’re not very important to me. It’s normal—people invite someone, then stop inviting them. It’s voluntary. So I don’t know what kind of things she’s posting now.
On the U.S. Electoral System Link to heading
Simon Ryaboy Now do you understand that Trump is like an amoeba, because guppy fish have slightly better memory? And now the question. What is a “receiver”? I guess you meant “successor.” Why can’t there be direct elections? A candidate from the outside is unclear to me. Trump as Biden’s successor—funny.
I didn’t quite understand the question. As for the electoral system of the United States, it really doesn’t look very democratic. But the logic is very simple: the goal is to preserve the sovereignty of the states. That is, if direct elections by the entire population were allowed, then obviously a giant state like California would dominate. States with small populations would end up, essentially, without any real political agency. The Founding Fathers’ task from the very beginning was to preserve the statehood of the individual states, to preserve them as sovereign entities. In fact, the U.S. is a union of sovereign states, in a certain sense. That’s why the system is structured this way.
As for the term “successor,” I honestly didn’t quite get it. Maybe it needs some clarification. Trump is, of course, not anyone’s successor. He just came in as the next president. There’s no succession in that sense.
About the TV Channel Dozhd Link to heading
Alright. Olga, please explain your skeptical attitude toward Dozhd. I watch them from time to time. To me, they have always seemed like honest, professional journalists who clearly expressed their stance on the war, on Putin, on the Russian occupiers, and who deliver truthful information to their viewers. For me, as a Ukrainian, their broadcast in the early days of the war with Ekaterina Kotrikadze was a breath of fresh air. She clearly laid out the whole history of Russian aggression, starting from 2014. It was very important for me to hear that from a Russian journalist who was able to bring that truth to Russia. This is from Olga in Sumy.
Dear Olga! You see, the position of Dozhd—yes, they are undoubtedly professional journalists, that’s true. But their stance has always been somewhat “above the fray” in this war. Yes, they call the war a war—that’s all correct. But in general, they proceed from the idea that, well, people in Russia are suffering too. That’s true. For example, why were they stripped of their licenses in Latvia and Estonia? Because of a stance suggesting the possibility of helping the Russian army. Then there was very harsh criticism—from Kotrikadze herself, in fact—of the mayor of Riga for allegedly violating the rights of Russians. But you see, if you’ve come as a guest—and Dozhd was a guest, a welcomed guest in Riga—and you start criticizing your hosts for how they conduct their policies… Look, Latvia has a large Russian population, and part of that population is a fifth column. Latvia is developing its approach to this category of citizens or guests. And criticizing them for, in the guest’s opinion—Dozhd’s opinion—the hosts are taking some precautions for their internal security… Given what’s happening in Ukraine right now, I think it’s at the very least tactless for a Russian TV channel and Russian journalists. That’s what troubles me.
They don’t seem to feel they bear any responsibility for what’s happening in Russia today or in Ukraine. They feel entitled to criticize the governments of the Baltic states for trying to protect themselves from the Russian threat. But look at what happened in Ukraine—largely because there wasn’t enough resistance to pro-Russian sentiments, this catastrophe occurred. And it’s one thing if it were some European channel—it does matter where you’re from. You can’t operate on the idea that it doesn’t matter who we are. It does matter. We are the ones who, to one degree or another, allowed what is happening in Russia and Ukraine to happen.
So this complete lack of any sense of responsibility—I think that’s wrong. That’s what unsettles me about Dozhd. And I emphasize that what unsettles me is their certainty in their right to criticize the governments of Lithuania, for example, or Latvia, or Estonia, for taking steps to protect themselves from the Russian threat. I think that’s wrong. And in general, their “above the fray” stance—although it might seem like objectivity, like a journalist should be above the fray—in a situation of war, like World War II, I think being above the fray is wrong.
What Does Putin Dream About Link to heading
Denis from Lyubertsy. What does Putin think about? What are his goals and values? He’s not sitting on piles of gold bars or planning the capture of Chasiv Yar 24/7. Some people just want to scare their neighbors and play loud music at night to prove their dominance. Others dream about their ex who’s now with a foreigner and posting pictures from Europe on Instagram. What does the leader of the “Moskals” dream about in the 21st century?
I think he dreams of going down in history as the gatherer of Russian lands. I believe he sees himself as a great historical figure who must overcome the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. I think that forms a kind of foundation for his actions. He imagines himself, so to speak, as Vladimir the Gatherer of Russian Lands, and as a man who leads the resistance against American hegemony.
On the Goal of Translating Mediafrenia into English Link to heading
Vladimir Golovin From time to time, people suggest that you organize the translation or broadcast of the program Mediafrenia for a Western audience. It’s rather strange that this is directed at a person whose financial, technical, organizational—and even physical—resources are quite limited. What are we trying to achieve? To enlighten Western society, to deliver the truth to them? But are opposition newspapers and broadcasting corporations banned in the U.S.? Is there an American firewall blocking information? Are we trying to prompt society into some kind of action? I haven’t heard of any anti-war protests in the U.S. The war in Ukraine has fallen out of the top news. I constantly read and hear in the West that Western society is tired of the war. Is that so?
Well yes, I agree with that. I don’t really understand what the question is.
Was the Two-Pronged Offensive a Mistake Link to heading
Second. You communicate with military experts. Could the Ukrainian counteroffensive have been successful without the use of aviation, combat helicopters? Ammunition shortages. There was also an opinion that the two-pronged offensive was a mistake.
Well. Again, if you mean that the offensive toward the Kursk region was a mistake, then I don’t think so. My communication with experts, including military ones, shows that it definitely wasn’t a mistake. I know there’s a popular opinion out there—“they shouldn’t have advanced toward Kursk, they should’ve focused on defense.” But again, my conversations with experts and my own impressions lead me to a different point of view.
Is It Accurate That the USSR Lost 40 Million in World War II Link to heading
One more question. In one of your streams, you mentioned a certain report that estimated the USSR’s losses in the Great Patriotic War at approximately 40 million people. How credible is that information?
Dear colleague, that’s absolute nonsense. I remember that report well. It was presented at parliamentary hearings in the State Duma. It’s complete nonsense. It’s not supported by any facts. Of course, it’s difficult to state the exact number, but to me it’s quite clear that the figure of 27–28 million is more or less reliable. Anything beyond that—well, those are claims that need to be proven. And in that report, there was no evidence whatsoever.
Why Don’t Western Politicians Put Putin in His Place Link to heading
A question from Svetlana Why do serious people listen to Putin’s and Medinsky’s version of history instead of pointing out that they’ve failed to evolve along with humanity toward international law?
Dear Svetlana, why do you assume that serious people—presumably meaning some Western counterparts—are truly listening in that way? The problem is, they don’t see it as their task. If you mean Macron or Scholz, who also once listened to Putin’s historical lectures—or journalists, for that matter—they’re not there to re-educate Putin and Medinsky. They have specific goals. Macron didn’t visit Putin to hear lectures. That was just, let’s say, a “bonus item” thrown in. His mission was to persuade Putin to make peace. But instead, Putin started talking to him about the Pechenegs. Macron couldn’t do anything about that.
Pointing out to Putin that he hasn’t evolved along with humanity is not exactly the best way to get any result from him. They hoped for a substantive conversation, and instead got history lessons about ancient tribes. What can you do? The real mistake was trying to talk to Putin at all. You have to act with force. Putin only understands force. Unfortunately, that still hasn’t become an axiom for most political leaders in Europe and the U.S.
On the Lack of Ideology in the Putin Regime Link to heading
Mata Hari. Please help with arguments. My opponent believes that modern Russia already has an ideology with a vision of the future. That we are surrounded by enemies, and we’ll prove to everyone that we are better.
But you see, there is an idea, but there is no ideology. That is, no, there is no concrete vision of the future. What does it mean to be surrounded by enemies? Are we going to stay that way forever? Surrounded, in a ring of enemies — is that a vision of the future? Probably not. Probably, there are some ideas, everyone has their own, but they don’t add up to a single one. I mean, if we take the classical version of communist ideology, right? It’s detailed, yes. It’s mistaken, it’s false, but it’s a detailed vision of the future. As for the Thousand-Year Reich — the book Mein Kampf was written. Tons, tons of plans, and so on. Specifics. Nothing like that exists in Putinism. There is an idea, but there is no ideology.
How the Author Assesses Education Link to heading
Art KGB TASS. Sometimes you point out that a certain person is highly educated despite their political views. How do you assess education? By what criteria? In your latest film, you mentioned that many of Putin’s opponents are not highly educated compared to Zatulin. What do you mean? For example, Katz, Pevchikh, Khodorkovsky, Yashin?
Education can be considered high — it manifests itself simply in speech, in writing. If a person writes some illiterate nonsense — like Medinsky, for example, who writes utter drivel — well, it’s impossible to consider him educated. The man doesn’t know history well. That is, the very subject in which he holds a doctoral degree. Zatulin knows history — I say this because, first, I know him personally, and second, I listen to and read him sometimes. Zatulin knows history — at least within the scope of a university curriculum. Medinsky doesn’t. That’s the difference. You see, in the latest Mediafrenia, I showed how leaders of the Russian diaspora answer questions from a kind of citizenship exam for migrants. To get Russian citizenship, migrants must pass a history test. And when people say that World War I was a war with Napoleon that happened in 1912 — well, everything is clear. Or when they answer that the unification of principalities under Moscow took place in the 10th or 11th century — when Moscow didn’t even exist, or at least wasn’t called that, and certainly wasn’t a significant settlement — it’s clear these people are simply uneducated. That’s all. It’s a very simple thing. You name specific people. Well, I think Katz is a fairly educated person. As for Pevchikh, I don’t see any signs of her being particularly well-educated. So everything here is specific. You have to look at texts, at what a person says, in which they either demonstrate education — or don’t.
Naive Idiocy Link to heading
Vlad writes Recently, Memorial published a set of proposals titled “100 Days After Putin,” where on page 371, in particular, it states the following: Ukraine bears responsibility for damage caused by unlawful actions committed in the course of repelling aggression. This does not apply to all damage — for example, Ukraine is not responsible for strikes on military targets that did not cause disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure. On the contrary, gross violations of the rules of war — including the killing or torture of Russian prisoners of war, or deliberate strikes on civilian targets like schools or hospitals — give rise to Ukrainian liability. Then they propose that such damage, allegedly caused by Ukraine, should be deducted from Russian reparations. In some ideal, hypothetical world, perhaps this would make sense. But in reality, what is being proposed is a situation where Ukraine will face accusations, demands — it will have to justify itself, prove that certain things were collateral damage, and so on. In short, they’re asking for commentary on the naive idiocy of yet another group of “good Russians.”
You know, dear Vlad, I’d actually — I can’t immediately say, but if — well, I trust you, and if everything you described is really the case, then yes, I can only confirm that this is yet another example of naive idiocy. I haven’t read it, I’m not familiar with this text, and it seems very strange to me. I mean, to seriously talk today about Ukraine owing something, and that there should be some sort of offset — well, theoretically yes. But I don’t understand why write this now. So I do think you’ve found the right term — naive idiocy. Completely irrelevant. Very, very strange. I’ll try to find time and read the text. It’s really quite odd.
Will Putin Keep Deceiving Everyone Forever Link to heading
OSTROVSKY You’ve repeatedly and convincingly explained that Putin doesn’t want to end the war. So it turns out he manipulates everyone to keep dangling this carrot of negotiations, keeping people hoping for a miracle. He regularly holds it out in front of the donkey so that everyone keeps moving down the path of war, death, and destruction. Is there any way out of this cycle? Is it closed?
No, of course not. The only way out is force. Trump — you see, Trump is a big… he’s a big stroke of luck for Putin, that’s obvious. But in principle, apart from Trump, there’s still Europe, and there’s Ukraine’s own military potential. And in the end, there’s nothing but military force that can break this vicious cycle. You see, during World War II, nothing but military force was available to stop that war. And it’s the same here. Nothing but military force.
Putin as the Cup Russia Must Drink to the Dregs Link to heading
Well then, dear colleague, I — well, I understand your approach, but still, I’m an atheist. Not an atheist, an agnostic — it doesn’t really matter in this case. And that’s why these kinds of arguments, about how God is leading someone or something like that, don’t really resonate with me. So, yes.
Gratitude to the Author Link to heading
Is that so? Vera? Alexandrovna, there would be no happiness if misfortune hadn’t helped. I want to especially thank you for your format.
Thank you for the kind words. So, well, this is mainly, mainly gratitude. Thank you for the kind, for the kind words. Let’s move on.
Could Putin’s Success Be Deduced from His Inherent Qualities in the 80s–90s? Link to heading
KAPO. Allow me to disagree with you. Everything you listed—well, except perhaps oil prices—is not luck, but a combination of this man’s personal qualities. Incredible perseverance and flexibility, the ability to lie in wait for a long time when necessary, the ability to read people. That’s key. Finding the right approaches, building connections, creating networks of the right people. An almost animal-like intuition, the ability to sense the right moment. All this, combined with the historical moment, with weakness—and, one could say, the insignificance of today’s Western leaders—leads to the outcome we see.
You’re now trying to rationalize this farce after the fact, right? This is an explanation after it already happened. But try predicting that very future outcome based on the initial circumstances Putin had. I assure you, it won’t work.
On Freedom of Speech in the USSR Link to heading
So. And? Irina. Today our memories don’t align. I was in high school and then at university in the late ’60s and early ’70s. Things weren’t all that politically strict in the Soviet country during those years. In school, in class, during social studies or modern history lessons, our whole class would present counterarguments to our teacher’s claims about the superiority of Soviet society. And no one—not once—was not only not persecuted, but not even reprimanded. At various meetings, we freely, sometimes even boldly, voiced our views about the not-so-rotten West, and so on. And in university, during seminars on CPSU history and political economy, debates got really heated. No one suffered any consequences. What’s happening in Russia today is beyond comprehension. And it seems to me that today’s situation in this territory is not comparable to the Soviet system. It’s much worse.
You know, well, you were lucky. You see, after all, yes, teachers were different. In the Soviet Union, there were different teachers and different schools. Somewhere it was like what you described. I mean, well, even today—our conversation with Dima shows this—schools in Russia are still different. So it all depends on the people. So I don’t see any contradiction in our evaluations and descriptions of Soviet reality.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
So. Well, I think I’ll stop here. We’re already having quite a long stream. I’ll leave the remaining comments for tomorrow’s stream. So with that, I’m wrapping up our morning conversation. Let me remind you that at 8:00 PM we’ll have a talk with Sergey Ivanovich Grabskiy. I think it’ll be interesting. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves. Freedom to Alexander Skobov and to all Russian political prisoners and Ukrainian captives! I’ll say goodbye until 8:00 PM. All the best to you.
Source: https://youtu.be/30GRYhmGXu4