The suspension of U.S. military aid opens the Ukrainian sky to the occupiers. Why is Trump betraying Ukraine? Russia – Azerbaijan: a chronicle of a spiraling conflict.
News Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is July 3rd. It’s 7:40 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our daily morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls. First and foremost, we continue our chronicle of what I would call a spiraling conflict: Russia–Azerbaijan.
Escalation of the Conflict Between Russia and Azerbaijan Link to heading
From the latest news: the son of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, 20–27-year-old Heydar Aliyev—named after his grandfather—has been accused of tax evasion for a mansion in Barvikha, located in the Moscow region. We’re talking about a property in an elite cottage community, with an area of over 1,500 square meters. Estimated value: $35,000,000. Well, in short—normal, I guess. The price. It is claimed that the Azerbaijani president’s son owes the Federal Tax Service nearly 1,000,000 rubles. But let’s agree: this isn’t about the numbers. After all, who’s counting the president’s son’s property? That’s not the point. The point is clearly the escalation of the conflict. The blow is being delivered through the son. It’s unclear how real the criminal case is—they say they tried to initiate one, but it didn’t work out due to some sort of procedural error. But in any case, a blow through the son—and I don’t know if Aliyev has any real opportunity to respond symmetrically to Putin, say, through one of his children. Unlikely. At the very least, this is a serious escalation. Because, truly, when blows are dealt through family members, that’s serious.
Yesterday, I had a conversation with Abbas. Radik Gallyamov. He leans toward the position that this isn’t part of some deliberate campaign, but just a coincidence. That is, amid this general escalation, there’s also an attack on ethnic Azerbaijanis. I don’t think so. I believe—look, when for 24 years there were no investigative actions regarding a murder that took place in 2001, and suddenly, in the context of escalating relations, they start arresting and even brutally killing—that’s clearly a campaign. It’s definitely an exchange of blows. And then there’s this action against Aliyev’s son. I think it’s serious. And it, in my view, reduces the chances of de-escalating the conflict. These things are rarely forgiven. Besides this, ordinary citizens are also being affected. Russians are massively complaining about document checks and violence in Azerbaijan. That’s according to information from the Russian Embassy. They say that unidentified people in civilian clothes are coming to Russians in Azerbaijan, checking documents, asking about the purpose of their visit. So, lots of complaints have been received from Russian citizens currently in Azerbaijan.
Zakharova advised Russians to, as she put it, “take the current situation in Azerbaijan into account.” And the Vice President of the Russian Tour Operators Alliance stated that tour sales to Azerbaijan have fallen by 40% after the arrests of Russians. I think this is just the beginning. It’s clear that if escalation continues, every Russian in Azerbaijan could become a target of so-called retaliation or score-settling. As for what steps could be taken to defuse this conflict—I don’t know. It seems no one is willing to back down. Both dictators are stubbornly digging in and unwilling to make the first move. Which is fine, really, because what matters most to us here is the weakening of Russia—somewhat, not critically, but still weakening. And that’s good, because what’s bad for Russia is, to some extent, good for Ukraine.
Trump Halts Weapons Shipments to Ukraine Link to heading
Now to the main topic. The central theme of today’s discussion is what I’m calling Trump’s betrayal. According to information from a number of outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, the United States has suspended the transfer of weapons to Ukraine—or suspended, or halted, depending on the terminology. For now, the weapons aren’t being delivered. And what’s most important is that this applies even to weapons that were already in Poland. In other words, weapons that had already been, essentially, brought to Europe—specifically to Poland—and were ready to be transferred to Ukraine. That’s a very important point. This isn’t a case where Trump reassessed the capabilities of the American military-industrial complex and decided, “Let’s produce for ourselves or someone else.” These were weapons that were, for all intents and purposes, already in Ukraine’s hands.
The key thing is that in Poland, there were more than two dozen Patriot missiles ready for delivery, along with more than two dozen Stinger air defense systems, several air-to-ground missiles, and over 90 air-to-air missiles. In short, the list is quite long. It mostly includes rockets and grenade launchers—lots of equipment. And again, all of this was already in Poland. So in this case, Trump applied what you could call the “chestnut effect” to Ukraine—pulling something back that was already paid for and prepped. I think that halting—again, I understand a military expert would be better suited here—but just on the basis of common sense, it’s clear that if the list reported by The Wall Street Journal and other American media is even remotely accurate, then this is very, very bad news for both Ukraine’s front line and its rear.
Let’s just go through the points, again from a common-sense perspective and based on what we already know. Our attention to what’s happening at the front doesn’t make us military experts, but some things are obvious. The cessation of HIMARS rocket shipments, for example, is a serious blow to Ukraine’s “long arm” capability—that is, the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to strike the Russian rear, including their logistics and command posts. This was one of the main methods of deterring Russian advances.
But probably the most critical issue is the cessation of American surface-to-air missiles for air defense systems—especially Patriot missiles, which are the main defense against Russian ballistic missiles targeting objects in Ukraine’s rear. Nothing else can really stop ballistic missiles, which—as we’ve seen—cause severe damage. So, if this move actually goes through—and judging by Trump’s stance, he has no intention of changing it—then all of Ukraine becomes extremely vulnerable to Russian ballistic strikes.
We’ve seen what happens when airspace is completely dominated—just look at the Israeli attack on Iran. They did whatever they wanted. Now, with the cessation of U.S. supplies, it likely won’t reach that same level of control, but something similar could occur. If the worst-case scenario materializes and aid is truly cut off, then the occupiers will be able to systematically and methodically destroy key targets in Ukraine’s rear—just as Israel did to Iran. That means airbases, defense production, critical infrastructure, logistics, and command centers could all be hit. This could turn into a very bad scenario.
Naturally, I plan to check in with Serhiy Ivanovych Hrabski on Monday. Maybe we’ll even bring in another military expert before then. But in any case, this is an extremely grim scenario.
So, the question is—why did Trump do this?
We’re running a poll on our website, our YouTube channel, and our Telegram channel. But it’s more or less clear that several main theories are circulating.
One is the official explanation given by the Pentagon and Trump himself: that there’s a shortage of weapons in the U.S., and that these are needed for the country’s own defense or for higher-priority partners—namely, Israel.
The second theory is that this is Trump’s way of pushing for peace. In one Pentagon briefing, it was said outright that Trump’s goal is peace. When asked why the arms shipments were halted, the Pentagon spokesperson said that Trump’s goal is peace. So maybe this is a way of forcing Ukraine to compromise with Russia. If Ukraine realizes it has no weapons and nothing left to fight with, it might agree to whatever terms Putin offers. And that’s exactly what Trump may want. Ukraine loses its sovereignty, and Trump gets the Nobel Peace Prize.
And finally, another very plausible theory: money. All of Kirill Dmitriev’s talks with Steve Witkoff are about money—very large sums. Not just money for the U.S. through contracts, but possibly private money lining the pockets of Witkoff—and of course, Trump. So, there are three main hypotheses here that, at the very least, are out in the open.
Before announcing the poll results, I want to share this: at the opening of the Alligator prison—which is surrounded by swamps and outfitted as a migrant detention center in Florida—Trump said that migrants would have to learn alligator habits and that you can’t run from them in a straight line—you have to zigzag. A real jokester. He also presented his own presidential rankings:
Obama: “a bad president.” Biden: “the worst president in our country’s history.” Bush: “shouldn’t have gone into the Middle East and blown everything up—so he doesn’t get high marks either.” As for Trump himself: “I give myself very, very high marks.”
Well, of course—if you don’t praise yourself, who will? Apparently, Trump still feels a lack of recognition. Though that’s hard to believe, given the number of sycophants and PR guys constantly telling him how great he is.
Poll: “Why Did Trump Halt Weapons Shipments to Ukraine?” Link to heading
So, before I move on to answering your questions and announcing today’s upcoming agenda, I want us to take a look in the mirror, so to speak. Let’s look at the results. So, why did Trump halt or suspend weapons deliveries to Ukraine?
2% support the official Pentagon and Trump version—that the U.S. itself lacks enough weapons for its own defense. 63%—nearly two-thirds—believe it’s a way to force Ukraine into a compromise with Russia. 29% think the reason is money—that Putin managed to financially interest Trump. 6% were unsure how to respond.
Now let’s check the results from the Telegram channel. A fairly large number of people voted there too. Over 1,000 people voted on the YouTube channel, and 491 people voted on Telegram. That’s also quite a lot. And here, the results are almost identical:
2%—not enough weapons in the U.S. (Pentagon’s official version). 59%—slightly fewer than on YouTube—believe it’s a method to force Ukraine into a compromise with Russia. 31% believe it’s about money—that Putin found a way to interest Trump. 8% were unsure.
So, in general, we see almost complete alignment between the YouTube and Telegram audiences, which isn’t very surprising. That seems to be the prevailing view. It’s difficult to comment definitively, of course. Ultimately, we’ll see how this plays out. There are quite a few members of Congress demanding a public investigation—what does “not enough” mean, how much exactly, and so on. Many, both Republicans and Democrats, are speaking out, saying this is outrageous—that Ukraine is now essentially standing alone to protect the West, fighting and bleeding. And that this is, indeed, a betrayal. We’ll see how events unfold further, but for now, that’s the situation. A very grim piece of news.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, I want to say that it’s 5:00 PM, and, as it seems to me, we have a very important and interesting guest — Professor Lipsits. And we haven’t talked about the economy for quite a while. And all these discussions about whether or not the Russian economy is in tatters, how much longer Putin can continue the war, and so on — of course, we’ll ask all these questions to Professor Lipsits. Well, who else would we ask?
Now, moving on to answering your questions.
The Murder of Prigozhin and Putin’s Consistency Link to heading
A question from Donets Poncho in the Telegram channel chat: Igor Aleksandrovich, after Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, Putin called it an internal betrayal a day later, then came the sudden death from a grenade explosion inside a plane. But at the same time, Wagner supporters were not prosecuted, their symbols were not declared traitorous, and so on — all the Wagner followers are alive and well. Why such inconsistency in the actions of the authorities?
Dear colleague, I don’t think there’s any inconsistency here. Prigozhin himself was called a traitor, along with his closest circle — in particular, Utkin. He was eliminated. Right. But Wagner? Why would they be? Wagner are the best units among the occupiers. It’s a very valuable resource. They were partly disbanded, partly subordinated, and they remained. They continued, so to speak, to serve the same cause they had always served — just under different leadership. The Putin regime doesn’t just throw away cadres like that. So in this case, everything was actually done very logically.
And besides, Wagner, the Wagner PMC, and Prigozhin himself are held in quite high regard in Russian patriotic circles. So starting a prosecution against Wagner out of nowhere, when they no longer posed any threat after Prigozhin’s elimination, was deemed impractical. And from the point of view of the interests of Putin’s fascist Reich, I must say that this action was, perhaps, close to flawless — again, from Putin’s perspective. He acted quite rationally.
About Verka Serduchka Link to heading
So, Bishkek. No one from the chat. A question: Please comment. It’s written as it’s written. This is about the scandal surrounding the artist Andriy Danylko — Verka Serduchka — performing songs in Russian. Right? You know, I looked it up — there’s a link sent to Pliushchev’s Telegram channel, and so on. It’s about the discussion on the use of the Russian language in Ukrainian media. Specifically, Serduchka performing songs in Russian.
You know, I’ll probably invoke Article 51 of the Russian Constitution and just not answer this question. Though of course, that’s a joke about the Constitution and Article 51 — but still, I don’t quite want to interfere in internal Ukrainian political matters here. There’s an ongoing discussion in Ukraine on this topic — I’m well aware of that. And I hope Ukrainians themselves resolve this not-so-crucial issue — what language Verka Serduchka sings in. That’s entirely up to Ukraine, entirely a domestic Ukrainian matter. And I don’t think this is a question where I need to break my own taboo. There are cases when you really have to go against your own, so to speak, prohibitions — but this isn’t one of them. I think Ukrainians will figure it out on their own — what language Verka Serduchka should sing in.
About the Prepositions “в” and “на” Russia Link to heading
So, Natalia Baryshnikova. I switched over to using the correct prepositions a long time ago and easily, and now it grates on me when people say “na Ukraine.” But now many Ukrainian bloggers are saying “na Rossii,” and I understand them too. It’s kind of a jab at their enemies. But why say it on air when talking to allies — like you, for example? A mystery.
Dear Natalia, I don’t see any mystery here. Although, by the way, it’s not very common for someone to use that kind of, let’s say, payback in a conversation with me. Because I don’t say “na Ukraine,” I say “v Ukraine.” So what’s the point of using that with me? There’s no mystery here, you see? For many Ukrainians, it has become a habit. Because, indeed, the insults from Russia and Russians — and the killings by Russians — lead to a desire to respond linguistically in this way. This position isn’t close to me personally. I don’t think we’re hurting Putin much by constantly calling him “Putler,” for example, or distorting his name, or calling him a war criminal, or anything else like that. But distorting his name — I’m not so sure about that. Why am I saying this? Because it’s the same thing — part of the same category. To some extent, I understand when people say “na Rossii,” or “na bolotakh,” and so on. I understand it and don’t think it should be made into an issue. Even though I don’t feel the same myself. But listen — in the end, what does it matter whether I feel the same or not?
Going back to the previous question about using the Russian language — you know, I quite often get invitations, several times a day, to appear on Ukrainian TV channels and YouTube channels. And I always speak Russian there. There are no problems at all. I immediately explain that Ukrainian is a foreign language for me. In this case, well — listen — if people want to hear my opinion, then they’ll listen in the language I can speak. I don’t see any problem with that. And as for how they say it — “v Rossii” or “na Rossii” — let them say it however they prefer. However they prefer. This isn’t a topic where you need to take a moral stand and say, “Please don’t offend me.” I’m calm about it.
About Aversion to Certain Bloggers Link to heading
A question from Audio and Savva: I have a complicated question I’ve struggled to answer for a long time. I’ve been with you through the whole war. But I only follow Ukrainian bloggers — except Portnikov — in fragments. I subscribe, then unsubscribe. I often see no point, especially when I hear again the phrase “a good Russian is a dead Russian,” or “stupidity is our national trait.” And, sadly, these things are said not only by emotional commentators, but also by intelligent, educated people. I understand the pain and rage, especially from those who have lost everything. But why go further with such generalizations? Recently, I heard someone joking about concrete slabs in Iran — saying, ‘If only it were like that in Russia.’ I asked, ‘Haven’t you had enough of batons, rape, murder?’ I also believe Russia is responsible for this war, and as its citizens, we bear responsibility. But I struggle to understand why in the Ukrainian public sphere there’s not even a symbolic attempt to work with anti-war Russians — or at least not to alienate them. What do you think — are Russians particularly susceptible to propaganda? And could there be some sort of effort, like how some Israelis work with Iranians?
Dear colleague, I understand everything you wrote. And I, too, feel aversion — especially when it comes from former Russians, newly former Russians. Like Babchenko’s “burn, baby, burn” — it puts me off. Or Muzhdabaev’s constant refrain that all Russian liberals are imperialists, as if the very existence of a Russian liberal implies imperialism, and so on. And the stuff about genetic slavery — all that nonsense — I can’t say it hurts me deeply, it just repels me.
Now, to the main question. It’s not that I disagree with you — I just have a completely different perspective on what’s happening. Here it is. And this may be a bit harsh, but such are the times. What is the rational point — put yourself in the shoes of the Ukrainian leadership — what is the rational point of working with Russians who are against the war? To what end? How will that help stop the war? Help fend off Putin’s invasion? The answer is clear: it won’t. Working with anti-war Russians — which ones, those inside Russia? What would that achieve? That they go after the Kremlin with toothbrushes and forks? They won’t. So what’s the point — for Ukraine? Why should Ukraine waste time on something that’s meaningless in terms of its primary goals? Working with emigrants? Again — to what end?
Look, Ukraine is actively working to recruit prisoners into the Armed Forces. There’s a serious screening process. There are risks, of course, but the work is being done. There’s serious screening into the Freedom of Russia Legion, the Siberian Battalion, etc. That’s real work, and it matters — these are people ready to fight for Ukraine. That’s clear and purposeful. There’s also work being done with “I Want to Go Home” — helping occupiers avoid death by surrendering. That’s meaningful. But as for some abstract group of people who are vaguely anti-Putin and anti-war — what’s the benefit for Ukraine? Where’s the gain? I just don’t see the point.
And, by the way, it’s very common, especially among emigrants, to complain: “But we’re with you in spirit!” Then be with them in spirit — donate to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, support them, pressure European politicians. But that’s your job. What does that have to do with Ukraine? Ukraine is handling its own business. If you can help — help. But what help should Ukraine offer to those who oppose the Putin regime — and why? I don’t see the reason.
So yes, I share your emotions. But on a rational level, that’s how I see the situation. And I’d like to point out that Zelensky’s position has evolved. Initially, he tried to appeal — and although Zelensky worked in Russia and so on, he’s not exactly an expert on Russia or its society. Early on, he addressed Russians, calling on them to influence their regime to stop the war. Then it became clear that it was absolutely useless. And Zelensky — and the Ukrainian government — stopped expecting anything from anti-Putin sentiment in Russian society. And from a rational standpoint, I completely understand them.
So in order to answer your question, we all need to look in the mirror. Let’s be honest — we’re not very useful. Not very useful, you see? And we have to admit that — and not take offense that no one’s paying attention to us.
Zaluzhny’s Portrait on Yuriy Fedorov’s T-Shirt Link to heading
So, Anatoliy Dovzhenko: The portrait of General Zaluzhny. And on Yuriy Fedorov’s T-shirt—is that a political statement? Anatoliy asks. And what would your reaction be if he came onto your channel wearing that T-shirt? In my view, the sanctions against Poroshenko were politicized not by lawyer Novikov, but by Zelensky and his team. Just like Zaluzhny’s dismissal early in the war and Budanov being positioned as a potential replacement for the presidency. If you disagree, then comment. Naturally, Novikov is defending Poroshenko for money, whereas other defenders are offering volunteer assistance.
Dear Anatoliy! Well, first of all, you know, after I read your question, I literally had a few seconds before going live, I looked online and couldn’t find a picture of Fedorov wearing a T-shirt with General Zaluzhny’s image. I just couldn’t find General Zaluzhny. It’s quite possible I didn’t search well enough. I’m not doubting that Fedorov—Yuriy Yevgenyevich Fedorov—has such a T-shirt. But I simply haven’t seen it. Yuriy Yevgenyevich hasn’t appeared on my channel wearing that T-shirt. And if he had? Well, most likely I wouldn’t even have commented. I don’t have a dress code on the channel—unless it’s something like a swastika. Yes, then I would of course ask someone to change. But with a portrait of General Zaluzhny? What, is General Zaluzhny some kind of persona non grata now? Honestly, I don’t fully understand. Yes, maybe it is some kind of political statement, but it’s not my political statement. I hold Yuriy Yevgenyevich Fedorov in very high regard and respect him. And if he, so to speak, makes such political statements, well, that’s his right. In any case, it’s not something that poses a problem for me. As for everything else—I’ve already said, I don’t comment on Ukraine’s internal politics, and I’ve written this to you personally, dear Anatoliy, many times. You’re free to make any statements you wish—as long as they’re not fascist, of course. Everything else is entirely up to you.
On Skobov, Gorinov, and More Link to heading
So. Yakov Abramov: Our question concerns Skobov, Gorinov, and so on. I’ll say right away that I deeply respect these people and others like them for their stance, moral purity, and strength of spirit. But do you think such self-sacrifice has historically been a defining trait of Russian dissidents over the past 100 years or so? Is it the best form of resistance? If these people’s strength of spirit is so great that they’re willing to go to prison and even die there, then perhaps other forms of activism—I’m not writing this openly for obvious reasons—would be more effective. Maybe it’s time to change the paradigm from being victims to becoming hunters?
Dear Yakov! I must say, first of all, that Skobov doesn’t behave like a victim. And I remember our correspondence literally the day before his arrest, the day before he was sent to prison. He said—when we were discussing the situation—it was clear that he was going to prison, he knew it, I knew it, and we were talking about it. I said maybe he should consider other options, especially since he was clearly being allowed to leave the country. And he said, “I won’t let them go anymore,” you see? That phrase is very characteristic of Skobov: I won’t let them go. Meaning, it’s not that they wouldn’t let him leave, but that he wouldn’t let them go. He cornered them, he’s holding them—because his behavior wasn’t that of a victim; it was the behavior of a hunter, to use your term. He accuses them, he uses every minute he’s given a microphone to accuse them, he uses it to denounce them. And indeed, his voice from prison is being heard quite loudly. Now, regarding your hint at other forms of activism—if I understood you correctly—other forms require other kinds of preparation. If you mean, say, the liquidation of Putin and so on—well, that’s simply a matter for other people. Now, as for the meaning of actions like these—you know, the famous protest of the eight in August 1968 against the occupation, against the destruction of the Prague Spring—it was very effective. Very effective, yes? They were immediately broken, beaten, imprisoned—some sent to psychiatric hospitals, some to prison, their lives were ruined, and so on. But it was very effective. They sat there at Lobnoye Mesto for just a few seconds before people ran in and started knocking out their teeth. But it was an extremely effective protest. You know, it became known around the world instantly. I know well the reaction in the West, in Czechoslovakia itself. Czechoslovak newspapers wrote that this protest—those eight people—were the eight reasons not to hate Russians. In fact, those eight became the very conduits through whom the world began to view what was happening in the Soviet Union differently. There are such people—what we might call the righteous—and as the saying goes, “while the righteous stand, the village and the country stand.” At least, that’s how it was at that moment. So yes, it’s a fairly effective thing.
Elchibey and Pozdnyak Link to heading
That’s how the author of the question refers to Kuchma. You recalled both of them, describing him as a romantic dissident unfit to govern a state. And what would you say about the Belarusian political figure from the same time period, Poznyak? He seems like a copy of himself to me in terms of unfitness. Or am I wrong? If I’m wrong, then in what way?
Dear colleague, I must tell you that the difference between these two very, very respectable men—dissidents, vivid, unyielding dissidents—is that the FSB was president and underwent—or more precisely, failed—a test of power. But Poznyak never underwent such a test. We don’t know what he would have been like. Well, I don’t know—maybe you have more precise information. There is reason to believe that Poznyak would also have turned out to be an ineffective president, but he wasn’t president, so it’s quite difficult to state that with confidence. That is, their biographies are different precisely in terms of access to power. So, yes, they may seem similar, but I’m just not ready to draw the same conclusions as you because I don’t have empirical evidence. I don’t know, you see? Simply put, his personnel—well, even his personnel policy—was extremely vulnerable. And in general, what happened later, when almost 100% of the population of Azerbaijan voted against him and for his resignation—that’s very telling. With S. S. Pozdnyak, nothing like that happened. There was simply nothing similar. I’m not arguing with you. I just can’t share your opinion because I don’t have the facts.
How to Navigate an Overwhelming Amount of Information Link to heading
So, Anna Tarkhova Sorry in advance if this turns out to be long, but how do you handle the huge amount of information that’s been literally pouring down on us lately? I feel lost. I read some post or article—it moves me deeply, fills me with empathy, outrage, anger. Then I read the comments. Often I come across a fairly convincing, well-argued rebuttal. I notice nuances, discrepancies that I didn’t pay attention to before. And even when I try to find primary sources, things are often contradictory. I catch myself being biased. I, too, have my own “us” and “them.” I, too, subconsciously—and sometimes not so subconsciously—look for confirmation of my already existing opinion. I just want to at least try to remain objective.
Well, thank you, dear Anna! If you’re asking about my methods, I follow a few rules. First of all, I try to select sources based on a kind of self-constructed reputation system. That is, it’s my internal compass. It may be debatable, but it’s the compass I rely on—the selection of sources according to a reputation system I’ve created for myself. Secondly, fact-checking. You know, since we’re operating in this day-to-day mode—not creating films or anything like that—unfortunately, detailed fact-checking isn’t always possible. But I try very hard. I really do try to check the facts. And finally, relying on expert opinion. Again, I select experts based on my own internal reputation system and lean on those whose judgment I trust. So those are a few methods that can serve as a guide in this sea of information.
Where’s the Line Between a Racist and a Non-Racist Statement? Link to heading
Yuriy Taurusy asks: Igor Aleksandrovich, where is the line between a racist and a non-racist statement? Every time you hear the phrase ‘genetic slavery of Russians,’ you get irritated and say it’s racism. At the same time, you agree that the Russian people are cruel. Somewhere else you said they’re a frightened nation. Why is slavery racism in the first case, but cruelty isn’t racism in the second? I personally agree with the theory of slavery in Russia, but I don’t see anything bad in it per se. Cruelty, in my opinion, is a more negative, demeaning trait. Chikatilo was cruel, whereas the most pitiful slave was the beautiful slave Isaura. So why does that make me a racist and not you? Where is the line that separates racism from a simple opinion?
Dear colleagues, I won’t delve into what’s worse—slavery or cruelty. Especially since there’s an obvious distortion of the argument on your part regarding, say, the slave Isaura. Yes, in that artistic work, we’re talking about slavery as a social institution—in Brazil, to be specific. The story is set in Brazil before slavery was abolished, so it’s about slavery as a social institution.
But in the case of the statement about Russians as genetic slaves, it’s about Russians having a “slave gene.” Now listen—I’m not going to go into detail about the difference between slavery as a social institution, which externally makes a person a slave, and genetic slavery, where a so-called slave gene supposedly belongs to an entire people and to every individual in it. If it’s a genetic trait, then every representative is a slave, regardless of whether they wear chains or not.
Now to the essence. The line is very easy to define. If someone claims that certain traits are inherent from birth to all members of a particular people, then that person is a racist. “Genetic slavery” is racism. Why? Because if it’s genetic, it means that every person of that nationality is a slave from birth. The litmus test is the Nuremberg Laws of the Third Reich. They are racist because a person’s rights were restricted based solely on national identity—or race, in that case. It didn’t matter who the person was—if he was a Jew, he lost rights. Or if he was a Roma, same thing. No one would look deeper. If you were a Jew, you went to the oven. That’s it.
This is the same logic: “If you’re Russian, you’re a genetic slave.” To the oven—or into the moat with crocodiles. That’s the whole point. Where’s the confusion? I’ve never had that. I never believe that a person, by virtue of belonging to a certain people, is born with some particular trait. Social conditions shape people and give them certain behavioral characteristics—cruelty, squeamishness, whatever. But people are not born with these traits. That’s the difference.
So when you assign specific traits to all Russians, or all Jews, or all Ukrainians or Brits—and you say these are inborn—you are being racist. If, on the other hand, we’re talking about how a certain nation developed certain behavioral or sociocultural traits over time, then that’s acceptable. Yes, different peoples behave differently, but that has nothing to do with innate characteristics. It’s acquired. That’s the difference.
Why is this crucial? Because a racist or a Nazi treats a person as if their worth is fixed from birth. You can’t change it. If I have “Russian genes,” I can’t do anything about it. Just like the Jews in the Third Reich couldn’t do anything—they were condemned from birth. That’s the difference. That’s the horror of Nazism. The horror of racism.
The Aliyev Dictatorship and the Putin Dictatorship Link to heading
Is that so? Oleg Makarov Igor Alexandrovich, the Aliyev dictatorship is no better than Putin’s dictatorship. The only difference is scale. Why are you trying to defend it? It’s just clan infighting.
Well, you know, I, I don’t even know anymore how—how to respond without sounding ridiculous, how to answer such questions? “Why are you trying to defend Aliyev’s dictatorship?” Oleg Makarov asks me. Dear Oleg, well, you know what? Then I’ll answer like this. Well, I like dictators, you see? I just like them. I love dictators—I love all dictators: Stalin, Hitler, Putin, Aliyev. That’s why I defend them. But where did you get that from? Where did you see even a hint of defending Aliyev’s dictatorship? Where did you get that, you see? And why, dear Oleg Makarov, do you insist on drinking brandy mixed half-and-half with the blood of Christian infants every morning? Why do you do that? Is it tasty or something? Why? Why? Why ask such questions that are based on nothing at all? Right. Now to the point. So, I—dear Oleg!—I think that Putin’s dictatorship is worse, much worse. Yes, both are dictators. But dictator Aliyev—yes, it’s true, he waged war against Azerbaijan, against Armenia, but ultimately—one can say as much as one likes about the historical rights of Armenians to Karabakh, and indeed, there’s a lot to say—but nonetheless, international law was on the side of Azerbaijan. So Ilham Aliyev is not trying to seize foreign territory. At least, he hasn’t been seen doing that. Putin is a dictator who poses a threat to all of humanity. Aliyev does not pose a threat to all of humanity, and that’s a huge difference. That’s why I’m absolutely convinced that the Aliyev dictatorship—it’s not that it’s better, but Putin’s dictatorship is incomparably worse than Aliyev’s.
About Those Killed in Sverdlovsk Oblast Link to heading
So, a question from Alex. Were the people killed or detained citizens of Russia or Azerbaijan? If you’re referring to those who were killed and detained in the territory of Sverdlovsk Oblast, then of course they were citizens—citizens of Russia.
On the Universally Moral and Ideologies Link to heading
So, Mikhail Khramtsov: Igor Alexandrovich, help me organize my thoughts into a more or less coherent system. The other day I asked you whether anyone is systematically working on developing the concept of a universal moral “ought,” and who should even be doing that? You replied that this falls within the domain of all ideologies and cited communism and Christianity as examples. From this, I drew the conclusion—possibly a false one—that you view ideals and ideologies negatively.
Well, let me say right away that this in no way means I view ideology in general negatively.
And then Mikhail continues and asks: does humanity have a positive ideology under development, based, for instance, on humanism—as in humane treatment of one another, of animals, of our planet? Not just in theory, but in practice. After all, everything alive—aside from the abnormal—wants to live. So that could become the foundation upon which to build a structure. Or would that not be considered an ideology? Or do thinkers simply not yet know how to implement this in reality without ending up with communism? Or is such a concept impossible for real humanity without distortion? That is, there seems to be no way to move it from the realm of the “ought” to the realm of the “is” without violence. Only through prolonged maturation. But the groundwork for that maturation—after all, it must be prepared by all who think, and spoken of constantly, otherwise nothing will ever grow. As I understand it, that’s what you’re talking about, which is why I follow you. And so on.
Thank you for the kind words that follow. I can say right away that I believe such an ideology exists. That ideology is liberalism. To some extent, it’s the liberal ideology. Social-democratic ideology also points in that direction. Liberal-democratic. So yes, such an ideology does exist—I support it. This idea is, without a doubt, the ideology of human rights. The ideology of freedom—it’s an ideology that works, that functions. Right now, it’s not in the best shape, but it still flies on the banners of many political parties. So I don’t see any real difficulty in this question.
On Stalin’s Attitude Toward Crimean Tatars and Chechens Link to heading
Bey writes: Don’t you think Stalin’s particular hatred of Chechens and Crimean Tatars is connected to the fact that a Chechen, author Khan, worked as Stalin’s aide, then fled to the West and began exposing Stalin and the Soviet leadership? Also, Chechens were fierce fighters against the Russian Empire during the Caucasian wars. So the Chechens had plenty of reasons for revenge. The Crimean Tatars had been a thorn in Russia’s side since the time of Catherine II. Long before the war, the Soviet authorities had plans to turn Crimea into a militarized, fully armed peninsula on the Black Sea. And the “outsiders”—Crimean Tatars, Volga peoples, Greeks, and Bulgarians living there—could become future spies. So they were deported. This plan of Russian chauvinists continued. Under Khrushchev, everyone was returned to their homeland—except the Crimean Tatars and political Greeks.
But also, by the way, the Volga Germans were never returned either. This is just a matter of historical justice. Not only the Crimean Tatars ended up being more wronged than others—the Volga Germans too.
By the way, Beria was farsighted when Stalin proposed this—and I quote: when Stalin proposed deporting the Kalmyks to Kazakhstan, near the steppes, Beria objected: “Comrade Stalin, I object, because the Kalmyks are no different from the Kazakhs. So it would be hard for the security services to track them.” He proposed deporting them to the Vorkuta region. And that’s what they settled on.
Well, I agree with almost everything you wrote. The only thing is—but still—the Kalmyks were deported. Not just to the Vorkuta region. Most were deported to the Omsk Region, to Novosibirsk, to Tyumen, to Krasnoyarsk Krai. So all over Siberia. But you’re right. And as for the officers—if I’m not mistaken—Kalmyk officers were deported to Central Asia.
On Corruption and Xenophobia Link to heading
Just like that. Alexander from Kyiv writes: Igor, I once witnessed something—the owner wasn’t afraid of Caucasians at all in the Ukraina Hotel in Moscow in 1995. How can this be explained during the First Chechen War?
Very simply. Dear Alexander! In Russia, corruption is stronger than xenophobia. That’s it. In Russia, corruption outweighs xenophobia. For money—anything goes. And at that point, it doesn’t matter whether someone is Chechen or not. Money decides everything.
On the Suspension of Arms Supplies Link to heading
So, a question from Raisa: I’m reading YouTube comments about the suspension of arms deliveries to Ukraine. It’s just a chorus of outrage. “Trump doesn’t owe them anything.” How can this be? All agreements have been broken. This is betrayal.
I agree, it’s betrayal. In fact, that’s exactly what I titled our stream today.
Trump and Ukraine’s Capitulation Link to heading
Olga Donetskaya: Don’t you think that through his actions and inaction, Trump wants to end the war by forcing Ukraine to capitulate?
Yes, dear Olga, I do think so—and, as it turns out, two-thirds of our channel’s audience thinks so too.
Interview with an “Empty Bucket” Link to heading
So, another question from Sergey: There’s this American Russian-language site called “One Day.” I watched an interview with an empty bucket—Trump will deport even those born in the U.S.—25 minutes. Once again, I was convinced that half of the American people must be seriously resentful, if they elected such an idiot as Trump. In 25 minutes, Trump didn’t say a single truthful thing—nothing but lies. I just can’t understand: is he really an idiot, or just naturally uneducated, a brute, a tyrant, a Nazi, and a pathological liar? How is he tolerated? And yet he assembled a government out of people just like himself—pure sycophants. Compared to this idiot, Sokurov, Malevich, and Bunker are much more competent—even though they’re devious fascist murderers. Watch it, if you haven’t. Tell me—do you agree with my impression?
I watched it. Dear colleague, I watched it. Well, you see, there’s a whole range of Trump’s claims—some of which are clearly false, and others… well, there were numbers cited that I wasn’t able to verify, or at least couldn’t quickly check. So regarding your categorical statement that he didn’t say a single truth—well, I trust you, but in this case I couldn’t verify it. But yes, there were absolutely monstrous things said in that interview. So overall—overall, I agree with you.
Psychology of Elderly Politicians Link to heading
Is that so? Alena Komova from the chat: I’ve been wanting to ask: do elderly or very old politicians want to leave a mark on history? Or do they just not care anymore and act autocratically on their own impulses—basically fulfilling their dreams? They have nothing to lose. Like boom, bombs on Kyiv—that’s been a dream for a long time. That’s one option. Assuming they’re not senile or demented, which also isn’t out of the question.
I think that when it comes to leaving a mark—if you’re specifically talking about, well, I assume you’re referring to Putin—there’s one detail that, in my view, undermines your theory. The thing is, Putin isn’t planning to die. If he knew he were going to die tomorrow, then maybe the logic you’re suggesting would apply. But he’s not planning on dying. So “leaving a mark”—more than that, I don’t know, you see—I’m not a mind reader or psychic, I can’t get inside Putin’s head. But I suspect he couldn’t care less about what happens after he dies. But he’s not planning to die. And that’s actually our hope—that’s the hope that he won’t go bombing Kyiv, Warsaw, London, or New York. So in that sense, it’s actually a good thing—his cowardice and his attitude of “after me, the deluge.” That, I think, is crucial. He wants to become “Vladimir the Gatherer of Russian Lands” in his lifetime. In his lifetime, you see? And that’s what matters. He wants to become great while alive. And after he dies—I think he doesn’t care what happens.
On Michael Naki’s Advice and the Phrase “Take Care” Link to heading
Viktor: You lightly teased Michael Naki’s advice to stay away from military targets, calling it a kind of free advice. In connection with that, I feel a similar kind of lightness every time you end the stream with “Take care.” But what is that, if not another piece of free advice? How is a person supposed to receive that information and change their behavior in order to follow your advice? It’s clear that an ordinary person isn’t foolishly standing under a missile, and they’re not intentionally lying about it. They’re not about to start obsessing over diet, alcohol, etc. So does “take care” carry some deeper meaning I’m missing due to my limited understanding? Please explain. Don’t take this as serious criticism.
Dear Viktor! You know, yes, this isn’t the most important issue, I agree with you. But there are rituals of politeness, of decent behavior—and, I’d say, rituals of goodwill. Like when we say “good evening” or “hello,” we’re kind of wishing the person well-being, right? These are such rituals. When someone is grieving, we say “my condolences.” Or when someone comes from the sauna, we say “light steam to you”—things like that. So, “take care” is not advice, not a recommendation for any specific course of action. It’s abstract—it doesn’t prescribe behavior. Michael Naki’s recommendation to stay away from military targets is a very specific behavioral suggestion. But it’s often impossible to follow, you see? Just like Babchenko’s advice: “Run, fools, run.” Well, they can’t run, you see? No legs. So they crawl to the border. So it’s exactly the vagueness of “take care” that places it in the category of politeness rituals, goodwill. And I’m not planning to stop saying it—I won’t. I’ll keep saying it. You see, it’s like saying “Glory to Ukraine!” I’ll put it this way: what does that give? Nothing—except to declare one’s position. You know the famous rhetorical triad: logos, pathos, ethos—I believe that combination should be present. Not just logos, which is what’s often demanded, but also an element of pathos and an element of ethos. And I believe rhetoric should include all three.
On the Expansion of Humanism Link to heading
So, a question from Yulia: It seemed to me that in yesterday’s continuation of the conversation about the relationship between humanism and national identity, there was some misunderstanding between you and the author of the question. Allow me to explain why I still side with the author. That is, Tajiks who rushed to save people did so not because they are Tajiks, but because that’s how they were raised. Yes, sometimes organically, sometimes religiously—but they retained their human face. Subscriber Max claims that humanism expands when national differences are erased. Absolutely right. In countries where there is freedom of speech, independent courts, and no Goebbels-TV propaganda, why shouldn’t that law work? But in Russia? In this damned country, the law works in reverse. It’s precisely in the national hinterlands, among national diasporas, that you’re more likely to encounter a human face. Today, these places haven’t yet been fully purged, flattened out, or reprogrammed. Yes, perhaps patriarchal norms and religious traditions also get in the way. But the disintegration process is accelerating, and in two years the author of the question may not only encounter indifferent compatriots, but also eager young people tossing old ladies off buses into rivers. Let them not be surprised.
Dear Yulia, I’ve come across this kind of view before—something in the spirit of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, you know? He idealized primitive people, believed we should return to nature, that simpler is better. A kind of hymn to a return to primal simplicity. Now, I don’t know how often you’ve personally interacted with members of national diasporas from the provinces, and so on—but in addition to frequent encounters, I’ve also studied the issue. As I’ve mentioned, I was involved in setting up and working with the Scientific Center for Sociology and Management under the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. I studied various criminal issues, including the problem of ethnic clans in the army—a serious problem then, and as far as I know, still a problem now. I also studied ethnic crime. Frankly, I would not wish for you, dear Yulia, to come face-to-face with certain representatives of national diasporas. There, you would see not only human faces, but quite the opposite. This idealization of “good people from the provinces” untouched by the corrupting influence of civilization—I think you’d be deeply disappointed if you encountered them. Then again, I don’t know you or your life experience—maybe yours is different. I’m a sociologist, and I study this issue comprehensively. And I don’t see what you’re talking about—I just don’t. For the record, Tajiks are migrants; they’re in very different circumstances. But as for the Russian hinterlands—there’s no particular advantage there in terms of humanism or anything like that. It’s just not there.
The Peasant – Not a Bearer of National Sentiment? Link to heading
ARESTOVYCH: Not sure this is worth airtime. But since there’s a reply, I’ll respond: the Russian peasant is a poor example—a bearer of national sentiment, yes, but also of the “noble savage,” because he’s a slave, in my view, a slave in every sense. A slave in the way Europe once had slavery, but ours was on another level—though I might be wrong. We know, for instance, that Pushkin had a nanny who, it seems, didn’t commit such savagery, as Gorky wrote. So something grows even through asphalt. Although that little genius with curly hair may well have had Stockholm syndrome. And maybe there’s more about his nanny that we just don’t know. I haven’t read Gorky’s article, but I gather I disapprove of it. Hard to even download now without a proxy, though so many years have passed. But I read something else. In general, this phenomenon is well known—“the sleep of reason produces monsters.” Maybe that’s why, from things like this, the English phrase “villain” and “villager” sound so close. That’s not by accident. The real issue is: how do you instill the good, the true, the eternal in people whose culture long ago lost all trace of it? That question has preoccupied me for years in this form: why can’t Russians think? And I ask it with some empathy—it doesn’t mean I’ve lost hope. But I just came across a new twist in the post of that bastard Jones.
Well, frankly, I don’t know what to respond to here. I don’t really see a question. It’s just a commentary. So I’ll leave it at that, without a reply. Moving on:
Skobov, I believe, speaks the truth. Of course, there is an ideology, but the time hasn’t come to fully rise and state it openly. People are still shy. And enemies are everywhere—could get themselves into trouble again. But films, books, songs—they’re emerging as if on their own.
Well, I just want to say that I will definitely respond. Aleksandr Valeryevich Skobov and I had agreed on a kind of debate—through the bars, so to speak. I hope it happens. That in itself is my support for Aleksandr Valeryevich, who is truly a vivid embodiment of the principle “I think, therefore I am.”
On Supranational Entities Link to heading
Max: When I wrote that national sentiment will fade, I meant something else. Its current form will disappear. Where was national sentiment before the rise of nation-states? In culture. I proceed from the assumption that if progress continues, the era of nation-states will be replaced by an era of supranational entities like the EU, and national sentiment won’t vanish, but will return to expressing itself through culture. If you compare the 19th, 20th, and early 21st centuries, you can sense these changes. But I’ll add—this is only if we’re lucky and progress continues.
I think I won’t comment either—I’ll just leave this as a comment, since it’s not a question.
Why Sanctions Instead of Trials Against Poroshenko Link to heading
Here’s a comment from Sfera. This time, I think I will respond to this comment. The question is: Igor Ivanovich, why sanctions instead of courts against Poroshenko? Because good, freedom of speech, and democracy must have teeth and fists. Otherwise, you end up with exactly what we see in Russia, the U.S., Trumpists, and Poroshenko—it’s all the same. I haven’t seen an exception. Biden could have imprisoned Poroshenko, Biden could have imprisoned Trump, but he didn’t. And now tens of millions of Americans will pay the price.
By the way, that statement really puzzles me—“Biden could have imprisoned Trump.” How exactly? You see, Biden is not Putin, and America is not Russia. How could Biden imprison Trump? He’s not a judge, he’s not a prosecutor.
And so—1,000,000 migrants… —this I’m now quoting—1,000,000 migrants have already suffered from the shutdown of USAID, directly or indirectly. 1,000,000 Snowdens will be maimed. How many Ukrainians will die because of Trump’s actions? This is only the beginning. Trump isn’t going anywhere—that’s obvious.
Still, I don’t understand why there are sanctions instead of courts against Poroshenko. If Poroshenko is guilty of something, there should be trials. Why impose sanctions on a citizen of your own country? I still don’t get it. Ignatov also writes, “You’re wrong about sanctions—the sanctions law is a copy of the American one.” Well, okay—but I don’t know of any cases where the United States has applied sanctions against its own citizens. That’s the issue. Ignatov argues that sanctions are a fast tool of economic pressure, and the courts are slow. But still—frankly, I don’t understand why you wouldn’t use a normal legal mechanism against a citizen of your own country.
On Novikov’s Citizenship Link to heading
Is that right? Like: Igor Alexandrovich, as far as I know, Ilya Novikov has submitted an application but has not yet received Ukrainian citizenship. He’s waiting for a decree from President Zelensky.
Perhaps he’s being confused with Ilya Ponomarev. Well, I can’t really comment here. I’m just repeating what I’ve heard—I heard that he had supposedly received citizenship. If that’s not the case, well, I don’t think this is a particularly momentous issue.
On Ukrainians’ Desire for Elections Link to heading
Here’s an important comment from Max: I agree with the statement that the Ukrainian people want a change of power. Sociology shows that Ukrainians feel, in their understanding, that their desire doesn’t match their capabilities. That they need to hold off on their desires. If peace came tomorrow, the sociology would be different—and the question of elections would arise the very next day. I’m not sure Zelensky would win. If I want to buy a sheep but don’t have the means, that doesn’t mean I don’t want the sheep. I’ll buy it as soon as I can.
Dear Max! You see, I don’t have a mystical connection to the Ukrainian people. I judge the desires of the Ukrainian people solely based on sociological data. As of today, that data shows that the Ukrainian people do not want elections. The fact that they don’t want elections because the conditions aren’t right—yes, that’s a fact. The fact that as soon as the war ends or martial law is lifted, the Ukrainian people will immediately demand elections—that’s another fact. As for your claim that you’re not sure Zelensky would win—again, public opinion currently favors Zelensky. But that could change tomorrow. I operate based on facts, not a vague sense of “what the Ukrainian people want.” Like anyone else, I go by the available public opinion data. By the way, Ukraine is lucky to have quite strong field sociologists—survey researchers there are quite solid.
American Interests and Arms Supplies Link to heading
VOLKER: Enough chatter about America’s interests. America’s interests aren’t suffering in any way. Even if it gave Ukraine every missile currently in production, there’s no idiot in the world who would attack America. Even if there were some massive “China of America,” it could cause a lot of trouble and do a lot of harm—but conquering America is impossible. Any real war with America is nonsense because of the great beautiful ocean, which makes it easy to repel attacks. And nuclear war is even more pointless—the attacker would suffer just as much as America itself. No one can win or conquer America. “America’s interests” is just a pure excuse. Trump needs a friend in Putin—that’s the only reason for what’s happening and what will happen. Trump doesn’t want Russia to lose in any form. I’m afraid not even the announced sanctions will materialize. And as for Russians and Germans—it reminds me of post-war street kids. ‘A German came out of the fog, out came a knife from the pocket.’ Where do you think those kids got the word ‘German’?
Well, sure—I was saying exactly the same thing. I don’t quite understand who you’re addressing with “Enough chatter about America’s interests.” No, that’s exactly the idea I don’t support. So, on that optimistic note, I’ll wrap up today’s stream—I believe I’ve answered all the questions. And all the meaningful comments you felt were worth sharing—I’ve quoted them.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
Dear friends, this concludes our conversation for today. A reminder that at 5:00 PM we have a meeting with Professor Lipsits. Don’t miss it—I believe it will be an interesting discussion. Glory to Ukraine! Take care. Freedom to Aleksandr Skobov, to all Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives! See you at 5:00 PM. Farewell for now. Have a great day!
Source: https://youtu.be/Sr9ODj90nYE