Negotiations through the eyes of Trump, Ukraine, and Russia. Who profited from “Trump’s swings.” Greenland: a guide to annexation.

Main Topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 11th, and I’m in Kyiv. It’s currently 07:41, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

Comparison of the Third Reich and the USSR Link to heading

Today, April 11th, is the day on which the International Day of the Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camp Prisoners is observed. This is because it was on this day, April 11, 1945, that the uprising of Buchenwald prisoners began. The rebels first attacked the guard towers, then the commandant’s office was seized. Everything was very well organized. In general, there was serious preparation. After that, the rebels set up a circular defense and waited. On that same day, they waited. The camp was practically liberated by then, when units of three armies of the United States entered. And you know, on the fate of Buchenwald, this death camp, there’s a good opportunity to make a comparative analysis. What were death camps like in the Third Reich and in the Gulag? The fact is that after Buchenwald was liberated—first it was indeed liberated by the three U.S. armies, but then, due to an agreement, it came under the control of the Red Army and was integrated into the Gulag system. And so, we can compare the deadly death camps of the Third Reich and the Gulag system. The fact is that during the Hitler period, when Buchenwald was a death camp in the Third Reich, it operated for eight years—from July 1937 to April 1945. During that time, 250,000 prisoners passed through Buchenwald, and 56,000 of them either died or were killed. So over eight years, the mortality rate was 22.4%. And in the Gulag system, from 1945 to 1950, over five years, 28,455 prisoners passed through the camp, of which 7,113 died. So in the Gulag system over five years, nearly 25% died or were killed. So in eight years there it was 22.4%, and here in five years it was almost 25. So we see, as they say, in this competition of murderers, the Gulag wins confidently—with a clear advantage. This raises the question of the cruelty of the systems: which one was more brutal—Stalin’s or Hitler’s? Well, at least using Buchenwald as an example, we can say firmly that the Stalinist system was more brutal.

Negotiations Link to heading

As for today, naturally the most important process that interests us is negotiations. And based on what happened yesterday, we can describe how the negotiations look from the perspective of the three sides: Trump, Ukraine, and Russia. Here’s the picture that emerges. What do negotiations look like in Trump’s worldview? I’ll quote his statement from yesterday. Here’s what he said: “I think relatively soon we will be able to reach an agreement with Ukraine and Russia to stop the fighting.” And then the usual refrain: “This is so stupid, it’s such a terrible thing. If I were president, this would never have happened. But it did happen. We were given this hand, and I think we’ll play it. I think we can stop it. We have to stop it.” End of quote. That’s Trump’s view of the negotiation process.

Now, what do negotiations between Russia and Ukraine look like? Well, there are essentially no negotiations at all. But as an illustration of these so-called “negotiations,” it can be noted that on April 10th, Russian occupiers carried out 113 shellings of border settlements in the Sumy region. 254 explosions were recorded. The Russian army has increased assaults in the Sumy region by 30% over the past week. In addition, there was a missile strike on Dnipro yesterday, causing a large fire. There are fatalities and many injuries. A Russian drone also hit an apartment building in Zhytomyr region, killing a person. There were also massive shellings of Kyiv and the Kyiv region yesterday. And Kharkiv continues to be shelled constantly. So that’s what negotiations between Russia and Ukraine look like.

And now, what about Russian-American negotiations? Those are actually happening. Yesterday, negotiations took place in Istanbul. The United States and Russia discussed normalizing the operation of their diplomatic missions. These were five-hour-long talks, during which the American side expressed strong concerns about the prohibition of hiring local staff at missions in Russia. They issued certain conditions, presented a note. Apparently, they’ll come to some kind of agreement. As for Russia, their main concern was property—specifically, according to Russian media reports, in Istanbul the Russian-American delegation developed a roadmap on the issue of returning six diplomatic properties that had been confiscated by the U.S. authorities. A whole range of issues was discussed regarding the convenience and comfort of diplomats in both countries. So, all in all, it was a very pleasant conversation. Not a word about Ukraine, no mention of war, no problems. Just the U.S. and Russia negotiating the comfort and convenience of their diplomatic missions in both countries. So clearly, they are negotiating, clearly everything’s fine. Russian-American talks are progressing successfully—but they have nothing to do with Ukraine. So in the end, we can say that the negotiation process itself has been pushed aside. There’s a war, and it’s escalating. We’ve discussed this many times, dear friends—the significant increase in strikes on peaceful Ukrainian cities, the killing of civilians, and, accordingly, a significant rise. According to the latest data from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, there has been a twofold increase in the intensity of military actions by Russia. That’s what these negotiations look like.

Tariff Cancellation Link to heading

Trump, in fact, is seriously preoccupied with something entirely different—something much more exciting. This exciting process can be called swings, or perhaps a roller coaster. And you know, I think some, or maybe many of you, watched yesterday’s conversation with San Sanych Genis and Vitaliy Portnikov. I shared my hypothesis with both of them. I played a very unusual and, frankly, not very pleasant role for myself—that of a conspiracy theorist. Because I just can’t shake the thought that these swings, this roller coaster Trump has set up, where he can crash the market or send it soaring to the skies in a single day—just with one move—are too strange to ignore. Stocks of hundreds of companies jump in value and then drop sharply. And there are beneficiaries. And the list of these beneficiaries makes a very odd impression on me. I can’t help but think that, well, it’s strange—having such leverage in your hands and not using it to benefit close associates. It’s just odd.

San Sanych Genis yesterday, and Vitaliy Portnikov as well in the evening, both tried to convince me otherwise. They said, no, these are very wealthy people, but they don’t care about wealth—they’re focused on power. So this kind of thing can’t be happening. Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe I’m not very good in this unfamiliar role of a conspiracy theorist. But you see, when I read that in just one day the 500 richest people on the planet increased their wealth by a record $304 billion, and that this followed Trump’s decision to, so to speak, play with the swings and suspend tariffs… and when I see that this is the largest single-day increase in total wealth in history… and when I see that the biggest winner was the richest man on the planet, Elon Musk, who got $36 billion richer in one day… and that right behind him in sudden wealth growth was Mark Zuckerberg, who made $26 billion in a day… and I see that both of these gentlemen are loyal Trump supporters… I don’t know. In any case, I was told, no, Trump didn’t tell anyone anything, it just happened. Well, I don’t know, I don’t know.

Anyway, San Sanych Genis criticized me yesterday for this, let’s say, Marxist—or rather Leninist—approach of looking for who benefits. I agree, it’s unconvincing. But still, having such an incredible lever in your hands… to say that no one’s using it? Well, I don’t know, I’m not sure. Let’s wait and see. Because Trump’s swings, this roller coaster, continues—and we’ll keep watching to see how the dynamics unfold.

Plans for Greenland Link to heading

And Trump has gotten himself a whole bunch of new toys lately. In particular, the Trump administration has prepared guidelines for the annexation of Greenland. So yesterday we were talking about how Austria was annexed—this is something similar. Though now, of course, we live in the 21st century, the age of postmodernism, and most things happen on social media. Everything unfolds on the internet. In this case, the people of Greenland are being encouraged to ask to join the United States themselves. Although Evans and others in Trump’s circle have hinted at the possibility of sending in troops, and Trump himself has also vaguely suggested a forceful solution to the issue, for now, the plan looks more like a serious media campaign aimed at convincing the island’s residents to vote for joining the United States.

This campaign is already underway, and it’s quite large-scale. There’s talk that the Danish authorities don’t take proper care of the island’s residents. It’s being said that only the United States can protect Greenland from invasion by Russia and China. And, of course, there’s the argument that the U.S. can help Greenland become rapidly wealthy.

Ukraine Forgotten Link to heading

As for Ukraine—well, apparently Trump has new toys now, and he generally doesn’t care much about Ukraine. All this talk about Putin having a psychological deadline, as the President of Finland put it—well, I don’t know. I’ve been watching Putin’s website closely, the official Kremlin site, and I haven’t found any signs of a psychological deadline there. I look at publications in the Russian press and I still don’t see where this deadline is supposedly hiding. So it seems that negotiations are being postponed indefinitely. And in the meantime, Putin is using this time to escalate the war, increase casualties, intensify shellings of Ukrainian territory and cities, and continue killing civilians. That’s the state of the negotiations.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

Before moving on to your questions, I want to say that today at 3:00 PM we’ll have Mykhailo Mykhailovych Podolyak, and possibly—this isn’t confirmed yet, we haven’t had a chance to finalize it—but possibly at 6:00 PM we’ll have Andrey Andreyevich Piontkovsky. But at 8:00 PM, Mykhailo Mykhailovych Podolyak is confirmed. So don’t miss it. I think the opinion of the adviser to the President’s Office regarding recent events is of great interest. Now I’ll move on to answering your questions.

On the Possible Collapse of Russia. Will It Collapse If Power Changes? Link to heading

Question from Alexander.
You’ve thoroughly analyzed the reasons why the collapse of Russia is possible. What are the reasons it might not happen in the event of a change in power?

Well, of course, we’re talking about a potential event. It’s clear that in the case of a change in power, it’s possible for the new leadership to maintain control, consolidate authority, and suppress certain centrifugal tendencies. All of that is possible. But it’s only possible if they manage to come up with some kind of solution. That is, in order to avoid Russia’s collapse, Putin’s successor will have to solve a lot of problems. First and foremost, to figure out what to do with these 600—well, I think the likelihood that the war will end after that is extremely high. The probability of somehow avoiding problems connected with the return of 620,000 thugs, who are used to killing, back to Russian territory—that’s a big question.

I think that the most reliable way to prevent Russia’s collapse would be a new war. Unfortunately, if the war with Ukraine ends, I think there could be an attack on the Baltic countries or other neighbors. So I believe that Russia, as an empire, can continue to exist. I’ll stress once again that on February 24, 2022, Russia became a country for which war is the only viable mode of existence. Therefore, if the next leadership is able to launch a new war, decides to do so, and has the potential for it, then Russia will remain a unified empire. Otherwise, collapse is very, very likely.

On Margarita Simonyan Receiving the Order of Saint Olga Link to heading

Question from Diana.
I heard the news yesterday that Russia’s main propaganda tree, Margarita Simonyan, was awarded the Order of Saint Olga. I wanted to hear your opinion. Don’t you think poor Saint Olga must have turned in her grave a hundred times? And the award is being handed out by the chief church criminal of the Russian Orthodox Church? Also, I wanted to hear your take on her idea to drop a nuclear bomb on Siberia?

Dear Diana, first of all, I want to say that I don’t think Margarita Simonyan being awarded the Order of Saint Olga in any way insults the memory of Princess Olga, because, as history tells us, Princess Olga was quite a noble but also rather bloodthirsty figure. At least there’s fairly convincing evidence of how she took revenge on the Drevlians for the killing of her husband Igor, who had been pushing them around with his extortion. So when it comes to dishonoring Princess Olga’s legacy, I’d hold back—frankly, they seem well-matched. Both were serious bloodsuckers.

As for the specifics—no, I don’t think it was for her idea to drop a nuclear bomb on Siberia in particular, but rather for her long-standing service to the interests of Putin’s fascist Reich. I think she’s fully earned that order.

On Zelensky’s Use of the Word “Russians” Link to heading

Serafim Lozhkin.
You answered a question about Zelensky’s use of the word “Russian.” But maybe the answer is much simpler—in Ukrainian, the words for “Russian” and “citizen of Russia” are the same.

Dear Serafim! Well, yes, indeed—many Ukrainians responded to my comment in exactly that way. But the thing is, I’m aware of that. I must admit, to my shame, that I still haven’t learned the Ukrainian language, but I do know that in Ukrainian, there is the term “rosiiska mova” (Russian language), and yes, in Ukrainian, “Russian” and “citizen of Russia” are essentially the same.

However, in this particular case, Zelensky specifically said “Russians,” he used the word “Russian.” So this is more of a reference to the European or Western perspective—an external view of Russia—where “Russians” is used to refer to all residents of the Soviet Union or all people living in Russia, regardless of nationality. So it seems Zelensky was emphasizing that Western approach. In other words, he didn’t say “citizen of Russia,” but explicitly said “Russian.” So this wasn’t entirely in the Ukrainian linguistic context—it was a deliberate nod to the Western way of framing it.

Is Empathy an Innate Trait? Link to heading

Galina Tverskogo.
Is empathy an innate feeling or an acquired one?

You know, for a long time—since I generally believe that most of our psychological traits are acquired and social in nature—I also thought that empathy was entirely an acquired trait. But not long ago, a few years back, I came across research from Cambridge University, which, based on concrete empirical studies, showed that about one-tenth of our capacity for empathy is influenced by genetics. I won’t go into the methodology, but it seemed convincing enough to me. So 90% of empathy is acquired, and 10% is genetic.

Interestingly, though the researchers found genetic differences between people who were more or less inclined toward empathy, they couldn’t locate specific “empathy genes” in the human brain or body that were responsible for it. So, let’s say, while the results of this research are worth reflecting on, two issues with the study give me pause. First, the fact that they couldn’t actually identify any genetic markers for empathy undermines the whole heredity claim—if there’s a hereditary component, there should be specific material carriers of it, but none were found. And second, the empathy index used in the study was based on self-report surveys, meaning that voluntary behavior and other factors could have influenced the results.

So, in short, this still needs to be looked into further. But the key takeaway is that, by any approach, 90% of empathy is acquired. Therefore, we can say that empathy is, of course, mostly an acquired trait. So the idea that “if the father is a ghoul, the son will be one too” doesn’t really hold.

On Kalyaev Street in Moscow Link to heading

Walter Herman,
Kalyaev Street in Moscow. Yes, about ten people have objected or commented on my statement that there was a Kalinin Street in Moscow.

Well, first of all, I didn’t double-check it, but apparently I misspoke and said Kalyagin—that was, of course, a mistake. The reference was to the terrorist Kalyayev, who assassinated Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich—and that’s what people like Walter Herman and the user who calls themselves “user” were referring to. There actually was a Kalinin Street—this was an extension of Novoslobodskaya Street until 1992; now it’s called Dolgorukov Street. That’s where the question about renaming came in. I still believe—although I’m not a big fan of these toponymic games—that nonetheless, I can’t imagine comfortably living on, say, a street named after the ghoul Kadyrov. People live on Kadyrov Street—how is that acceptable? Sure, you can try to mentally detach from it and ignore it, but still, when your passport says “Kadyrov Street”—why?

The same goes for the terrorist Kalyaev—he didn’t deserve that honor. And there were objections about Voykovskaya too. I still believe that the existence of a Moscow metro station named Voykovskaya, and other places named after a murderer, simply makes no sense.

On Trump’s Behavior. The Hypothesis That His Main Motivation to Run Is to Avoid Prosecution Link to heading

Igor Kudryashov
I have a hypothesis about Trump’s behavior. I’d really like to hear your opinion. It’s a long one, so I’ll summarize it in my own words: given the number of cases opened against Trump and the severity of the charges, he’s practically guaranteed a lengthy prison sentence. So he has no choice but to do everything possible to win the presidency. And at that point, any means are justified. In short, our colleague Igor Kudryashov suggests that Trump’s sole and primary goal is to escape prosecution. That everything he’s doing is for that purpose. Also, Igor sends greetings from Kharkiv.

Thank you very much. Sending warm greetings back to you. Hang in there—Kharkiv is truly in one of the hardest-hit positions under constant shelling. Now, regarding the hypothesis: I don’t share your view, because I think Trump, of course, does have avoiding prosecution as one of his goals. But you see, if your hypothesis were correct, then Trump would probably be behaving differently. If that were his main goal, he could act in a more passive, inertial manner. He wouldn’t be causing this planetary turbulence, which is a risky move. After all, he’s alienating the whole world, as well as many people within the United States itself. Ultimately, he’s risking impeachment—again—which could, in fact, trigger even more criminal proceedings down the line.

So his behavior doesn’t suggest that his primary goal is to avoid prosecution. Therefore, dear namesake, I think your idea isn’t, at least, supported by the facts.

Is There a Threat of Russia Attacking the Baltic States or Finland? Link to heading

Margarita.
It’s hard to predict anything in today’s world. But still, I’d like to know what awaits us all. You’ve said that Putin doesn’t have two armies and likely doesn’t have the strength to attack the Baltic states or Finland. But still, even a small percentage of threat always exists. After the Winter War in Finland, when a piece of Karelia was seized, Finnish army recruits were told: the enemy always attacks from the East. That was an actual principle taught to young people. Older Finns were ready to defend their country with weapons. But now, I don’t know who would defend their country. Yes, NATO soldiers present in the Baltic states and Finland look formidable. But are the reserves enough to confront an enemy? And territory size matters too. Finland has room for maneuver—it’s long and spread out—but the Baltic countries don’t. One could cross them in a day. So what do you think? What if the worst-case scenario comes true—if Putin comes with his destructive ‘Russian world’? And where to then?

Dear Margarita, I think the threat to the Baltic states is real—it’s not zero. And the threat to Finland exists too. The question of how well these countries can resist is a very big one, and there’s considerable uncertainty. Here’s why. During the Winter War, the world was completely different. One of the key differences in today’s world—especially in the European context—is the freedom of movement. Right now, millions of Ukrainian citizens have emigrated, including men.

In the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, people were more tied to their place of living, and therefore, more prepared to defend it. Yes, there is still a certain group of patriots today who are ready to fight and die for their country. But it’s only a portion—not even close to 100%. During the Winter War, migration and relocation were atypical. Yes, people emigrated back then, of course. But there wasn’t the same free-glide lifestyle across the globe that we see today. Now this global mobility is standard, everyday life. And in my view, this lowers resistance—it reduces the number of people willing to stand and die for their country.

So what is the homeland? For many, it’s simply where they live. And why should someone die for a territory if they can easily go live somewhere else? Or they already live elsewhere. Or they can move and continue living normally. People now have countless life strategies that have nothing to do with the place where they were born or live. Many have the ability to move to any point on the globe and carry on just fine. So why would they die for this particular patch of land?

I’m saying things many won’t like—because a lot of people believe that one must fight for their country, even die for it. But not everyone thinks that way. In the Winter War example you brought up, circumstances left people with no choice. If you were a farmer, or worked at a factory, or somewhere else—moving was not easy, and ties to the land were much stronger than now. That’s no longer the case. Now people leave without hesitation.

And that’s connected to the issue you raised. All polls show that fewer than 20% of men of mobilization age are willing to defend their land against an invader. So yes, the problems you mention are real. That worst-case scenario is terrifying. And again, unlike our military expert Serhiy Maratovych Hrabskyi—here I disagree with him—I believe that the likelihood of an attack on European countries, including the Baltics, Finland, Poland, while Putin is still waging war in Ukraine, is close to zero.

But even then, the probability isn’t zero. And if and when Putin somehow ends the war in Ukraine—whatever the reason—then the likelihood rises significantly.

On Macron’s Statement Regarding Foreign Troops Link to heading

Vladimir,
Macron spoke out about the possibility of deploying a foreign contingent in Ukraine. He said that Russia has no right to interfere in Ukraine’s decision to host such a contingent. Ukraine is a sovereign country, and it’s their right to decide—period.

Dear Vladimir! Of course, Macron is speaking a sacred truth from the perspective of international law. But forgive me—under international law, is the occupation of 20% of Ukrainian territory considered normal? Putin couldn’t care less about Ukraine’s sovereign right to decide what troops can be on its soil. That’s not the issue. You see, Macron is absolutely right in what he says—but the problem is, where are the French troops on Ukrainian soil? Where are they? I assert that they’re not there—and won’t be, as long as the war continues. They’re not there and won’t be.

Because this isn’t about Ukraine’s sacred right to decide what forces are on its land. It’s about reality. There’s a huge gap—a chasm—between what ought to be and what is. Macron is absolutely right when he speaks about what ought to be. Yes, ideally, that’s how it should work. But now let’s look at what is. The reality is that the moment French, German, or British troops step onto Ukrainian soil, they immediately become prime targets for Russian aircraft, drones, and other means of killing. Absolutely guaranteed. And it will be perceived as a declaration of war.

So yes, Ukraine has every right to allow whoever it wants on its territory. And France has every right to help Ukraine with its troops. But doing so means entering a war—against Russia. And clearly, no one wants that. So, while I fully agree with Macron’s words, I must point out that Macron himself doesn’t follow his own stated principles. So, that’s the story here—a gap between what is and what ought to be.

On Podrabinek’s Article About Berkovich Link to heading

Question from Ilya
Did you read Alexander Podrabinek’s column about Valeria Zotova and Yevgenia Berkovich? I’m interested in your opinion. And second, is it possible to invite Alexey Petrovich Kondaurov for a conversation?

Oh, how possible—well, let me clarify. Naturally, Alexey Petrovich Kondaurov is someone I deeply respect, and his opinion—he is perhaps the only KGB general who, in my view, managed to preserve quite serious moral qualities and certainly intelligence despite his rank. So yes, I’d really love to have Alexey Petrovich Kondaurov on our channel. There was a conversation with him, we’ve exchanged messages, we know each other well, and we’ve always had a collegial relationship. But I believe he’s not currently ready to be public—whatever the reason may be. He is absolutely aligned with our views, but for now, he’s not ready. Though thank you, Ilya, I’ll probably write to him again. Honestly, I’ve lost track of his recent publications, which used to be quite interesting. I’ll reach out—maybe this “taboo on publicity” has changed. We’ll see.

Now to the main question about Podrabinek’s column. Of course, I’ve read it. And I can say that my position on it—my view of it—is strongly negative. I feel that his stance, well… I don’t want to go into it too long, because it’s a vast and complex topic. But the idea that someone who ends up in prison must take on certain “codes,” especially the criminal underworld’s codes—that’s the core of it. Alexander Podrabinek, despite the enormous respect I have for his dissident past and the resilience he showed during his time in the Yakutian camps, is taking a position here that I find deeply troubling.

His assertion that artistic activity in prison is a form of collaboration, even snitching—well, excuse me, there are countless examples. Georgiy Zhzhyonov, for example, continued acting and directing in the camps. So what? Yes, there are criminal codes that demand one not participate in anything—no artistic activities, no work at all. If we follow that logic to the end, you’re not allowed to work at all. And Podrabinek is essentially taking that side. He says no “real” inmate will trust Berkovich after she put on plays in the camp. But she never intended to be trusted by inmates—she never planned to be some “mother hen” figure.

So I think this over-vigilance, this excessive purity test is just wrong. Everything he wrote struck me as awful—because I imagined what life would be like if people with such views organized the future of Russia. It would be terrifying. The personal endurance and strength of people who survived prison is admirable—but that doesn’t mean the same standards must apply to everyone else. Felix Dzerzhinsky endured Tsarist prisons with great courage—and then built a regime far more brutal.

So, with all due respect to Alexander Podrabinek, my opinion of this column is strongly negative.

On the South Caucasus Link to heading

So, Vivien
I’d like your opinion on the South Caucasus—Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan. What might happen in this region if, God forbid, the Putin regime wins in Ukraine? Is a Ukrainian-style scenario possible in the South Caucasus?

Dear colleague, first of all, I must say—I don’t quite understand. You see, to conduct a thought experiment, we still need some sort of realistic foundation. I believe the probability of Putin winning in Ukraine is simply zero—or, at the very least, extremely close to zero. Putin does not, and never has had, the resources necessary to achieve victory in Ukraine. The chance that Putin will exit the war in the foreseeable future—likely not this year, maybe not even next year—does exist. But let’s construct this thought experiment anyway.

Let’s break it down. The situations in the three South Caucasus republics are very different. Georgia—there’s no sign of a Ukrainian-style scenario unfolding there, because Georgia is quite comfortably nestled in Putin’s pocket. Why would he attack when everything is already working out so well for him there?

As for Armenia, the risk is a bit higher. But still, I’m not convinced that Armenia would be a priority target for Putin.

As for Azerbaijan, I believe a Ukrainian-style scenario is simply impossible there, for a very straightforward reason: the solid concept that Aliyev and Erdoğan stand on—“one nation, two states.” Putin isn’t crazy enough to attack Turkey.

So, I think two South Caucasus countries—Azerbaijan and Georgia—are excluded from a Ukrainian scenario, though for completely opposite reasons. Armenia—unlikely, in my view. So most likely, the South Caucasus will follow a completely different trajectory.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

That’s it for our morning broadcast today. I’d like to remind you that at 3:00 PM we’ll have Mykhailo Mykhailovych Podolyak. I think it will be interesting—at the very least, it’s very important to hear the position of the Office of the President of Ukraine. As for Andrey Andreyevich Piontkovsky, that’s still uncertain—we haven’t been able to reach him yet, but I hope that conversation will happen too. With that, I’ll wrap up. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom to Aleksandr Skobov, to Ukrainian prisoners of war, and to Russian political prisoners! All the best! See you at 8:00 PM!

Source: https://youtu.be/4-Y6pfV5Ews