Operation Web, its military, political, economic, and moral significance. The reaction of Russian Z-enthusiasts, ultra-patriots, and also woolly liberals.
Operation Web Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 2nd, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls. It’s 7:40 a.m. in Kyiv. So, what do we have? Today, we have a very big stream, and as it seems to me, a very important one. There are many questions. And the most important event that we will discuss with you today—the only event, because there are a lot of events, like the elections in Poland and a number of questions related to what is happening in the United States.
Preliminary Results of the Operation Link to heading
But the main thing, of course, is that yesterday the Ukrainian special services and the military-political leadership of Ukraine conducted Operation Web. The assessments, the scope of this operation, and the evaluation of its military, military-technical, economic, political, foreign policy, and domestic political aspects are yet to be fully analyzed, and we will be doing that not only in my solo streams but also, of course, with experts. Today, I would like to draw attention to what seems to me a very important dialogue with Sergei Maratovich Grabsky, with whom we will be speaking, as usual, on Mondays at 8:00 p.m. And, of course, we will discuss the significance of today’s event in detail with him. But first, let’s look at the facts. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, as a result of the strike on four Russian airbases, 41 aircraft of Russian strategic aviation were damaged.
Description of the Operation Link to heading
So, well. The reaction of the Russian side. I’ll go into detail about the official reaction and the reaction of that ultra-patriotic community. There are varying assessments here. At the very least, there is accurate data confirmed, including by the Russian side. At first, it was said that two airbases had been attacked and that 10 aircraft had been damaged. Initially, it was said just a few, then seven, then 10. So, in general, the data is being clarified. The final tally will be known after everything is determined. Well, here, I think there is a criterion—satellite images. It will be possible to say with certainty exactly what happened. The Ukrainian side, the Security Service of Ukraine, reports that this operation was in preparation for more than a year and a half. It was personally overseen by Zelensky, while the operation itself was carried out directly by the head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Vasyl Maliuk. So, the technology is unique. You know, for these more than three years of war, we have always said that Ukraine should or could—or it would be nice if Ukraine turned into a big Israel. But in reality, there is nothing comparable. With all due respect to the Israeli special services, even the famous Pager operation, thanks to which a significant part of Hezbollah militants was eliminated, probably does not compare to what Ukraine has done—especially since the adversary Ukraine is facing is certainly nothing like Hezbollah, nothing like Hamas, nothing like the Yemeni Houthis. Therefore, the technology, the preparation, the meticulous precision here is simply off the charts—truly remarkable. Ukrainian drones took off from trucks that had driven up to the bases in Russia. These drones were assembled in Russia; these wooden sheds were built, and then they were loaded onto trucks, which then drove right up close to the military airfields. And then, the SBU somehow managed to transport them into Russia. Well, there are various assessments here. Some sources say that the SBU first transported the drones into Russia, then later the mobile wooden sheds, and that the drones were then hidden in Russia. But there is other information that it was all done directly on Russian territory. In this case, I think that the difference is not very significant, but it still seems to me to be quite significant for the technology itself. But it’s not that important. President Zelensky reported that the headquarters for this Operation Web, the Ukrainian headquarters, was located practically next to the FSB headquarters in one of the regions of Russia. Also quite curious. And in fact, everything that happened occurred at precisely the right moment yesterday. The roofs of these sheds were remotely opened, and the drones flew out to strike Russian bombers. Once again, the SBU reports that all the people who participated in this historic special operation have long been safely in Ukraine. Let’s note again the assessment of the Ukrainian special services: the estimated cost of the Russian losses is about $7 billion. 34% of the strategic missile-carrying bombers at the four main airbases in Russia were hit. Well, I won’t go into detail—yesterday in the Weekly Summary, I talked a bit more about which airbases and which bombers. Well, I think we’ll be discussing that today as well with Sergei. Five airbases were planned as targets. One of these airbases is already in the Far East—it’s Amur Oblast, the Ukrainka airbase. They didn’t make it there; there was some sort of malfunction, and it exploded. But otherwise, basically, from Murmansk Oblast to Irkutsk Oblast, nearly the entire territory of Russia was covered. All the main airbases from which heavy bombers took off—the primary resource for these endless bombings of Ukrainian cities—were hit. Again, the range is very large. We still need to clarify—whether it’s 34% of the strategic missile carriers, and most importantly, this is an absolutely irreplaceable resource, because today Russia does not produce this type of aircraft, and there are no spare parts—no essential components. So it’s irrecoverable damage. If it is indeed 34%, that’s a catastrophe for the Russian Aerospace Forces. If it’s, as Russian sources claim, 9–10%, that’s still a very serious blow. But, of course, it’s not a catastrophe. We’ll see. In fact, I think that in the very near future, we’ll learn the true scale—the true scale of this special operation. But in any case, the special operation is brilliant. The grand consequences are very, very significant.
Reaction of the Russian Side Link to heading
Yesterday, I promised the participants of the Telegram channel that I would somehow sum up the reaction, first and foremost. Let’s take a look at the reaction of various representatives of the Russian official establishment, the ultra-patriotic public, and also some other categories. And then we’ll talk a bit about the consequences. So, first, the reaction of the Westerners. Here, I think it’s important to quote, because this reaction, in large part, is itself one of the moral and political consequences of this operation in Russia. A fairly well-known former adviser to the governor of Kursk Oblast and also a writer, Roman Alekhin, who was the first to introduce the term “Russian Pearl Harbor”—although, of course, that’s nonsense, as this operation has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Rather, if anything, it’s more like the Russian Tsushima, a symbol of the crushing defeat of the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese War. But I’m just quoting here. And this very famous pro-Western author, Roman Alekhin, writes: “I can’t even imagine how to respond to this, and with what. And yes, we don’t have dozens of countries to supply us with aircraft. And what does the chief of the General Staff think about this?”
Then there’s the very well-known military correspondent of Komsomolskaya Pravda, one of the most famous war correspondents, Alexander Kots. Here’s what he writes: “Well, what? A new stage of confrontation. In fact, it was only a matter of time before drones would start working in our deep rear. But now it’s important to tell the truth, no matter how bitter it may be.”
The military channel Romanov Light says: “The bombers built in the Soviet era are an irreplaceable strategic resource.” Modern lamplighters—this is how Romanov Light puts it—only came up with the idea of covering the fuselage with tires. As for using netting like the operators do in their area, that hasn’t even occurred to these lamplighters.
A very popular channel, also ultra-patriotic, the channel “Two Majors” writes: “This is a direct blow to the strategic nuclear balance of power. It’s a reduction in the nuclear security of our country.”
One of the largest militaristic musical Telegram channels in Russia, “Russia is a Knight,” states that the Russian Ministry of Defense was once again unprepared to promptly comment on what happened. “Every time,” writes the Knight, “when chaos breaks out, we get hit where it hurts, and the Ministry of Defense fails again. The information services work as usual—bury their heads in the sand and don’t react to anything.”
The military correspondent Filatov gives a detailed analysis of the failure of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Russian General Staff. I’ll quote a fairly long passage—sorry for the two minutes—but I think it’s important to understand what’s going on in the enemy camp. Here’s what military correspondent Filatov writes: “If we’re talking about the information support of that glorious ministry, remember the articles ‘Russia surpasses the AFU in drones’? All this triumphal laxative. You can look up the links and even serious analysis from Western media about Baikal. Bravo, bravo! But what do we have today? The largest special operation, aimed at one of the last trump cards of our army—the nuclear triad. If anyone doesn’t understand, let them live in illusions that the damage is minimal. Today we have what we have. For two and a half years now, the most effective weapon of the AFU has been drones. From the moment of outright denial of small aviation to the acceptance of the need for at least some UAVs, it took about a year. After that, they slowly began to buy and hand out UAVs to some select units. But in any case, the main supply of UAVs for the army came from volunteers. Finally realizing that drones are a promising direction, through private companies that could launch several drone creation projects, the ministry decided that it was also innovative and began to invest in small drones and kamikaze drones. But it all boiled down to the banal creation of a monopoly where only a few manufacturers were allowed, and all contracts went to them—no one else was needed. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians let a thousand flowers bloom.”
End of quote. So, let’s put it this way—it’s clear that these are ghouls, they really are bloodsuckers, but still, they are rational bloodsuckers who are actually trying to help their main bloodsucker. They’re trying to somehow open up, to correct the Russian idiocy. And the main point here from this military correspondent is that Ukraine’s huge advantage lies in its focus—drone production in Ukraine has been created on a networked basis. That same “web” that gave its name to this unique special operation is essentially the foundation of Ukraine’s drone production. It’s dispersed across a huge number of private enterprises, whereas in Russia it’s monopolized. And here is yet another proof of the network-based principle—this web principle of building both the operation and the military-industrial complex—versus the old centralized monopoly system of Gosplan.
Reaction of the Nightingale Droppings Link to heading
Well, I’m not going to say much about him today, you’ll understand that. I hope we’ll have a few episodes of Mediafrenia soon, but still, yesterday’s Nightingale Droppings. I’ll quote. So, yesterday, Solovyov said: “The attacks on Russia were carried out with the participation of Western intelligence services. Allegedly, the entire Ukrainian segment of the Internet is abuzz about this.” I don’t know what’s buzzing in Solovyov’s ear, but I tried to analyze the Ukrainian segment of the Internet, and there was nothing—no buzz about Western intelligence services participating in Operation Web. There was nothing like that anywhere except from Solovyov. In fact, it’s well known that the United States was not informed about this operation. This has been recognized by everyone—at least, there isn’t a single source claiming it was a joint operation between the Security Service of Ukraine and Western intelligence services. There’s nothing like that. But Solovyov’s decisive argument is that Deutsche Welle promptly reacted to the news on social media, so supposedly they were warned and waiting. Well, here we can congratulate Solovyov, as always, on lying, because I looked closely.
Reaction of Western Media Link to heading
Naturally, it was very important for me to understand how the Western media reacted and how they responded. How did the BBC react? How did Deutsche Welle respond? How did the Washington Post respond? I closely followed all of these sources, and I have to tell you that Deutsche Welle did respond. Well, as usual, they reacted after the information appeared in Ukrainian media, after a huge amount of video footage had surfaced. They reacted promptly, as professional journalists should. So, once again, congratulations to Solovyov for lying. Among the fairly typical reactions of these rabid ghouls was what Vitaly Tretyakov wrote on his social media. Ha! “I believe that, first, Russia should publicly renounce negotiations with the terrorist Kyiv regime.” How terrorism comes into this is unclear. There’s a war going on; Ukraine is striking—by the way, this term “terrorist attacks” shows the complete inadequacy of Russian media and Russian authorities, because strikes on military aircraft are absolutely legitimate targets in wartime. And, by the way, they themselves claim that there were practically no casualties. So it’s purely a surgical, surgically clean operation—military equipment destroyed. But that’s if we believe the Russian sources, of course. So, Tretyakov says: “I believe that, first, Russia should publicly renounce negotiations with the terrorist Kyiv regime. Second, it should move on to the second decisive stage of the special anti-Nazi military operation.” Well, obviously, these are just Tretyakov’s fantasies.
Audience Poll on Possible Russian Response Link to heading
By the way, today I’m going to conduct a poll. After we finish the main part of our stream, I’ll put up for a vote the question of how the Russian occupiers will actually respond to Operation Web. I’m genuinely curious to hear your opinion. This poll will be published at the moment—at the moment after we finish the main part of our stream and move on to the big, long part of answering questions, which will be very long today. I’m giving you a heads-up—I hope you’re listening, because there are a lot of very interesting questions.
Zelensky’s Evening Address Link to heading
So. In his evening address to the people, Ukrainian President Zelensky provided a detailed account of this special operation. According to him, it was in preparation for a year and a half. Again, confirming that Zelensky stated that the operation’s headquarters was located on Russian territory, right next to an FSB office in one of the regions. The total number of drones, according to Zelensky, was 117. Zelensky also assessed that 34% of the strategic cruise missile carriers at the airbases were hit. Truly, the scale is astonishing. That’s three time zones—from Murmansk to Murmansk, Ivanovo, Irkutsk Oblast, and so on. So, really, the main and probably the most powerful blow seems to have been dealt to the Olenya military airfield in Murmansk Oblast, where a very large number of strategic bombers had been gathered in advance—presumably in preparation for a major attack on Ukrainian cities. Well, the result there is indeed very serious damage.
So, what else? President Zelensky adds that this is an absolutely brilliant result. These Ukrainian actions will definitely be in the history books. The Ukrainian operatives who planned the operation were safely withdrawn from Russian territory in time. This is truly, truly some sort of absolutely new development. I don’t know how repeatable it is, but it’s clear now, as they say, that all the bad generals prepare for the previous war. It’s clear that there will likely be some kind of counteraction against this kind of operation. But, as they say, I think the Ukrainian military and political leadership will come up with another step. So, we’ll see.
Reaction of Russian Woolly Liberals Link to heading
I also wanted to talk separately about the very specific reaction of a certain category of Russian public figures—the so-called “woolly liberals.” This is a whole separate topic for research in itself. But every time—well, I don’t know if the word “astonish” is appropriate here, because, in principle, everything has long been clear about these people—but still, it does require additional analysis of why this is happening to them. These are the woolly liberals—again, I’m not insisting on the term, but the point is that these are people who essentially declare themselves to be supporters of liberal views, opponents of the Putin regime, opponents of the war. But there’s always something else that breaks through—constantly breaking through is the fact that these people have not decided whose side they’re on in this war. Or rather, they have—they’re on Russia’s side. They categorically do not want Ukraine to win; they don’t believe in it and don’t want it. It’s unclear what’s primary and what’s secondary—whether they don’t believe because they don’t want it or they don’t want it because they don’t believe. Usually, these are people who hold imperialist views. These two fantastically successful operations—well, there was also the rail war operation, which has now faded into the background, because compared to the Web, of course, its significance is negligible. But the Web operation has essentially become litmus paper that allows us to identify all the people who belong to this numerous group of woolly liberals. These are people who, as a rule, have been branded as foreign agents, but they don’t want Russia to lose. At least, maybe they don’t say it outright, but everything in their texts says exactly that. Moreover, the reason is clear—in their attitude toward Russia, they feel a deep imperial feeling, while Ukraine, in those same depths of the imperial soul, they genuinely despise. They never write about it directly, of course, but constant belittling remarks towards Ukraine, towards the possibility of its victory and successful resistance, reveal them.
So, let’s be specific. Yulia Latynina. Quote: “Today is for some reason Russia’s Pearl Harbor.” Well, it’s clear what she means. Zelensky has just opened a new stage of the war, a fundamentally different one. A massive operation against a variety of Russian targets, from strategic bombers—which are obviously legitimate targets—to a civilian train. And in terms of the rules of war, that’s terrorism. On the eve of negotiations in Istanbul, this is exactly what Alexey Arestovich warned about: that Zelensky would go to any lengths to disrupt any negotiations. But as we see, no negotiations have been disrupted. Today, negotiations between the Russian delegation in Istanbul and the Ukrainian delegation are apparently beginning—Ukraine doesn’t seem to have refused. So, Yulia Leonidovna, once again, congratulations on lying.
Then there’s the point itself—what does Pearl Harbor have to do with it at all? That was Japan attacking the Soviet Union—no, sorry, the United States of America. So Japan was the aggressor. Which means that Yulia Leonidovna, along with Putin and Solovyov and company, believes that Ukraine is the aggressor in this war. What does Pearl Harbor have to do with it? It’s better to compare it to Tsushima, really—historical analogies should be chosen more carefully.
Then Yulia Latynina writes, quote: “Europe may very well be afraid that it is raising in Ukraine something like Hamas—a player that’s not very strong but desperate and without rules. And, of course, every missile that Putin launches at Ukraine will be used by Ukrainian propaganda in the style of Hamas’s Ministry of Health—claiming that once again, women and children are being bombed.” But in the context of what has happened—this so-called Pearl Harbor—that’s already just detail. End of quote.
Just so you understand, from Yulia Latynina’s point of view, Ukraine is the aggressor, it’s a terrorist like Hamas. So the dots are dotted. In fact, I really don’t understand why Latynina isn’t invited to Solovyov or to Kabaeva. At the very least, to Norkin. She would really fit right in on those programs. There seems to be a certain backwardness in the management of Russian television channels—such a resource is going to waste. She’s such an outspoken propagandist, with a biography to match. So they really don’t know how to use traitors on Russian television. They get a failing grade in that respect.
Here’s another version from a prominent liberal, more, I’d say, inspired—this is Vladimir Pastukhov, a guru of the Russian liberal crowd. I’ll quote first and then explain why I think this way. So, a strategic quote from Pastukhov: “Strategically—or even militarily—the SBU special operation to destroy Russian long-range bombers, in my opinion, has no significance for Ukraine. The current war is being fought with minimal involvement of Russian strategic aviation, and for the purposes for which it is still involved, there are more than enough remaining aircraft.” End of quote.
What’s striking here is that Vladimir Pastukhov usually—like all of us, actually—prefaces his comments by saying that he’s not a military expert and doesn’t understand military strategy or tactics. And normally, in this situation, like any normal person, he would refer to experts. Here, for some reason, he’s expressing his own expert opinion—one that contradicts absolutely any military expertise I’ve seen. I’ve tried to analyze a sufficient number of military experts, but I haven’t seen anyone—either from the Russian patriotic experts or from the pro-Ukrainian side—who holds this view. So you see, the destruction of a third of the bombers that have been bombing Ukrainian cities this whole time supposedly has no significance? Well, what does have significance, then?
The reason is very simple—Pastukhov’s woolly liberal soul just can’t accept a Ukrainian success of this magnitude. It would destroy all his constructs, all his texts that he’s been writing all this time about how Ukraine is basically losing, about how Russia is an empire—and that this empire is good. This is a real, deep problem for all these Russian regime liberals.
Another text with a similar tone is by Fyodor Krasheninnikov, who wrote the following, quote: “I don’t feel sorry for Putin’s aircraft. But the main thing here is to make sure we don’t have a repeat of the Moskva cruiser story—so much joy, memes, and hopes! But alas, the cruiser was indeed sunk. But three years of war have since passed.” You see the problem here? The grand success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces—specifically that with naval drones they essentially destroyed the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Partially destroyed, partially driven deep into the ports on the eastern shore of the Black Sea—essentially, the Russian Black Sea Fleet no longer poses the threat it once did. This was a serious resource—especially considering that Ukraine had no real navy of its own, just some tugs, some of which were sunk, some of which played no military role. But the Russian Black Sea Fleet was a serious combat unit that threatened Ukrainian cities—remember how it all started. The Black Sea Fleet posed a real threat. First, from the Black Sea Fleet’s ships, missile strikes were carried out. Second, it was an important part of Russia’s military potential. Now that threat is gone.
And so Krasheninnikov says: “Well, you know, they sank the Moskva cruiser, and so what? Nothing.” But the fact that this threat is gone—and not just the Moskva cruiser but other warships have also been destroyed—means they no longer pose a threat. And it’s the same here—well, so what? The bombers have been destroyed; they no longer fly and no longer launch cruise missiles from their decks. That’s the result. Well, you know, what’s the use of destroying the Wehrmacht’s military machine? So what? The war went on, but in the end, the Third Reich capitulated. Of course, the distance from today’s Operation Web to Ukraine’s victory is still considerable and not a straight line. But still, you see, this constant belittling of Ukraine, of Ukraine’s achievements—that’s what these Russian woolly liberals are about. They always want to say the glass is half empty or even completely empty. That’s the politics of constant belittlement of Ukraine and its successes.
Now, let’s say a few words about the consequences. In my view, that’s significant. By the way, there’s now a poll running on our channel’s website, and I suggest we start the voting at the end of our very, unfortunately—or maybe fortunately—long stream, because there’s a reason to sum up the results.
A Few Words About the Consequences Link to heading
So, a few very preliminary words, of course, about the consequences. As for the military consequences, I think I won’t go into too much detail. I think we’ll try to summarize these preliminary military consequences at 8:00 p.m. with Sergei Borisovich Grabsky. I think that’s the right approach. Well, it’s more or less obvious that the main question here is the question of the assessment. In fact, the key question is how many aircraft were actually destroyed—whether the Ukrainian military and political leadership’s figure of 34% of the strategic military aviation is closer to the truth, or whether it’s the Russian sources, which claim that if it’s 10 aircraft, that’s certainly a very serious achievement but not a collapse, not a catastrophe. It needs to be clarified. That will determine the analysis of the military consequences.
As for the economic consequences, here we can already speak about some preliminary assessments. I’m not talking about the direct damage yet—again, if the Ukrainian version is $7 billion, the main thing here is something else. The main thing is that in order to prevent a repeat of such an operation, Russia will have to invest enormous resources. The scale of these costs is hard to estimate right now, but it’s clear that we’re talking about serious shelters, serious security measures for airfields—and these are gigantic sums of money. This is money that will be taken from the military-industrial complex. So it’s actually a serious economic blow. And besides that, we can talk about other economic consequences, since this special operation, Web, was mainly carried out using trucks. So now, some roads are already blocked. In reality, cargo transportation in Russia will become much more expensive and more problematic. These security measures will inevitably deal a serious blow to the Russian economy. To prevent the further use of such technology, very serious security measures will be required for cargo transportation, for highways. And not just highways—trains can be used, too, and other means of transportation. Given the, I would say, well, I would say the usual—let’s put it this way—primitive approach of the Russian special services, who in any situation believe it’s better to overdo it than not to finish it, I think there will be measures that will significantly harm the Russian economy. In addition to the direct costs of shelters, this will include the blocking of cargo transportation. So let’s see what it all turns into. But the economic consequences are definitely very bad for Russia.
Political consequences—you know, here, it seems to me, the foreign policy consequences are particularly important. They’re pretty obvious. All this rhetoric from the current U.S. authorities—somehow they’ve got it into their heads, and Trump constantly says it, that Ukraine has already lost the war. “If it weren’t for me, they would have taken Kyiv a long time ago.” Although it’s unclear how that could have happened, given that Trump has only been in office for a couple of months out of the three-plus years of this war. Still, his constant statements and his whole team’s attitude today is that Ukraine has already lost the war. So they’re pushing—really, they’re trying to secure for Ukraine softer surrender terms than Russia demands, and they consider that a win for themselves. And they’re outraged that Ukraine doesn’t appreciate these efforts and instead says it has no intention of surrendering. In fact, these constant statements from Trump that Zelensky and Ukraine have no cards are simply refuted by this special operation, Web. Because these statements—“sign any terms, recognize Crimea as Russian, give up four regions that Russia couldn’t conquer, because everything’s bad for you, you have no cards”—well, what happened yesterday was Ukraine revealing its cards. So, Trump says Zelensky has no cards. But here you go—look at the photos of burned Russian strategic bombers and the destruction of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Here are the cards—Ukraine’s cards. Today, at the meeting with Russia, the Ukrainian delegation has revealed its cards. And I think they’re all trump cards. So I think that’s a very, very, very important political aspect.
As for the domestic political consequences for Ukraine, they’re mainly moral. I think there was a question about this—later we’ll talk about it. This is the experience of Dr. Richter—a cruel, sadistic experiment on rats that showed that faith in the future, in a favorable outcome, helps them survive. Well, obviously people are not rats—especially Ukrainians, certainly not rats. But it’s a sort of biological-psychological experiment. It shows that optimism is really important. And this optimism, sparked by yesterday’s Operation Web, seems to me to be no less important for Ukraine’s resistance than even the fact of destroying a significant part of Russia’s strategic aviation.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Well, that’s basically what I wanted to say today before we start answering your questions. Let me remind you once again that there is currently a poll running on our channel. And another reminder: at 8:00 p.m., we’ll have a conversation with Sergei Borisovich Grabsky, and I think it’s worth listening to. Now, I’ll move on to answering your questions.
On the Difference Between a Philosopher and a Theologian Link to heading
Well, these are some philosophical, worldview questions from my namesake, Igor.
Igor, recently Ukrainian philosopher and translator Aleksei Panich wrote the following: “What is the use of a philosopher for society? A philosopher is a specialist in the system of worldviews. In this, he is related to a theologian. But a theologian builds a worldview based on worldview axioms that are already known to him, which are the foundation of his professed faith. A philosopher, however, always chooses worldview axioms at his own risk and responsibility. Therefore, philosophy reacts more flexibly than theology to the spontaneous changes in worldview positions that occur with the evolution of society. But in this flexibility, there is always a risk of losing the shore and getting into a deep worldview unpleasantness. Could you please comment on this position?”
Dear namesake, to be honest, I don’t really understand what “worldview unpleasantness” is. Somehow I just don’t have a clear sense of what that is. But I would look at this difference between philosopher and theologian a bit differently. The philosopher is engaged in the search for truth, you see—when a philosopher begins his reflections, he is trying to discover the truth, while a theologian already knows it. For the theologian, there is no process of discovery. That’s the problem with theology—there is an established truth, it’s already fixed in these texts, in certain sacred texts. I can immediately say that there are philosophers—though I doubt they can really be called philosophers, more like philosophy scholars—who also have a known truth that they already know and are simply sharing it with their audience or readers. But that’s more of a philosophy scholar, a dogmatist, let’s say. Among philosophers, there are also those who don’t try to use the philosophical method to discover truth, because they believe it’s already given in some texts. These are dogmatists, yes—they’re very much like theologians. But the difference is this: for theologians, there are texts in which the truth has already been captured, often long ago. For philosophers, truth is a process—an open-ended process, and philosophizing is precisely the process of grasping truth that is unknown at the start of the process. That’s the fundamental difference.
Will Proof of a Higher Intelligence Emerge in the Future? Link to heading
ELENA: Yes, here are a few more questions, also of a rather theological nature, I’d say. Elena from Kyiv: Here’s her question about faith in science. “Igor, before you close the topic of cosmic intelligence, let me ask a related question: why don’t you believe in our science, in its future capabilities? Yes, today scientists are powerless to understand the cosmos, which, in their opinion, consists of 95% dark matter and dark energy—the composition and nature of which are currently unknown. But maybe in 100–200 years there will be such research tools, such evidence of a higher intelligence, that today’s wonders like the internet, artificial intelligence, and so on will seem like children’s toys. Perhaps humanity in its current state just isn’t ready for these kinds of discoveries.”
Dear Elena! I actually have another question along these same lines, but let me answer yours first. Here’s the thing about knowledge—it’s like a sphere that follows this pattern: the larger the volume of knowledge, the greater the interface with the unknown. So the larger the radius and volume of the sphere, the greater the contact with what we don’t know. A person who knows nothing has no questions—he has no unknowns, because he has no knowledge. But the larger the volume of knowledge, the more questions arise. That’s the pattern.
As for your hypothesis that humanity will discover what cosmic intelligence is, I’ll first let Shura the Curious—who’s already asked more than once about cosmic intelligence—speak, and then I’ll respond to everyone at once.
So, Shura the Curious asks: “Igor Aleksandrovich. Did the human mind adjust all the physical constants? Or maybe, on the contrary, the mind itself arose thanks to adjustments made by someone else? And then you cite the opinions of certain people, which are unlikely to matter for objective reality. Strange statement. I don’t know. Whose opinions matter—yours? Mine? There is the fact of the universe, of us—you, me—there is the fact of someone’s jeweler-like tuning of physical values. A simple example: there was a time when we had no idea about electromagnetic waves. By your logic, that would mean they didn’t exist, but they do.”
How? Where? Where do people come up with claims that I never made? Incredible!
“The human mind is simply too weak to comprehend the greatness of harmony that cannot possibly arise from chaos, because entropy only breeds greater chaos.”
Amazing phrase.
“Again, entropy of chaos breeds even more chaos. You yourself confirmed it. But there’s a line you don’t want or are afraid to cross—because it’s more convenient for you.”
I’m struck by the aggressiveness of some supporters of a higher cosmic intelligence. I don’t know if it’s their higher cosmic intelligence pushing them to be so aggressive. “It’s more convenient for me,” I don’t know—about electromagnetic waves and so on. Let me put it this way. I’ll wrap up the discussion about the existence of cosmic intelligence in this way: you all have this faith in this higher cosmic intelligence. It’s like an answer to all questions. Why does this or that happen? Because the higher cosmic intelligence wanted it that way. Or that’s how the higher cosmic intelligence arranged things. But that’s just… well, what is this higher cosmic intelligence? What are your questions about it, what is its nature? You’re not asking these questions. For you, this higher cosmic intelligence is like some kind of boss who’s always right. You know, like in the Soviet Union there was the simple rule of the charter: the boss is always right. And if he’s wrong, refer to point one. It’s the answer to everything—“the higher cosmic intelligence arranged it this way”—and then you don’t have to explain anything else. How is this higher cosmic intelligence arranged? Oh, we’re not supposed to know that either. Again, that’s a kind of militant atheism that was typical of the Soviet mentality, and also a religious worldview that involves either God or a higher cosmic intelligence as a stand-in for God. In fact, they merge, because in both cases we’re not supposed to know. The higher cosmic intelligence is in charge—it answers for everything, it takes responsibility for everything. That’s how it’s arranged. It’s just like in the Soviet Union—the party knows everything, the boss knows best, we’re not supposed to know. That’s it. I think that’s not a productive position. You’re essentially shutting down the processes of inquiry by explaining everything away as the higher cosmic intelligence’s plan. To me, that’s not very productive. For all questions—“why is the world this way?”—you answer, “the higher cosmic intelligence arranged it that way.” That’s it, no need to explain further. And how is this higher cosmic intelligence arranged? “Oh, we’re not supposed to know that.” That’s the same mindset—whether it’s militant atheism or religious dogma—it’s all about closing off questions.
So that’s where I’ll end the discussion about the existence of a higher cosmic intelligence, about the existence of God. My own position is firm and consistent: I’m not familiar with these entities, and I’m not going to discuss things I’m not familiar with. I see no way to provide evidence for the existence of a higher cosmic intelligence. Therefore, I don’t consider it appropriate to talk about it. Thank you all for this discussion. Now let’s move on to more relevant questions.
Kurt Richter’s Experiment and the Importance of Hope Link to heading
So, here’s a question from Helen Tama. Again, if you want me to address you by name, please sign your messages—if not, no problem, I’ll use the name YouTube displays. Here’s an important question. I’ll quote it:
“In the 1950s, Dr. Kurt Richter conducted a famous—albeit cruel—experiment with drowning rats, which demonstrated the power of hope. If you’re familiar with it, I’d be interested to hear your thoughts.”
Yes, this is a famous experiment, and it’s important not only because it does indeed illustrate what we might call psychology, but also because it can to some extent be extrapolated to people. Let me briefly describe the experiment, since it really is important and I’ll take about half a minute to do it.
Actually, the inspiration for this experiment for Dr. Richter was what’s called voodoo death. This is a phenomenon that Walter Bradford Cannon described in detail—he’s the author of the famous psychological term “fight or flight.” He described how, in tribal societies, people could die simply from the thought of danger. For example, Cannon describes a situation in Africa where a young man who accidentally ate an untouchable and sacred wild chicken died within 24 hours—from the fear of his transgression. There are many similar cases described by this psychologist, essentially showing how people can die from stress—suggestion, constant adrenaline, falling blood pressure, and so on.
Now, about the experiment. It involved wild rats. What was discovered was that wild rodents gave up almost immediately. The experiment involved simply putting them into a bucket of water and observing how long it took them to drown. A cruel experiment—disgusting even to describe, but important. So, wild rats would die right away, immediately after being put in the water. Domesticated rats, however—most of them would last much longer. Then Dr. Richter did another experiment: as soon as a rat began to give up and sink, he would pull it out, let it rest, and then put it back in the water. After some time, again into the bucket. The rat began to understand that the situation wasn’t completely hopeless. It realized that there was a possibility of rescue—that not everything was doomed.
So, in one situation, the rat would assess—in its rat mind, being intelligent enough—that in a bucket of water, there was no escape, and so it would start to drown. But in another situation—especially the domesticated rats—they would understand that a person might come to their aid. That’s the first point: they trust humans and understand that a human might help. A wild rat sees no hope for rescue because humans are the enemy—they’re just drowning it. A domesticated rat hopes for a human’s help, so it holds on longer. Even a wild rat that was pulled out of the water and then put back in would understand that there was a chance of rescue. Things were not so hopeless. And rats given hope would stay afloat for more than 60 hours in what seemed like a hopeless situation—after removing the factor of hopelessness.
So an animal in a bucket of water, with no way out—if it comes to understand that there’s a way out, it doesn’t give up. Hope gives us the strength to fight and cope with difficult situations, with stress, and so on. That’s why I’m often criticized—especially, for example, Andrey Andreevich Piontkovsky is often criticized—for being a supporter of “combat politology,” always trying to see the optimistic side and focus on positive experiences. But this is actually a very important part of political analysis, because, you know, in physics it’s very important to consider the observer—the observer affects the experiment. And so do we. We also have an impact. The very fact of political analysis exerts an influence. We’re not observing from the cosmos; we’re inside the situation. So of course we need to look for positives, to focus on positive experiences, to always say that the glass is half full. That doesn’t mean engaging in mindless optimism—no, in our community, between the extremes of head-in-the-sand optimism and despair, there must be a healthy middle ground.
So here on our channel, we’re proponents of the position: the glass is half full, and that’s very important. No need to lie that it’s completely full—but it’s half full, half empty. And that kind of despair, that accentuated, I’d say, rabid skepticism—woolly skepticism—is destructive. It’s basically the path to defeat.
Why Are Some Believers So Aggressive? Link to heading
Olya from Sumy asks: “Igor, I admire your patience. You’re always fending off these attempts to impose belief in a higher intelligence—just from your streams alone, it’s clear there’s a difference between atheists and believers. I’ve never heard of an atheist attacking a believer, trying to prove there’s no God. But with believers, it’s the opposite—and sometimes they even kill atheists. Can’t people just believe quietly?”
Dear Olya, I think, first of all, not all believers are aggressive. I know believers who calmly accept that their interlocutor doesn’t believe. There are also militant atheists out there. So, yes, there really is a difference. But, you see, belonging to a particular faith or confession does impose some limitations on the mind—it certainly affects things. Still, dear Olya, I don’t agree with your harsh assessment of believers. No, I don’t agree. It’s just not very representative. I don’t know what percentage of our audience is believers, atheists, or agnostics—that’s something I don’t know. Frankly, I’m not very eager to find out—although maybe it would be worth doing a poll. Maybe it would be worth it, by the way.
But you see, in the comments, it’s those attacks on me—where people try to literally force me to say, “How can you, fool, not believe? Look at this cosmic intelligence, look how everything is so reasonably arranged!”—not realizing that it’s we, with our own minds, trying to impose order and form on it all. In fact, it’s our minds that impose that order and form. That’s the problem. But again, these demands—“admit immediately that you’re blind, you don’t understand there’s a cosmic intelligence, how can you not see it?”—that kind of aggressiveness is typical of just a few people. In fact, among more than 300,000 subscribers, there are only a few who participate in that aggression—while there are many more believers. And I’m sure there are many more people who think there is some kind of supernatural intelligence. So I wouldn’t generalize here.
On the Terms “Win” and “Lose” in Relation to War Link to heading
Viktor from Hamburg writes: “Well, I have practically no disagreements with your worldview, except maybe in matters of faith. I still consider myself an atheist. My question is this: how do you feel about the use of the words ‘win’ and ‘lose’ by many people in relation to war—specifically, the war in Ukraine? Personally, it sounds off to me. Or is it just a feature of the Russian language? Should we not pay attention to it? After all, war isn’t a game.”
Dear Viktor! I personally use other terms—different words. I think that here it’s more appropriate to say “to achieve victory” or “to suffer defeat.” Well, but I don’t attach any particular significance to these words. “Win” and “lose,” yes, not the most fortunate words. But still, in the end, I don’t think it should be seen as turning war into a game. No, they’re just not the best words—agreed. Overall, I agree.
On Marx’s Concept of Alienation Link to heading
Sokol Pushkin writes: “Marx distinguished four specific manifestations of alienation in capitalist society. It reminded me of a line from a famous movie: ‘Kosoy Igor has a keen eye. Only trouble is, he’s always looking the wrong way.’ Apart from the fourth—alienation of the worker from others—everything else, as you rightly noted, is not unique to capitalism. Could you briefly comment on each of these postulates?”
Dear colleague, I didn’t fully understand the task you’ve set for me—do you want me to recall, as it were, my yellowed lecture notes from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 or from Capital? Here’s what I’ll do. Indeed, Marx’s theory of alienation is one of those working theories—one of those tools that make sense to use. These four key manifestations of alienation are indeed important. But what’s very telling is that, in fact, the concept of alienation reached its fullest expression in the implementation of Marx’s own ideas—when they tried to build a communist society based on his theory. There, alienation manifested itself 100%.
Specifically, the first form is alienation from labor. Workers do not see labor as their own; they see labor as a means, not as a joy of self-expression. Something like that—it’s not a literal quote, of course. And under socialism, this was fully expressed, 100%.
Second is alienation from the product of labor. The worker doesn’t own what he produces—the product of labor is foreign. And this is hardly new in socialism, where what do we actually own? When everyone steals everything—this is precisely a demonstration that everything is foreign. That’s a perfect illustration of alienation under socialism.
The third is alienation from one’s “species being”—alienation from the very essence of what it means to be human. The worker does not feel or identify with his labor. Take socialist production, for instance, with its countless pointless research institutes and design bureaus—like in the film Office Romance, it’s wonderfully depicted there. Classic Marx—but under socialism! So, ironically, what Marx wanted to fix became the ultimate expression of alienation in the very society he inspired.
And finally, alienation from others. Marx argued that capitalism divides people, turning them into enemies or competitors. But socialist society realized this fully in the slogan “Don’t trust, don’t fear, don’t ask.” To me, that’s the extreme form of alienation.
So you could say that socialism, as the implementation of Marx’s ideas, turned out to be the final and complete degree of alienation. That’s how it goes. In Marx’s view, alienation is a result of private ownership of the means of production, but in practice, the most extreme forms of alienation were reached under socialism—at least under the form of socialism that was implemented based on Marx’s ideas.
So I don’t know exactly what you wanted from me, dear colleague, but this is everything I can say right now. If you want something more serious and in-depth, please rephrase your question, because sometimes I’m just at a loss for what exactly you’re asking. I’ve tried to answer as best I understand. In general, Marx’s theory of alienation is a very useful thing—but it’s not purely Marx’s. Hegel also worked through alienation very well, in his own way, of course. In any case, in my personal “toolbox,” these ideas have a spot on the shelf. They’re useful tools.
Is happiness possible in fascism Link to heading
From a Telegram chat in the channel “Vopros” (Question). So, there was a discussion about happiness in the Telegram channel. A question arose. Igor Alexandrovich, are you happy? Can you call yourself a happy person? And this is not only idle curiosity, but in the context of discussing the fascist thesis about the dispensability of happiness. Here, Yudin analyzes fascist regimes and one of the fascist theses about the dispensability of happiness. Well, regarding my own happiness, we’ll come back to that in a moment. But first, about Yudin. Indeed, Yudin is a very interesting sociologist. He had a very controversial thesis regarding happiness. What does it look like? That fascism forms a worldview — this is practically a quote from Grigory Yudin — a worldview in which strength and violence dominate, in which the idea of progress is denied, and only life as a constant war is recognized, where one must draw upon one’s strength, as a constant struggle for survival, where only brute force decides everything. This leads to the destruction of any normative horizon. And therefore, say, the ideologue — probably the main ideologue of fascism — Giovanni Gentile, in his famous text on the doctrine of fascism, which was later rewritten, by the way, by Mussolini — Mussolini, by the way, had his own texts as well. So here, I think, Yudin is not entirely right. But okay, that’s a minor point. But there, quite directly, it says that there is no such thing as happiness. And in general, the drive for happiness is kind of a “green” element in a person. In 2021, Vladimir Putin says directly the exact same thing, completely unprovoked. He says that there is no happiness in the world, no happiness in life at all. He says this suddenly, and Putin means exactly the same thing, that the world is actually a constant struggle, a war, in which violence prevails.
In fact, here, as it seems to me — by the way, I was helped to sort this out in the text. Thanks. Thanks to our… our, well, assistants here. I was simply shown a link that Putin spoke of the impossibility of happiness, meaning his relationship with Biden, when after negotiations with Biden in Geneva he was assessing the prospects of Russia’s relations with the United States. And he then quoted Tolstoy’s words: “In life there is no happiness, there are only flashes of it — cherish them.” So I think that Yudin’s reference to Putin’s words about the impossibility of happiness is somewhat far-fetched. I think that if we consider happiness as a degree of satisfaction with life, then I think that many, many supporters of fascist ideology at the moment — at the moment of the triumph of fascism, so to speak — were in quite a happy state. So, in general, I don’t adhere to this simplified point of view that fascists cannot be, but can quite be happy. Bandits can be happy as long as they are not caught or killed. Fascists can be happy when they satisfy their need for aggression. They experience… You see, I’m not a supporter of this perception of the world that if a person is a villain, then he is necessarily unhappy. But this… this is what I would call an overload of meaning. Overloaded with meanings, they can well be happy. Why not? We see monsters who are happy, we see scoundrels who are happy. We see fascists who are quite happy, right? Therefore, I am against this simplification. So, about myself — well. It’s a rather complex question. There are, you see, truly happy people… Truly absolute happiness is typical of people with very serious psychological deviations. That is, infinitely happy are the fools. Well, because they have an inadequate perception. They, most likely, are happy. And I cannot call myself an absolutely happy person. Sometimes there are moments — yes, indeed, I agree here with Tolstoy that in life there are flashes of happiness. Yes, I agree with him on that. Flashes of happiness. Well, thank you for that. I do have such flashes of happiness.
Important principles for personal development Link to heading
ANDREY Okay, my name is Andrey, your regular listener. Please tell me, what five life principles should be instilled in a child so that they grow up to be a successful and decent person?
Well? Why necessarily five? I would like to understand this about the numbers. It’s genuinely interesting to me, dear Andrey, why exactly five? Well, okay, five, five it is. A stadium is like a stadium. So, respect for others. For me, respect for people is very important. And I think that’s what I — well, in general, the phrase “instill in children,” I don’t know. We live together with our children. I don’t see myself as their boss. With my children and grandchildren, I generally try… We live and shape our children and grandchildren by example. Respect. Respect for people. That’s the first thing. The second is the understanding that people are equal. There’s no arrogance, no snobbery, no boorishness, no treating others as inherently worse, and so on. People are equal until they prove otherwise. Third, empathy — a very important thing. Honesty, of course, is also important. And last in order — if we’re sticking to five — but not last in importance, is critical thinking. These five qualities, at a minimum, taken together, allow you to be — if taken together, they will likely allow you to be a decent person, for sure. How successful? Well, that’s another matter. Success requires other qualities. These need to be developed. Abilities — these are not so much qualities as abilities. I think that critical thinking, among other things, will also help with success.
Little sect of Yakovenko and what to do Link to heading
Drone Vito Corleone, answering the question. You always have a little sect here, everyone worships you. Is that so? I’m your fan — what should change in Russia, or in people’s minds, so that at least things are normal? At least understandable propaganda, the horror is terrible. So, what to do? The question is what to do?
Well, I don’t really know where you got this “sect” from. As for whether someone worships me — I have to tell you that if you take the ratio of critical remarks to what I say and do, and some praise — well, it’s probably fifty-fifty, considering that these are people who have come, who are part of our audience. So, generally speaking, I don’t think there are really any sectarians here. There are people with critical thinking. If I’m often in the minority, for example, during votes. So I don’t know where you got that from. As for what to do — well, who should do it? Who has what resources? You see, that’s too broad a question. So let’s talk specifically about who has what resources. Some people can go and fight, some can write articles, some can financially support Ukraine. There are plenty of ways to apply one’s efforts. Some people will simply try to preserve themselves and survive in these conditions. That’s also a good pursuit.
Definition of “country” and “state” Link to heading
So, Anastasia, please give me the definition of “country” and “state.” What’s the difference between them?
Well, the difference is simple. A country is a territory. A state is the political system that governs that territory. A country is a historical and geographical concept that denotes a territory with certain state borders. A state is a political and legal concept that defines how public authority is organized in that territory. Well, I think this is a fairly clear distinction, at least in the American sense.
Forecast for the next US election Link to heading
Pavel Igor Alexandrovich, what’s your forecast? November 2028. A 61-year-old son versus a 45-year-old Vance.
I don’t know. This is… one of those cases where… Well, I definitely don’t. I’m sorry, Pavel, but unfortunately… You know how some of my colleagues like to say about that — “it’s above my pay grade.” Especially since I haven’t received a salary in who knows how many years. Seriously though, this is exactly it. The planning horizon is so short and narrow right now that I’m definitely not ready to make predictions.
Will Putin continue the war after Trump Link to heading
So, a question from Vladimir Please evaluate my forecast: in the absence of any unforeseen events, Putin will continue the war until the end of Trump’s term in order to extract the maximum gain from the war without fearing a dangerous reaction from the United States. By the end of Trump’s administration, Putin will move towards a peace agreement with Ukraine, trying to secure the maximum advantage. But he’s unlikely to risk carrying the war over into Trump’s term, especially if there’s a chance of an inconvenient candidate coming to power in the US.
Dear Vladimir! You know, I think that of course, Putin has been very lucky with Trump. But I don’t think the end of the war will be rigidly tied to Trump’s term. We? We don’t know how. Again, the narrowness of the horizon and the shortened planning and forecasting horizon make it necessary to avoid looking, for example, beyond 2027. I think the war will continue this year and next year, and quite likely. And then the probability of forecasts starts to decrease, because I can say with sufficient confidence that in 2025 the war will continue. Whether there will be some short pauses or not — I don’t know. But that the war will continue, I am almost sure. Most likely in 2026 too. Beyond that, uncertainty grows so much and the interference of various factors becomes so significant that a responsible forecast, in my opinion, is impossible.
As for what you’re saying further — I don’t know, I’m not sure that it’s so rigidly tied to Trump. Yes, of course, for now, Putin feels more comfortable with Trump, at least for now. But that Putin will rigidly tie himself to whoever is in power in the US — no. I think that Putin has much deeper reasons to continue the war. He will continue the war as long as he can.
As for the overall probability of your forecast — if I answer your question precisely, I don’t share your forecast, because your forecast very rigidly links the war for Putin to the leadership in the US, and that’s not the case. Putin started this war when the president was not Trump, let’s put it that way, yes? So to say that if it’s not Trump in power in the US, Putin will stop the war — no, I don’t agree with that. There’s no such linkage. Coincidence? Maybe, but there’s no cause-and-effect relationship like that.
On the superiority of the ancients over modern people based on ancient structures Link to heading
The sound of rain. What do you think about the ancient structures — Machu Picchu, the pyramids, and so on? How could humanity in ancient times reach such heights, heights we can’t even reach now, and then degrade to zero?
Dear colleague, I don’t share your position, your approach to history — that in ancient times there was a golden age, that there were some heights we can’t reach today, and that now we’ve degraded to zero. That’s not a view I hold. Well, there is. There’s concrete evidence that humanity has not degraded since ancient times, but rather has developed. And here, well, I could list some obvious points, but I don’t think there’s any need to do that. Progress exists. It does. Yes, there are some backward movements, incidental movements. All that exists. But in general, historically, if you take long enough periods, progress is obvious. In science, in technology, in life expectancy, in people’s health, in the level of freedom — which is important — and in knowledge in all respects. Progress is obvious. So the idea that we have “degraded to zero” is a very strong exaggeration.
About the ancient Egyptians Link to heading
Tatiana from the chat a couple of years ago, in response to the question from listeners, you said that the Egyptians were not smarter than us. The answer was very short, and unfortunately, nothing more remained in memory. But I remember the dissatisfaction with the answers. I love watching programs about Egypt and culture. People there believed that earthly life was just a transition to the eternal one. They lived it that way. Recently, in one of the programs, I heard exactly what I wanted to hear — many people do not want to admit that the Egyptians were smarter than us. They invent stories that the pyramids were built by a vanished civilization, by aliens, or by raising stones with their minds, communicating with the heavens. We still don’t know what the pyramids of Khufu were for. The program ends with a firm conclusion — they were smarter than us. You, Igor, do you not agree with the scientists, archaeologists, and other Egyptologists? One of the specialists suggested a hypothesis — the version of transporting the stone blocks on rails, for example. These are not just rails but warfare on rails and ingenuity. Oh, how over the last 500 years men have become smaller.
Specifically, men have become smaller. Note that this is already my comment. Comment in the course of the film The Bat. In your case, one could say: over the last thousand years, sociologists and social scientists have shrunk. Your statements are ridiculously reminiscent of the Gospel saying — actually, “I know Christ, and I know Paul. But who are you? Who are you?” I dare to assert what you know nothing about and cannot know — be inspired and humble yourself before the greatness, hard work, and intellect of others. Then you might have a chance to be at least as intelligent as an Egyptian slave.
Such is Tatiana’s rebuke. Well, dear Tatiana? Well, about us knowing nothing about the Egyptians — I don’t know. Probably the strange people who say that the pyramids were built by some vanished civilization, and so on, know nothing. And those who say that we don’t know what the pyramids of Khufu were for — well, the pyramids of Khufu are quite well understood. Let’s say, more or less clear, why the pharaohs built pyramids for themselves. The beliefs of the Egyptians are well known. Thank God, there are plenty of sources, so there’s no particular mystery here. How they were built is also quite well studied.
Now, as to who was smarter or dumber — when I said that the Egyptians were not smarter than us, I didn’t mean that I think they were dumber than us. It’s just that you, apparently, upon hearing the phrase, started to invent something. But I only said what I said. I don’t think the Egyptians were dumber or smarter than us. That’s the question. And regarding who’s smarter or dumber — I remember very well the answer of the outstanding Russian anthropologist Arutyunov. From my point of view, he’s the number one anthropologist in Russia. I was lucky enough to do a program with him for over two years. On Radio Svoboda — it was called something like “The Anthropological Map of Russia,” I think. It was about the peoples of Russia, about Russian peoples. Each broadcast was dedicated to one of the peoples of Russia. Thankfully, there are about 200 of them, so it lasted quite a while. Unfortunately, it was a very funny moment — the program was interrupted just when we were preparing a program about the Russian people. So I wanted to do it at the end, but the program was stopped. No ill intent, it just happened. Most interestingly, the program was ready. Unfortunately, it never aired. But that was, I would say, a huge… You’re asking me about happiness? Well, happiness in creativity, you see? Those moments of happiness were there when something came together. And interacting with the anthropologist Arutyunov brought me some moments of happiness because it was truly a feast for the mind. And I once asked him which peoples he considered the smartest. I thought he would say something about the Jews or maybe some European peoples. But he said the smartest are the Chukchi and the Eskimos. I asked why. He said, “What is intelligence? Can an academician be a fool?” Well, Arutyunov himself was a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He said, “Can an academician be a fool?” I said, “Of course. There are plenty of examples of that — professors who are fools, academics, and doctors of science — plenty of them. And can a janitor be smart? Yes, absolutely.” Knowledge alone doesn’t teach — as the ancients said. So why does he consider the Chukchi and the Eskimos the smartest? Because they manage their lives quite successfully, while also handling ours. Meaning, they can survive in our world, but we wouldn’t survive in theirs. Creating an igloo, crafting a pivoting hull for a kayak — a whole series of inventions from this northern civilization — it’s comparable to the invention of the wheel. Their ability to survive in the harsh conditions of the Far North, where each of us would die quite quickly, leads to the understanding that they are certainly not dumber than us. That’s why all these jokes about the Chukchi are just a result of hidden xenophobia and chauvinism. So I don’t consider myself smarter than an ancient Egyptian. They had a completely different mindset. And since I had to lead several specialized courses at the university, I had to study, among other things, the mindset of the ancient Egyptians. One of the reasons, for example, why science as we know it emerged not in Ancient Egypt but in Ancient Greece, even though practically all the discoveries of the ancient Greeks were taken from the experience of the Egyptians. The person considered the first real scientist in human history — Thales. The first person to publicly demonstrate the prediction of a solar eclipse. The first to prove a geometric theorem. He got all that from the Egyptians. So the Egyptians were undoubtedly pioneers in many mathematical, physical, and astronomical discoveries.
But they had two particular mentalities that, so to speak, make us not see them as “scientists.” First, they had no concept of authorship. So you can’t name… Well, we know Thales — a person who made several discoveries in physics, geometry, astronomy, etc. But we don’t know a single person in Egypt who made a comparable discovery. Not a single name. Why? Because they didn’t have the concept of authorship. They didn’t see themselves as making discoveries — they believed that through them, these discoveries were made by that cosmic mind that some of our discussion participants urge me to acknowledge. So the concept of authorship only arises in Ancient Greece. In the same way, the concept of “proof” only arises in Ancient Greece. The ancient Greeks, who borrowed mathematical or astronomical knowledge from the Egyptians, accompanied it with proof. And thus, science was born. So the fact that the Egyptians knew all this much earlier than the Greeks — that’s all true. But that knowledge had a sacred character — I would say, well, a “Greek knowledge.” Knowledge that had clear practical applications in agriculture, in the construction of those same pyramids, in shipbuilding. So, yes, it’s a different mindset. Completely different. Very different from ours.
Our mindset arose specifically in Ancient Greece. That’s a very important point — the concept of authorship: I, as a person, produce this or that discovery. Understand, we still don’t know the author — and we never will — of one of the greatest literary works of antiquity, The Tale of Sinuhe. The tale is a profound reflection on what the human inner world is. But no author. Why? Because the authors believed that it wasn’t them writing it. It was the deities speaking through them. That’s such a characteristic.
Are the Egyptians dumber than us? No, they’re not. Are they smarter than us? No, of course not. But undoubtedly — in one of the earlier questions, what I would like to see in my children and grandchildren is the absence of snobbery. I don’t consider myself smarter than other people. I think that’s very important — not to consider yourself inherently smarter. Of course, that doesn’t mean self-erasure. Not at all. But at least I definitely don’t have any snobbery. Anthropologist Arutyunov — certainly, he was an outstanding figure. I still regret that we didn’t continue that “Anthropological Map of Russia.”
Does the BBC use reliable sources when covering the situation in Gaza Link to heading
Igor, namesake, asks, how should one treat BBC publications in recent months about the war in Gaza? BBC journalists cite Hamas or structures associated with Hamas. Can one still take seriously these once-standard media?
You know, well, I’m not going to be an advocate for the BBC, but generally speaking, I haven’t really seen much of that, maybe just because… As for the situation in Gaza, I rely more on Israeli media, and to some extent on other sources. It’s just that I haven’t really come across those kinds of publications — anti-Israeli ones, let’s say, from the BBC. The fact that there’s a certain fascination with this sort of tolerance and some left-leaning tendencies — yes, that’s known. But to say that the BBC should be completely discredited as a source — no, I don’t agree with that. The BBC remains an important source for me. As for Gaza and Israel, well, there are other sources to use — which is exactly what I do.
How the author defines themselves Link to heading
Andreas Karlsson. Where do you see yourself on the scale of media engagement? An independent analyst, a critical expert, a publicist with a position, or a political activist?
Well, I’m definitely not a political activist — that’s for sure. That part of the scale you suggested, I categorically reject. Maybe that’s not great — of course, political activists are important — but I’m definitely not a political activist. As for everything else… You know, to some extent, it’s a bit of all three. I am truly an independent analyst because I don’t depend on anyone except my audience — on you financially, I mean. But at the same time, I’m not afraid to go against the majority opinion, including the majority of my own audience, and I often do that. So I’m definitely independent.
As for being a critical expert — well, probably, yes. Yes, critical analysis is my credo, so to speak. As for being a publicist with a position — yes, I have my own position, I don’t see… You know, I don’t see any contradiction between these three identities.
Why keep up with the news Link to heading
So. Mariupol. I’m reading the name of the question’s author. Could you clarify your opinion on one question? Many of my loved ones think I’m wasting my time constantly watching political news on YouTube. I, however, feel that this is really important, because we live in a historically significant time, and I’m simply curious to understand what’s happening. How, in your opinion, can I briefly and convincingly explain what this interest is? That it’s not a waste of time, but a conscious desire to understand reality.
Dear colleague, there’s a very simple thing. When people say, “Why do you watch all these news reports, why do you need that?” — information is a very important tool for survival and success. You see, if you want to navigate this world, rather than being a tool — if you want to be a subject, not just an object, where circumstances manage you rather than you trying to manage circumstances — then of course you need to be in the news stream.
You know, even animals have what’s called an “orienting reflex” — it helps them survive. That curiosity… When we see animals, a kitten’s curiosity, a puppy’s curiosity — they want to know everything, they think everything through, they examine everything. That allows them to survive. It’s what’s called the human orienting reflex — curiosity. You see? Information allows you to survive.
A classic case: 1986, Chernobyl. Information was restricted; they thought people didn’t need to know. As a result, people went out and suffered massive, severe radiation exposure. Information allows you to survive. Information allows you to navigate.
So of course, you need to be in the news stream. Otherwise, you’ll just be a victim — a victim of unexpected events that will happen to you, and you won’t be able to avoid them because you didn’t follow the news. That’s important. Another question is how to navigate this sea of information — but that, you’ll agree, is a different question altogether.
On moderating channels Link to heading
A question from Faust, Faust Havana. If you happen to be on Gram, please reflect on moderating chats in general, and in Telegram chats in particular. I’m asking because Gram decided to shut down a rather interesting Telegram chat, justifying it by saying that Telegram sent them a warning about rampant hate speech with the threat of deleting the chat. Follow-up questions, including whether in this case the entire Telegram channel of Gram might be deleted, received no answer. In the end, they made commenting paid, though at a minimal fee for two stars. Predictably, the chat in Telegram fell apart. While writing this, I realized the question isn’t about Gram — it’s to you. How do you think chats in Telegram should be properly moderated?
Well, you know, I’ve settled this question for myself — though it’s not a universal method. I just encountered the situation that when I was managing moderation myself, first of all… You know, separation of powers is very important. And although, what kind of “power” do we have here? We’re basically just sharing our opinions — but nevertheless, there are some elements of administration, some element of authority, yes? Well, let’s put very big quotation marks around the word “authority.”
So, look, I considered it necessary to establish this kind of separation of powers. At some point, as the author and owner of the Telegram channel, I found it impossible for myself to also be the administrator — to moderate the chat. Because if I, as the owner, also start moderating — in some cases enforcing order, banning people, and so on — it turns into an excessive concentration of administration.
So I held a vote, got the result I needed. I’ll say right away — it was a vote on whether people thought it was right for us to choose moderators from among the chat participants. I got overwhelming agreement. Then, based on three years of observing the chat, I picked two people who, with their consent, became the administrators and moderators of the chat. I couldn’t be happier! First of all, I removed from myself any accusations of abusing power — because, well, first of all, I’m very pleased that I chose the right candidates. These are two extremely intelligent, educated, and very practical people — very, very different from each other, but each in their own way highly respected participants in our community. They took on all that work. It’s wonderful. So, delegation of authority — I think that’s one of the most important keys to success.
As for principles — well, the principles are a kind of reasonable approach. On the one hand, you can’t turn the garden into a garbage dump. On the other hand, you have to be moderate — there should be pluralism. You have to tolerate other opinions — which I think is exactly what happens in our chat. Unlike the chat on YouTube, which often turns into a garbage dump. I’m still thinking about how to bring some order there. Lately, unfortunately, the comments on the YouTube channel itself are also turning into a garbage dump. At one time, I was constantly doing a wet cleaning. Lately, I’ve slacked off, and I think it’s time for me to tackle it again or maybe delegate that, though the volume there is of course much larger. But in general — that’s how it is.
About Larisa Brycheva Link to heading
Now, regarding the people suggested to be invited to the channel. Hendrik Hose asks, Are you familiar with the name Larisa Brycheva? People are talking about her now as a sort of cardinal — the Italian cardinal who brought Putin to power and to the current state.
Well, first of all, I think it’s a very strong exaggeration that she’s some sort of gray cardinal. Larisa Brycheva is the head of the legal department, an aide to the president. Well, it’s probably not worth elevating her to such a pedestal that she brought Putin to power. That’s clearly an overstatement. Well, yes, an aide — one of many. I don’t think she had any greater influence on Putin coming to power than other employees of the presidential administration. Take Voloshin, for example — that’s not even comparable, of course.
As for whether to invite her to our channel — I don’t understand why. You see, I personally don’t have much interest in this figure. I don’t know, maybe one should indeed talk to such people if it’s about some candid conversation — maybe with Kiriyenko, that could be interesting. But as for Brycheva, I don’t know — she seems to me just a cog in the mechanism of Putin’s administration.
About inviting Sevastyanov Link to heading
A question from Verbitskaya. Since you’re answering questions about guests for your broadcast, I’ll ask my question for the third time. I’d really like to see Sevastyanov as a guest. You had a meeting with him a few months ago. It was a very interesting broadcast.
Dear colleague, there have been quite a few questions about Sevastyanov being a “Trumpist.” I still haven’t found the time to watch his broadcasts, say, with Yevgeny Kiselyov. I know he had broadcasts where, from the point of view of my critics — people who demand that I “expose” Sevastyanov — there were supposedly some Trumpist statements. Well, I need to check that out first. Setting up a debate with Sevastyanov as a “Trumpist” is a separate story. You see, debates are a different format. Inviting an expert is another. So I need to figure out in what way we’d approach it. I haven’t had the chance yet to get to know these views of his specifically. I’ll figure it out. And then we’ll decide how and in what role to invite Sevastyanov. But again, if he wants to — that’s a separate question, too.
About Ivan Zatevakhin Link to heading
A question from Ilya Are you personally acquainted with Ivan Zatevakhin? We’re interested in your opinion about his numerous programs and projects related to animals.
I’m not personally acquainted. I was very well personally acquainted and maintained friendly relations with Vasily Peskov and Nikolai Drozdov. But Zatevakhin — Zatevakhin was familiar to me. My attitude is positive and interested. Zatevakhin is a bright, interesting publicist. His programs about animals have always interested me.
Pavel Selin Link to heading
Tatiana K. Igor Alexandrovich, good afternoon. Who is Pavel Selin? An acquaintance told me about this philosopher. I suspect he’s just another creep.
Dear colleague, if I’m not mistaken, I think in the previous Friday stream I talked in detail about who Pavel Selin is. And I agree — it’s not just your suspicion. He is, indeed, just another creep. Well, to put it simply, of course. But I don’t think getting to know this so-called “philosopher” will bring you much pleasure.
On the change in Osechkin’s position Link to heading
Valentina Volkova It’s not true that Osechkin supported the occupation of Crimea, that he was against the Maidan. He explained his stance on this. I believe him. Osechkin is doing a lot to restore human rights. His attitude toward the war is well known. Igor Alexandrovich, if you can, ask Vladimir these questions yourself. And let the couch dwellers lie on their sides.
I don’t mind them lying on their sides, dear Valentina, but Osechkin did indeed support the occupation of Crimea at the time. That’s true — it’s not disputed by anyone. He was indeed against the Maidan, and that’s not disputed either. But times change, and he is now against the war. He really is doing a lot to restore human rights. And he’s now against the war. Period. One thing does not contradict the other. You see, people change.
Once, almost everyone wore diapers — and now they don’t. People change, you see? So there’s no need to be indignant — that’s just how life works. And I won’t be asking Osechkin questions about his past views. Why? I don’t see the point. Just why? That’s a historical fact. Yes, at that time he was against the Maidan, at that time he supported the occupation of Crimea. So what? But now, as the saying goes — well, we don’t love him for that. Just kidding. But seriously, I don’t see any point in now turning a conversation with Osechkin into digging through his past views. There are much more interesting topics for discussion.
About the conversation with Sheitelman about animals Link to heading
A question from Sandro Petra in the chat. Question about the conversation with Mikhail Sheitelman about animals. I think that with Mikhail Sheitelman and animals, you’d have a very interesting stream. He was recently talking on one channel about his snails, how he fed crows while observing them. He spoke so warmly about our little brothers. I listened with bated breath. After that stream, there were lots of comments and letters.
Mikhail — I agree, I… I’m just not sure, you see. I’m not 100% sure that it’s appropriate here. I don’t know — maybe, maybe it’s situational. I’m not sure whether we should bring up these topics in our joint streams. Maybe, maybe it should be done. I don’t know. I haven’t formed an opinion on this yet.
On the splitting of empathy Link to heading
Yuri, a question. Recently, in one interview, Katya Margolis recounted how she was attacked by pro-Palestinian activists because she was holding a Ukrainian flag. They tore it out of her hands and tried to burn it. I wasn’t surprised by this story because I often see this mutual understanding between pro-Palestinian people and Putinists. Even those blue-haired American LGBT activists, who cry on YouTube about the mythical Palestinian genocide, are completely indifferent to the suffering of Ukrainians. They don’t mention the war in Ukraine at all, but they happily swallow any Palestinian fake news. Now, as far as I know, Mr. Arsen — or Arsen, I still don’t know where the stress is — supports both Ukraine and Palestine. This really puzzles me. In my view, pro-Palestinian LGBT people indifferent to Ukraine are more natural because it’s probably just cynicism or idiocy. But with Osin, what’s going on? How does this work when empathy splits? Isn’t a sympathetic person supposed to be sympathetic across the board?
Dear colleague, I remember an accusation from one of our sponsors from Israel, who accused me of once having a conversation with Osin and asked if I knew his views. I understand it was about some anti-Semitic views. I said that I simply didn’t know. Osin is a Tatar activist, a supporter of Tatarstan’s independence, a fighter for the freedom of the Tatar people — he does have a very active life position. In my opinion, he’s obviously pro-Ukrainian. Well, I can neither confirm nor deny his alleged anti-Semitism, but the fact of his possible pro-Palestinian views — I think since he’s Muslim, that might very well be the basis for those pro-Palestinian views, if they exist. I have no reason not to trust our Israeli colleague. Well, if he writes this, there’s probably something to it. Where there’s smoke, there’s usually fire.
So, pro-Palestinian views from someone who’s a Tatar activist — they’re probably linked to a certain sense of Muslim solidarity. That’s a plausible hypothesis. You know, this splitting of empathy is a very interesting topic. The attitude toward Ukraine — well, as a hypothesis, first of all, it’s Islamic solidarity, which for many people doesn’t extend to Ukraine. But for American or European leftists — or for Osin and other such activists — the attitude toward Ukraine is tied to the fact that the enemy is shared. You see? The enemy is the same for the Tatar independence activists and for Ukrainians: the Putinist empire. And so the stance is completely different.
For those American “blue-haired LGBT” folks you mention, they don’t see the Putin regime as their enemy — it doesn’t threaten them at all. But for the Tatar activists and the independence supporters of Tatarstan, there is a common enemy with Ukrainians: the Putin regime. That’s why their stance toward the Putin regime is completely unambiguous, and support for Ukraine is perfectly natural and logical.
As for solidarity with the Palestinians — there, I think, religion plays a significant role. It’s a sense of being part of the Islamic ummah. That’s not an isolated case. I know several such Tatar activists who are supporters of Tatarstan’s independence and simultaneously supporters of Palestine and critics of Israel — denouncing the “Israeli military,” as it’s often called in such cases. This is not an isolated phenomenon, and it has perfectly reasonable explanations.
Again, I’m not going to play the role of the ultimate truth-teller. I’ll find time to look into his views. If I see that this is indeed something like the anti-Semitism that Roman Grigoryevich Oon once allowed himself to express, then I probably won’t go on that channel anymore.
On the impossibility of commenting on internal Ukrainian politics Link to heading
So? Yegor, a question How could it be that in Russia, Roshen stores opened under Poroshenko? Isn’t this a war, but also business? Well, that’s what I’m reading — not very coherent. In 2014, at Ilovaisk, Ukrainians were being killed, while in Kyiv there was a parade, and Poroshenko was shaking hands with Putin and Lukashenko. Where is the president looking? Comment, please.
Dear Yegor! I don’t comment on internal Ukrainian politics. With all due respect, you have plenty of conversation partners on this topic. In Ukraine, there are plenty of analysts who thoroughly examine Ukrainian politics. I don’t do that, unfortunately.
Will foreign car import duties be lifted in Russia Link to heading
So the author of the question calls themselves Your Namesake. Do you think that after the collapse of Russia, foreign car import duties will be lifted? Well, there’ll be no one to pay them to.
I think… I think not. I think that predicting what statehood will look like in the various fragments on the territory of Northern Eurasia is pretty hard to do right now. It’s quite possible that people will still pay them. I don’t see the connection.
On Mann and social statehood Link to heading
So, a question from the chat from Pavel, my regular interlocutor. Here’s what he writes: Igor, in response to my question, you mentioned some man named Michael Mann, professor of sociology at the University of California and Cambridge University, member of the British Academy. Since Mann is the author of books on the history of the development of forms of social state power, published in all major languages, including Russian, I ask you to clarify — are you unfamiliar with this author’s works because the questions of the development and formation of social power were outside your sphere of interest? In this case, I apologize for having asked you questions on this topic. Second question: is it considered normal for a scholar, in cases when the facts presented contradict their theories, to label the presenter of these facts, for example, as an apologist for the USSR?
You know, Pavel, since it’s not just you who’s evaluating what I say — in the main streams, in my answers to questions — I also, in some way, study you, right? So, let me first say something general and then answer your question directly. Your comments, your remarks, your questions strongly remind me — not only of the “apologists for the USSR,” as I’ll explain in a moment why I call you that — but also of Gleb Kapustin from Shukshin’s famous story Srezal. It’s when someone starts a conversation not to synchronize watches, or to challenge a particular statement, or to establish the truth — but to “cut down,” you see?
Now, to specifics. You attributed… well, I don’t know about all Mann’s works being translated into every language — that’s not true. I have indeed read one of Mann’s books, and only one. I can’t say I studied him deeply — it was the only book I found in Russian. That’s The Dark Side of Democracy — it has some longer subtitle, but the main title is The Dark Side of Democracy. I can’t say I was particularly impressed by this author as a sociologist. By the way, I didn’t find in there the assertion that you attributed to him. I’m not disputing that he might have said it somewhere else — maybe in another book — but the claim that power in the USSR was “polyarchy” — what is polyarchy? It’s power divided into several centers, which means modern democratic governance with separation of powers. Applied to the USSR, excuse my bluntness, that’s absolute nonsense — complete nonsense.
Anyone who knows how power was structured in the Soviet Union knows perfectly well that there was no separation of powers because power was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party. In your previous question — not today’s, but the one before — I remember your question very well because I was deeply outraged by the number of distortions and lies. You twisted things, saying that I claimed that power belonged to 20 million Communists. That’s a lie. I never said that. I said that power belonged to the Communist Party as an organization, as some sort of “order of sword-bearers,” as a structure in which the principle of democratic centralism meant that those 20 million Communists had no actual power — the power was held by the party organs. That’s completely different.
So, yes, power belonged to the CPSU — the VKP(b) — from the very beginning. There was no division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial. None. That’s a lie that you… that’s a lie you attributed to Mann. Then you turned it into a sort of “truth” that I’m supposed to agree with. It’s nonsense.
As for why I call you an apologist for the USSR — for a very simple reason. You constantly try to prove that the collapse of the USSR was a catastrophe that led to terrible misfortune in Ukraine — you even compare it to the Holodomor. You always try to fudge the facts, to distort things, to lie outright. And as a result, yes, you’re certainly an apologist for the USSR.
As for your final question: I’m probably on the verge of stopping answering them altogether because I see no point in constantly exposing your distortions and outright lies. But please, I don’t mind if you keep expressing your opinion — I’m ready to give you that opportunity on the pages of our Telegram chat or in the YouTube comments. But I’ll mostly try not to waste time on exposing your distortions and outright lies. That’s to the question — maybe even a hint at reducing the time spent on streams — and some comments I want to read aloud.
Does Putin have problems with manpower resources Link to heading
Sad Donkey. Two comments. I disagree that the manpower resource is persistently inexhaustible. If that were the case, there would be no need to call in any North Korean military, no need to strip the rear areas when invading, no need to recruit serial killers into the contract army.
Dear colleagues, I’ll pause reading your question here. What I mean is that the resource is, practically speaking, not inexhaustible — I’m not claiming it’s infinite in theory — but practically inexhaustible because he has, first of all, the purchase of cannon fodder. And that resource hasn’t yet been exhausted. Second, there are the convicts, the murderers. And in addition to that, there’s a pretty inexhaustible resource of people who are accused of something and then given the alternative: either prison or war. That’s an inexhaustible resource.
So there are about 20 million people who can theoretically be taken to the front — they’re somehow “actualized,” let’s say. And the North Koreans are also a resource. I’m not saying that only one of these resource types is inexhaustible — no. Collectively, all three of these resource types create a practically inexhaustible resource for Putin. So I don’t see any contradiction between what you’re saying and what I’m asserting.
Can criminals be called by their full name (name and patronymic) Link to heading
Next, Sad Donkey asks the question: how should enemies be named? He writes the following: After serving their sentences, Mikhail Viktorovich, the Angarsk maniac (78 victims), and Alexander Vasilyevich, the Bitsevsky maniac (49 victims), met up and decided to have a drink together. At the same time, they paid tribute to their elder comrade Andrei Petrovich Chikatilo (43 victims).
And then, Sad Donkey expresses outrage about the fact that I sometimes refer to these people by their full name, including patronymic. Don’t you think, dear colleague, that here the intonation is what matters? I don’t see a problem here. Yes, sometimes I do refer to these monsters by name and patronymic. And I think it’s not a sign of respect. Rather, it’s an emphasized distancing. So, after all, please — don’t dictate to me how to use the Russian language. I’ve been speaking it — with varying degrees of success — for over 70 years. And… well, don’t limit me. If you insist that I shouldn’t call them by name and patronymic, I’ll call them that when I think it’s appropriate.
And those who feel the Russian language the way I do will understand in which cases it’s respect, and in which cases it’s distancing, sarcasm, to some extent detachment. It’s all about nuance. So let’s not all walk in lockstep, in formation, strictly saying “the bloody maniac Putin” — that’s it. Well, don’t you find that kind of speech and linear reduction boring, yes?
Are Russia’s small ethnic groups murderers Link to heading
Ah? Harlequin studio intonation, intonation — the meaning of the deeply respected Oreshkin during his articulation. The majority of the audience doesn’t hear and perceive it as a misunderstanding. Personally, it, Vladimir Vladimirovich, just infuriates me. I immediately think of Mayakovsky — if you speak in the Russian-speaking environment, “führer” is an insult to Germans today. But for Pu, or for “P” or the rat — it’s a sea, it’s passing. No words to express my feelings about this person. Well, again, again the demands that we only swear. Well, yes. So. Winds of Russia. Vladimir Kara-Murza once expressed the idea that representatives of national minorities are more indifferent to the killing of Ukrainians than Russians. And I largely agree with him. The fact is that the Buryats and Tuvans are generally wild, poorly educated peoples, without a culture of humanism. Even before the war, these two republics were leaders in murders and alcoholism. Today, Putin has armed them and given them the opportunity to kill. There you have it. Leaders in war crimes, leaders in deaths. I don’t understand why you pity, essentially, the headline-grabbers of the war? Muscovites aren’t to blame that the national periphery itself willingly goes as cannon fodder to the front. Oh, what! What kind of chauvinism is that, huh? So, Muscovites…
Well, of course, every Muscovite individually may not be to blame. But in general, Moscow — as the center, as the structure of the Russian Empire — certainly, undoubtedly, bears the main weight of the guilt for the fact that the national periphery ended up in this position and willingly goes as cannon fodder.
As for the statement that the Buryats and Tuvans are generally wild, poorly educated peoples without a culture of humanism — listen, if I had the time and opportunity, I would arrange a meeting for you with a whole group of Tuvans — whom I know less about — and a large number of Buryats. I just mentioned the outstanding, I would even dare to say, the genius anthropologist Arutyunov, who had a Buryat wife. I had the honor of knowing her as well — she, too, was a scholar, an anthropologist, a brilliantly educated person of great intelligence and humanism.
So I’d put this Buryat woman’s head above the absolute majority of Russians, you see? So be more careful with your chauvinism, especially on our channel. Here, such statements are simply not accepted.
Therefore, the idea that representatives of national minorities are more indifferent to the killing of Ukrainians than Russians — it requires some very weighty evidence. I think you’re mistaken. I haven’t heard Vladimir Kara-Murza make such a statement. But if he did, then I think he was very much mistaken.
On mentioning small ethnic groups Link to heading
Next, from someone who signs as Siberia: How Yakovenko “loves” in quotes the small peoples. Again he remembered the dead Buryats and Altai people. But why not talk about the regions, the republics that lead in absolute numbers? If one of them doesn’t go to war — out of 50, in percentage terms, it’s a huge number. In terms of harm to Ukraine — minimal. The desire to humiliate small peoples in every broadcast.
Listen, how did you manage to see something that isn’t there? Where? Name at least one quote — show me an example of me humiliating small peoples. What nonsense! The problems of Ukraine and Ukrainians, on the other hand, are being silenced. As Portnikov said, if you look at the surnames of those killed from the Far East, there are only Ukrainian surnames there. And how are things with the Ukrainian language itself? In Ukraine, especially in the eastern and central regions — once again, you’re lumping everything together. Ukrainian surnames, the problems of Ukraine…
You know, I don’t deal with Ukraine’s problems. There are plenty of people who do that very well.
As for my supposed “humiliation of small peoples” — bring at least one example. And stop lying, finally. Really, I’m tired of it.
Do Muscovites really live better Link to heading
So. Children. I’m writing from Moscow. I recently buried my husband in a new cemetery. There aren’t many graves yet — by memory, no more than 1,000, maybe even fewer. But the graves with huge Russian flags stand out — WWII participants. There are a lot, really a lot. Why? This constant lie about Muscovites — what’s in it for you personally? Everyone else is taken at their word, but Muscovites aren’t. All regions are starving, Muscovites are feasting — two-thirds of them live in poverty. What nonsense. And besides, in which Western country do the capital’s residents live the same as in the provinces? Or worse? Maybe in Ukraine? I’m sure not. You Russian liberals — are you masochists, or is your super-intelligence keeping you from calling Putin “Putin”? Let me repeat: it looks vile and humiliating.
Well, there are statistics, you see — they’re quite objective. So it’s not a lie. Yes, indeed, about Muscovites. I present facts, statistics, you see? While you’re responding with emotions. So flinging around such statements is simply inappropriate. It’s not nice.
The fact that a Muscovite’s chances of ending up at war are dozens of times lower than those of a resident of Buryatia or Tuva — that’s a historical fact. The fact that Muscovites live on average — I emphasize, on average — better than, and have always lived better than, the inhabitants of the periphery — that’s also a historical fact.
Well, forgive me — as someone who traveled twice around all the regions of the Soviet Union, all the republics, all the regions of the RSFSR, I can confirm it. And just the same, after the Soviet Union collapsed — around Russia, too. These are obvious things. What — does no one remember the “sausage trains”? What nonsense.
Why no mention of Ukrainian cemeteries Link to heading
So? Valery Bykov Why doesn’t Yakovenko show Ukrainian cemeteries? It’s a nightmare! Well, yes, they’re not showing them.
It’s just that these are internal Ukrainian matters. Yes, many people are dying in Ukraine. Is that not known or something? Why do I need to show Ukrainian cemeteries for that — I don’t understand.
Should militant believers be banned Link to heading
Alexandra Recently, militant believers have become more active on the channel. They need to be cut off from serious conversation somehow. For example, as they do on other channels. Ban them. It’s a pity for your time and ours, which you spend answering them.
Dear Alexandra! You know, I think banning them — I definitely won’t do that. That’s 100%. Banning people for their views — that’s definitely not for me.
But as for not answering some questions that keep repeating… The thing is, the problem of faith is important. The problem of worldview is important. The problem of arguments about how the universe is organized is important. But when it’s just the same repetition over and over — I just won’t answer. I won’t ban them for sure, but I’ll probably stop answering the repetitive questions from the same authors. That’s all.
Results of the survey Link to heading
So, dear friends, it seems that’s all, it seems that’s all. We had a very long stream today, and I promised at the end of our conversation to show the results. The results of the survey. Just a moment. So.
The question was: What do you think the occupiers will respond with to the Paustian operation? 4,100 people took part in the survey. The options were: “They have nothing to respond with except threats” — 17%; “With nut strikes” — 5%; “With nuclear weapons strikes” — 1%. And the absolute majority, more than three-quarters of respondents, 76%, said: “With massive strikes on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities.” We’ll probably find out in the near future how they actually responded.
That was our survey, and on that note…
Closing words Link to heading
Dear friends, I’m concluding our morning stream for today. Well, the topic was very important, and there were a lot of questions, so it was quite long. But I hope that at least someone got their questions answered. With that, I’m wrapping up. Let me remind you that at 8:00 PM we’ll have a conversation with Sergey — Sergey Borisovich Grabskiy. I think it will be interesting, considering today’s topic. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom for Alexander Skobov, for all Russian political prisoners, and for Ukrainian captives! See you at 8:00 PM. Goodbye!
Source: https://youtu.be/CcHcctfHDqc