KIIS poll: “Ukrainians are ready to endure and are not ready to surrender.” NATO Secretary General Rutte: “Russia produces more ammunition than all NATO countries combined, and does so much faster.”
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is June 11th. In Kyiv, it is currently 07:41, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Prisoner Exchange Link to heading
Let me start with some good news. Russia and Ukraine have conducted another prisoner exchange. This is the second exchange under the Istanbul agreements. Both Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Russian Ministry of Defense spoke about it yesterday. Zelenskyy said that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, National Guard members, and border guards have returned home as part of the exchange, and so on. In reality, their lives were truly saved—at least for many of them. I want to highlight separately the message from the Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which reported that among the Ukrainians freed yesterday were defenders of Mariupol who had spent more than three years in captivity. Almost all of the Mariupol defenders released yesterday have severe injuries and chronic illnesses. These are people with amputated limbs and serious chronic diseases. Some of the freed have been diagnosed with hepatitis and tuberculosis. This speaks to the conditions in which people were held captive. Meanwhile, the Russian Ministry of Defense said that Russian soldiers are in Belarus for some reason. We can, of course, speculate and guess why, but for now, it is unclear why they are not being sent directly to Russia. As for the number of people released yesterday, this has not been disclosed. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War explained that this figure is not being made public for security reasons and will only be announced after the process is complete. This prisoner exchange is the best news of the day.
Massive Strikes on Peaceful Ukrainian Cities Link to heading
Bad news. The massive strikes on peaceful Ukrainian cities continue. Overnight strikes on Kharkiv have killed two people—at least, these are the figures reported by the Kharkiv city administration at the time of preparing this stream. Two people killed, thirty-seven injured. Among the injured are five children. In fact, not a single soldier was hurt, not a single military facility was damaged. What was damaged? Trolleybuses. You see what kind of military targets we’re talking about—trolleybuses. Municipal production facilities. Not a single military facility was hit.
As for the overnight strike that hit Kyiv and Odesa yesterday, what did it destroy? What “military facilities” (in quotes, of course) were damaged? St. Sophia’s Cathedral, the Odesa Film Studio. Among other things, a maternity hospital was also damaged—a very important military facility, as you understand. Just a couple of words about the strike on St. Sophia’s. St. Sophia’s Cathedral was built in the 11th century. It was begun by Prince Vladimir and finished by Yaroslav. Sophia survived Batu’s invasion, stood for a thousand years. And now it’s under threat.
The second object, which I think is very important for people who speak Russian, is the Odesa Film Studio. As you know, I’m a categorical opponent of engaging in any kind of literary or film criticism, but for any Russian-speaking person, the works produced by the Odesa Film Studio—like “Spring on Zarechnaya Street,” “Vertical” with Vysotsky, “Urban Romance,” “Magicians,” and so on—these are cultural milestones. I also recall “The Military Field Romance” by Todorovsky, though my memory fails me a bit here. But this is what comes to mind. In fact, this is a strike at what is proudly called Russian culture—Russian, Soviet, or otherwise. The Odesa Film Studio is really something that any Russian-speaking person considers part of a shared heritage, even though it was created in Ukraine. St. Sophia’s Cathedral is also part of that same shared heritage.
So, of course, what’s happening now is, in essence, the self-destruction of the so-called “Russian world” that Putin is trying to impose on Ukraine.
Psychological State of Ukrainians Link to heading
Now, let’s move on to the main topic of today’s discussion. It’s about the core of this confrontation. I’ll start with the heart of this conflict, which is not purely military but lies in the military-psychological plane. When people talk about how this war will end and what the outcome will be, they usually focus on political analysis or purely military aspects. But, as I see it, the issue is much broader. It’s about a clash of character, a clash of the psychological state of the millions-strong Ukrainian people and the Russian military machine. Here, I’d like to highlight two points—two pieces of evidence. One is the result of the latest survey published yesterday by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, which used a rather original method that, honestly, I hadn’t come across before. They surveyed 2,000 people in four groups of 500 each, using complementary, intersecting questions. The second point is a significant statement by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, which relates to military-technical analysis.
So, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll found that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are against territorial concessions and are prepared to endure the continuation of the war; they are not ready to surrender. More than half of Ukrainians oppose giving up any part of Ukraine’s territory to Russia for the sake of peace. In response to the question of whether they are willing to make territorial concessions, 52% said they were against any such concessions. In February of this year, a similar question had 50% saying they were not willing—so there’s been a slight increase. Let’s say, if we use the term “intransigence,” Ukrainian intransigence has slightly grown from February to June. Currently, 38% of Ukrainians are willing to accept some territorial losses—down slightly from 39% in February, likely within the margin of statistical error. When asked about officially recognizing Ukrainian territories as part of Russia, the overwhelming majority—68%—were against it, while 24% were willing to accept it. Finally, only 15% are prepared to hand over to Russian control those territories currently held by Ukraine, essentially agreeing to the demands of the Russian delegation in Istanbul, while 78% reject this outright.
All this clearly demonstrates the deep-seated resilience and intransigence of the Ukrainian people, which, I believe, is well captured by the professional methodology of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and truly reflects the mood of Ukrainian society. This Ukrainian resilience and intransigence is what stands behind the Armed Forces of Ukraine: the will of Ukrainian society itself.
Mark Rutte on Russia’s Military Potential Link to heading
Now, regarding what I see as an equally important message from Rutte. It largely contradicts the numerous statements by various analysts who argue that Russia is unable to fight, that the Russian economy will soon collapse, that the Russian military machine is stalling, and so on. Here’s what Mark Rutte said. This was during a recent speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. He stated that the Russian Federation produces more ammunition than all NATO countries combined—and does so many times faster. Specifically, he said that Russia produces in three months as much ammunition as NATO does in a year. As for the pace of Russian military production, Rutte said that the Russian war machine is not slowing down but actually gaining momentum. In this process of restoring and regenerating its military potential, Russia is being aided by China, Iran, and North Korea.
Rutte also highlighted that Russia is using Chinese technologies to modernize its army. In terms of concrete figures, he said that Russian defense industries are expected this year to produce 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles. Summing up his analysis, Rutte said that Russia might be ready to launch aggression against NATO within the next five years—that Putin is preparing for this. Similar sentiments have been expressed by German politicians. In particular, the head of the German Bundeswehr procurement office stated that Europe has three years to rearm itself; otherwise, there will be war with Russia.
All these statements show that there is a very clear situation: Ukrainian resilience right now—Ukrainian resilience, ingenuity, special operations by the SBU and Ukrainian military intelligence—this is what is currently holding back Russian aggression. I have the impression that a number of European countries understand this. But the presence of Trojan horses—like Hungary, Slovakia, and others—significantly undermines Europe’s readiness to turn itself into a military camp. Still, the situation is such that Ukraine simply has no other choice. All these talks—like those by Orban—about how it’s time to negotiate with Russia are clearly manipulative, since Russia—meaning Putin—has no intention of negotiating with anyone. That’s quite obvious. That’s the situation.
Street Talk Instructions Link to heading
So, we’ve agreed that we’ll be trying to conduct some street talks. I fully understand that this isn’t about making any claims—we’re not the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, and it’s more or less obvious that this is just for illustration. It’s simply a kind of snapshot that we’ll try to provide. I realize that this is an attempt to show some slices of public opinion from different cities and different countries. We’re taking quite a risk, of course. It’s obvious that we can immediately say it’s not representative, but let’s still try to implement this idea, dear friends. The idea is simple—if you have a mobile phone, that’s all you need. If you’re ready, just record a raw video and send it to our editor at the address we’ve provided. The only thing you need to include is the country or city where it was recorded. Just the raw video—if you want to include the name of the author, do so; if not, that’s fine too. But I have one very strong request: please refrain from conducting these interviews in Russia. Of course, I would love to have some data like this from Russia, but I can immediately say that we won’t be using it. One cruiser in prison is already enough for us—and not just him. So, you see, heroism is great, but sitting in relatively safe Lithuania, I can’t take responsibility for that. So, once again, surveys are welcome from any country in the world except Russia.
Here’s the first question I suggest—just a test question to start with: Will the war end in 2025? If it does, how? Once again, we’re not claiming any kind of representativeness here. Let’s just try. Maybe it’ll be interesting. You know, we need to somehow illustrate our discussions, synchronize our watches, and get some feedback. Let’s give it a try. Thank you in advance to everyone who will take part in this little experiment of ours.
Answers to the Questions Link to heading
Now I’m moving on to answering your questions.
What Explains the “Panic Fear” of the Russian Opposition to Organize Armed Resistance Against the Putin Regime Link to heading
So, Anatoly Alexandrovich, please tell me, in your view, what explains the panic fear of the so-called Russian opposition to organize an armed struggle against Putinism? Why do you think these “Russian oppositionists” in quotation marks avoid this topic in every way under the pretext of fighting corruption? Recall Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, which showed that Putinism is not as terrifying as it is painted. What exactly are they, these “Russian oppositionists” in quotation marks, afraid of?
Well, comparing them to Prigozhin, in my opinion, is absolutely irrelevant. Prigozhin had an elite army—essentially the best part of the Russian military, very well and abundantly funded. And obviously, there’s nothing like that among those you’re calling the “Russian opposition.” Besides, Prigozhin’s army had popular support. I think that even if a similar raid had been carried out by some Ukrainian Armed Forces units, the results wouldn’t have been so triumphant. In reality, Russian forces might have engaged against the Ukrainian units, but they didn’t move against Prigozhin because, well, he was considered one of their own heroes, and so on. So there’s really no analogy here.
As for Russian emigrants, like myself, I’m actually trying to help organize armed resistance to Putinism along with the Free Russia Forum and many others. We’re working to support and assist the leader of the Free Russia movement, the Russian Volunteer Corps, and other units that fight as part of the Ukrainian army against Russia. That’s what I believe is right. As for everything else—well, I think it’s a utopia. We’re specifically trying to support armed struggle against Putinism. This is exactly what those Russian volunteer units fighting side by side with Ukrainian heroes are doing. That’s what I can tell you, dear Anatoly.
On the Role of the “Free Russia Forum” versus Yulia Navalnaya and Ilya Yashin Link to heading
A question from Lana Why doesn’t the Free Russia Forum declare itself as the opposition before the European Parliament, as an alternative or alongside Yulia Navalnaya and Ilya Yashin? After all, nature abhors a vacuum, and in the future Russia there will be two parties. This is important for those who stayed behind. Moreover, it would change the perception of the Russian opposition among European politicians.
Dear Lana, well, you see, I’d like to answer your question—maybe not very politely—by asking you a question in return: how do you imagine the mechanics of this? The Free Russia Forum was founded by Garry Kasparov and Ivan Tyutin. So, Garry Kimovich Kasparov and Ivan Ivanovich Tyutin should fly to Strasbourg, stand in front of the European Parliament with a sign saying, “We are the opposition, let us in too”? You understand, the European Parliament invites those it wants to hear from. It invited those three. That’s a question for the European Parliament, you see? Because of this, Navalny, Yashin, and Kara-Murza didn’t suddenly become the only leaders of the opposition. But, you know, this is a question for the MEPs or those in the European Parliament who deal with this sort of thing. That’s all.
To try to impose yourself, to jump up like that frog that croaked “I did it all,” to jump out and say “No, it’s us, we’re the opposition leaders”—well, that’s impossible, that’s not how it works. Life will sort everything out in its own way.
On Corruption and the Work of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) Link to heading
A question from Martin. Exposing corrupt officials is significant—it clearly discredits them and the rest of the elite. That’s already a big plus. Isn’t it helpful for people who don’t completely support what’s going on?
Dear Martin! Let me ask you: in whose eyes? How does this actually work? What’s the logic here? Look at it this way: the Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF) did another investigation—this time about the owner of a helicopter factory. They found corruption. Who sees this? Where does it spread? It’s seen by the channels of the ACF, which are watched almost exclusively by people who already share that perspective. So, in whose eyes exactly is this discrediting taking place? Are we talking about people who don’t fully support what’s going on—like they see it and suddenly have an epiphany? That just doesn’t happen. That’s not how it works.
If this were shown on federal channels, then maybe it would make a difference. Though I have to say, you see, the ACF’s investigations of corruption by Russian officials are on the same level as the investigations by the Russian Prosecutor’s Office and the Investigative Committee. Essentially, they’re working side by side with Russian law enforcement. They’re not standing out in any particular way. Corrupt officials in Russia do get jailed. In this case, the ACF is basically competing with the Russian Prosecutor’s Office and the Investigative Committee—maybe even helping them. That’s the reality. It’s not that there’s no fight against corruption in Russia—it’s happening, but it’s selective, because corruption is the backbone of the Russian economy. In this sense, neither the ACF nor the Russian Prosecutor’s Office nor the Russian Investigative Committee can really change the situation. In some ways, the ACF just helps Russian law enforcement. That’s it—it’s all part of the same system.
So, to say that this changes public opinion in any major way—well, public attitudes are pretty loyal. “Yes, corruption is bad, but everyone steals, right? If I were in their place, I’d steal too.” That’s the typical reasoning of the Russian layperson. And those who are against it are already against it. So I don’t think this really changes much in the public’s attitude.
How Afraid Is Putin to Stop the War Because of the Risks Posed by Ex-Convicts and Ultra-Patriots Link to heading
Serafim Karnavalov, two questions—really rhetorical ones. So, in your opinion, how much is Putin afraid to stop the war because of concerns about the consequences of returning crowds of ex-convicts and ultra-patriots from Ukraine? How dangerous is this for the regime itself? Would there be some kind of “cold summer of 1953” scenario? So far, February 1917 doesn’t seem to be on the horizon. The army has long ceased to be a political actor. The Prigozhin episode was about money, not power.
Well, I think the scale of what would happen if the war ended would be a hundred times greater than the “cold summer of 1953.” A hundred times. Because it really would be like 1917, when crowds of people with weapons poured back from the front, and we know what the result was. That’s exactly what happened in February 1917—and October 1917, too. That’s the more important comparison here.
As for the more important part of your comment—that the Prigozhin story was about money, not power—that’s true. But I think that stopping the war would be a catastrophe for the Putin regime, because it has no other meaning left. The Putin regime no longer has any real content except for war. It wouldn’t be able to create any kind of counterweight to the chaos that would erupt—chaos in people’s minds, on the streets, and in society itself—if the war were to end. You can’t just squeeze that toxic paste back into the tube. So I think it would be a catastrophe. And Putin understands this perfectly well, by the way. That’s why he won’t stop the war.
On Russian Schoolchildren’s Talk of “Cleansing” Ukraine Link to heading
And then Serafim Karnavalov asks a second question. What’s even more frightening is that I periodically hear conversations on the street between older schoolchildren in Russia. Maybe it’s just that in some places the atmosphere is particularly bad. But they talk about “cleansing” occupied territories, or how many missiles it would take to destroy Ukraine. A rhetorical question: are they being taught anything else at home and in school besides this?
You know, I think there’s something important to understand here. Conversations among older schoolchildren on the street don’t fully reflect what’s really in their heads. It’s the classic “spiral of silence.” You see, talking today in Russia about how many missiles it would take to destroy Ukraine is safe. Talking about how to cleanse occupied territories and how many Ukrainians need to be killed is safe in Russia. But talking about how we need to stop killing Ukrainians—that’s dangerous. You could get arrested for that. And schoolchildren understand this very well.
So I think what’s at play here is precisely that spiral of silence that conceals or strongly distorts the real mood. I’m not saying your observations aren’t valid—they do reflect reality, but they reflect it in a skewed way. Because, just imagine: a schoolkid standing on the street, talking with their friends and saying, “Enough, what are we doing? We’re a criminal country,” and so on—you understand that this is impossible. Of course, maybe there are some such kids, but they’re isolated cases. Because everyone understands perfectly well that tomorrow they’ll come for you and your parents: dad and mom to prison, and the schoolkid to an orphanage. Everyone gets it.
So I think your observations are real, but the reality they show is distorted.
On Hitler’s Rise to Power and a Dictator Leading a Democratic Country Link to heading
So, Stanislav Ogurtsov You said you didn’t know of any instance where a fascist-type leader came to power in a democratic country. But didn’t Hitler come to power in such a country?
Dear Stanislav! You see, Hitler came to power in the Weimar Republic. But the Weimar Republic can’t really be considered comparable to, say, the United States of America. The United States is the most powerful country in the Western world—democratic, with robust checks and balances, and well-established democratic traditions. The Weimar Republic was an experiment after the November Revolution, after the German Reich was dismantled by the revolution. It was extremely unstable.
First, there was the terrible crisis of 1919–1923, when the fragile, newly-formed Weimar Republic struggled with the aftermath of World War I and the Treaty of Versailles. There was horrifying hyperinflation, numerous coup attempts, and political assassinations. From 1924 to 1929 there was a short, five-year period of very relative stability. Then came the 1929 crisis. The Weimar Republic was essentially a house of cards—and German public opinion didn’t see it as a real achievement. No one took pride in the Weimar Republic, you see? Unlike Americans, who are proud of their democracy and their country, Germans saw the Weimar Republic as something deformed and caricatured.
So these aren’t really relevant comparisons. That’s why I maintain, at least in my view, that I don’t know of any example where a fascist-type leader came to power in a truly democratic country. Hitler’s rise doesn’t serve as an example in this context.
On TikTok and the Promotion of Russian Propaganda Narratives Link to heading
Mariupol. Could you clarify why TikTok, a Chinese app, is so often filled with pro-Russian propaganda videos? What’s China’s interest in spreading such content? Is it an algorithmic response to clear demand, a form of neutrality, or a deliberate information strategy within broader geopolitics?
Dear colleagues! I’m not sure that China is deliberately creating conditions to promote pro-Russian propaganda videos on TikTok. I think what’s really going on is this: we’re talking here about the Russian-language version of TikTok—the people who watch it. And, simply put, most Russian-language content is produced in Russia. Most people who speak Russian live in Russia. Since the mood in Russia itself is pro-war and pro-Putin, these propaganda videos are naturally going to dominate.
Of course, there are also plenty of anti-Putin videos—there’s a lot of them. I haven’t done a content analysis myself, but I trust your observation that pro-Russian, pro-Putin videos might be more common. But that’s for the same reason that pro-Putin, pro-war Telegram channels dominate Telegram itself—because the main content creators are in Russia. It’s just a matter of numbers. For example, Russian-language YouTube has a different slant because YouTube has a policy of actively blocking pro-Putin, pro-war channels. But when there’s no blocking, the numerical majority of content creators ensures that the pro-Russian content dominates. That’s true for Telegram, and it’s true for TikTok, too.
On Religion and Quantum Physics Link to heading
So, a question from a friend of a Chekist. It’s about religion. Sorry if this topic was closed already. Well, it’s a humorous question, but still: what’s the difference between quantum physics and any religion—for example, Christianity? After all, to the overwhelming majority of adherents, neither is truly understood; you can only believe. Both have similar characteristics—concepts, prophets, miracles, and so on. Quantum physics has a cat invented by the prophet Schrödinger to attract new followers, and Christianity has Segalovich’s dog for the same purpose—apparently for the same purpose.
Alright, let’s skip the cat and dog parts—yes, clearly a joke. But as for the main content, it’s actually not entirely a joke—not entirely a humorous question. Here’s the key difference: quantum physics produces results that are used in practice. The findings of quantum physics are used in computers, in mobile devices, in optical instruments. There are quantum calculations that have been experimentally confirmed. There’s a huge number of practical applications for what quantum physics does. Can you name even one practical application of religious postulates? Any miracles contained in religious doctrines—just one example of something that’s been practically demonstrated? No, right?
So, as for the idea that it can only be believed in—here, yes, I agree with you. The vast majority of people who benefit from the results of quantum physics—who consider it trustworthy, who treat it as science—are really just trusting the scientists. And that’s a very important feature of any science. You know, there’s that question: what makes a good mathematician? A good mathematician is someone other good mathematicians recognize as a good mathematician. Yes, that sounds like circular logic, but there’s a fundamental difference between that and the kind of mutual support you find in religious sects. The difference is that the results of mathematical or scientific research lead to practical results—tangible consequences.
The same goes for quantum physics. The main difference is that the results of quantum physics are used in technology, research, and calculations, and they’re measurable in the real world. In some areas of science, these results don’t appear immediately, but ultimately they lead to practical outcomes. Everything we see around us today is based on scientific research. But no religion has ever produced a single practical result. That’s the difference. And I think that’s a fundamental distinction.
On Harsh Hazing in the Soviet and Russian Army Link to heading
Poncho. In opposition channels, there are often videos showing brutal hazing of Russian soldiers. I’ve read that during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army wasn’t much better in how it treated deserters and those who refused orders. Is this basically standard military behavior in wartime, or is it the attitude of certain individuals?
No, I think this is a feature specific to the Soviet and Russian army. Take, for example, the Israeli army—there’s nothing like this at all there. That’s a striking example: the Israeli army doesn’t have anything like this hazing culture, nor this kind of treatment of refuseniks, and so on.
On My Work in the District Committee Link to heading
So, Ruben? Igor Aleksandrovich, could you tell us about your work in the district committee? What did that work involve? What made it interesting? What kind of people surrounded you?
Well, the district committees, the city committees, and the central committees of the union republics were real organs of power. Formally, power belonged to the Soviets—the district and city councils’ executive committees. But in reality, the highest power was in the hands of the party organs. These were real organs of power that, alongside all the nonsense and backwardness, really did exercise control. I remember what a workday, a workweek, a workyear looked like. There was a lot of nonsense, sure, but that nonsense only took up part of the time.
Roughly a third of my working time was spent dealing with citizens’ letters. I started out as an instructor in the district committee, and typically, each of us had about 20 or 30 citizen letters to review at any given time. These letters were about housing, unfair dismissals, requests for help with pensions, and so on. There was a lot of very specific stuff—complaints about workplace issues and so on. Some of these letters were very interesting. I remember a prolonged conflict at a publishing house—Chelovek i zakon—which involved antisemitism and other issues. I spent a year dealing with that, and in the end, we managed to get the chief editor fired.
So that was about 30% of the work. Another 30% was spent dealing with the real problems of the district or city. People who are nostalgic for the USSR either didn’t live in it, have forgotten, or never really understood how it worked. Nothing happened on its own in the Soviet Union. There wasn’t a functioning economy that just ran on its own. Everything needed a push—a “kick.” And the party organs provided that push. It was an awful system. Imagine a clock with no spring—the free market spring that would normally drive it. In the district committee, it was as if you had to move the clock’s hands manually.
For example, how did you supply stores with produce? Nobody in the fruit and vegetable bases wanted to work. So you’d issue an order—50 KGB officers in tracksuits would go out to sort cabbage and carrots, then load back on the buses and head home. It was the same with design bureaus and research institutes—everyone had to pitch in for these forced tasks.
Moreover, the fruit and vegetables didn’t magically appear at the bases. We had to call around to figure out where the freight train was stuck that was supposed to bring potatoes to Moscow, then call the military to get it moving again somewhere in the Urals. This wasn’t Orwell—it was something else entirely. But it was 30% of the job.
Finally, I’d say about 10–15% of it was sheer madness. Here’s an example: when Boris Yeltsin became first secretary of the Moscow city committee, he wanted to “revive” Moscow by setting up ice towns in every district—even though it was a very warm winter. So every district had to find ice, which didn’t exist. Some places had big freezers to make ice, but they were few and far between. Our district’s solution? Cut blocks of ice out of the Ostankino pond—thin ice, but that’s what we had to do, just to fulfill Yeltsin’s order. That’s how we spent a chunk of our workdays.
Personally, what did all this give me? It gave me a very clear understanding of how the Soviet Union worked. Later, when I met my teacher, Alexander Ivanovich, and read his works on “crippled decisions,” I saw just how accurate they were. My years in the district committee provided me with a huge trove of empirical evidence to support his theories. So when I took part in Alexander Samoilovich’s seminars, I had a whole Mont Blanc of evidence to draw on.
On “Mediafrenia”, “Trumpofrenia”, and “Traitors” Link to heading
Lyudmila Syomina Who knows why Igor Aleksandrovich canceled “Mediafrenia”?
I haven’t canceled anything. “Mediafrenia” will continue, just like “Trumpofrenia.” There are some limitations, some health issues—hopefully temporary—that have caused some disruptions in the work, but “Mediafrenia” is as important a product of our channel as “7-40.” There will also be “Trumpofrenia,” and of course, the “Traitors” section will definitely continue. So no, nothing has been canceled.
On Secret Documents and Their Storage in Russia and the US Link to heading
A question from Lora. How is the storage of state secret documents organized in Russia and other countries, particularly in America? Can they be secretly destroyed by interested parties in power?
Well, I’m not really the best person to answer this in detail. But I know that, for example, unlike Russia, where there’s a law on state secrets, in the United States there isn’t a single unified law. From what I know—having twice been part of a Russian parliamentary delegation to the US and exchanging experiences there—the legal framework around secrecy in the US is more patchwork. As far as I know—correct me in the comments if I’m wrong—what’s currently in place is still an Obama-era executive order that governs the handling of secret documents in the US. In Russia, there’s a specific law on state secrets.
That doesn’t mean Russia’s system is better, and America’s worse—just that in Russia it’s more rigid. In the US, we see frequent leaks of secret documents, which I think are a byproduct of a more liberal system.
As for whether interested parties can secretly destroy these documents—well, I don’t see any real obstacles to that. I think they can. It’s true that documents are encrypted, but still, yes, probably, they can be destroyed. I’d say it’s quite possible.
On Children, Fools, and Truth Link to heading
Yulia. A question from Yulia. There’s a Jewish proverb that says children and fools tell the truth. But I don’t see Trump, in his role as a fool, speaking it. Does that mean real fools like Vasily the Blessed are a thing of the past? Or do today’s fools just lack the courage? What’s wrong with today’s fools?
You know, dear Yulia, I think you’re not so much confusing things as using the word “fool” in a completely different sense than what that Jewish proverb implies. In this context, it’s really talking about yurodivy—holy fools—like Vasily the Blessed. He wasn’t a fool in the sense of being a simpleton. He was a yurodivy, which is a completely different phenomenon. These weren’t stupid people—they were a special social category in Russia, often mentally ill or pretending to be so, who could speak the truth to rulers without fear. Trump has nothing to do with yurodstvo. He’s just an unbalanced person—a fool in the sense of someone incompetent or deluded. So here, it’s just a matter of the same word having two very different meanings.
On Hiroo Onoda Link to heading
A question from Vlad. What is your opinion of Hiroo Onoda—the Japanese soldier who fought on in the Philippines for 30 years after World War II, robbing and occasionally killing locals? I used to feel positively about him. But now I see he was fighting for imperial nonsense, killing the locals. I’m reconsidering whether he should be seen as a Japanese martyr or whether he’s a positive figure because he was willing to endure so much for what he believed in—unlike Putin, who risks nothing himself. I read that the Filipino commander who finally accepted his surrender called him a model of military loyalty. What’s your opinion?
Dear Vlad, you know, of course, the story of this Japanese soldier is well-known. I believe it was even adapted into a film. It’s certainly striking—the idea of someone staying on that island for so long. First, he fought in a small group, and then, if I remember correctly, he spent the last two years fighting completely alone. That’s really something.
But my attitude? It’s definitely negative. You see, the bravery of an enemy doesn’t change the fact that he’s the enemy. He was a soldier of the Japanese army—an ally of Hitler. So what should our attitude be? He was the enemy. The enemy’s courage might earn a certain respect, but let’s be clear—I risk being accused of an unfair comparison here, but think about Hitler himself. Hitler was a hero of war, personally brave—who can deny that? He was willing to die for his ideals and his values. But so what? Does that mean we should admire him? Of course not.
It’s the same with Onoda: yes, the story is astonishing, but he was killing innocent people. So no, I’m not in awe of him. The story is fascinating, sure. But my attitude is sharply negative.
On Boris Stomakhin Link to heading
Aleksey Vlasov I wanted to ask if you know Boris Stomakhin. He’s a unique person, spent nine years in prison, and there’s that line about how “Russia will only be saved by a nuclear strike.” But that’s inhumane—and he said, well, it’s inhumane, but it would bring Russia from the 14th century straight to the 21st. So do you know him, and what’s your view?
I don’t know him personally. Stomakhin is, of course, someone whose ideas are absolutely not close to me. He expressed ideas about how Russia should be destroyed with nuclear bombs, how all Russians should be killed wherever you find them—he was saying these things long before the war. If I’m not mistaken, his first arrest for these kinds of texts was in 2002. So yes, these are views that I find completely alien. Now, I can somewhat understand Ukrainians who hold such views today, but in the early 2000s, that kind of rhetoric was just repulsive to me.
But that’s not all I want to say about him. Here’s my second point: his imprisonment and the horrific treatment he endured in prison were absolutely unacceptable. Back then, and even now, I’ve always said: freedom for Boris Stomakhin. This was a case where, you see, the real question is how widely his views were being spread—if I remember correctly, it was something like 30 copies. So he posed no real threat. If he’d been, say, a parliamentarian spreading those views from the Duma, maybe there’d be a case to argue about social danger. But he wasn’t. Stomakhin never posed any threat to anyone. So his imprisonment and the trials against him were totally unjust and wrong.
And here’s my third point. Stomakhin’s case was a kind of litmus test for revealing scumbags. Among the people who were supposedly on “our side,” there were democrats—even liberals—who happily welcomed Stomakhin’s prosecution and imprisonment. The first of these was my former colleague, now deceased, Volodya Lysenko. Lysenko, while a deputy in the State Duma, wrote a denunciation of Boris Stomakhin, after which Stomakhin got his first sentence. I hadn’t been in touch with Lysenko for a long time, but I found his phone number, called him, and said, “What are you doing? What danger does Boris Stomakhin with his 30-copy leaflets pose to anyone?” And Lysenko said, “No, he’s a criminal, he should be in prison.” After that, I had no desire to speak with him again.
Another example is Leonid Volkov. This is what sparked my strongly negative view of Volkov. After Stomakhin’s next sentence, Volkov wrote, “Stomakhin is a freak and a scumbag. The zone is exactly where he belongs. He’s no political prisoner—he’s just a Russian scumbag.” I’m quoting Volkov here. Volkov’s attitude was: if we defend Stomakhin, why not defend Hitler? Volkov didn’t understand that Hitler, who called for killing Jews, had no reason at all to do so. Stomakhin, who called for killing Russians—especially those in power—did have at least some reasons, even in the 2000s.
So that’s my view. I don’t sympathize with Stomakhin’s views, but what the Russian state did to him is absolutely criminal.
On the Film “Civil War” Link to heading
So, the author? The author of the question. Let’s see, one second. It’s a question about the film “Civil War” that came out last year.
You know, I haven’t seen the film. I’ve heard that it’s a dystopian movie that, supposedly, predicts a civil war in the United States of America. But no, I haven’t seen it.
About Vox Veritatis Link to heading
A question from Aleksey. In your comments, there was an idea to invite Vox Veritatis to a broadcast. You said the idea was interesting but that a conversation about history isn’t very relevant right now.
By the way, coming back to that topic—I actually think this idea might be relevant after all. So maybe we’ll even hold some historical discussions now. You know, I’ve been thinking about it, and this objection—that now isn’t the right time—seems very dangerous to me. If we keep saying that, there will never be a right time. So I think we might well get to historical discussions. And I think we should definitely invite that historian. The only question is whether he’ll want to talk to us—this is a separate question.
Mykola Pasyvny Link to heading
So, Galin, if you want to invite our historian on the topic of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, there’s no one better than Mykola Pasyvny. He’s the guru on the topic.
I don’t know him. We’ll look into it. And absolutely, if he’s interesting, we’ll definitely invite him.
With Alexander Kushner Link to heading
A question from Sasha in the chat. Could you get in touch with Alexander Kushner—he’s also in Lithuania sometimes—and ask him to duplicate his broadcasts on Telegram since YouTube isn’t available in many places? He could do what you do, or just set up a separate site like they did for the best Israeli radio.
Well, I’ll try to fulfill your request and reach out to him. I don’t know… but yes, I’ll write to him. I’ve copied your message and will send it to him.
On Naum Korzhavin Link to heading
So, a question from Anastasia Fainshtein. I became curious about Korzhavin. Wikipedia says he’s a Russian poet of Jewish origin, born in Kyiv, died in the US. Russian poet—funny, because he wrote in Russian. Please comment.
Dear Anastasia! You know, when I was doing research on the Jewish people in Russia, I had a whole section on culture and the question of who should be considered a Jewish poet or writer versus a Russian writer of Jewish origin. It’s clear, for example, that Sholem Aleichem is a Jewish writer—no question there. But what’s the criterion? If a writer writes in a Jewish language, that’s a Jewish writer. If a writer writes about Jews, that’s a Jewish writer. If they write for Jewish audiences, again—Jewish writer. But if a writer writes in Russian, not about Jewish themes, and for a non-Jewish audience, then they’re not a Jewish writer—they’re a writer of Jewish origin.
The same goes for Naum Moiseyevich Korzhavin. He was born not just in a Jewish family but in one with a very strong Jewish identity. If I remember correctly, both his father and grandfather were religious figures—real believers. But his work? It has nothing to do with the Jewish people. In fact, I know that in debates between russophiles and russophobes, he took a strongly russophile stance, defending the traditions of Russian culture. I’m not an expert on Korzhavin’s literary work, but I never came across a Jewish theme in his writing.
When I last came across him—though I didn’t know him personally—he was writing for Novaya Gazeta, in a column called “The Side,” and there was no Jewish theme in it. He was just a typical Russian journalist—oppositional, like everyone at Novaya Gazeta.
So, for me, the criterion is this: yes, he may be a Russian poet of Jewish origin, born in Kyiv, but his work was almost entirely in Russia, in Russian, and for a Russian audience. While his themes were broad, the core was always Russian. So yes, he’s a Russian poet of Jewish origin—but not a Jewish poet.
On Street Polls in Yerevan Link to heading
So, regarding participation in street polls—Leo. I’m interested in the possibility of joining in the street polls. I’m in Yerevan, have only a phone, don’t know Armenian, and haven’t done street polls before. What are the requirements, format? Any general advice?
Well, we’ve already given some initial instructions today on our channel. Maybe it would make sense to put together a little guide to help people assess their options ahead of time. Let’s start like this: let’s try to do a first street poll, see what the challenges are. Let’s give it a try. If it works, great—if not, well, no harm done. Let’s see how it goes!
On Trump and Protests in California Link to heading
Ivan, How can anyone dictate to federal officials to turn a blind eye to illegals? That’s a slap in the face to those who live here legally.
Well, I understand that this is about those clashes—Trump’s clashes with the protests in California. You see, it’s not about turning a blind eye to illegal immigrants. It’s about Trump breaking the law by sending in the National Guard and Marines without an invitation. The state authorities believe they can handle this themselves and don’t see it as a problem. This violence that Trump is imposing is what people are angry about—it’s the basis of the protests.
So what is a “slap in the face” to those who live here legally? This little town, where more than 80% are Latino, they live in a close-knit community. Sure, most of them are US citizens, but there are also plenty who’ve just arrived and are still working through their adaptation challenges. Overall, the community is willing to tolerate them. No one’s spitting in anyone’s face. It’s Trump who’s spitting in the face of California’s authorities and residents—who are ready to handle their problems on their own.
Remember, the United States is a country of immigrants. Who is Trump? Someone whose grandfather came from Germany. Elon Musk? A recent immigrant who was born in South Africa. So this anti-immigrant campaign—especially in a state that’s mostly against it—is really just part of Trump’s signature approach to everything. That’s the issue. Trump is the one who created this problem.
In continuation about the protests Link to heading
Valentina Galimova Dear Igor, why are the protests happening under the flag of another country? And I’ll add to this question. Khodorkovsky canceled Khodorkovsky. In California, mobs of hooligans with Palestinian flags are rampaging. Do you like them? Hatred for Trump is poisoning your brain.
Dear Mila! And here I’ll also respond to Valentina. I haven’t seen any Palestinian flags there. I’ve watched a huge number of videos. A huge number of photographs. And mostly there are Mexican flags. Maybe you’re just not distinguishing them. That is, maybe your love for Trump is poisoning both your brain and your eyes. So mainly there are Mexican flags, right? These are people from Mexico. And there are Mexican flags there. Do you know why? That is about Palestine, about Mila, who says that there are Palestinian flags. That’s not true. There is a difference. So, why are the protests taking place under the flag of another country? Because the United States of America is a free country. People protest however they want. That’s it.
About the “Founding Fathers” and Trump’s clash with institutions Link to heading
Alex Ivanov You didn’t really answer my question about the Founding Fathers, their system of checks and balances. The California exam is clear. But in general, if Trump completely ignores these institutions, what could happen? What do you think could happen? Ignoring court decisions. How to force them to comply with these decisions? Are there mechanisms? Could the system they created essentially become a sham?
You know, the system can’t become a sham because it has worked for several centuries and continues to work. And right now, this system is resisting. As for how to enforce these decisions? Well, I think they can. Congress can have its say, civil society can have its say. Right now, at this moment, civil society is protesting, in particular against the abuses of immigration authorities. Not only civil society, but also the states, the state governments. They can really have their say. Right now, a test is underway, yes? Resistance, as well. Americans are taking to the streets to defend their point of view. So right now, there is a test taking place.
About the difference between Babchenko and Portnikov Link to heading
Vladimir, please list them all. Explain, what is it? What is the difference between Babchenko and Portnikov? For some reason, it’s written in lowercase. Both of them, besides of course personal sympathies of the questions being asked. Both hate Zelensky, love Roshen chocolate. Babchenko, at least, does it openly. If possible, ask Portnikov how it feels to pilot a plane? Because he was very upset that an amateur like Zelensky took the controls. For me, they are both harmful. But don’t rush to label them as enemies. Because I listen to you every day and consider you the smartest.
Well, in general, thank you for the kind words. So, dear Vladimir. First of all, I’ll say right away that I don’t label as enemies everyone who has a different point of view, precisely why I read out all questions, including those with a negative connotation towards me. So you’re not enemies in any way; you’re friends, just with a different point of view. That’s all. I don’t label as enemies. I label Putinists and Trumpists. That’s it. Well, and also fascists. And rude people. But people with a different point of view—you’re my friends, just with a different perspective. So, dear Vladimir, I just don’t know if you watched the latest broadcast with Portnikov? Our joint one—it was yesterday at 9 PM. We often talk. You know, I just can’t imagine anything like that with Babchenko. The difference between Portnikov and Babchenko is a chasm. Because Portnikov is a person who is an unquestionable patriot of Ukraine. Well, he still believes that the Ukrainian people made a mistake by electing Zelensky. But his position isn’t to start and end every single speech with curses against Zelensky. That’s not the case. Overall, he stands on absolutely pro-Ukrainian positions. Babchenko, on the other hand, in every one of his speeches, nitpicks, smears Zelensky, smears Ukraine, and so on. So in reality, there’s a huge gap—just a chasm. Portnikov provides analysis; Babchenko throws mud. Look at what Babchenko does in his texts. It’s just open slander. Portnikov has a position. Yes, a position I don’t agree with. But here, there’s a chasm. And then there’s Babchenko’s whole “burn, burn brightly” attitude. These are people who, to some extent, we talked about Stomakhin—he has a similar attitude towards, let’s say, Russians. “Burn, burn brightly.” Portnikov has nothing like that. So there’s a chasm here.
A series of questions about Russian “opposition leaders” Link to heading
So. Comments. Leopold. Allow me a few words in defense of the Anti-Corruption Foundation. Yes, fighting corruption strengthens the aggressor’s economy. But the nuance is that within the system, corruption is mostly already known. However, the fight against it is still not being carried out.
Well, and so on. So, you know, I think the fight against corruption within the system is being carried out, but it’s selective, it’s sluggish. But the activity of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, I’ve already answered this point, they’re hand in hand with the prosecutor’s office, hand in hand with the Investigative Committee. And yes, indeed, it increases the amount of money in the budget, which can also be spent on war.
A comment from a subscriber named “real estate.” Igor Alexandrovich, don’t be shy about giving clear definitions. Traditionally for you, bowing to the late Navalny isn’t necessary. It’s not necessary, in my opinion, even from the phrase “Boy, bring us some vodka.” It was clear that Yulia Navalnaya. I must quote: “Dumb chicken, now happily jumping on the flag of Volkov’s scam company, which for some reason Vladimir Kara-Murza joined.” Now that’s truly a naïve person who doesn’t understand at all who he’s gotten involved with.
I think Vladimir Vladimirovich Kara-Murza is not a naïve person, but a sophisticated and, without a doubt, smart person. That’s why I wouldn’t just call him… well, I personally know him, and I consider him an experienced politician, sophisticated and knowing what he’s doing. And as for Yulia Navalnaya, well, I’d avoid those sorts of… those sorts of crude remarks. But overall, I agree with the assessment.
A question from Alexander. The infighting among the Russian opposition isn’t my business, as a Ukrainian living in Israel. But you really surprised me. Let’s start with the simplest thing. Does corruption affect the amount of weapons killing Ukrainians? The classic scenario: “Dad, will you drink less?” “No, son, you’ll just eat less, even if everything’s stolen.” The amount of shells and everything else will be limited only by production capacity and the capabilities of the Korean, Iranian, and Chinese comrades. There will be no more money for anything else. But who cares? Regarding the big three: Yashin and Kara-Murza—everyone understands. But you’ve said yourself more than once that they’re focused on a hypothetical voter in Russia. What should they say? Arm Ukraine to the maximum. It’ll defeat Russia, and then we’ll go there on a white horse. Who else do European politicians know besides them? Kasparov, besides Kasparov. But he’s in the States. And Yulia Navalnaya can only be sympathized with. She was a wonderful wife, but she can’t become an independent political figure. And she’s still seen that way by inertia, as her relationship with Alexei is transferred onto her. Imagine a situation where, with Mikhail Sergeyevich, the reins of power in Ukraine were handed to Maximovna, who was seen as a comrade. My point is that you’re taking these not-so-significant events far too seriously. In my view, what’s significant is that the Russian opposition still hasn’t put forward any alternative politicians to these people. Right?
Well, about the hypothesis that the reins of power would have been handed to Raisa Maximovna—that structure of power in the Soviet Union didn’t allow for that. As for whether corruption affects Russia’s military potential—it does. You see, when corruption occurs in the military-industrial complex, it has an impact. And in the end, yes, I also believe that the blows, the sanctions strikes, they weaken Russia’s economy, but not, so to speak, Putin doesn’t sacrifice the civilian sector. But still, nonetheless, the overall state of Russia’s economy definitely affects its military potential. So this phrase—“Son, you’ll just eat less, and I’ll keep drinking”—it’s rhetorical, not literal. But still, if there’s no money, there’ll be less to drink as well. So corruption undoubtedly affects Russia’s economy. And if there’s less corruption, then obviously there’s more money. Overall, the budget feels more secure, and overall there’s more money left over for AI, for the production of all sorts of deadly hardware.
And about the insignificance, well, yes, in general, it’s not the most significant event, but nonetheless. You see, in our conversation today, for example, I haven’t said a single word about Shlosberg. I definitely will, because you see, that’s an environment that, one way or another, overlaps with ours. We’re in adjacent areas of this social field. So I think many people are interested in it. The significance, you see, we choose from a huge number of events the ones that are close to us—not by their global significance, but also by proximity, you see? Because there are very significant events, but they’re far away from us. So they affect us less. But what’s happening—we still have about 40% of our audience being Russians, residents of Russia or those connected to it. So we’re going to touch on these issues, even though they might not be the most important ones.
So, Alina, I want to defend, defend Yulia Navalnaya. It’s not nice of you to discuss her. How are you any better? She’s a wonderful, brave person, boldly fighting Putinism. It would be great if she became president of Russia.
Well, I’ll leave that without comment. I’m just reading it out so that you know that this opinion also exists.
Gennady Konovalov. It’s noteworthy that you devoted an order of magnitude more time to the speeches of Yashin, Kara-Murza, and the self-proclaimed Navalny in the European Parliament than to the war itself. With your thinly veiled hatred for certain representatives of the Russian opposition, you’re starting to remind me of the ICC’s Abaev. If they’re not fit to be opposition leaders, then take Khodorkovsky. He, without any false modesty, has long since appointed himself the leader of the Russian opposition.
Dear Gennady, how exactly? Can you substantiate that with something? When and how? Khodorkovsky? No, I don’t mind. Just give me a fact—when did he appoint himself leader, when did Khodorkovsky say he was the leader of the Russian opposition? Navalny said directly, “We are the united opposition, we have united, we are the united opposition.” When did Khodorkovsky appoint himself the leader of the opposition? And as for corruption—corruption, the general moral decay in Putin’s Russia, have indeed led gradually to the emergence of fascism. Well, again, I can immediately say—what’s the logic here? What’s the roadmap? How do you see it, dear Gennady? You think that if you fight corruption, fascism will disappear? Is that it? So if you expose the helicopter guys, that will lead to the disappearance of fascism, is that it? Well, that’s absurd. Don’t you see that yourself?
Comment about the thumbnails Link to heading
So. A comment from Max. This is a kind of online street talk. I’m a passerby. I was asked about the illustrations. My attitude towards the thumbnails of the videos is zero. I don’t look at them, I don’t look at them like a puzzle. I don’t get distracted by them at all. If the thumbnail was just a black background with “7-40” in bold in the center, the date at the top, and the day of the week at the bottom, I’d be happy.
Dear Max, that’s your perception. I think that for the vast majority of people—it’s well known that the vast majority of people do react to images, they do react. And such a strict limitation of images—like a black background and only “7-40”—would lower this. It would make it worse. You see, people react not only to content, but also to form. That’s how people are. For example, I know for sure that because I’m not in great shape right now, because I’ve been constantly coughing, that reduces—really reduces—views. I’m sure of it, I know it for a fact. I don’t know by how much, but I know it does. So form matters.
Comment about Korzhavin Link to heading
So-so. Serafim Lozhkin. If a Ukrainian had read Korzhavin’s poem, especially in the Ukrainian language, he wouldn’t have had any questions in Ukrainian at all. In Ukrainian. “Man” means “man.” Well, it’s the same. Physicist. Says that in Ukrainian the word “man” means “man, husband.”
Yes, that’s true. Korzhavin has Ukrainian roots. He’s from Kyiv. Perhaps, perhaps, here I, here I won’t argue.
Concluding words Link to heading
Well, dear friends, this concludes our morning stream for today. Please take care of yourselves. Freedom for Alexander Skobov! By the way, despite the fact that we didn’t analyze today what happened with—what happened with the Yabloko members—his name slipped my mind—poor health is catching up to me—Shlosberg. So freedom for Shlosberg, despite all my serious disagreements with him. A man who was detained absolutely unjustly. Freedom to all Ukrainian prisoners and Russian political prisoners. See you soon. Take care. Goodbye.
Source: https://youtu.be/kNsRV9LXynw