Trump set a psychological deadline for Putin but forgot to name the date. Perhaps this is a know-how of combining the principle of a deadline with the practice of procrastination.
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 1st. It’s 7:41 AM in Kyiv. Well, actually, in Moscow too, and in the Baltic countries. So now we all share the same time. And, as usual at this hour, we move on to discussing the issues and events taking place in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.
Spring Draft in Russia Link to heading
Just a couple of updates on what’s happening in Russia. Putin signed a decree on the spring military draft, which begins today. The decree will be in effect until July 15. It is planned to conscript 160,000 citizens aged 18 to 30 for compulsory military service. As usual, the State Duma and the Ministry of Defense declared that conscripts would not be sent to the special operation zone. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense stated that the draft is in no way connected to the conduct of special operations. Well, it’s clear that this is a lie. It’s obvious that after some time, we will see a certain number of conscripts at the front. This is done very simply. A person who ends up in the army is completely deprived of rights, and special procedures will be carried out to get them to sign a contract. The voluntary nature of this contract is, well, clear. Is there some pressure? A person who is in practically slave-like conditions has very few means of resisting such pressure. So, some portion of the conscripts will end up at the front eventually. By the way, this is closely related to the alarming reports coming from the Western press. In particular, the Associated Press reports that a massive offensive by Russian occupiers on the northwestern regions of Ukraine is expected soon. President Zelensky is also talking about this. It’s clear that for a large-scale offensive, there are currently not enough forces. That’s why Putin desperately needs reinforcements. Part of that reinforcement may come from the draft. Although, in any case, there still won’t be enough troops for a massive offensive because, according to experts, a serious attack on Ukraine’s regional centers would require at least 2 million people, but there will definitely be some reinforcements from the draft. So this is not an innocuous development. The only thing one can wish for is that Russian citizens focus on doing everything possible to avoid being drafted. A draft is, of course, not exactly the same as mobilization. But in any case, the risk of ending up in Ukraine’s black soil is quite high for those being conscripted now.
Trump Gave Putin an Unlimited Deadline Link to heading
And now let’s move on to the main source of news. It’s still Trump. And unfortunately, even though we’d really like to stop mentioning his name, he still remains the main newsmaker. His recent statement declared that Russia cannot drag out the negotiations forever, so a deadline has been set for Moscow to agree to a ceasefire. This is a psychological deadline, Trump said, adding that talks between Moscow and Kyiv are ongoing, albeit in an unfriendly atmosphere. Honestly, I don’t know what negotiations Trump is referring to, as neither Moscow nor Kyiv confirms that such talks are happening. But this is yet another peculiarity of Trump—when he speaks, it’s often unclear what he actually means.
According to Trump, Putin and Zelensky deeply hate each other, but he believes they will manage to overcome their differences. Well, yes, it’s quite surprising. Putin attacked Ukraine, launched an invasion, killed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, and left many homeless—and somehow people feel negatively about him. Strange indeed. Truly something to marvel at.
Now, about this so-called psychological deadline. A deadline, by definition, is a date—a specific time by which something must be done. It’s a clearly defined point when a task should be completed. In this case, we have a truly unique phenomenon: a deadline without any actual deadline. Trump declared there is a psychological deadline for Putin, but never said what the date is. Did the president of Finland name the date? He said it was April 20, but he’s not Donald Trump, and his position doesn’t carry the same weight for Putin.
So we have the word “deadline” mentioned, but no actual date given. This is a unique concept—a deadline without a time limit. An unlimited deadline, something like wooden iron or fried ice. From a formal logic perspective, it’s absurd. But for Trump, this seems to be a very fitting idea. It’s his own innovation—trying to fit the concept of a deadline into the culture of procrastination, constant postponement, which is very typical for Trump. He has a classic procrastinator’s style—first he says peace will be established in 24 hours, then in 100 days, then he names more dates. These constant delays are, in everyday life, a hallmark of people who are seen as unreliable. “Tomorrow, not today”—we all know people who speak like that.
For Trump, this kind of fluidity, this constant substitution of one thing for another, is very characteristic, especially in terms of time management. The idea of an unlimited deadline really reflects Trump’s postmodern approach. I think it’s one of his postmodern know-hows. So I don’t think Putin needs to worry too much about this deadline or about Trump’s wrath.
It’ll be interesting to see whether a conversation between Trump and Putin actually happens this week—it’s not guaranteed. That’s another hallmark of Trump: he scheduled negotiations with Putin this week, but it’ll be interesting to see if that turns into another postponement, another act of procrastination. We’ll be watching.
Coalition in Europe Link to heading
At the same time, a certain consolidation of will is taking place in Europe. This “coalition of will,” which we discussed in detail with Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, is crystallizing, and what has emerged here is, so to speak, the Big Five Plus—or rather, the Big Six: Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The foreign ministers of these countries met and made a rather serious statement about their readiness to strengthen sanctions pressure on Russia. In addition, they issued a fairly tough statement regarding the idea of a ceasefire, making it clear they are not willing to stand aside. They stated that they will not accept any peace agreement that limits Ukraine’s military or defense industry, or the military presence of partner countries in Ukraine.
Moreover, they declared that Russian assets in Western countries must remain frozen until Russia ends the war and compensates Ukraine for the damage caused. This firm stance from these six countries—Europe’s leading nations—essentially expressed their unwillingness to let the fate of Ukraine be decided solely by Trump. At the very least, this was stated quite firmly. Well, that’s basically what I wanted to share with you today.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
And now I’ll move on to answering your questions. I can say right away that there are a lot of them, so I won’t be able to respond to all of them today. But I’ve noted down the questions I won’t have time to answer, and I will definitely get to them tomorrow.
Kadyrovites – Part of Putinism? Link to heading
So, a question from Dmitry Lemeshev:
Can the concept of the Kadyrovites be considered a particular case of Putinism, or does this phenomenon have unique social and socio-historical aspects?
Well, I think the Kadyrovites are undoubtedly a phenomenon that emerged in connection with Putinism—no question about that. But it’s also an independent phenomenon that can’t be entirely reduced to it. So, what is it—a particular case of Putinism? Yes, definitely. Kadyrov and Chechnya are attributes of Chechnya, and of Putinism as well—undoubtedly. Of course, there are unique social and historical aspects involved here, related to the Chechen people’s struggle, to Putin’s need to suppress that struggle, and to the betrayal by the Kadyrov clan. So yes, there are certainly unique socio-historical elements. But this phenomenon is, of course, closely tied to Putinism. I’m not sure—I might not be grasping the full depth of the question, but it seems to me the answer is fairly straightforward. Unfortunately, it’s a bit banal.
On the Upcoming Russian Offensive Link to heading
Margarita:
Have you heard that a large-scale attack on Ukraine is being prepared for May? I spoke with a friend from Kyiv today, and she told me this. When I asked her source, she said Zelensky mentioned it. The war is ongoing, people are dying all the time. But this was specifically about a major offensive.
Yes, this was indeed mentioned in Zelensky’s address, and in media reports as well. At least I saw material from the Associated Press that spoke of a large-scale offensive. Experts, however, are not in agreement that this would be a truly large-scale assault. The talk is about strikes on the northeastern regions of Ukraine, particularly Sumy, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. But there’s no confidence that Putin has the strength for a large-scale offensive—that is, one that would seriously threaten regional centers. That’s almost out of the question. There simply aren’t enough forces.
Yes, some groupings can be concentrated for these strikes, but not ones that pose a real threat to major cities. According to expert assessments, the maximum force that could be concentrated in the northeastern direction is around 50,000 to 60,000 troops. That is clearly not enough to pose any serious threat to regional centers. So again, it becomes a matter of terminology—what does “large-scale” really mean? This will clearly not be a serious threat.
On Creating an English-Language Channel Link to heading
So, two questions—or rather, suggestions—of a similar nature. I’ll read them out and try to respond. A question from Yulia:
In your morning broadcast, you said you’d like to see a more active viewership. I suggest that we, your subscribers, create a program to be broadcast in the US. I’ll say upfront, you wouldn’t be the one announcing it, as we all understand you simply don’t have the time, but maybe it’s possible to organize those of us who are willing, just this once. An English-language version on YouTube. Title suggestion: “Attention! Fact.” Broadcast no less than three times a week. No host, no discussions or dialogues. First, we show a speech by Trump or his publications in the media, then a rebuttal. The source of the rebuttal—for example, Trump says, “I don’t like saying this, but Zelensky’s support is around 4%.” Then a printed poll of Ukrainians is shown on screen. Voice-over: “According to a poll on [date], by [organization], the support was 72%.” And so on, for each of Trump and his team’s statements. Focus especially on numbers, historical facts, financial flows, and so on. No commentary, no discussion. Just a dry format: statement, rebuttal. I think busy people don’t have time to read the press, but a program like ‘Attention, Fact’ would be a success.
And then the follow-up:
Could you help organize a group of those interested?
I’ll also read a similar comment—a suggestion from Sergey, which aligns with Yulia’s idea, and I’ll respond to both together. Sergey writes:
A few days ago, I reached out to you with a suggestion. Here’s another try. Could you once again announce it, inviting anyone who’s interested to take it up? Considering the channel’s reach of 300,000 subscribers, perhaps someone will bring it to life. My idea is this: you could make a huge contribution to Ukraine’s victory—or rather, to the defeat of Trump’s team in the 2026 and 2028 elections. The idea: create an English-language channel tentatively called “Trump’s Lies and His Team’s Lies.” Where we catch them in their words, in their ignorance—Trump, Whitkoff, Musk’s arrogance, etc. And so on. Sergey basically repeats Yulia’s idea. He adds that you personally don’t need to do it, but perhaps some people on your team or trusted subscribers could. You figured out moderation—so the same could apply here, just under your supervision.
Dear Yulia and Sergey,
Look, the idea is excellent—there’s no doubt about that. It’s sound, well thought out, and logical. But I have to say right away that if we’re talking about simply tossing the idea out there for someone else to independently make a separate channel—well, I don’t think that’s very constructive. The idea is already in the air, and if someone wants to do it, great. But where do I come in, exactly?
If the idea is to create another channel—or even, as Yulia suggested, to post a few episodes of “Attention! Fact” on my channel—then let’s be realistic. I immediately imagine what that looks like. This wouldn’t be a stream, it would be a recorded video, requiring a dedicated team. There has to be a script, material selection, editing, voice-over—in short, it’s a proper video production, or essentially a small documentary. Either way, it’s serious, detailed work. And especially since we’re dealing with facts, we have to stand by everything we present.
And let’s be clear—anything published on our channel is my responsibility, which means I’d be accountable. So fully delegating it, doing it on the fly or in some amateur way in someone’s spare time—that’s just not realistic. This is real production. I can tell you—it’s like adding another 24 hours to the day. I already have a new project coming up this week, a UN tribunal initiative, and that alone will require an even tighter schedule. I couldn’t even release a new episode of “Trumpophrenia” this Sunday because I simply ran out of time.
So yes, I’m absolutely supportive of the idea—but I struggle to imagine how it can be done as you describe, purely by subscribers without my involvement. I mean, theoretically it’s possible, but here’s what I suggest: let’s not discard the idea, because it’s genuinely a good one. We have a Telegram channel with a chat—that’s where I suggest interested people take a look. There’s some degree of personalization there, so I can understand who’s really willing to take part. Maybe a group can form there with people who’d like to take this on, and from there we can move to a real, practical discussion of the proposal—what resources people have, meaning not money, but time, professional skills, and so on.
To actually make this happen—and for me to personally commit my time and energy—because without me it won’t work, unless it’s a professional journalist taking it on—I’m willing, honestly, to provide a platform on our channel for a professional team to do this. I’m not looking to be in the spotlight all the time; I don’t have a shortage of publicity, so there’s no problem there.
If a professional team emerges, I’d be happy to give them space on our channel. But again, this needs to be discussed in a serious, practical format. It’s a good idea—I definitely don’t want to dismiss it.
The Idea of Deploying Russian Military Resistance in Kazakhstan Link to heading
Denys Lyubarev:
Could Ukraine negotiate with Kazakhstan to hold joint military exercises on Kazakh territory involving the Siberian Battalion and other Russian military personnel fighting on Ukraine’s side? Please ask the experts for their opinion. Maybe it’s possible?
You know, dear Denys, I won’t even need to ask the experts, because I understand that this is, let’s say, absolutely impossible—just completely. I’m not equating Kazakhstan with Belarus, of course, but the issue is that Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, a military-political alliance led by Russia. There have even been cases where Kazakhstan has extradited Russians who fled mobilization back to Russia upon request. So this scenario is, unfortunately, entirely unrealistic.
Proposal for Viewers to Act as Moderators Link to heading
A rather lengthy message—not exactly a question, more of a critique—from Ubludok Jones. Here’s what Ubludok Jones writes:
About the segment involving your viewers: I’d like to see a viewer choose questions—say, five of those you haven’t answered, or where your response was incomplete or vague. It’s irritating when you pick the most convenient part of a complex question, answer that, and then triumphantly congratulate the opponent on their ignorance, imprecision, or dishonesty. With a viewer involved, someone could challenge you and ask clarifying questions—this would be more honest, in my opinion. By the way, I’ve long wanted to ask: do you somehow organize questions delegated to you for your guests, grouping them by expert? There were questions here about the division of USSR assets after the collapse—by all successor states. I think Dmitry Borisovich Oreshkin could handle that perfectly, especially if given a couple days to prepare. I’d like to pose a question through you, perhaps to Osechkin or Romanova—what should prisons look like in the country of our future?
Then Ubludok Jones goes on to describe what such a prison could be like. And finally, he writes:
Stop ignoring my question to you as a philosopher. I have no one else to ask: does the statement “Crimea belongs to Ukraine” fall under the modality of the normative or the modality of actuality? If you ignore it again, or are afraid of any of the above questions—I’ll understand, as always.
You know, Ubludok Jones, I believe I’ve already answered that last question. To me, it’s absolutely clear that the statement “Crimea belongs to Ukraine” falls under the normative modality—that’s obvious. I believe it’s normative in the sense of international law, of “ought to be.” That’s exactly what it is. And the fact that, in reality, it’s an occupied territory controlled by Russia—that’s just as obvious. I suspect you might just be trolling here. Well, everyone has their own sense of humor. But yes—it’s clearly a normative modality.
Now, regarding the idea of creating a kind of viewer-moderator—I’d say this: if we extract the rational kernel from what you’re proposing, you’re essentially suggesting the creation of an ombudsman. As for the claim that I avoid tough questions—that’s simply untrue. I never dodge sharp questions, I don’t cherry-pick convenient parts. I always read the full question out loud. So, obviously, I don’t hide any part of it. And I answer as I see fit.
As for having a viewer pose uncomfortable questions—that’s not something I oppose. But this is a broader concept. It’s the idea of an ombudsman—a kind of internal critic on the channel. It’s a concept that may indeed be viable. I’m actually a fan of media ombudsmen. I was once very enthusiastic about the work of the ombudsman at The Guardian—actually, they had several over time. But here’s the thing: a YouTube channel is not quite the same as a media outlet. Still, I’ve long had the idea of having some sort of internal critic on the channel.
But again, this comes down to trust. It’s about the person. What kind of ombudsman would be ideal for me? Well, someone like… like Skobov, you see? A person of that kind. Of course, Skobov, as we know, is currently occupied with other, far more serious matters. God willing, he continues. We started a program with him—Prison Notebooks, which his wife was passing on. Sadly, he’s now likely to be sent to prison; his sentence has already been passed. So unfortunately, that project is on hold. But that’s another story.
In any case, it comes down to the individual. Regarding the delegation of questions to experts—I do try to do that. Yes, not always, but I try. The idea to have Oreshkin analyze this issue—well, asking a busy person to take on a new task… I’m not 100% sure he’d find that relevant. But it’s a good idea. I’ll ask. I’ll talk to Dmitry Borisovich about doing an analysis of how the USSR’s assets were divided after the collapse. Again—it’s a big undertaking. I’m not sure he’ll agree. But I will ask him.
What’s wrong with UN external governance of Ukraine Link to heading
Question from Alex
Explain what’s wrong with external governance by the UN. It recognizes Ukrainian territories, therefore it first selects not Ukrainian formations from Ukrainian territory, from Crimea, from Donetsk and Luhansk. It takes measures to cleanse the territory of illegitimate populations, ensures independence from hostile external influence, guarantees democratic elections, and most importantly, calls on all members to maintain order; it can act through the General Assembly.
You know, I read your question, Alex, and at first I thought it came from… well, to put it bluntly, it’s a strange one, because it’s just so disconnected from reality. External governance is established only under specific circumstances. First of all, the goal of external governance—it is imposed when a country is either occupied as a result of military defeat. Germany, for example, was subjected to external governance after it was defeated in the war. That was an occupation, and it was managed by four countries. The same thing happened with Japan. It was also occupied and placed under external governance. That’s one case. Another case is when there is complete ungovernability in a country—meaning the government is entirely unable to manage processes. Ukraine has neither suffered military defeat, nor is it completely nonfunctional. So the idea itself was invented by Putin. Are we supposed to support this idea? Of course not. That’s why the concept is absurd.
Besides, external governance by the UN—by whom exactly? Who will actually manage it? In the General Assembly, there are two countries—Russia and China—that would clearly seek to turn this external governance into full-blown occupation. So again, the positions of General Assembly members are directly opposed. For example, under Trump, the U.S. position could theoretically side with Russia. But in any case, the UK and France would clearly take an entirely opposite stance. Therefore, I think this is pure fantasy. Putin floated the idea with clearly provocative intentions. So this idea has no chance of being implemented, and even in the extremely unlikely case of success, it would simply lead to the destruction of Ukraine as a country.
On the development of nuclear weapons in Ukraine Link to heading
Next is a letter from Ruslan with one question
Why hasn’t Ukraine started working on thermonuclear weapons yet? If Ukraine does not create thermonuclear weapons, it is doomed to a shameful capitulation—that is, to inevitable destruction. Because a non-nuclear country cannot defeat a nuclear country. Ruslan then writes a fairly long argument explaining why Ukraine must develop nuclear weapons. And finally concludes: the guarantee of peace in Ukraine is a Ukrainian hydrogen bomb.
I fully support the idea of Ukraine developing nuclear and hydrogen weapons. Everything—absolutely everything—is correct. Unlike many of my interlocutors, I believe Ukraine has the potential to do this. But I disagree with one of your points: that a non-nuclear country cannot defeat a nuclear one. There are plenty of examples of non-nuclear countries defeating nuclear powers. Afghanistan, in effect, defeated the Soviet Union—the world’s second most powerful nuclear state. It also forced out the Americans, the world’s leading nuclear power. At one time, Vietnam—yes, with the involvement of another nuclear state, of course—nonetheless forced them to leave and essentially defeated the top nuclear power. So such cases do exist, have existed, and will continue to exist.
The key issue is that you assume that in this war, a nuclear power must necessarily resort to a nuclear strike. I believe that is extremely unlikely. But in any case, I support your idea. The problem is clear. The issue is that the countries currently aiding Ukraine will resist this program in every possible way. As soon as Ukraine begins implementing such a program, it will immediately face strong opposition not only from the United States but also from its European partners. So that’s where the problem lies. Right?
If Israel doesn’t have a constitution, does that mean it’s not a real state? Link to heading
Tofik Mamedov,
Please explain to me why the state of Israel has no Constitution, or whether Israel is just fine with that. Is it simply the military-political arm of the U.S.? Maybe Israel is just a U.S. military base?
You know, well, I’m not sure… you seem to have a certain… Anyway, never mind—I won’t comment on your personal stance here. Let me answer the question. You see, having a constitution is not a mandatory attribute of a state. There are different legal systems. Britain, for example, functions perfectly well without any written constitution. It operates under what’s called common law, where judicial decisions are the main source of law. Israel, to some extent, adopted this British model.
Initially, when Israel was established, it was indeed supposed—according to the Declaration of Independence—to adopt a constitution shortly after the founding of the state. But, as we both know, right after the state of Israel was declared, seven Arab nations immediately declared war on it, aiming to destroy the Jewish state. So there was no time for a constitution. And now, the question of creating one has been debated for over 70 years. But Israel continues to function without a constitution, just like the UK—governed by its Basic Laws and legal precedents.
As far as I know, the debate over whether Israel needs a constitution is now fading into the background. Ben-Gurion, one of the founding fathers of the state, initially supported the idea of a constitution when Israel was established. But by around 1950, he changed his mind. In his famous Knesset speech, he said that all the dangers that worry constitution advocates are actually just as present in countries that do have constitutions. In other words, the problems of a country with a constitution are no different from those of a country without one. That’s the essence of it—I’m paraphrasing because I don’t have the full speech in front of me.
So overall, I think Israel can live perfectly well without a constitution, just like the UK. Countries that do have constitutions—take Russia, for example—can still be examples of total lawlessness. So a constitution doesn’t guarantee justice, and the lack of one doesn’t mean the absence of law. As for the claim that Israel is a U.S. military base—well, it’s hard for me to respond to ideas that are completely detached from reality. I’m uncomfortable even calling such ideas by name. That hypothesis simply has nothing to do with how things actually are.
The Oscars and anti-Israeli propaganda Link to heading
Marina. Marina from Israel
Regarding so-called quality journalism—what do you think about the Oscar being awarded in the documentary category to the openly anti-Israeli and completely deceitful film No Other Land?*
You know, how can one respond to this? You can only view it as part of the broader wave of anti-Israeli propaganda sweeping the West—a wave of anti-Israeli sentiment tied to understandable, natural human sympathy for the Palestinian people, but completely disconnected from the real causes and real processes taking place in the Middle East. This film, No Other Land, was created by activists—these are not journalists, but activists. It’s essentially a direct-action film.
Let me give you an example, Marina—pardon me for digressing a bit, but this is important. I can easily imagine a similar film about the bombing of Dresden, where the residents of Nazi Germany are portrayed as victims. The bombing of Dresden—an awful crime. You could show cold, helmeted British pilots killing civilians. Or a film could be made using footage of Ukrainian drone strikes—showing the grim, fierce faces of Ukrainian soldiers launching drones and the poor residents of Russia’s Belgorod region hiding in fear, some of whom have died. All of that exists. So you could create such an emotional, one-sided “direct-action” film, and then the global humanist community would start sympathizing with the Russians suffering from Ukrainian brutality—or with residents of the Third Reich being slaughtered from the air by sadistic British pilots. That’s the kind of film we’re talking about here.
There’s no exploration of why Israeli soldiers are doing what they’re doing. What are the actual roots of all this? The filmmakers only focus on the immediate image—here’s a suffering Palestinian kissing his land because he doesn’t want to give it up. But what’s the cause of all this? Where are the October 7th scenes? Where is the footage of the genocide against the Jewish people? Where is the footage of the endless, ongoing terror attacks by Palestinians, by people from Gaza who go into Israeli streets and kill civilians?
There’s no understanding of what Israelis are even trying to achieve. The film presents it as: on one side, poor Palestinians, and on the other—sadistic Israelis. It’s a political statement aimed in a very specific direction. Again, it’s just like portraying the bombing of Dresden as pure sadism by British pilots—sadists who simply enjoy killing unarmed Germans. That’s the kind of thing this is.
And the fact that it’s sweeping awards—well, yes, that’s the problem of today’s film-industry establishment.
About Echo of Moscow, Venediktov, Shenderovich, Plyushchev Link to heading
So, we have a lot of long and challenging questions today—I’d even call them confrontational. But that’s a good thing. The user “Melancholy Donkey” continues the discussion about Echo of Moscow. I’ll read it in full because the position presented is important. Here’s the text from Donkey:
In May 2015, [Korzon] announced his resignation from Echo of Moscow. The decision to leave was due to offensive remarks made by deputy editor Lesya Ryabtseva on Echo’s website blog about the opposition and the station’s staff, to which editor-in-chief Alexei Venediktov did not respond. Korzon believed his silence implied agreement with her derogatory labels. Thus, the station today is betraying its core audience in favor of ratings at the expense of fundamental values. The Echo we started in the ’90s no longer exists. The body still functions, but brain death has already occurred, Korzon stated. Then comes the question: Is Sergey Korzon, in this case, also someone with weak and nonviable views leading to ideological and political collapse, as you put it, Mr. Lipsits? Igor Aleksandrovich, I honestly don’t understand why complicate what’s been said, replacing concepts and applying labels? Things like ‘inner circle,’ ‘handshakes,’ ‘coded terms’—what does any of that have to do with it? I haven’t accused you of anything, certainly not of being three or six handshakes away from someone. I believe it’s all quite simple and specific—Plyushchev and Shenderovich, fully aware of what Echo had become, continued working there and lent it credibility. They were the last of the Mohicans still respected by decent people, and they attracted hundreds of thousands of listeners to what had become Kremlin Echo, to Venediktov. All three understood exactly what was going on. They were the carrots luring listeners into this dumpster and making content for Venediktov. Meanwhile, people like Liza, Alexey, Markov, and the morally ambiguous Remchukov waited in ambush to brainwash the audience. That was Plyushchev and Shenderovich’s real role for Venediktov. So either they were useful idiots, unaware they were being used, or scumbags who knew and still chose to work at Putin’s radio. Therefore, they were helping strengthen the regime. I say Venediktov is just as much a Putin functionary as Simonyan, Kiselyov, Solovyov, and the rest. In fact, Venediktov is even worse, because those others are at least more honest—or at least they don’t hide their vile essence. Venediktov pretends to be a liberal anti-Putinist, but in reality he’s no better than the rest. There’s not a square inch on him free of blame, etc. Even after the full-scale war began, he tried to justify mass killings. And so on. After all that, to continue working with him as if nothing happened is the same as co-hosting with Solovyov. For me, there’s no difference. Venediktov just has a fancier platform. He looks more respectable, but there’s no real difference. And as for the moral purity you seemed to reproach me for—what’s wrong with that? Listeners ask you to invite this or that person on the air, but you reject almost every second one, citing ‘hygiene’ and the respondent’s lack of integrity.
So, well—what can I say? I read the whole thing on purpose, and I want to respond directly.
First of all—look, Korzon left Echo in 2015 because of Lesya Ryabtseva. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have left. So here’s my question: was Korzon also a useful idiot or a scumbag before 2015? Just a question. By the way, I also used to appear on Echo of Moscow—only with Kara-Murza Sr., though. So was I a scumbag or an idiot too? Let’s just get our definitions straight.
The reality is this: Putin cleansed the media space. Echo remained one of the few places where many people—including myself, Shenderovich, and Plyushchev—could express their views. Of course, this is a serious problem. And when you say “don’t simplify, don’t overcomplicate,” my response is: don’t oversimplify either.
You could also claim that Alexander Skobov was a useful idiot or scumbag because he once served on the board of the Free Russia Forum alongside Alfred Koch. Or that being published on Kasparov.ru, where many different authors appear (some of whom I deeply disrespect), makes you complicit. Is that valid?
Being in the same media space—or publishing in the same magazine—with a range of people, some of whom I disapprove of, doesn’t mean I’m “like them.” This “guilt by association” logic is just flawed. It’s like saying if I talk to someone who talks to Putin, I’m also aligned with Putin. That’s not how relationships work.
Journalism is about communication. And communication means engaging with all sorts of people. The idea of total moral sterility is simply incompatible with the practice of journalism.
So I repeat—my attitude toward Venediktov is clear, but I do not equate him with Solovyov. They are different people with different levels of responsibility. Likewise, I don’t equate Venediktov with Shenderovich or Plyushchev. You are radically mistaken if you do.
Right now, as we speak, the editor of Osoboe Mnenie in St. Petersburg is messaging me—that’s still Echo. And I appear there because I see the difference between those people. Even if they’re part of the liberal “scene,” I go on air because I know I can get my message across to people I wouldn’t otherwise reach. And I think that matters.
Now, of course, there’s always the question: to what extent can you spread your ideas before you end up complicit in something unacceptable? That’s an individual judgment. It depends on the platform, the goal. And since this is my channel, I set the rules. And the rules are what I just described.
What if Trump starts bombing Kyiv Link to heading
Aleksey Alekseev
What do you think—if, God forbid, Trump gives the order to bomb Kyiv, how would the Trumpists react? Would they blame Biden or Ukraine?
You know, well, this thought experiment, I think it’s based on very risky assumptions. I believe the likelihood that Trump would give an order to bomb Kyiv is in the realm of science fiction. But if we still entertain such a hypothetical scenario, even though it’s clearly too far-fetched, then I think some part of the Trumpist base would support it. Trumpism is essentially a kind of totalitarian cult at its core.
Why isn’t there a new episode of Trumpophrenia? Link to heading
POSTANYUK
Why hasn’t there been a new episode of Trumpophrenia in a while? By the way, why? Will your acquaintance Mikhail Sheitelman be featured in this segment? I think he deserves it. Please consider it.
You know, I am considering it, as you put it—considering it. I’ve been observing Mikhail Pavlovich Sheitelman for quite some time. I haven’t noticed any signs of Trumpism in him. That’s the first thing. Why hasn’t there been a new Trumpophrenia? Well, I’m planning it. Planning it. It’s just that it’s work. And unfortunately, I haven’t had the time. I simply haven’t had the physical time.
Zelensky replaced the word “Russians” with “Russians” (ethnically) Link to heading
The person who asked the question is a subscriber named “So that he dies.” The question:
Actually, I need your opinion. In the last couple of weeks, Zelensky has had many speeches at round tables and other events. There have been a lot of press conferences, personal statements, and addresses. I noticed one particular fact—in all of Zelensky’s speeches, there’s one important change: he has completely excluded the word “rossiyane” (citizens of Russia). He used to use that term, but now he exclusively says “russkie” (ethnic Russians). Russian troops, Russian horde. Russian crimes, Russian atrocities. Russian propaganda, and so on. I’d like to hear your opinion—is this a change by his speechwriters, or something more? Maybe Russian speakers didn’t notice this because they don’t feel the Ukrainian language. The Ukrainian word Zelensky now uses translates specifically as “Russian.”
I… I hadn’t noticed that. But I don’t think it’s accidental. You see, we’re in the fourth year of war. And in general, the replacement of “rossiyane” with “russkie” is a hardening of rhetoric. It’s definitely a hardening of rhetoric. I would—this is important. It’s an important observation. Thank you for making it. This is a kind of rhetorical escalation, I’d say. There’s a kind of pyramid. A pyramid of escalating responsibility, escalating the issue of guilt. At the top of this pyramid—only Putin is to blame. Going down to the next level of the pyramid, we say the authorities are to blame. The next level—the “rossiyane” are to blame. Another level—the “russkie” are to blame. Another level—everyone is to blame, including political emigrants, including the opposition, including those in prison, and so on. Zelensky has gone through several stages of this pyramid. You remember how at the beginning of the war he addressed the “rossiyane”? He called on them, urged them to speak out against the war. Now he no longer addresses them, for obvious reasons. Yes, for Zelensky, he has passed through a certain trajectory—from perhaps hoping that there are forces in Russia capable of stopping the war, to, it seems to me, a hatred not just for Putin personally, but for the entire country and its people. So this escalation in rhetoric is the understandable and explainable result of four years of war, during which Zelensky’s citizens are being killed constantly. That’s all there is to it. This is escalation—an obvious escalation of rhetoric. Take note: during World War II, there was the slogan “Kill the German.” Not “kill the fascist,” not “kill the Hitlerite”—but specifically “kill the German.” And this is a similar story. And that slogan, if I’m not mistaken, didn’t appear in the fourth year of the war—it appeared in the second.
Can the Russian opposition strengthen relations with Ukraine? Link to heading
A question from a namesake, from Igor:
In 1987–88, U.S. President Ronald Reagan invited Soviet dissidents to the embassy in Moscow and spoke with them. Donald Trump invited Mikhail Khodorkovsky to his inauguration. On March 28, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine could hold talks with other representatives of Russia—businesspeople, opposition figures, or regional leaders—about ending the war. This was his response to a statement by Russian President Putin about introducing temporary external governance in Ukraine. On Saturday, on the Dozhd TV channel, Mikhail Khodorkovsky said that the Russian opposition has practically no relationship with the Ukrainian government. The question is: is that really the case, and is it possible to establish relations with the Ukrainian authorities? In other words, is there a way to use this situation for the common good?
You know, dear namesake, I don’t think that today the Ukrainian authorities are ready for any serious engagement with representatives of the Russian opposition. It’s just—do you understand? In general, some kind of dialogue is taking place, but not at that level. The question is, with whom exactly would they be holding this dialogue? Who is the Russian opposition? Is it Khodorkovsky? Or is it Kasparov? Or is it Yashin, or Yulia Navalnaya, or Volodya Kara-Murza? So again—who exactly is the Russian opposition, and on what subject should the Ukrainian government talk with them? I don’t fully understand that. And what can the Russian opposition offer? You see, Ukraine currently has specific needs. The first is money, the second is weapons. The third is soldiers at the front line, people to free Ukrainian prisoners, someone to try to pull out of Russia those people who were driven there from Ukraine. So what specific problems can Mikhail Borisovich Khodorkovsky solve? Well, he might be able to give money—depending on how much he wants to and can—but that doesn’t require contacts with the Ukrainian government. You see? So again—what exactly can the Russian opposition offer Ukraine? I know, for example, that the Free Russia Forum is trying to support those armed units made up of Russian volunteers fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. I’m also trying to help, though unfortunately the resources are very limited, but I’m also trying to send them money. What else? What exactly can the Russian opposition offer the Ukrainian authorities? First, we need to define that, and only then can we expect any kind of dialogue. That’s how it seems to me. Right?
Closing words Link to heading
As I already warned, unfortunately, I won’t be able to answer all the questions today, simply because time is tight. But I promise to answer all the remaining questions from yesterday’s stream, as well as those that come in today—I will definitely respond to them tomorrow. With that, I conclude this morning’s broadcast. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom to Aleksandr Skobov, to Ukrainian prisoners, and to Russian political detainees. All the best to you. Take care! See you soon!
Source: https://youtu.be/tQfslQjMkLc