Trump destroyed USAID and Voice of America, while Radio Liberty is still alive. After Trump’s lovebirds’ tweeting with Putin, the EU imposed four sanction regimes against Russia.

Main Topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is May 21. It’s 7:41 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, in Ukraine, and in our souls.

Summary of Bombings in Ukraine Link to heading

Putin’s peacemaking efforts, his aspirations. As we know, the relentless pursuit of peace in Ukraine continues today. The Ukrainian Air Force reported the destruction of 35 out of 180 Russian drones. Additionally, 58 unmanned aerial vehicles were neutralized by electronic warfare systems and did not reach their targets. So, this so-called peacemaking by Putin had limited success today.

USAID and Voice of America Link to heading

While Putin is trying to destroy Ukraine, his accomplice Trump is trying to destroy America and the West as a whole. So far, neither of them has had any decisive success. In particular, Trump’s efforts—here are the latest updates in this regard. Trump’s attempts to dismantle the soft power of the United States have certainly achieved some success, and quite significant at that, but not complete. Trump managed to kill—completely destroy—USAID and Voice of America. So, these two instruments of soft power, these two important components of the United States’ image, are finished. We can forget about them. I don’t know if it’s forever—I think that this kind of killing is, after all, final. It will be very difficult to restore them, even after Trump. But he did not manage to kill Liberty. The European Union—latest reports—will allocate $5.5 million in aid to Radio Liberty. This is urgent, emergency aid. This was announced yesterday by Katsi Katsi. But I must say, this is, of course, a partial measure. That is, in reality, it’s clear that the EU fully understands it will not be able to completely compensate for the global funding shortfall of these organizations. But some partial support and assistance is certainly there. Among other things, Katsi is now calling on the 27 EU member states to provide Radio Liberty with more long-term funding. For now, it’s unclear to me how much this EU support can actually achieve. First, the full scope of what Radio Liberty represented—as a powerful corporation broadcasting to a large number of countries—will hardly be compensated by the European Union. Still, we see that Trump’s efforts to destroy this soft power, to destroy the image and support of independent media around the world, are indeed being met with resistance. Just as Putin’s efforts to destroy Ukraine are being met with successful resistance from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. So these two accomplices are trying hard, but so far, thankfully, they are not entirely succeeding. Now, the main thing. The main topic is the landscape after.

Details on the Trump-Putin Conversation Link to heading

Following yesterday’s phone interaction between these two sweethearts, here are a few details. First, it turned out that during Trump’s call, the President of Russia was, as it happens, in a music school building in Sochi. That’s the territory of the Sirius Educational Center. I regularly monitor what’s happening on the Kremlin website, Kremlin.ru, and I noticed a lot of children’s events there—particularly, the Board of Trustees of the Talents and Success Foundation. This speech of his at the Sirius center, at the music school. So, the fact that he was talking to Trump during a visit to a music school is quite significant, because it means that Russian propaganda is emphasizing that Trump’s call was something very, very secondary. Putin was busy with important matters. He came to a music school. Music, children—those are important things. And then Trump called. Well, Putin is a polite man, he couldn’t not answer, but in between his important affairs, he spoke with the President of the United States. That’s how Russian propaganda is portraying this conversation from yesterday.

Overall, the key takeaway from this conversation is the increasing likelihood that Trump may want to pull out of the process—pack up and leave. Trump essentially repeated this point again when he commented on his talk with Putin. As usual, he said something vague, but the message can still be traced. I quote: “I think something will happen, but if not, we’ll just walk away. This is Europe’s issue.” So—will he leave or not? I still think that, first of all, Trump will not leave the negotiation process, at least he’ll remain in it formally. And second—he won’t slam the door on it. And secondly, Putin doesn’t want that either. Putin wants Trump to stay in the negotiation process—doing nothing in practice, but remaining formally involved—because, to some degree, this may serve, as Putin sees it, as a guarantee that the West won’t take any overly decisive actions.

European Sanctions Link to heading

Nevertheless, after this sweet two-hour chirping session, Europe made some decisions. In particular, yesterday, Tuesday, May 20, a large-scale meeting took place in Brussels in two simultaneous formats—foreign ministers and defense ministers of the European Union countries. They gathered on the same day, and the topic was, of course, Ukraine. First and foremost, economic sanctions were discussed. In general, the strategy toward Russia—how to pressure Putin in a way that would actually end the war. Naturally, both economic and military pressure were considered, given the involvement of foreign and defense ministers.

So, first, regarding economic pressure. That’s the reduction of the oil price cap. Currently, as we know, the cap is set at $60 per barrel. Today, this is completely absurd, because the actual price of Russian oil is already lower. So what’s the point of imposing a price cap when reality is already below it? Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba believes that reducing the oil price ceiling is the most effective measure against Russia. Well, I’ve expressed my opinion on this—who am I to advise the Foreign Minister of Ukraine? But I think the most effective measure would be a couple thousand Tomahawks. Still, lowering the oil price ceiling is also good. Kyiv, in particular, is proposing to radically drop it to $30 per barrel, while the EU is at least open to $50. I have strong doubts, first of all, that lowering the cap like this would actually make an impact. But in any case, it’s obvious—just by common sense—that if you’re going to set a cap, it should be below the real market price of oil.

So now, apparently, the EU by itself cannot solve this problem, because so much depends on the United States. Most likely, the final decision on this issue will be made on May 22. That is, right now, these days, what’s happening in Canada is the G7 finance ministers’ meeting—so that’s what’s being decided now, and I don’t yet know what was or wasn’t resolved.

Now, something significant regarding security guarantees for Ukraine: the so-called “coalition of the willing” has been joined by Belgium, which is quite important, because Belgium is an active country that strongly supports Ukraine.

And finally, perhaps the most important thing the European Union could and did decide on its own, without the United States, is the largest-ever coordinated implementation of multiple sanction regimes, which was approved yesterday in Brussels. These are the so-called four sanction regimes: the first is for the war in Ukraine, the second for hybrid attacks, the third for human rights violations, and the fourth for the use of chemical weapons. In total, over 130 individual sanctions were adopted, including against the Russian military-industrial complex, the shadow fleet, suppliers of sanctioned goods to Russia from third countries, and against the spreaders of propaganda and disinformation.

I won’t list them all—there are indeed many. These are specific personal sanctions against 75 new legal and physical entities, against 189 tankers and shadow fleet vessels. So really, this is slowly approaching total sanctions. Not quite there yet, but close.

As for the personal sanctions, some of the notable names include Judge Olesya Mendeleeva, who issued a guilty verdict against Alexey Grin; Svetlana Zhuravleva, the prosecutor who acted as the accuser in that case; and so on—judges, investigators, prosecutors, FSIN employees, and others. How effective are these personal sanctions? Well, their effectiveness is probably more symbolic, moral, than real. Because, of course, none of these people are planning to keep money in European banks or travel around Europe. So it’s more of a labeling exercise than a real blow.

The UK also imposed sanctions against Russia—this includes 18 shadow fleet vessels, British nationals who bought ships for oil export from Russia, and some financial sector companies. Importantly, it also includes staff from the Agency for Social Design, which is unquestionably a tool of Russian interference in democratic political processes. That’s arguably one of the more significant elements.

As for America, Trump has already stated that he is not currently prepared to impose any additional sanctions. The ones that exist will remain, but he won’t add more, because he believes it could destroy the intimate dialogue with Putin, which he thinks is leading to peace. Well, what can I say? Reason is powerless here. That’s the aftertaste of yesterday’s sweet little rendezvous.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

I’m moving on to your questions now. As for today’s upcoming schedule, I’m not sure I’ll be able to prepare a new Mediafrenia episode, even though there’s enough material—just because there are quite a few segments and live appearances today. We’ll see. If it works out, I’ll be sure to give you an early heads-up. So, let’s move on to your questions. First up, questions from the comments on yesterday’s stream.

Series of Questions About Trump Link to heading

First, a few questions about Trump. Alter John asks: Why do you think no journalist has ever asked Trump direct questions? For example, questions like: Did you receive money from Putin, the FSB, or related individuals? What kind of kompromat does Putin have on you? Are you Agent Krasnov? Why do you act with Putin like his little—well, I assume—dog or something like that?

That’s how Alter John sees the need to ask Trump tough questions. Well, dear colleague, what can I say? First of all, I don’t know exactly which questions have or haven’t been asked to Trump. I don’t do full-scale monitoring of American press conferences. I mostly watch, read, and listen to Trump himself, but I don’t track the Q&A in detail, so it’s possible questions like that have come up. That’s the first point.

Second, it should be noted that Trump has done quite a thorough cleanup of the pool of journalists who are allowed into the White House and can ask direct questions. That’s the second point.

And third—perhaps most importantly—I’m not sure that asking questions in such an offensive tone is good form. What kind of answer do you expect to a question like “Are you Agent Krasnov?” What do you think Trump would say? “Yes, I am Agent Krasnov,” then rip open his shirt to reveal a tattoo of Lenin and Stalin kissing? Is that what you expect? What’s the point of questions like that—are they supposed to change public opinion somehow?

I must say that if you want to ask direct questions to a president, there’s a master class for that—Tsymbalyuk, for example, asked very pointed questions to Putin in a diplomatically correct tone, and yet they were quite damaging in substance. So, I don’t know—I’m not convinced that asking questions in an offensive style is appropriate. For example, asking “Why do you act like Putin’s little b*tch?” or whatever—what is Trump supposed to say to that? And most importantly, what kind of public reaction would that provoke? I think even Trump’s opponents would hardly be inspired to take the side of a journalist who asked such questions.

Now then, Andrey Andreyevich—clearly not Piontkovsky—writes, excuse the language: This old freak has completely lost his mind. Maybe he needs to be treated—kept out of politics? This is lawlessness! How much longer do we have to hear this? Let Ukraine follow Israel’s example, build nuclear weapons, and attack Rashka. What other option is there?

Dear colleague, what can I say? I share your emotions, but in reality, 77 million American voters chose Donald Trump. No one’s going to treat him. Keeping him out of politics isn’t possible—America is a democratic country, and 77 million people voted for him. I agree with your outrage.

Then there’s this: I caught myself wondering—could Trump be a kind of vaccine for the civilized West? Europe may look fine on the outside, but its internal weaknesses and its capacity to defend itself are well known. The anomaly of Trump, within the framework of democracy, is not eternal. Europe is already undergoing recovery and will heal—and then maybe America too. The crisis will pass, but the immunity will remain. Don’t you think that soon the U.S., together with a strong Europe, will no longer allow opponents to doubt their strength again?

You know, dear colleague, I really want to hope—I want to believe—that things will turn out the way you say. But I’m not sure, you see? Because, as we know, there are different types of vaccines. Some help build immunity. Others kill. So I don’t know what kind of vaccine Trump is meant to be here. Of course, we want to believe in the best, that things will go the way you say. But there are no guarantees. So, we’ll see. As they say—we live in this world. Let’s wait and see.

Suggestion to the Author to Stop Acting Smart Link to heading

Here’s a very interesting comment I’d like to read out—it’s not even a question, but a remark from an unidentified subscriber. Let’s call them “User.” And here’s what User writes, with plenty of exclamation marks:

You really love Ukraine, constantly insulting Trump!!! You have no right to do that!!! Say whatever you want in your kitchen, but not on air!!! Stop acting so smart, so smart!!! Don’t forget—you’re not an idiot???

Well, if you’re so smart, why aren’t you marching in formation? Looking people in the eye? Very good. Very. I just want to say that I don’t have a kitchen, so I—well, just the rental apartment I have in Vilnius doesn’t have a kitchen, so I can’t say anything in “my kitchen.” So I have to say it on air. What a very amusing remark.

Should Russia Be Called Evil Link to heading

Mikhail Khramtsov repeats a question about good and evil: I don’t know how to explain it, but in my experience, a person will readily admit they’re on Russia’s side, but never that they’re on the side of evil. Maybe that’s their weak spot, and we should all be pressing on it.

And so on—it’s a long preface. But the main idea is that we should simply label those who are not on Russia’s side as being on the side of evil. I, for one, haven’t yet met anyone in my life who would say they’re on the side of evil. Everyone thinks they’re doing good, even when committing evil. Why is that? Maybe it’s time for all of us to more clearly name evil as evil and not let it hide in the forest of geopolitics—and to consider the bearers of that evil not only those who commit it, but also those who support it, and perhaps even those who believe it to be inevitable. Accepting evil also helps it thrive.

Dear colleague, first of all—the problem is that our opponents believe we are the ones on the side of evil. And playing a game of words—where we say “they’re evil” and they say “no, you’re evil”—doesn’t change anything. That’s the first thing.

And separately, I’d like to address your final hypothesis: considering pessimists—those who see evil as inevitable—as bearers of evil. That’s a rather dangerous path, because if you go down it, you’ll end up with only pink ponies and flag-waving cheerleaders as your like-minded allies. If someone believes evil is inevitable, that doesn’t mean they’re on its side. That’s just their perspective.

In fact, to some extent, your humble servant also believes that evil is inevitable. You cannot fully eradicate crime. You cannot fully eradicate drug addiction. You cannot completely eliminate disease. You cannot entirely get rid of war, you see? So what—should we only consider as allies those who follow Fukuyama’s ideas from the late 1980s and early 1990s, who thought history had ended, the last man had emerged, and everything from then on would be fine?

That’s why I don’t fully agree with your final point.

Is There Any Point in Voting in Russia Link to heading

A question from Master Drone, who writes, for the sake of discussion: I strongly disagree with your statement about the uselessness of participating in elections in the Russian Federation. The goal is not to win, but to participate—to give hope to those who can’t leave, to show them they’re not alone, to give a physical opportunity to do something for those who are not as brave as Skobov. To give people a chance to be Skobov for just one day. This is long-term work.

Dear colleague, this is one of those cases where—I understand what you’re aiming for, I understand your good intentions—but I think this is exactly the kind of good intention that leads straight to hell. Because this is false hope. “To be Skobov for a day” is like going to vote for a fascist in the Moscow City Duma. For example, Kac specifically proposed taking part in voting for the Moscow City Duma. For whom? There are no people worth voting for. The idea is to sift through the candidates for someone who is supposedly less dangerous. For example, anyone not from United Russia. But among the non-United Russia candidates are Stalinists and outright fascists. Is voting for them what you call “being Skobov”? Is that what you call giving people hope?

I believe this false hope is a deception—it draws people into fake elections under conditions where there are no real elections at all. I think that’s harmful. And it’s certainly not hope, and definitely not “being Skobov.” So on that point, I must disagree with you.

Why Do Ukrainians Abroad Speak Russian Link to heading

A question from Lyudmila Kuznetsova: How do you explain that Ukrainian refugees abroad speak Russian? This applies to both children and adults. In 3.5 years, I’ve only once heard two women speaking Ukrainian on a Swedish train.

Dear Lyudmila, I certainly understand that you’re describing what you yourself have seen and heard, but with all due respect, I wouldn’t consider your observation a full-fledged or representative study. Again, this is not because I’m trying to disprove you, but simply because I don’t know. I haven’t come across, as I’ve said many times before, any solid sociological research on what language Ukrainian communities—or refugees, as they’re often called—speak in Europe.

As far as I understand, there are about 3 to 5 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. I think it’s closer to 5 million. And I haven’t seen any research into what language they predominantly speak. I don’t know. I’d love to see your observations in the comments, dear colleagues—this is me addressing the audience. But again, I don’t know for sure. You may be right.

If you are right—if this is indeed a widespread phenomenon—my hypothesis would be this: practically all or nearly all Ukrainians are bilingual. They speak at least two languages. Russian is simply more “utilitarian” than Ukrainian. That might be part of it. In Europe, in many countries—especially in the Baltic states—you can often speak Russian and expect to be understood. Naturally, Ukrainian is less likely to find a conversation partner. That’s one possible explanation. But again, I emphasize: I’d really like to see some concrete research on this. Still—an interesting observation.

Several Questions About Crimea Link to heading

So, a few questions about Crimea. Sergey Dovgan: No one, nowhere, in any stream, ever explains why Crimea was transferred to Ukraine. Could you clarify? I think only Shvets croaked something once—two years ago. Sorry, but I’ve never heard Yury Borisovich croak anything. Anyway, supposedly it wasn’t just handed over for nothing but as some kind of payoff to someone.

Dear colleagues, I just answered the question of how, why, and by whom Crimea was transferred, only yesterday. I’ve addressed this question multiple times. I wouldn’t say I do it every month, but at least several times a year. So yes, I’ve answered this question many times.

Another question about Crimea from Anna: Igor Aleksandrovich, when answering why Khrushchev transferred Crimea, you focused on who transferred it, not why. But the “why” is much more important. I don’t know what the original author meant, but my question is—why was it transferred? What economic issues were being solved?

As I’ve said before, Khrushchev was involved on the side, but the main signatures on the decree belonged to Malenkov and Voroshilov. Khrushchev wasn’t the sole leader at the time—1954 was still a period of very collective leadership. Malenkov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich all played no lesser roles than Khrushchev, at least for the time being.

Now, regarding the economic aspect. I remember that 1954 decree well, since the topic comes up constantly. It said the following—quoting from memory, but very close to the original text: the need to transfer the Crimean oblast to the Ukrainian SSR was based on economic unity, territorial proximity, and close economic and cultural ties between the Crimean oblast and the Ukrainian SSR.

Specifically, one can mention the provision of fresh water to Crimea. Freshwater sources in Crimea are limited. And if you look at the map, it’s quite obvious—how could Crimea be supplied with fresh water from Russia, from any part of the then-RSFSR? Technically possible, but extremely difficult. Just look at the map: geographically, territorially, Crimea is clearly part of Ukraine, not Russia. It’s the same kind of situation as with the Kaliningrad Oblast—East Prussia was seized, but now it’s a distant enclave deep in Europe. Crimea is the same—geographically and economically, in every sense, it belongs to Ukraine. So the decision was quite logical. And yes, the water supply issue was a major factor.

Vera also has a question about Crimea: I once read—though I don’t know if it’s true—that one of the main reasons for transferring Crimea to Ukraine after the war was that there wasn’t enough money to restore it due to its remoteness from the center. The region remained devastated for a long time—there wasn’t enough water, and people lived poorly. It was seen as more logical and efficient to let Ukraine rebuild it. Water and other resources came from Ukraine. Do you know anything about this?

I’ve partially answered that already. I would just be cautious about stating categorically that people in Crimea lived especially poorly at that time. I wouldn’t want to make any sweeping claims, but from what we know about the postwar Soviet economy in general, I don’t think Crimea was in especially bad shape. But yes, of course, rebuilding Crimea in the postwar period would have been much easier, quicker, and more practical from Ukraine. Once again, I emphasize—Crimea is a territory that, geographically, clearly belongs to Ukraine. It borders Ukraine directly, whereas it was separated from the RSFSR by bodies of water.

The Connection Between Cold Climate and a Country’s Development Link to heading

Maksimka: Over 10 years ago, I was in Denmark. In Copenhagen, I saw a lot of bicycles near the parliament. Our tour guide from St. Petersburg said that this was how the deputies get around, and the speaker himself takes a taxi. The guide said that this kind of democratic behavior is typical only for northern countries. Do you agree that a cold climate contributes to a country’s better development?

You know, I wouldn’t make that claim universal, at the very least. In Russia—across most of historical Russia, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union—the climate is much colder than in Denmark. I haven’t been to Denmark, but I clearly understand that most of Russia experiences far harsher conditions than Denmark. So that statement is, at the very least, not universally applicable.

On Including Fake Opposition Figures in Mediafrenia Link to heading

So, Tatyana Shatova: This is completely off-topic, but I would really like to hear a professional breakdown in Mediafrenia of pseudo-independent media outlets that claim to hold an allegedly opposition and independent point of view. To me, they are far more dangerous than overt propaganda because they operate more subtly.

I agree—and I do cover this from time to time, periodically.

Bank Details for the Freedom of Russia Legion Link to heading

Lyuda: Could you please repost the link to support the Freedom of Russia Legion? I’d like to support them on a regular basis, but I lost the link to the Monobank. My apologies again.

Dear Lyuda, I just want to say that the links to support the Freedom of Russia Legion—and a separate one for raising funds for drones for the Legion—there are two links, and they are always included in the description of each and every stream. Not just the streams, but also the regular videos. The link to support the Freedom of Russia Legion and the one for drones for the Legion are always there. So, just open any video on my channel, and you’ll find those links in the description.

Attitude Toward Alexander Osovtsov Link to heading

Another unidentified user writes: What’s your opinion of Sasha Osovtsov? He has a lot of dogs. He also loves a certain pipe with an amber handle. When you were writing a book with him, didn’t his smoking bother you?

I have a positive opinion of Alexander Osovtsov. He was, indeed, a colleague of mine—he was part of that major Jewish studies project, The Jewish People in Russia. So I’ve known him a long time and think well of him. His smoking doesn’t bother me. And his attitude toward animals is one of the fundamental reasons for my positive regard toward him.

About Pivovarov and Yudin Link to heading

So, Dima asks a rhetorical question: Why is Yevgeny Kiselyov able to run a regular series of historical conversations with academician Pivovarov, but you’re not? Is it just a matter of scheduling and timing? And is it possible to see Grigory Yudin on your channel?

I would like to have Grigory Yudin on my channel, but for now he’s not ready. Again, I’m not going to discuss the reasons—it’s a personal matter. Some people come, some don’t. That’s not up for public discussion.

As for academician Pivovarov, I used to run a regular series with Yury Sergeyevich. And there was a mistake—my mistake. We originally framed it as a historical series, a set of historical conversations. It ended up being more like history lectures. And yes, it worked—sort of. But it turned out a bit dull. What we really need is a different approach.

I do want to return to conversations with Yury Sergeyevich. But that’s a separate undertaking that takes time and energy—which I currently lack. The format needs to be changed—not lectures, but discussions of current issues through the lens of history. That approach, I think, would be relevant. For now, it’s not happening. But I hope it will. I hope we’ll return to conversations with him.

On the Gene of Slavery Link to heading

Marina Krichevskaya: About human material. If there existed, as in our case, an intelligentsia over generations, why can’t there be slaves over generations? If certain neurons in the brain aren’t used, they die off, scientists say. Place a slave in perfect conditions—he likely won’t appreciate them or will get angry and begin to take revenge on his benefactors, even unconsciously. Or he’ll adapt for a while, but his slave essence will resurface. You don’t deny genetics, do you?

Well, of course I don’t deny genetics, but I seriously doubt the existence of a “gene of slavery”—especially when such a concept takes on a caste-like character, as if there’s a gene of intelligentsia, a gene of slavery, and so on. That simply contradicts facts. There are countless examples of people from far-from-intellectual backgrounds who essentially made themselves and became fully developed, cultured individuals. And the reverse—someone from a thoroughly intellectual family turning into total scum.

There is no gene of slavery, and no gene of intelligentsia. People are shaped by the environment they grow up in—and also, undoubtedly, by themselves. At some point, a person becomes autonomous. There is freedom—freedom of personality, freedom of choice. At some point, a person gains subjectivity and becomes, to some extent, independent of their circumstances and of wherever, metaphorically speaking, the stork happened to drop them.

So, with all due respect to genetics, I know for certain: there is no gene for being an intellectual, and no gene for being a slave.

On Leftism and Rightism. Noam Chomsky, Skobov, and Others Link to heading

So, a separate topic on Gaza and the left: When you responded to criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza, didn’t you feel some internal dissonance? You explained it as the dominance of left-wing views in Europe, citing their rise after WWII. But it was precisely after the war—and especially because of the horror of the Holocaust—that the Geneva Conventions were adopted, and the system of humanitarian law was created to protect all civilians, regardless of nationality. Isn’t it a paradox that laws born in response to the destruction of the Jewish people are now declared “leftist” when applied to Israel’s actions? And isn’t criticism of such actions necessarily leftist nonsense? Centrists and even many conservatives criticize them too, because it’s simply a natural application of the same universal social principles the world embraced after the catastrophes of the 20th century. I get the irony at the spectacle of leftist vulgarity, but isn’t that just manipulation—a mockery of leftist ideas? The left criticizes. Chomsky criticizes. So all leftists are Chomsky?

Well, about this kind of sophistry—I want to say this separately. You know, I make a very clear distinction between left-leaning thinkers, whom I don’t agree with politically but respect deeply, and leftists of the vulgar, destructive kind. So—who are real leftists? I’ll give just two human examples.

There’s Alexander Skobov. He is someone I respect immensely. At the core of his leftism lies humanism. Just that—humanism and decency. That’s what underlies leftist views like Skobov’s. He is, without question, a leftist.

And then there’s José Mujica. We recently marked his birthday on our Telegram channel. The famous president of Uruguay, known as the poorest president in the world—he donated over 90% of his salary to charity and lived a very modest life. That’s a leftist. A true leftist. That’s nobility, humanism—that’s what I call the Left.

As for Noam Chomsky—who is undoubtedly a genius in linguistics and science—but a complete idiot in politics: that’s a leftist radical. That’s a man who’s willing to support terrorism because terrorism is the weapon of the weak. He supports the weak. That kind of person would be just as ready to destroy the United States as Trump—just from the opposite end. Someone who would let terrorism into the U.S. because, well, they’re the underdogs—you’re not supposed to kill them. That’s a radical leftist.

So I draw a very sharp line between people who hold left-wing views and radical leftists. Just as I draw a sharp line between right-wing conservatives and outright far-right extremists. The boundaries in my worldview are clear. So I wouldn’t lump everyone into the same box.

On Gaza and the Left. Why Isn’t Ukraine Supported the Same Way? Link to heading

Continuing the topic of Gaza and the left: Why hasn’t support for Ukraine reached the same extremes as for Gaza? Ukraine is also a victim. It’s hard to recall a protest in, say, London, where a Russian flag was burned over a missile strike on a playground. And vice versa—if Ukrainians in Europe did even 10% of what the Gaza or Syrian guys do, it’s not hard to imagine the reaction in Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. How do you explain that?

Let me explain, dear friend of the Chekist. First, let’s talk numbers. According to official statistics, there are 15 million Muslim migrants living in EU countries. That’s over 3% of the population—15 million. Most of them are concentrated in France, Germany, and the UK. By comparison, there are about 5 million Ukrainians in Europe—three times fewer. That’s also an official figure.

Now, a few more factors that amplify Muslim influence on European politics. First, as mentioned, there are at least three times more of them than Ukrainians. Second, they tend to live in tight-knit communities. These are cohesive groups, unlike Ukrainians, who are scattered and dispersed. There’s no serious Ukrainian lobby in Europe—but there is a Muslim one.

Also, Muslims have been living in Europe for a long time. Many of them are already citizens. That’s another big factor—it gives them significant lobbying power and the ability to influence national politics. Ukrainians, on the other hand, are relatively recent arrivals. They’re still “fresh,” so to speak, and don’t have that kind of impact yet. Most of them aren’t citizens of European countries, so their ability to influence policy is limited.

And finally, there are about 2 billion Muslims in the world. Compared to 30 million Ukrainians, that influence is simply not comparable. So, by every measure, it’s clear that the influence of Muslims on European politics is far greater than that of Ukrainians. These are simply things that cannot be measured on the same scale. I think that’s pretty obvious.

Olga Trifonova visited the Ilya Glazunov Gallery—a three-story mansion in central Moscow. Founded in 2007, it is now a concentrated cult of Putin’s ideology in all its forms. So the process started a long time ago. Were you perhaps acquainted with this person? Tell us a bit about the phenomenon.

You know, thank God, I wasn’t acquainted with Glazunov. This is a fairly typical phenomenon—a court painter, like the court sculptor Tsereteli. My mother worked at the Decorative Arts Combine; she was an art historian. Back in Soviet times, there were people who specialized exclusively in portraits and sculptures of Lenin. That’s all they did. Just churning out Lenins. And by the way, no one else was allowed to do that—only select individuals were entrusted to depict the leader.

So, court artists, court sculptors—it’s a pretty common type. This Ilya Glazunov was a rather obscurantist figure. All his paintings have this hyper-patriotic tone. It’s a very common phenomenon—typical, in my view, not particularly interesting. I don’t see any real depth or complexity there. Maybe I’m wrong—every person is a cosmos, of course—but in this case, it’s a very small and very dark cosmos.

Agnostic vs. Atheist Link to heading

So, a few worldview-related questions. Larisa Smirnova: In response to a question about the knowability of the world, you said you believe the world is knowable. So in that sense, you’re not an agnostic. But when asked about belief in God, you said you’re an agnostic. What does it mean to be agnostic in terms of religion? It’s not just the denial of God, like atheism. What’s the difference between an atheist and an agnostic?

An agnostic—well, I think it’s pretty straightforward. I can’t confidently say that—well, obviously, I don’t believe in the existence of the classical biblical God. But to categorically deny the existence of some kind of supernatural, immaterial force—some kind of cosmic or non-personal intelligence that might underlie events in the universe—I don’t know. I don’t think there’s any solid scientific evidence that such an intelligence exists. But by the same token, there’s no evidence that it doesn’t exist either.

You know, among atheists—particularly the strict ones—the one I like most is Bertrand Russell, with his famous teapot analogy. I’m sure many of you know Russell’s teapot: it’s the idea that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. If we imagine there’s a small object—a teapot, say—orbiting somewhere in space, it’s impossible to prove it’s not there, simply because we lack the tools to detect it. That’s how Russell approached the question of proving that God doesn’t exist: there are no tools, no proof.

But that also doesn’t mean the absence of evidence for that teapot means it’s actually there. That’s the whole point of Russell’s teapot analogy. So I feel the same way: I have no proof that God doesn’t exist. And my opponents have no proof that He does. That’s all.

That’s the difference between an atheist and an agnostic. Russell believed that the inability to find this teapot in the universe doesn’t mean it’s there. As for me, I simply don’t know whether it exists or not. That’s it.

On Belief in Ukraine’s Victory Link to heading

Alright, here’s another pressing question. Today, May 20, on the Morning Stream, you once again expressed confidence that Ukraine will win. I really want that to happen. But recent developments with the so-called negotiations and Russia’s subsequent actions, as well as Europe’s ineffective response, have shaken my belief in this victory. What is the basis for your conviction that Ukraine will win? America won’t help. Europe is incapable of providing the necessary support for victory. It seems to me that European countries are very bold in words but timid in action. The sanctions are a joke. They do not stop Russian aggression at all—or if they do, it’s so slow that Russia will have time to turn Ukraine into a lifeless wasteland. Even if it dies in the process. I object. Please justify your confidence in a just victory. It’s very hard to live without faith—and without faith in that victory.

Let me try. First of all, by method of negation. It’s already the fourth year of war, and Putin still hasn’t managed to capture a single regional center in Ukraine. Again, what’s happening shows that Putin will not be able to achieve his goal. That is, he has essentially declared his goal to be the destruction of Ukraine. He definitely won’t be able to achieve that. So what’s next? Ukraine also clearly cannot liberate all of its territory. So, when you talk about a just victory, I’m not sure. I’m not at all sure about a just victory. I consider Ukraine’s victory to be the situation in which it prevents Putin from achieving his. What comes after that? I’ve said many times—and I think that despite your criticism of the Europeans, I just spoke about the sanctions that are being implemented. And yes, sanctions can’t force Putin to stop the war. That’s true. But sanctions can significantly weaken his economy. Significantly. And combined with military aid—and I do believe military aid will continue—and with Ukraine developing its own military industry, and with the fact that in the field of drones—and this is now a drone war—Ukraine is ahead of Russia, and that gives hope. That gives hope. Yes, undoubtedly, there will be no turning point at this moment, but Ukraine has no way back. The hope lies in the fact that Ukraine has no choice but to move forward, and Putin is not winning. Putin is not capable—not capable of destroying Ukraine. And inside Russia, gradually, as this endless war drags on—well, the professional idiot Medinsky said that “we”—Russia—“can fight forever.” They can’t. They won’t manage. So as this military saga deepens, micro-cracks are forming in Russia. And eventually, at some turning point, it will all collapse. Ultimately, Russia as an empire is doomed to fall apart. Ukraine, in this case, thanks in part to Russian aggression, has become a rather cohesive nation-state. That’s why I believe that from a historical perspective, although there may not be a just victory in the conventional sense, the end of the war and the collapse of Russia seem inevitable to me, based simply on the general logic of historical development. But the fact that Putin clearly cannot achieve his goal—I think that’s obvious. So, using the method of negation, we arrive at the conclusion that eventually the situation will shift in Ukraine’s favor.

On the Uniqueness of Israel Link to heading

A question from Misha. On today’s stream, you called Israel a unique entity on planet Earth, which is hard to disagree with. As an agnostic, how do you explain the historical continuity of events that were clearly and unambiguously described in the Old and New Testaments before they came to pass? For example, the destruction of the First Temple, the Babylonian captivity and return, the destruction of the Second Temple, centuries of exile, the rebirth of Israel, and the mass repatriation of Jews. Do you consider this chain of events a unique historical phenomenon, or is there a rational explanation for it? I just want to remind you that tiny Israel has lived its entire history surrounded by total hostility from neighboring states and peoples. As a result, many of those are now completely gone, while Israel has endured and preserved its identity.

Well, dear colleague. First of all, the Bible, as is known, was written by different authors over many centuries. I’m referring now only to the traditional point of view accepted in Christianity. That would be from the 15th century BCE to the 1st century CE. Now, your claim that over the centuries Israel survived while its enemies disappeared? Well, that’s quite a debatable statement, because for most of those centuries, there was no Israel at all. As for the hypothesis that the Bible describes events that had not yet occurred—I am absolutely convinced that this is a misconception. Events that happened later were written down later. Let me emphasize again: the Bible was written over the course of more than 1,500 years. It was written by different authors over a period of more than 1,500 years. So those events that occurred later were described later—nothing more. This is actually a field of study. Regarding the Bible—there’s even a specific academic discipline, Biblical Studies, that examines how the Bible was written, who the authors were, and so on. So this is quite a well-researched topic. As for Israel—what happened over a millennium is that Jews existed, but the state of Israel did not. That kind of state simply didn’t exist.

Victim and Aggressor. Reparations Link to heading

A question from someone who calls themselves Gen. Regarding reparations. The example of Germany isn’t entirely applicable to Russia. Germany capitulated. Russia, even if it is driven out of Ukrainian territory, won’t capitulate. Can it be said that Ukraine is the victor and Russia the defeated country? Even if some part of Ukraine remains occupied by Russia—what if the occupiers are never fully expelled? Maybe, in the context of Ukraine’s war with Russia, we should use terms not of victors and defeated, but rather aggressor and victim of aggression? Are there historical examples of an aggressor paying reparations to the victim of aggression? Were the U.S. operations in Iraq an act of aggression, and what happened with reparations there? Is there a gray zone in all this?

Well, first of all, I have to say that your proposal not to use the terms “victor,” “defeated,” “aggressor,” and “victim of aggression”—well, it’s like you’re walking through an already open door. Please go ahead. That’s exactly what I say. I’ve never used the terms “victor” or “defeated” to describe the current moment. Right now, we have an aggressor and a victim of aggression. That’s true. And that’s exactly how I talk about it—how everyone talks about it. So I don’t know, maybe you had something else in mind, but what you’re proposing is already the reality. Nobody is talking about winners and losers now—at least, not unless you count some hardline propagandists.

Now, as for reparations. You know, the topic of reparations is important—it should be part of the conversation. That’s right. But this is one of those cases where I’m not at all confident that any reparations will actually be implemented. I’m not sure at all. It’s highly desirable, it would be very right, very fair—absolutely, I completely agree. But I’m not confident it’s going to happen. You see, for Russia to pay reparations, it would have to be defeated. Russia would have to sign a complete and final capitulation. That could possibly happen in the event of regime change—and if a new force comes to power that wants to integrate with Europe. Yes, maybe then. But I think that’s extremely unlikely. In general, I think the idea of Russia paying reparations to Ukraine is more of a highly desirable scenario that Ukraine is rightly demanding. It’s a justified demand. But as for when and under what circumstances it might happen—I honestly can’t even imagine it today. Because that would require Russia to declare itself defeated—something like the signing of Germany’s Act of Unconditional Surrender on May 8, 1945. That kind of scenario—I find it absolutely implausible. The idea that Russia suffers defeat and Ukraine demands reparations—what would have to happen for that? Well, I just don’t see it.

I believe the main objective should be to inflict a serious defeat on Putin—to significantly destroy the Russian army and military-industrial complex. After that, no one is going to march on Moscow. And that’s the kind of condition under which reparations should be demanded. That could result in the collapse of Russia. Then the question arises—who exactly will pay reparations? The Far East? Yakutia? Who, specifically? With what resources will you compel the broken-up parts of Russia, and in what proportion? What’s that going to look like? At the very least, it seems to me like a complex process that is theoretically possible, but only just.

If we’re going to start fantasizing, flipping through the pages of future history, peeking at the end of the textbook of that future history, then we might imagine a situation where some parts of a disintegrated Russia want to integrate with the European Union, the West, and so on. What will the West look like? That’s unclear. So there are many questions. If the West changes and recovers from Trumpism, and offers some sort of Marshall Plan to the fractured parts of Russia—like with Germany—then in exchange for that plan, the parts of the former Russia might pay reparations. Then there starts to be some kind of chance for reparations. In all other cases—it won’t happen.

Once again: the demand for reparations is correct, fair, logical. And look—right now, the Baltic states are already demanding reparations from Russia and naming specific amounts. So is there any realistic chance that, say, Estonia, Lithuania, or Latvia will get reparations from Russia today? Be honest with yourself: is there any chance at all? Clearly not. In the distant future—maybe. But that would require some absolutely fantastical events to occur in Russia. These are questions for the beautiful Russia of the future—which may never come to be. That’s all there is to it.

As for reparations—well, for that, there has to be defeat. Victors don’t pay reparations to the defeated. That’s why the United States has no intention of paying reparations to Iraq.

On Crime Rates in the USSR and Russia in the 1990s Link to heading

A question from Vladimir. I recently clicked on a YouTube video about criminal Russia in the ’90s, and the algorithm started suggesting lots of similar content. After watching some of it, I was, to put it mildly, shocked by the level of crime and brutality. Could you please tell me if there are any studies comparing crime rates across similar countries and societies? Are there any data on the number of serial killers in the USSR or Russia in the ’90s? Was there as much of this as in other countries during similar periods, or was it still a uniquely Russian phenomenon? And if so, what was it linked to?

Dear Vladimir, Well, of course there are comparative studies and crime rate rankings. And again, since I constantly deal with this topic, including the Communist Party, I must tell you that Russia is far from having the highest crime rate. I understand that these days it’s emotionally satisfying for us to say how terrible Russia is, and yes—it really is a fascist Reich that poses one of the most serious threats to humanity. But we must note that in the fascist Reich, crime wasn’t particularly high. And in Stalin’s USSR, either, crime wasn’t particularly high. You see, when the state itself is a terrorist, it suppresses all other types of crime. This is a classic pattern. When the mafia comes into a town, it suppresses street crime. So, in Russia, the crime rate isn’t the highest in the world—Russia is a criminal state in itself. It’s like the mafia entering a town and clamping down on street crime. This is a well-known phenomenon. This is also part of the reason why, at times, law enforcement agencies can view the mafia as a kind of benefit—because it imposes “order.” Order gets established.

So, Russia doesn’t have the highest crime rate. I can’t quote exact rankings from memory, but Russia is somewhere in the middle of the list. The highest crime rates are found in a number of Latin American countries—Venezuela, and others. So no, Russia is not the leader here. The state itself is a terrorist and suppresses crime. So, there are just objective parameters at play here.

On Belief in Miracles Link to heading

A question from Yulia. A personal question—you don’t have to answer, but I’m still curious. Have there ever been moments in your life when you really, really wished for something and it came true? I’ve had that happen. It really did. I’ve asked my son the same thing several times, and he also says he’s experienced that—especially in difficult times. In a dream, a fairy with lilac lazy wings would appear and make his wish come true. Have you had such moments? Why am I asking? Yesterday’s question about the intelligibility of the world made me think about it. I don’t fully understand the connection with the world being intelligible. And with your point that if you ask for something, it gets fulfilled.

You know, when I read your question, it reminded me of a joke about God and a lottery ticket. Do you remember the story where a man keeps complaining, saying to God, “I keep asking you for things, but you never give me anything. My neighbor won a Volga in the lottery, another neighbor got his PhD, made a discovery, and built a stone house. God, where’s the justice? I’m always praying to you, and you give me nothing!” Then the clouds part, and a voice from heaven says, “Well, at least buy a lottery ticket!” You see, you still have to do something. Just asking—just really wanting something—that’s not enough. You have to take some kind of action. I’ve never really had it happen where I did absolutely nothing, and my dreams just came true. There’s always some kind of roadmap to making a dream happen, and it becomes reality as a result of some action.

On Actual Crimes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces Link to heading

So, Georgiy? A very interesting question, Igor Alexandrovich, name at least one clear or implied crime committed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and not just vague talk that “if there’s a war started by Rashka against Ukraine, then both sides are criminals.”

Well, dear Georgiy, I have a counter-question for you. Just answer it directly and honestly—don’t dodge. Tell me, please, why do you drink a glass of Christian baby’s blood every morning? I get that it might be tasty—haven’t tried it myself—but surely there are victims involved. You’d have to kill a child for that. Why do you do that?

Now, I suspect that when you heard my response, you were outraged, right? Outraged. How can someone ask such a thing? So I’m asking you the same: how can you attribute such nonsense to me in your question? When have I ever said that both sides are criminals? What are you talking about? Why would you say that? I’ve never, ever said that both sides are criminals. That’s something you’ve made up and falsely attributed to me—and now you’re posing clever little questions based on that fiction.

Let me remind you what actually happened. I responded to a report from Memorial, which was presented during a previous stream. I didn’t read the report myself, but one of the viewers presented the position of Memorial. Allegedly, Memorial suggests that alongside Ukraine’s demands for reparations from Russia, Russia could also, in theory, claim reparations from Ukraine for actions that violated the laws of war. To that, I responded—as in the previous question—that reparations are a very big and complex issue.

Is it possible that Ukraine, in the course of defending itself, may have committed some actions that could be interpreted as violations of the laws of war? Well, for example, Ukrainian rockets hitting residential buildings and killing civilians—yes, that has happened. But does that justify reparations? In an ideal world, which doesn’t and won’t exist—maybe someone could try to calculate mutual claims. But in real terms, it’s complete nonsense, and I said so. Because that’s not how things work. There has never been a situation where some accountant sits down and calculates: “this side killed this many civilians—so they owe a few billion dollars; the other side killed this many—so we deduct it for a mutual settlement.” That’s nonsense. It’s never happened and never will.

That’s what I said. And you, Georgiy—if I’m not mistaken—are attributing some nonsense to me. So please, just don’t. What’s the point of doing that?

On Europe’s Support for Ukraine and the Global War Link to heading

Yakov Shulman — Yakov is a sponsor of our channel, and we are very grateful for that. I completely agree with you that at this pivotal moment in history, everyone must make a choice — they are either on the side of good or evil. And this includes politicians. Unfortunately, we cannot trust the leaders of major European countries to reliably support Ukraine if they oppose Israel in its vital struggle against Hamas — I mean Macron, Sánchez, and so on. Supporting Ukraine will require great devotion to the cause of good. And these leaders will betray it if the political winds shift.

You know, dear Yakov, I think that despite the fact that I still believe the struggle — Israel’s fight against terrorists and Ukraine’s fight against Russia — is, to some extent, part of a broader war, a war of civilization against archaism, I do still think that. But nevertheless, these are different wars. Ukraine is fighting an enemy far superior in strength — it’s defending itself. And Israel? Israel is preventing terrorism coming from Hamas, from Yemen’s Houthis, from other Iranian proxies — and overall, it’s defending itself quite successfully. So, there is a difference here. There is a difference.

I watch with sadness the position of European countries now preparing sanctions against Israel — that’s one point. Second, I do not consider Netanyahu’s policy infallible. So, some criticism of his position is quite possible. And that does not mean antisemitism or anything like that. We shouldn’t equate criticism of Netanyahu’s policy with antisemitism. Netanyahu is no saint. And criticizing him is entirely possible — it doesn’t mean supporting terrorism or anything horrific like that.

So this needs to be approached carefully. As for Ukraine, I see absolutely no actions that suggest there will be betrayal — not from Macron, not from Sánchez, not from anyone else. I don’t think such parallels are appropriate. I don’t think they reflect reality.

On Lithuanians’ Interest in Soviet Nostalgia Link to heading

Alexander — Alexander is also a sponsor of our channel, and we are very grateful to him. This seems to be a follow-up to the earlier question about why certain things don’t affect Lithuanians. There was a question about why, in the Baltic states—particularly Lithuania—there seems to be a fascination, as the question’s author sees it, with nostalgia for the USSR.

I answered that question by saying I don’t see it. I’ve been living in Lithuania for four years now—well, definitely for three years—and I don’t see any fascination with Soviet nostalgia.

Now, in continuation of that question, Alexander writes: Why is something that has no effect on Lithuanians—from TV series to Shapoklyak—so dangerous for Ukrainians?

Well, I can explain. The fact is, Ukraine was much more deeply permeated by pro-Russian sentiment than Lithuania ever was. Let’s be frank—Ukraine joined the Soviet Union much later. So this process of being absorbed by the empire occurred to a much lesser extent in Lithuania, and therefore the danger is lower. That’s the first point.

And second—Lithuania is a member of the European Union and NATO. It’s under a protective umbrella. Ukraine is not. So naturally, the danger for Ukraine is much greater. The influence of Russian TV channels and so on is far more dangerous for Ukraine than for Lithuania. Lithuania is under the umbrella, like all the Baltic states. Whether that umbrella is truly reliable is another matter—but still, it’s a completely different life situation. A fundamentally different life situation for the Baltic countries compared to Ukraine.

And Lithuania hasn’t been attacked by Russia—Ukraine has. So of course, the danger of Russian propaganda is significantly greater for Ukraine.

Closing Words Link to heading

So, dear friends, we’re wrapping up our morning stream here. If I manage to, I’ll record another episode of Mediafrenia later today. But that depends on how much energy I have left after this broadcast. I’d like to end today’s conversation here. Glory to Ukraine! Please take care of yourselves! Freedom for Alexander Skobov! For Darya Kozyreva, all Russian political prisoners, and Ukrainian captives! See you next time! All the best!

Source: https://youtu.be/jdLGQVeCH-Y