Negotiations in London: Rubio and Witkoff are not going, the Kremlin denies Putin’s ceasefire proposal, Zelensky opposes Trump’s plan. What is the point of the negotiations?

Main Topic Link to heading

Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 23. It’s 7:44 AM in Kyiv, and we continue our morning reflections on what is happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.

A Rocket Depot Exploded in Russia Link to heading

I’ll start with some good news. An explosion occurred in the Kirovsky District of the Vladimir Region. Why is this good news? Let me explain. The explosion happened at the 51st arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. What exploded was a large quantity of missiles and ammunition that now won’t be launched toward Ukraine. That’s why this is good news. I won’t delve into the various theories—especially since none of them have been confirmed, at least so far. The Ministry of Defense claims it was spontaneous detonation of ammunition. There’s also a hypothesis that it was caused by drone strikes. Which version is true? Well, a serious investigation is needed. I tried to find one, but I couldn’t—so, anyway, it’s a good thing either way.

Negotiations in London Link to heading

Now for the main topic of the day. Today, negotiations are taking place in London regarding the cessation of the war in Ukraine. You know, it feels like London has returned to the vegetarian era of Queen Victoria’s time, when London fogs were a real disaster. People died from illnesses and accidents because London was truly a city of continuous FOG. Since those days, the issue has been resolved—coal is no longer the main source of heating in London, and the fogs are no longer a national urban calamity. But politically, it feels like the Victorian era is back. Right now, around today’s negotiations in London, there’s probably more FOG than there was during the infamous London smogs.

Let’s go point by point. First, the fog is partially clearing up regarding who will attend the meeting. At the last moment, it became known that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will not attend the negotiations in London. I really liked the explanation given by U.S. State Department spokesperson Tommy Bruce, who said Rubio is a very busy man, a very active Secretary of State, and that while the meeting continues in London, he will not be attending. Instead, Trump’s special envoy to China will represent the U.S. at the meeting. It also became known that Steve Witkoff will not be present either. In plain language, this means that Rubio and Witkoff don’t consider the negotiations about ending the war in Ukraine worth their valuable time. The one who is going is going only because he has nothing else to do—as Trump’s special envoy to Ukraine, a country Trump doesn’t care about. To me, this is a clear signal about the importance of this meeting and about the overall value of all peace negotiations the United States continues to lead out of inertia.

Ukraine, of course, finds itself in a no-win situation, because refusing to attend these talks would mean publicly taking responsibility for breaking off relations with the United States, which would naturally be viewed negatively by European allies. As for the content of the negotiations, we’ll see how things turn out in the evening. Maybe we’ll be able to summarize everything, including in a conversation I’m having at 19:00 with Roman Tsymbalyuk—if there are any results by then. But already this morning, it’s clear that Trump’s proposal, which is on the table, is a one-page document with seven points. Almost all of these points will be rejected by the Ukrainian side. That’s already known. During a briefing held before the Ukrainian delegation’s meeting with the Americans and Europeans in London, President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Kyiv does not recognize Russia’s jurisdiction over Crimea, saying, “This is our territory, the territory of the Ukrainian people. There’s nothing to discuss—this is beyond our Constitution.”

So nearly all the proposals on that page will be rejected by Ukraine. This includes the proposal regarding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which the U.S. suggested be operated by the United States. Ukraine obviously cannot accept that, since the plant is on Ukrainian territory, and for clear reasons, the operator must be Ukraine. In essence, these are the specific points in Trump’s proposal. The United States expects a response from Kyiv today regarding the proposals submitted. Let’s be specific—what does Trump’s proposal offer Russia?

First, de jure recognition by the U.S. of Russia’s control over Crimea—meaning Crimea is Russian, as per the proposal. Second, de facto recognition of the Russian occupation of parts of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Third, a promise that Ukraine will not join NATO, a hard demand that must be somehow confirmed by the Ukrainian side. Another point: the lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014. Next: expanding economic cooperation with the U.S., particularly in energy, industry, and other areas. This package is clearly substantial, heavily tilted in Russia’s favor, and resembles a scaled-down version of Putin’s own proposals.

Now, about the fog. The fog is truly spectacular, because for a long time it was reported that Rubio and Witkoff would be attending, which elevated the significance of the meeting. Their absence now makes it clear this is a low-level gathering. This is not a criticism of the general representing the U.S.—it’s about the role he currently plays in the negotiations, which is basically none. The American side is represented by someone clearly sidelined, not part of Trump’s inner circle, unlike Rubio and Witkoff.

Now let’s talk about a fake. There was wide discussion of an alleged proposal from Putin, supposedly conveyed through Witkoff, to freeze the conflict along the current front line. As I was preparing for today’s conversation, I read many comments, including optimistic ones claiming “the ice has broken” and Putin is finally ready to stop the war. Many believed this was a serious offer, especially since Putin had previously refused such terms. If true, this would raise huge questions—even though Putin would likely deceive again, the mere fact of such a proposal from him contradicts everything he has said and done recently. Honestly, I couldn’t find any solid explanations—until today, when I read a statement from Dmitry Peskov in RIA Novosti. In response to a question about details of Putin’s conversation with Witkoff, Peskov directly debunked this claim. He advised people to rely on primary sources, saying many fakes are being published—including by reputable outlets. He specifically referred to the Financial Times, which was the main source of this rumor about Putin allegedly proposing to freeze the conflict at the current front line during a meeting in St. Petersburg.

Peskov said many fakes are being published, even by respected media, so people should listen only to primary sources. Clearly, Trump is pressing hard for a result by April 30, aiming to score a win within his first 100 days—a traditional milestone for a new U.S. president. Ending the war would be a huge win. So Trump is trying everything he can—but in my view, he’s using completely unacceptable methods: pressure on Ukraine. He’s already squeezed everything possible from Ukraine: readiness to sign this insane resource deal, and many other things. But forcing Ukraine to recognize Crimea as Russian, to hand over control of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, to accept even de facto Russian control over four regions—that is absolutely impossible. Ukraine cannot be pushed into capitulation, because it hasn’t lost the war. Even in a fantastical scenario, Ukraine would still resist. So I still believe that Trump’s mission is impossible.

Poll: “Will the Meeting in London Bring Positive Results?” Link to heading

I asked a question on our website about whether you believe the meeting in London will bring positive results. The optimists—those who think the London meeting will yield positive outcomes—make up 14%. The skeptics—those who believe there will be no positive results—account for 73%. And 13% are undecided. What can I say? This is one of those cases—not always, but this time—where I find myself among the majority of our audience. Like 73% of you, dear friends, I also believe this meeting will not yield positive results. Considering everything mentioned above, unfortunately, I think the war will continue. Trump’s mission is impossible, and I believe that the sooner these negotiations end, the sooner this fog—London’s included—dissipates, the better it will be for Ukraine. Because then there will be no false illusions, no perception that since peace talks are happening, Ukraine no longer needs support, no longer needs arms, no longer needs to prepare. I think this bitter truth will ultimately be beneficial. Although, I want to stress again, I would be incredibly happy to be wrong—ecstatically happy—because every day, even this fake, absolutely fake Easter ceasefire from Putin, though it was mocking and completely deceitful, still, during that night, during those 30 hours, missiles did not fly toward Ukrainian cities. And that is a good thing. So of course, if, despite my strong dislike for Trump, he actually managed to achieve something, I would be very glad, and I would gladly admit I was wrong. But I’m afraid that’s not going to happen.

Answers to Questions Link to heading

Before moving on to your questions, I want to remind you once again that today at 19:00 we will have Roman Tsymbalyuk. I think it will be an interesting conversation, and now I’ll move on to answering your questions.

On Communist Functionaries Who Became Religious Link to heading

Sergey Baranov:
I mostly share your attitude toward religion and the institution of the Church. But what do you think about the one million of our fellow citizens who once used their membership in the Komsomol and the Party for personal career advancement and are now devout believers? Are they just a part of the flock willing to follow any leader’s will? What do we call those who used to head political organizations or institutions, especially educational ones, and now see themselves as carrying the cross? Watching how these builders of communism have now scattered into various religious sects and foam at the mouth trying to prove their newfound enlightenment—could this hypocrisy be the root of the silent agreement with the war, the tacit support of violence, looting, and murder? When were these individuals ever truly human? Or were they never human at all?

Dear Sergey! I think there are three components to this phenomenon. First, after the disappearance of an official ideology—communism—it truly became necessary for many people to find some kind of guide. Since Putinism offers no ideology, and even during the Yeltsin period there was no official ideology, all attempts to artificially grow one in Kremlin dachas failed. So people turned to something else—to replace communism with a form of Orthodoxy, such as it is. Especially since the current Russian Orthodox Church is not a Christian denomination at all—it is a totalitarian sect that very effectively replaces the kind of communism that existed in the Soviet Union. So it’s a pretty equal swap.

Second is fashion, the desire to stay in trend, which also matters. In the end, this helps. The careerists of the Soviet Union transitioned smoothly into careerism in post-Soviet Russia. It’s more or less the same thing. There’s a difference, of course—church attendance is not exactly a direct career-boosting button, but it does help people stay in trend. If Putin is standing with a candle, Medvedev is holding a candle, and everyone else is doing the same—well, then so are we. Just like everyone else. So yes, this is undeniably about belonging to the herd.

Will Ukrainians Forget What Russians Did to Them Link to heading

Oleg Aleksandrovich,
I think you are deeply mistaken. During the war, a member of the Ukrainian parliament’s wife is earning income in rubles and openly declaring it. I’m more and more convinced that distance is inversely proportional to understanding what is happening on Earth. I won’t name the MP or the party out of respect for your stance on not discussing Ukraine’s internal politics. But if this information is requested, I can provide it immediately. Ukrainians will go to Russia, they will go to Russia for work—stepping over the graves of their neighbors, turning away from demobilized veterans, pushing aside widows and orphans. They will go for rubles. The only way to prevent this is through the collapse of Russia and a prolonged, deep crisis in its regions. In light of this, I have a question: after the possible and, for many, desirable collapse of Russia, should there be a symbolic 40-year wandering in the desert, a deep crisis, so that all the current residents of Russia are reborn into neighboring peoples, and realize that Russians must atone for their guilt? Might that help prevent revanchist sentiments and future wars in the post-Soviet space?

Dear Oleg! I’m willing to agree that distance is inversely proportional to understanding what’s happening on Earth. But that formula isn’t universal, because I often encounter this argument—“You’re not in Ukraine, so how can you judge Ukrainian affairs? You’re not in Russia, so how can you judge Russia? You’re not in America…"—and so on. The conclusion becomes that no one on Earth can judge anything, because you can’t be everywhere at once. Even being in Ukraine—you might be in Kyiv, Poltava, or Lviv—and still be asked, “Do you see the whole of Ukraine?” In today’s world, information spreads in such a way that a serious, responsible analyst, even located anywhere on the planet, might possess more objective, accurate knowledge than someone “on the ground.”

As for the information you provided—about a Ukrainian MP’s wife earning rubles—it doesn’t refute what I’ve said. You claim that after the war, Ukrainians will go back to Russia for rubles as they did before. Let me once again try to explain my position. First, the situation has changed drastically. Before the war, or at least before 2014, and even more so before February 24, 2022, Ukraine was marked by a high level of identity fragmentation. There were at least three dominant identities: Ukrainian, Belarusian, and post-Soviet. And the balance did not favor Ukrainian identity. This is evident from many factors—including the fact that Putin was for a long time the most popular politician in Ukraine. When asked who they trusted most, the majority of Ukrainians named Putin. Russian TV channels dominated Ukrainian airwaves. That created a very different environment.

But after the occupation of Crimea and the start of the war in Donbas, especially since February 24, 2022, the situation changed radically. Yes, there are a few “Zhdanovs” (traitors), but they’re relatively few. The enormous difficulty the Russian occupation authorities have had finding a “Gauleiter” (collaborator) for the newly occupied territories like parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia proves that. There are not many traitors. So, who would go? The general attitude toward Russia among the vast majority of Ukrainians is extremely negative, and that won’t go away after the war.

Second, and even more importantly—we don’t know how the war will end. And we have no idea what condition Russia will be in. I repeat, you mention the possibility of Russia’s collapse—I talk about that constantly too. Regardless of whether Russia falls apart or not, it will be in very poor shape after the war. So going to Russia for rubles is not exactly a great idea, especially when Europe is an option. So I think your hypothesis is quite questionable.

Also, we don’t know what condition Ukraine will be in. But a Marshall Plan for Ukraine will happen—even if not American, since Trump won’t be around forever, then definitely European. It’s very possible that a situation will develop where Ukrainians can earn a living at home. Given today’s very narrow forecasting horizon, trying to predict the postwar situation is a bit irresponsible. But what can be said with confidence is that the kind of labor migration to Russia that existed before the war will not return—not in the same proportions. That much is a safe prediction.

Now, as for your final question—what must happen for all current residents of Russia to be “reborn” and for neighboring peoples to feel that Russians have atoned for their guilt? You used the term “reborn,” clearly referencing something akin to what happened with Germans after WWII. I don’t believe that process will happen in Russia. That process in Germany was possible because of occupation. Germany lost sovereignty for a time and was steered in a specific direction. Then came denazification—not very successful, but still, it took at least 30 years to uproot those Nazi attitudes.

Nothing like that will happen in Russia. Just nothing like it. So I don’t think this “rebirth” you mentioned is going to happen. In the event of a Russian collapse, the imperial syndrome might disappear—more as a phantom pain than a dominant sentiment. That’s the best-case scenario. Then, in some regions, things might evolve in a more positive direction—even in the way you’re describing.

But if Russia remains within its current borders, there will be no rebirth. That, to me, is completely obvious.

Should Ukraine Give Up on Joining NATO Link to heading

Yevgeny Rubio:
Don’t you think it would be reasonable for Ukraine to voluntarily and officially give up on joining NATO, considering the organization’s decay, inefficiency, lack of historical perspective, and current revival?

You know, I think, first of all, this is entirely Ukraine’s internal matter. I generally try to comment on such issues as little as possible, but in this case, I can allow myself to say that I don’t believe Ukraine should give up on joining NATO—at least not until an alternative is created. Again, with Trumpism dominating in the U.S., forecasting becomes very limited here, because we don’t know—if Trump, for example, fulfills his dream of pulling the U.S. out of NATO, which is unlikely given Congress, but still, if it happens, then an alternative will arise. And that alternative is already taking shape—some kind of European military union. And if such an alternative appears, then it would make sense to step away from NATO. But for now, there’s no point. Kosovo is a messy case, but NATO remains a military alliance with standards and rules. And I still think giving up on NATO would be unwise. There must be an alternative. If one emerges, then it would be time to consider withdrawing.

The Author Does Not Comment on Ukrainian Politicians and Journalists Link to heading

Master Orban:
I’m curious about your opinion on Dmytro, Dmytro Kerchensky, and Yuriy Butusov. Since you don’t invite either of them to debate, could you please share what you think about them, dear colleague?

I want to remind everyone of my personal rule of refraining from commenting on Ukrainian politics, Ukrainian politicians, and Ukrainian journalists. I only make exceptions for those who have openly sided with Russia—in other words, for traitors such as Shariy and others. I also include Arestovych in this category. For them, I make an exception. But I do not comment on or evaluate Ukrainian politicians. Of course, I have thoughts, of course I follow what’s happening, but I reserve commentary on Ukrainian politicians and journalists until after the war. For now, as a citizen of the aggressor country, it’s simply not appropriate.

How Can Trump Expect His Terms to Be Accepted Link to heading

Olga Demidova:
Igor, it turns out the London meeting is pointless. Trump can’t seriously expect Ukraine to accept even one of his proposals. Why would we agree? Everywhere it’s been stated—nothing will be given up, these are our red lines. And now suddenly we’re supposed to reconsider and agree? By the way, what do we get in return?

I agree, and I must have mistakenly taken your comment as a question. I fully agree with what you’ve said, dear Olga.

Should the Editor-in-Chief Verify the Truthfulness of Advertisements Link to heading

A question from Gena Dugin:
How should newspaper editors verify the truthfulness of advertisements?

Newspaper editors are not required to verify the truthfulness of advertisements. There is a law on advertising, and editors must ensure compliance with that law. This is a big topic that could take hours to fully discuss, but I’ll try to summarize it briefly. The advertising law contains many restrictions on the types of products and services that can be advertised. For example, with certain limitations and exceptions, it’s forbidden to advertise chemical weapons, combat weapons (except in specialized publications), or narcotics.

In addition, advertising must not violate fair competition rules. There are many restrictions—this law contains dozens of them—and that’s what editors must monitor. That’s it. As for truthfulness, the editor is not responsible. They’re not required to personally buy each product or test each service advertised to confirm whether, say, the clothing is actually stylish or the shoes are comfortable. The editor doesn’t have to try on every pair of shoes featured in the publication. What they must do is ensure that the ad complies with the advertising law. That’s what matters.

Arestovych and Trump’s Son Link to heading

Irina Kalchenko:
Yesterday I watched an interview of Arestovych with Feldman. I learned that Arestovych has access to Trump’s family through Trump’s son. Of course, it’s clear that someone as insignificant as Arestovych can’t influence U.S. policy. Igor Aleksandrovich, what’s your opinion?

Well, this is one of those cases where I can allow myself to comment on something related to a Ukrainian politician or journalist. Arestovych—he’s a Khlestakov, what can I say? A Khlestakov with 35,000 different couriers.

Why Can’t Crimea Be Recognized as Neutral Territory Link to heading

Oksana Samarina:
Why can’t Crimea be recognized as neutral territory for now—essentially freezing the decision on Crimea? Europe does not recognize Crimea as Russian.

Dear Oksana! I believe that any concession to the aggressor in this case is a step toward dismantling the international consensus, the rules, norms, and laws of international law that were established after World War II. You cannot use force to seize someone else’s territory. You cannot take what doesn’t belong to you. Internationally recognized borders are inviolable. Crimea, under international law, is Ukrainian. Period. Any attempt to change that—to recognize Crimea as Russian, Turkish, American, or neutral—is a violation of international law. Period. I think this is quite straightforward.

Why Are Conditions Imposed Only on Ukraine Link to heading

Sofiya:
Thank you for your kind words, Sofiya. And your question:
Why are Trump and Putin, in proposing a ceasefire along the front line, setting conditions that infringe on Ukraine’s interests, while Ukraine is offering a temporary ceasefire without preconditions? Can someone ask this question?

To Trump? Well, the reason is clear—because Trump is playing on Putin’s side in these negotiations. That’s obvious. And who could ask Trump this question? Journalists, probably. After all, there is still an independent press in the United States. Yes, it’s under pressure, shrinking, and facing all kinds of issues. We’ve just talked about the flood of fake news. But even so, journalists still exist, and they can ask this question to Trump. And that’s the vital and meaningful role of journalism—even under the most difficult conditions.

Today we’ll be speaking with Roman Tsymbalyuk. And if anyone knows how to push through the cracks and ask the tough questions, it’s Roman. When he was accredited in Russia, he knew how to break through the asphalt, so to speak, and ask Putin questions that left him visibly uncomfortable.

Should We Talk to Children About Politics Link to heading

So, Erik Anus. A very long lead-up to the question. Well, let me read it:
Help me understand. After the divorce, my two sons moved to the U.S. with their mother. They were 10 and 5 at the time. I stayed in touch with them. Recently, I also moved to the U.S. and visited my sons. They are now 21 and 16. In the younger son’s room, there’s a Bible with certain verses highlighted—statements like “I believe only in myself.” So I assume we don’t share a common worldview, at least not yet. When I talk to my sons about politics, my ex-wife intervened and strictly forbade any political discussions. I used to tell them about Putin, about the fascist nature of today’s Russia—long before the U.S. elections. I told them that Trump is evil on a cosmic scale. I believe political topics must be discussed within the family, and children should learn critical thinking and understand cause and effect. My older son is interested in politics; the younger one is not. The question is: Should we talk to children about politics? At what age? Or avoid political discussions altogether?

You know, I’m absolutely convinced that you should talk to children about everything. Just everything. Of course, there are certain limits that arise from specific life situations. But the fact that your children live in the United States removes the issue of conflict with the surrounding environment. In Russia, that’s a real issue. Still, I believe that even in Russia, you should talk to kids about politics. Of course, you shouldn’t force it—if a child says clearly, “I’m not interested,” then fine, don’t push. But in general, yes, you should absolutely talk to children about politics, just like you talk to them about everything else. I think you’re right. And from what you’ve said, your ex-wife is not. So there.

Closing Remarks Link to heading

Dear friends, that’s all for today—our morning broadcast is coming to an end. A reminder: at 19:00 we’ll be joined by Roman Tsymbalyuk. I believe it will be an interesting conversation. Glory to Ukraine! Take care of yourselves! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives. See you at 19:00.

Source: https://youtu.be/F2E4J0sT3U0