Trump has challenged the entire world. So far, only China has picked up the gauntlet. Who will be able to accept this challenge in Europe and in the USA itself?
Main Topic Link to heading
Good morning, dear friends! My name is Igor Yakovenko. Today is April 8th, and it’s 7:40 AM in Kyiv. And we continue our morning reflection on what is happening in Russia, in the world, and in our souls.
Trump Has Challenged the Entire World Link to heading
So, the central event, the central process unfolding in the world, is that Trump has challenged the entire world. So far, only China has picked up the gauntlet. The question arises—if we consider that there are currently three economic and geopolitical centers in the world: the United States of America, China, and Europe—who will be able to accept this challenge in Europe and in the United States itself?
As for China: yesterday, Trump twice threatened China with new gigantic tariffs, stating that he intends to add another 50% to the already announced 54% tariffs on Chinese imports. He declared that if China does not cancel its decision to respond to the tariffs, then the total tariffs on Chinese goods will amount to 104%. In effect, this is a ban—essentially, a ban on trade with China. A complete ban.
In response, China’s Ministry of Commerce stated that China will not succumb to blackmail and will fight the tariffs to the end. So, in fact, what we’re seeing is a head-on collision—literally head-on. It’s a deadly game of chicken, like in those car races where two vehicles speed toward each other to see who swerves first—and it seems that neither side intends to swerve. China has clearly decided to seriously confront the United States.
So, against this backdrop, before we move on to the question of what is happening within the United States itself and in Europe…
Putin Signed a Treaty with Iran Link to heading
A small detail—against the backdrop of the total chaos stirred up by Trump, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is brewing his own little soup on this bonfire. He not only has no intention of stopping the war, but is also, so to speak, continuing to strengthen the axis of confrontation with the United States of America. In particular, today, April 8th, the State Duma has placed on its agenda the ratification of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and Iran. This document was previously signed by the two presidents. And today? Today it will be ratified.
This ratification is taking place against the background of threats of bombing Iran from the United States, from Trump. What is this treaty about? Something similar was signed last year with North Korea. But there is a significant difference—in the treaty with North Korea, it is essentially a military alliance, since the parties directly pledged to provide immediate military and other assistance in the event of an attack on either country. That treaty already had a clear practical implementation: 12,000 North Korean soldiers participated in the war against Ukraine, and after 4,000 North Korean troops had fallen in Ukrainian black soil, Kim Jong-un sent another 3,000. So that treaty has a rather stable character. Plus, there is also the supply of weapons. It is, in fact, a solid military alliance.
With Iran, the parties will not go that far. It is clear that this treaty does not include any provisions for mutual assistance in case of military aggression. In other words, Moscow will not go to war with America over Tehran. This is not a military alliance, unlike the treaty between Russia and North Korea. Nevertheless, it is clearly a challenge to the United States, because, despite not being a military alliance, there is some form of mutual assistance. Iran continues to supply weapons to Russia, and Russia, in turn—although this is not reliably confirmed—possibly helps Iran with its nuclear program. So, to some extent, Russia is acting here as a counterpart to the U.S., despite all of Trump’s efforts to somehow forge an alliance with Russia.
California’s Stand Against Tariffs Link to heading
Now let’s return to the question of who in Europe and the USA will raise the banner of an anti-Trumpist uprising. I phrase it this way deliberately, because what’s really needed here is a turning point—a turning point in the mood of loyalty toward Trump and his expansionist agenda, a mood that currently prevails both in the United States of America and in Europe.
So, let’s start with the United States itself. I believe that the only serious act of resistance we’ve seen so far is not some speeches in the U.S. Congress or shifts within the Republican Party—though those are important. But I don’t think these movements in Congress or in civil society can amount to any decisive radical opposition to Trump. The main center of resistance, the key stronghold against the destruction of the American state and the ruinous economic doctrine that Trump is pushing, I think, is the states themselves—primarily the largest and most economically powerful one: California.
Here, I see the statement by California Governor Gavin Newsom as very important and significant. He announced that his state will independently develop strategic relations with foreign countries and will continue trade partnerships in defiance of Trump’s policies. If those countries respond with mirror measures to the customs and tariff madness initiated by Trump, the governor said he is ready to offer them exemptions for goods produced in California. That is, in principle, possible—there’s a real possibility of concluding such agreements. As far as I understand, the sovereignty of U.S. states allows for such flexibility.
This is a course of direct noncompliance—in essence, a rebellion by the state against Trump’s tyranny. And California has a strong tradition of sovereignty. There are constant rumors about California’s potential secession from the United States. And in fact, the state’s economic—and not only economic but also intellectual—potential allows it to maintain such an independent stance. As is well known, in terms of economic power, California ranks as the fifth-largest economy in the world. Its gross domestic product is about 50% larger than that of the next largest state, Texas. California annually contributes about $90 billion to the federal budget. That’s a major deal.
Moreover, 32 of the 50 leading global centers working with artificial intelligence are located in California. So, it’s clear what California represents. And therefore, when Trump declared a trade war on the entire world, it was only logical that the governor of California would rise up and declare that he would not comply with this madness.
In addition, Trump’s policies would harm California’s economy significantly more than other states, because its main trading partners are China, Canada, and Mexico. This would seriously lower the standard of living in California itself. So, everything here is fairly logical and understandable. Especially since next year, in 2026, Gavin Newsom is stepping down from his post and clearly aiming to run in the 2028 presidential elections. He’s 57 years old, which by today’s standards for presidential candidates, makes him a relatively young man.
So, everything seems to be falling into place. I think that if this uprising against Trump’s insane policies is supported by other governors from other states, it could truly become serious, serious resistance. At the very least, the first one has already stepped forward.
Europe Is Opposed, but No One to Raise the Banner Link to heading
Now to the question of Europe. I don’t know to what extent a banner of an anti-Trumpist uprising—which would inevitably lead to broader anti-American sentiment—can be raised in Europe today. The idea is that someone in Europe should raise a banner that says, “Make Europe Great Again.” But again—who? Who can realistically raise that banner?
Historically speaking, the strongest traditions of anti-American sentiment have existed in France—the famous legacy of de Gaulle, who was known for exactly that, and whose place in history is partly defined by it. At present, Macron is trying to pick up de Gaulle’s banner, but so far, not very convincingly. Still, the fight against Trumpism in Europe has been relatively successful. Despite efforts by Elon Musk and Trump himself to push Trumpism into Europe, which gained some traction, it has now been halted.
Take France, for example: the main threat of a rightward shift has been neutralized—at least for the time being. Le Pen has been pushed out of the political spotlight. As for what’s happening in Hungary—well, let’s be honest, Hungary is not the main country in Europe. Nevertheless, that Trumpist Trojan horse present in Europe will also likely be disabled in the foreseeable future. Anti-Orbán protests will probably, at some point, lead to Orbán stepping down. At least, the chances of that are fairly high.
Now, from my point of view, the most likely candidate to lead this anti-Trumpist uprising—to raise the banner and proclaim the slogan (in whatever terms) “Make Europe Great Again”—is Germany. Germany is, of course, the most economically powerful country in Europe, and it is currently suffering significantly from Trump’s high tariffs. If those tariffs are not lifted, German exports to the United States could fall by at least 15% in the near future. Germany will soon have a new government, a new chancellor. And that chancellor—again, I’m no expert in Germany’s domestic politics—but the potential for leading an anti-Trumpist uprising undoubtedly exists.
Granted, my statements here are more speculative than in the previous segment about California, where everything has already more or less taken shape. There, the anti-Trumpist uprising has essentially already begun—the governor of California has effectively raised the banner. In Germany, it’s harder to say, because the political approach there is very cautious. At least for now, the people currently shaping Germany’s policies are not inclined to confront Trump. But we’ll see—this should become clear in the near future.
I believe that without this kind of large-scale anti-Trumpist uprising in response to Trump’s madness, the problem will not be resolved, and the situation in Ukraine will not improve significantly. Because Trump’s policy is obvious: it is a policy of alliance with Russia, a policy of indulging Russia.
Russia, Belarus, and Cuba Didn’t Receive Tariffs from Trump Link to heading
Here’s a small detail to further support my reflections. The point is that this insane tariff policy, under which 186 countries came under tariff pressure, included exceptions for only a few nations—namely, Cuba, Belarus, and Russia, with Russia being the largest country spared from this tariff assault. The explanation for this was quite absurd: that negotiations are ongoing with Russia. Excuse me, but then the question arises—aren’t there negotiations with Ukraine as well? Talks are being held simultaneously with both participants in the war: Russia and Ukraine. Yet, for some reason, Ukraine appears on that infamous list, in that infamous chart—tariffs were imposed on Ukraine, a base tariff was applied, while Russia is absent from the list.
It’s absolutely clear whose side he’s on. There’s no need to guess—everything is written right there in the chart that Trump brandished when he declared April 2nd his so-called “Day of America’s Liberation.” Everything was made clear. That’s why I think, to some extent, whether this anti-Trumpist uprising in Europe and in the United States will take place under such banners—and who will lead it—remains a big question.
Nevertheless, I believe all of this benefits Ukraine, because it is obvious that today Trump is clearly playing on Putin’s side, clearly on Russia’s side, despite all his harsh and angry rhetoric aimed at Putin. In the end, Trump’s words don’t matter—his actions do. And his actions clearly show whose side he’s on. At least, that’s how I see the current situation—with this global trade war and the way this war is turning out for Ukraine.
Answers to Questions Link to heading
Before moving on to answering your questions, I want to say that today at 8:00 PM we have a long-awaited guest—Mikhail Pavlovich Sheitelman. I think the conversation will be interesting. As always, he has his own perspective and expert assessment of current events. It will be very interesting to hear from him. And now I’ll move on to answering your questions.
Did Stalin Kill Lenin Link to heading
So, Vladimir Viktorovich, here’s the question:
Today you said something unexpected to me—that Stalin not only destroyed the so-called Leninist Guard, but also killed Lenin himself. Is that not a mistake? Are there any facts supporting such a claim?
You know, when we talk about Lenin’s death, the main, widely accepted version is that he died of illness. Since all archival materials about Lenin’s death were only declassified last year, in reality, no version has a solid evidence base. However, there is one version that seems quite logical to me—not a conspiracy theory, but a logical one, supported by a number of experts: that Stalin did, in fact, poison Lenin.
This is supported by memoirs of several people close to both Lenin and Stalin. The hypothesis suggests that Genrikh Yagoda, who was a pharmacist before the revolution and had access to a collection of poisons, was involved in the poisoning. For example, I came across the memoirs of Stalin’s secretary, Georgy Kanner, who recounted that on January 20, 1924—a day before Lenin’s death—he saw Yagoda, accompanied by two doctors (one of whom was the Lenin family’s personal physician), enter Stalin’s office. Stalin then ordered them to go to Lenin. After that, Kanner overheard Stalin telling Yagoda that Lenin would soon have a seizure, as all the symptoms were present.
Trotsky also wrote in his memoirs that he blamed Stalin for Lenin’s death, claiming that Lenin had been given poison under the guise of medicine. The fact is, Stalin had a clear interest in Lenin’s death—Lenin had written a letter to the Party Congress demanding Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary. That famous letter. For a long time, Stalin tried to isolate Lenin. This is well documented, including the fact that Pravda was printed in a single copy specially for Lenin to cut off his access to the outside world. That story is well known.
There are a number of other pieces of evidence as well. Again, I’m not claiming with certainty that this is the only true version, but it certainly has the right to exist. Let’s look at a few key factors:
Did Stalin have a motive? Of course—absolutely. A living Lenin was an obstacle to Stalin’s total power. That’s obvious, given Lenin’s authority within the party and his clear desire to prevent Stalin from becoming all-powerful.
Did Stalin have the means? Again, yes—clearly.
Is that enough to consider this version proven? No, definitely not. But it at least deserves to be considered. Especially given that there are testimonies—whether reliable or not, I can’t say—but there are grounds to treat this version as plausible.
On Lev Gumilev Link to heading
A question from a subscriber under the name VZGLYAD:
What is your opinion of Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev?
Risking the wrath of Gumilev’s fans, I’ll say that I see him as a talented publicist. But I believe—no, I’m convinced—that his main theories, Eurasianism, passionarity, and especially his Soviet-era concept of the passionary theory of ethnogenesis, lie outside the bounds of science, history, anthropology, and historiography. Not to mention that his very concept essentially ends up justifying all the villains of world history. Because if the passionary activity of Hitler, Napoleon, Genghis Khan, or Putin today is caused by biological mutations, then everything’s fine—they were just following natural laws. So how can Hitler be guilty if everything was the result of some mutations that triggered this passionary explosion?
Gumilev’s ideas, including Eurasianism, without a doubt became one of the foundations of brownshirt ideology. For example, Alexander Dugin—one of the self-proclaimed founders of Russian fascism—is a Eurasianist. Eurasianism as a whole is a brown ideology. And Gumilev, as one of its prominent figures, clearly leans in that direction.
The very idea that passionarity results from cosmic radiation is bizarre. It’s completely unclear why cosmic radiation would selectively lead to mutations that produce an explosion of inner energy—why wouldn’t it cause mass deformities instead? Why would this radiation, which supposedly blankets the entire planet, only fall on certain countries and not others? Does space have a political agenda? Is it intelligent? It all seems pretty absurd to me.
On top of that, Gumilev invented a special kind of geo-biochemical energy of living matter, which cannot be detected by any natural scientific method. So overall, I would say this is something like folk history—somewhat reminiscent of the theories of academician Fomenko or Medinsky. Unsurprisingly, Putin is a big fan of Gumilev. I remember well his admiration for the passionarity theory. He said he believed in it and actively supports it, claiming that Russia and Russians are a young nation on the rise. Putin draws on Gumilev’s theory to argue that Russia has a high chance of leaping ahead.
So in short, my opinion is that Gumilev’s theory is unscientific, pseudo-scientific, and ultimately underpins imperial and essentially fascist ideology. That said, this does not negate Gumilev’s talent—he presented his ideas in a powerful and compelling literary style, which ensured his massive popularity. We all know the kind of print runs his books had, both in the USSR and abroad. It happens.
On Mikhail Khodorkovsky Link to heading
A question from Nadezhda—Kotik from Kryvyi Rih. Nadezhda is a sponsor of our channel, for which we are very grateful. She writes:
I’d like to know your opinion of Mikhail Khodorkovsky. I watched his first interview after his release—given to Yevgenia Albats—and I was horrified. Khodorkovsky clearly said that under no circumstances should territories conquered by Russia be returned to indigenous peoples. He said, “This is our land now, we conquered it.” If the choice is between returning it peacefully or fighting, he said he would fight. He mentioned the Caucasus and Yakutia as dangerous regions. So in his worldview, Putin is right to wage war in Chechnya and Ukraine.
Well, dear Nadezhda, let me say right away—not trying to act as Khodorkovsky’s advocate—that when it comes to Ukraine, Khodorkovsky definitely holds an anti-war position. He firmly supports Ukraine on this. There’s no question about that. So in that part of your preamble, you’re simply mistaken.
Now I continue quoting from Nadezhda Kotik’s question:
He explains the peaceful breakup of Czechoslovakia by the high cultural level of its people, yet he himself is ready to fight. So his own cultural level is lower than that of the Czechs and Slovaks. He admits himself that I follow the news from Khodorkovsky’s channel—now I don’t know if I should continue. What is your opinion? Please answer, if it’s not too much trouble.
Dear Nadezhda, to be honest, I still don’t fully understand what that was. That interview with Yevgenia Albats, given right after his release—it broke so drastically from the overall image of Khodorkovsky that I truly don’t know what it was. It shook me to my core. I mean, I can’t say I know Mikhail Borisovich well—I’ve met him only twice personally. Later we had some interaction on Facebook, when he used to comment there. At the time I was still writing, not just speaking—those were the good old days when I had the chance to write.
And yes, that interview stunned me, because it was a completely different person. I don’t recall any similar imperialist statements from him since. I don’t know. I’ve never heard him express regret over that interview or that position. It would, of course, be good to ask him directly: is he still ready to fight for the Caucasus? And if so, why would he fight for the Caucasus but not for Crimea, for example? That’s a question, you see. It all seems quite strange.
So I don’t know—there’s a kind of gaping hole in my understanding here. This just doesn’t align with the person I thought I knew. Because overall, even though I don’t always agree with Khodorkovsky’s current positions, and there’s a significant divergence between his views and those of the Free Russia Forum (which I generally support), well… that’s how it is.
At the same time, he doesn’t belong to that “party of native blood”—the likes of Shlosberg, Yavlinsky, or, say, Svetlana Latynina. He’s in a different camp altogether. But in general, I’d say his position is internally contradictory.
Why Nuclear Weapons Are Seen as a Guarantee of Security. Is a Preemptive Strike on Iran Necessary? Link to heading
Aleksei Kabanov:
Two questions not directly related to the stream, but ones that often come up in our shared reflections. I’d like to hear your opinion and reasoning. First, why is it considered that a country’s possession of nuclear weapons is some kind of guarantee of security? Israel has them, and yet is constantly subjected to barbaric attacks. India and Pakistan both have them, but that doesn’t stop them from periodically clashing. And most importantly—say today it turns out Ukraine has nuclear weapons—what difference would that make to how or when the war ends? Second, why is there a tacit consensus that the upcoming U.S. decision to strike Iran with missiles, just because Iran refuses to agree to a nuclear deal, is somehow right and just? Yes, we don’t like Iran. Yes, it’s part of the “Axis of Evil.” But why is the whole world—not just Israel—watching the prospective strike with barely concealed approval?
Well, these are two very different questions, dear Aleksei.
On the first one: possessing nuclear weapons is certainly no guarantee, but it is a very substantial deterrent against the intentions of a powerful state that might decide to resolve some kind of national or sovereignty issue by force. I think the intention to “finally resolve” the Ukrainian question, for instance—if Ukraine had nuclear weapons—would never have arisen. Because nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent. I’m not sure they would have prevented the invasion altogether, but rattling nuclear sabers at a country that actually has them—sure, on Solovyov’s show that might still happen, but it wouldn’t be official state policy.
So as a deterrent, nuclear weapons do work. Against terrorism, no—nuclear weapons didn’t save the U.S. from the 2001 terrorist attack. It’s clear that nukes don’t protect against terrorists. And Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons doesn’t stop attacks from Hamas, Hezbollah, or other terrorist organizations. But they do deter attacks from a state like Iran. A nuclear counterstrike against Iranian aggression is a serious threat—and that threat is what prevents a direct Iranian assault on Israel. Iran may act through proxies, but not directly as a state with a substantial military force.
Again: nuclear weapons don’t protect against terrorism—but they do protect against attacks by large states. That’s the key point in response to your first question.
As for your second question: Iran is still a state with terrorist leanings. Its support for terrorist proxies is proof of that. Creating a situation in which Iran gains nuclear weapons—and then could potentially pass them on to anyone, including those same terrorist groups—is extremely dangerous. Iran has its proxies: the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas. Now imagine Iran has nuclear weapons. What’s the guarantee that Iran wouldn’t hand over tactical nuclear arms to, say, the Yemeni Houthis? Do you want to live in a world where the Houthis have nukes? I don’t.
That’s why I support this effort—by the United States—to prevent that. Whether it will be effective or not—I don’t know. We’ll see.
On Alexander Shtefanov Link to heading
A question from Sergey:
Have you heard of the young blogger Alexander Shtefanov? I’m curious about your opinion—how accurate is he as a historian? He’s definitely an engaging storyteller when it comes to history, but how truthful are his accounts?
Dear Sergey, I’m not familiar with Alexander Shtefanov’s historical content. I’ve come across him in the context of debates he’s hosted, but I’ve never engaged with his historical research—never listened to it, never looked into it—so I don’t have an informed opinion on that.
As for his political stance, that definitely raises some concerns. For example, he opposes the return of Crimea to Ukraine—not on the grounds of it being unfeasible now, but in principle. He’s also against reparations to Ukraine. He’s not as overtly pro-Putin as someone like Svitov, but he’s in that general direction—just slightly toned down. That, of course, makes me approach him with skepticism, at least in his role as a political figure. And he does present himself as a political blogger.
As for his role as a public educator or popular historian—I’ve heard of it, but I haven’t had the chance (or, frankly, much interest) to explore it. But as a political blogger, my view is fairly skeptical.
On Conspiracy Theories Link to heading
A question from Oleg:
Tell me, Mr. Yakovenko, have there ever been moments in your life when some extreme conspiracy theory floating around in the information space eventually turned out to be such an obvious fact that you felt awkward about your initial skepticism? Or does conspiracy theory always remain just a product for consumption by the uneducated?
You know, when I was going through all the questions today, I tried to think back—and I can’t recall any such case. You see, Oleg mentions the Ryazan sugar incident from my life experience as an example. But I don’t consider the Ryazan sugar case to be a conspiracy theory. These were facts that were made public. It was known that the FSB had stored explosives in one of the buildings. That was known. There was no conspiracy theory there—just objective reporting. There was no secret society or anything of the kind. These were fully verifiable facts, not a conspiracy theory.
So to answer your question: no, I haven’t had that kind of experience. Yes, I’ve been wrong about things—no doubt there are areas where I’ve made mistakes. But it was never a case where some theory involving hidden elites or a shadow government running the world later turned out to be true. I’ve never come to believe in anything of that kind, because I’m convinced those things simply don’t exist.
So I still view conspiracy theory as the result of a flawed worldview—one that stems from fear of the unknown. And no, I haven’t had such an episode in my life.
On Valery Solovey Link to heading
Van Si asks:
Does Professor Solovey really believe there are so many feeble-minded people in Russia that he can feed them all that nonsense he talks about? He even put Putin in a “freezer,” just because people kept pestering him with “when will it happen?” None of what he’s predicted has come true—aside from the obvious things already floating in the info space. And yet some people are still signing up for his paid lectures. I’m convinced Solovey is doing this deliberately, running a social experiment to induce stupidity. And judging by the glowing comments, it’s working.
You know, dear colleague, I think that, like all forms of populism, Solovey fits squarely into the category of both conspiracy theory and populist narrative. It’s based on the idea that people are drawn to simple answers for complex questions. People want to hear versions of reality that comfort them, that align with their hopes. They want to hear from a blogger or political figure exactly what they want to believe.
They want to believe Putin is dead? No problem—Solovey serves them up that information dish: “Putin is dead.” They want to believe that Trump is about to end the war? Fine—Trumpists offer up a narrative that Trump will soon bring peace. That’s populism.
I think Solovey is simply a talented mystifier working within the populist domain—and it’s working for him. What else can I say?
On Military Analysts Link to heading
Viktor Makarov:
We have no objection to Mr. Hrabski. But why haven’t there been any streams with military analysts and practitioners like Mr. Cherniak or Colonel Svitan? Or do they not understand military affairs at all? Surely a former secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists knows that information must be presented from at least three independent sources? By the way, the same principle applies in any intelligence work—whether tactical, operational, operational-strategic, strategic, legal or illegal.
Dear Viktor! The thing is, I agree that it would indeed be good to feature some alternative perspectives on military expertise on our channel. But first of all, let me clarify—it’s not the case that we don’t have them.
Currently, we regularly have military expert Fedorov on the channel, whom I find very, very valuable. Alongside him is Serhiy Maratovych Hrabski, who appears every week to analyze developments on the front. Fedorov appears from time to time, and his views sometimes differ. And beyond him, we’ve also featured several Israeli military experts. So yes, we do offer multiple viewpoints.
As for Colonel Svitan, he was on our channel regularly for many months. But later, his openly antisemitic remarks led me to ask him about them directly. We had a respectful but frank exchange on the channel. Afterward, Roman Hryhorovych sent a note to the editor of our channel requesting not to be invited anymore. There was no quarrel, no scandal—but by mutual understanding, we parted ways.
I simply do not believe that someone with openly antisemitic views should have a platform on our channel. That’s a stance I’m not going to abandon. So, Roman Hryhorovych will not be returning—but everyone else is welcome, and yes, we do have a plurality of viewpoints and information sources.
On a Personalist Regime and the Possible Collapse of Russia Link to heading
Tanya—who is a sponsor of our channel, for which we’re very grateful—asks:
A question about the nature of the regime and Portnikov’s opinion. If those who come after Putin end the war, what will they do with those returning from the war with weapons? Will they build new camps and imprison everyone?
Of course not. Dear Tanya, of course they won’t imprison everyone—especially since we’re talking about hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people. This is a very important question. And I believe that ending the war will, with high probability, lead to the collapse of Russia. Those returning from the war will be participants in that collapse. There may be localized clashes in which returning soldiers will be involved. Or it could escalate into a large and serious war on Russian territory, in which these very same former soldiers take part.
So I think the process of disintegration will move very rapidly. And the war participants—the occupiers returning from the front—will take part in the division of Russia, serving as cannon fodder in the process. I think the likelihood of that is quite high. As for the idea that they’ll all be imprisoned—no, that’s not going to happen.
Request to Post Skobov’s Letters on Facebook Link to heading
A question from Tifa:
Could you post Skobov’s letters somewhere else, like on Facebook or here on the channel? I don’t have access to the Telegram post.
Dear colleague, I’m a bit surprised that someone doesn’t have access to Telegram, but I understand—and I’ll take that into account. I’ll try to post the prison notebooks that have already been released, and I’ll do my best to share them wherever possible, including today if I can.
On Possible Agreements Between Russia and Ukraine – Not Striking Decision-Making Centers Link to heading
A question from a subscriber with the nickname “Real Estate”:
This question is really for a military expert, but since I don’t have one on hand, I’ll try to answer it. There’s an opinion that there is allegedly an agreement between Russia and Ukraine not to strike decision-making centers—government buildings where the leaders of the states work—even though both sides have the weaponry to do so. For example, expert Savostyanov voiced this idea in a Kiselyov film. In my view, this is incorrect. Knowing Putin’s character, it’s safe to say he would strike exactly where Zelensky is, given the chance. Only the inaccuracy of Russian weapons, combined with Ukrainian air defense, prevents this.
You know, dear colleague, in this case—as usual, when you cite an expert I haven’t heard myself—I’m not trying to question Savostyanov’s opinion, but I’ll share my view on the idea itself: that such an agreement exists. I don’t know whether it does. Perhaps this question really should be addressed to a military expert or someone knowledgeable in intelligence operations. But I’m not at all convinced such an agreement exists.
Moreover, even if it does, given Putin’s nature, I am 100% certain that such an agreement would not be any kind of guarantee that it would be respected. And the deep distrust that exists between the military-political leaderships of Russia and Ukraine makes it hard for me to take such agreements seriously—if they exist at all.
Closing Remarks Link to heading
Dear friends, this concludes our morning discussion for today. I’d like to remind you once again that at 8:00 PM we’ll be joined by Mikhail Pavlovich Sheitelman. I, for one, will be listening to his views on current issues with great interest. Take care of yourselves. Glory to Ukraine! Freedom to Alexander Skobov, to Russian political prisoners, and to Ukrainian captives! See you at 8:00 PM!
Source: https://youtu.be/Pr-drCwWgtw